Brown v. State (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Brown v. State of Mississippi
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Mississippi (MS)
Court
Mississippi Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Pé (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 670733Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASEDFOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENTLAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT ISSUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.Court of Appeals of Mississippi.EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWNA/K/A EDWIN TERREL BROWN APPELLANTv.STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEENO. 2024-KA-00489-COA|DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/24/2024|DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 03/10/2026TRIAL JUDGE: HON. MARGARET CAREY-McCRAYCOURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SUNFLOWERCOUNTY CIRCUIT COURTNATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONYAttorneys and Law FirmsATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: MERRIDA COXWELLCHARLES RICHARD MULLINS COURTNEY DENISESANDERS MADELINE BEARDATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THEATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELANDBYRDDISTRICT ATTORNEY: WILLIE DEWAYNERICHARDSONEN BANC.OpinionCARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:*1 ¶1. Edwin Brown was convicted of capital murderand armed robbery in the Sunflower County Circuit Court.For his capital murder conviction, the trial court sentencedBrown to life imprisonment in the custody of the MississippiDepartment of Corrections (MDOC) without eligibility forparole or probation. For his armed robbery conviction, thetrial court sentenced Brown to ten years in the MDOC'scustody, with five years suspended on the condition ofcompleting five years of post-release supervision. The trialcourt ordered Brown's sentence for armed robbery to runconsecutively to his sentence for capital murder. Brown nowappeals his convictions and sentences.¶2. On appeal, Brown asserts the following assignments oferror: (1) his due process right to a fair trial was violatedwhen the trial court denied his motion for a mistrial ordismissal; (2) the trial court erred in admitting testimonyregarding a firearm; (3) the trial court erred in admittingevidence of Brown's other crimes; (4) the trial court erredin admitting into evidence the confession of Brown's co-defendant Derrion Eloby; and (5) the jury's verdict wascontrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.¶3. After our review, we find no error. We therefore affirmBrown's convictions and sentences.FACTS¶4. On August 10, 2012, Merio Harris and his roommateNathan Williams were robbed in their home in Drew,Mississippi. During the course of the robbery, Williams wasshot and killed.¶5. Harris testified that on the evening of the shooting, he andWilliams were selling marijuana from their house, after whichthey retired to their individual bedrooms, and Harris begancounting his money. At approximately 10:30 or 11:00 p.m.,two men wearing ski masks and carrying firearms enteredHarris's bedroom. Harris testified that he did not know themen and could not see their faces because they wore masks.One man pointed a gun at Harris and told him to “give it upand lay down,” referring to the money Harris was counting.Harris complied. Several minutes later, Harris heard a gunshotin another part of the house. He got up, walked to the hallway,and discovered Williams lying on the floor. Harris called 911and then drove Williams to the hospital. Williams eventuallydied from his injuries.¶6. Chief Deputy Marvin Flowers of the Sunflower CountySheriff's Department investigated the robbery and murder.During his investigation, Chief Deputy Flowers spoke withHarris, as well as Brian Hannon, Sophia Sharkey, and CartishaBanks. Banks testified that on the night of the incident, she,
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Sharkey, and Hannon rode in Sharkey's truck to Harris andWilliams's house to purchase marijuana. They pulled up to thehouse, and Hannon exited the vehicle. Banks testified that asHannon approached the door to the house, three men “withmasks and guns” came out the door and went to the backof the house. Hannon then entered the house, and Sharkeypulled her truck out of the driveway to follow the three menwith guns. Sharkey and Banks proceeded to follow the men,and they observed the men get into a dark-colored truck.Sharkey, Banks, and Hannon then followed behind Harrisas he drove Williams to the hospital. While driving to thehospital, Sharkey announced that she had spotted the maskedmen's vehicle. Sharkey called the police and provided the tagnumber of the vehicle.*2 ¶7. Harris testified that a day after the shooting, hefound a shell casing in his bedroom. Harris alerted thesheriff's department, and Harris testified that someone fromthe sheriff's department came to his house and collected theshell casing. At trial, Chief Deputy Flowers denied that a shellcasing was recovered from Harris's home.¶8. The case eventually went cold until 2013, whenInvestigator Bill Staten from the Leflore County Sheriff'sDepartment contacted Chief Deputy Flowers and informedhim that he had detained someone with information related tothe case. Chief Deputy Flowers went to the Leflore CountySheriff's Department and spoke with Davontay Brown. Afterspeaking with him, Chief Deputy Flowers searched DavontayBrown's cell phone and Facebook page. Based on informationhe gleaned from these searches, Chief Deputy Flowersobtained a warrant for Brown, Jabrandon Green, DerrionEloby, and Carlos Jones.¶9. In 2015, a Sunflower County grand jury indicted Brown,Eloby, Green, and Jones for one count of capital murder withthe underlying crime of armed robbery and a standalone countof armed robbery. In 2021, the original indictment was nolleprosequied due to a defect, and a second Sunflower Countygrand jury indicted each of the Defendants for one countof capital murder with the underlying crime of burglary andone count of armed robbery. Each charge included an addedfirearm enhancement.¶10. Before trial, Green—after agreeing to a plea deal withthe State and agreeing to testify against Brown, Eloby, andJones—successfully moved to sever his trial from his co-defendants.¶11. Brown, Eloby, and Jones (collectively, the Defendants)were jointly tried on January 30, 2024, through February 2,2024. At trial, the jury heard testimony from Harris, Banks,Chief Deputy Flowers, and Green, as well as Dr. MarkLeVaughn, a forensic pathologist at the Mississippi StateMedical Examiner's Office; Officer Kevin Nelson of the Cityof Horn Lake Police Department; Investigator Darrell Saxtonof the Sunflower County Sheriff's Department; Mark Boackleof the Mississippi Forensics Laboratory, an expert in the fieldof firearms and toolmarks; and Audra Brown, Brown's wife.¶12. After Chief Deputy Flowers testified, the defendantsmoved for a mistrial. Counsel for the Defendants claimedthat Chief Deputy Flowers indicated through his testimony1that evidence was intentionally destroyed and that some ofthe State's evidence was not disclosed to the Defendants. TheDefendants also asserted that these evidentiary issues wererelevant to their motion to dismiss based on a speedy trialviolation, and they renewed their speedy trial motion. Afterhearing arguments from counsel, the trial court denied themotions for a mistrial or dismissal, and the trial continued.¶13. Green testified that on the night of the shooting, heand the Defendants drove to Harris and Williams's residencewith the intention of robbing the house. According to Green,Brown drove the men in his silver Pontiac car. The men drovepast the house to make sure the coast was clear, and thenBrown parked his car on a gravel road, out of sight. Green,Eloby, and Jones then exited the vehicle carrying guns and skimasks. Green testified that Jones entered the house through awindow and then opened the door to allow Green and Elobyinside. Green claimed that during the robbery, Eloby orderedWilliams to lie down, and when Williams refused, Eloby shothim.*3 ¶14. Dr. LeVaughn testified that Williams was shot inthe left shoulder and died as a result of internal bleeding.Dr. LeVaughn opined that Williams's manner of death washomicide. During Williams's autopsy, a bullet was recoveredfrom his body, and the sheriff's department sent the bullet tothe Mississippi Forensics Laboratory.¶15. Officer Nelson testified that at approximately 7:30 p.m.on August 11, 2012, the evening after the shooting, hewas sitting in a patrol car at an intersection in Horn Lake,Mississippi. Officer Nelson observed that the driver of apassing vehicle was not wearing a seatbelt and that the twopeople inside the vehicle “appeared noticeably nervous.”Officer Nelson proceeded to conduct a traffic stop of the
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3vehicle. Officer Nelson testified that Davontay Reedus andEloby were the occupants of the vehicle. During a search,officers found 1.6 grams of marijuana separately packagedon Eloby's person and $190 in cash in $5 denominations. AK-9 search revealed a Taurus 9mm handgun underneath thefront passenger seat where Eloby was sitting, and Eloby wascharged with possession of a handgun by a minor.¶16. In April 2021, Chief Deputy Flowers learned that theHorn Lake Police Department had taken possession of Eloby'sgun during the traffic stop in 2012. Investigator DarrellSaxton testified that upon orders from Chief Deputy Flowers,he had retrieved the gun and logged it into evidence at theSunflower County Sheriff's Department. Investigator Saxtonthen took the gun to the Mississippi Forensics Laboratoryand advised the laboratory staff that they needed to comparethe gun to the projectile (bullet) recovered from Williams'sbody. According to Investigator Saxton, laboratory staffinformed him that they had returned the projectile to ChiefDeputy Flowers. Investigator Saxton eventually located theprojectile in the evidence room at the sheriff's department,and he returned the projectile to the Mississippi ForensicsLaboratory.¶17. Mark Boackle testified as an expert in the field offirearms and tool marks. Boackle testified that he analyzedEloby's Taurus 9mm gun and the projectile recovered fromWilliams's body. Boackle opined that the projectile “bearsclass characteristics consistent with 9mm.” However, incomparing the projectile to the gun, Boackle determined thatwhile the projectile had similar class characteristics withthose produced by Eloby's gun, it “could not be positivelyincluded or excluded as having been fired in [Eloby's] gun ...to the exclusion of all other firearms bearing the same classcharacteristics.” Boackle testified that this conclusion wasdue to the mutilation and “insufficient reproduction” of theprojectile recovered from Williams's body. Boackle explainedthat the projectile's outer covering had “ripped away fromthe core” of the bullet, and this mutilation made it hard tofurther classify or identify whether the projectile was shotfrom Eloby's gun. Boackle testified that a projectile jacket cansometimes separate from the core of the bullet when the gunis fired or when the projectile hits something hard, like “bone,glass, [or] metal.”¶18. After the State rested its case-in-chief, the Defendantsmoved for directed verdicts, arguing that the State had notmet its burden of establishing a prima facie case of capitalmurder and armed robbery against the Defendants. The trialcourt denied the motion.*4 ¶19. Finally, Brown's wife, Audra, testified as Brown'salibi witness. Audra testified that on the evening of theshooting, Brown was at home babysitting their infantgrandchild while Audra was at work. Audra stated that whenshe arrived home around 9:45 p.m. on the evening of August10, 2012, Brown and their grandchild were both asleep. Audraposted a picture of Brown and their grandchild, both asleep,on Facebook and captioned the photo “Why they couldn'twait on me to get home 8/10/12.” Audra also testified thaton August 11, 2012, she and Brown went to a restaurantand to the movies, and she posted a picture of the two ofthem on Facebook and captioned the picture “A night on thetown 08/11/12.” Both pictures were entered into evidence,and each picture's caption and date were posted across thecenter of the photo. Audra testified that the dates contained inthe captions were autogenerated. During closing arguments,the State disputed Audra's claim that the dates in Facebookcaptions were autogenerated, and the State encouraged thejury to use common sense as to whether Audra herself placedthe date on the caption. Audra also testified that neither shenor Brown had ever owned a silver Pontiac car.¶20. The jury ultimately returned a verdict finding theDefendants guilty of capital murder, with the underlyingcharge of burglary, and armed robbery. For his capitalmurder conviction, the trial court sentenced Brown to lifeimprisonment in the custody of the MDOC without eligibilityfor parole or probation. For his armed robbery conviction,the trial court sentenced Brown to ten years in the MDOC'scustody, with five years suspended on the condition ofcompleting five years of post-release supervision, set to runconsecutively to his sentence for capital murder.¶21. Brown filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding theverdict or a new trial, which the trial court denied. This appealfollowed.DISCUSSIONI. Violation of Brown's Due Process Rights¶22. Brown first argues the State violated his due processright to a fundamentally fair trial; accordingly, he argues thetrial court erred by denying his motions for a mistrial anddismissal.
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4¶23. The decision “to grant a motion for a mistrial is withinthe sound discretion of the trial court. The standard of reviewfor [a] denial of a motion for a mistrial is abuse of discretion.”Dorsey v. State, 310 So. 3d 1238, 1247 (¶26) (Miss. Ct.App. 2021). “A trial judge need declare a mistrial only whenthere is an error in the proceedings resulting in substantialand irreparable prejudice to the defendant's case.” Young v.State, 281 So. 3d 179, 186 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)(quoting Hutto v. State, 227 So. 3d 963, 984 (¶66) (Miss.2017)). However, we review de novo a trial court's denial of adefendant's motion to dismiss. Lewis v. State, 295 So. 3d 521,531 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019).A. Destruction or Loss of Exculpatory Evidence¶24. Brown asserts that the State's destruction, loss, andmishandling of evidence violated his due process rights.Brown claims that he was prejudiced due to the unavailabilityof exculpatory evidence, namely, the missing audio filesof recorded witness interviews and Chief Deputy Flowers'ssticky notes that he used to draft his final case report. Brownalso asserts that the State erred by mishandling and failingto test the shell casing that Harris claimed he turned over tolaw enforcement and that the State mishandled the projectilerecovered from Williams's autopsy, which deprived Brown ofthe ability to prove its exculpatory value.¶25. We recognize that “[t]he State has the duty to preserveevidence ... which might be expected to play a significantrole in the suspect's defense.” Northup v. State, 793 So. 2d618, 623 (¶16) (Miss. 2001) (quotation mark omitted). Todetermine whether the State violated Brown's due processrights based upon destruction or spoliation of evidence,Brown must show the following:(1) the evidence in question mustpossess an exculpatory value thatwas apparent before the evidence wasdestroyed; (2) the evidence must be ofsuch a nature that [Brown] would beunable to obtain comparable evidenceby other reasonably available means;and (3) the prosecution's destruction ofthe evidence must have been in badfaith.*5 Robinson v. State, 247 So. 3d 1212, 1234 (¶56) (Miss.2018). Brown must meet all three of these requirements tosuccessfully prove that his due process rights were violated.Childs v. State, 133 So. 3d 348, 350 (¶10) (Miss. 2013).¶26. Regarding Brown's claim that the State mishandled theprojectile recovered from Williams's autopsy, we find nothingin the record to support this claim. Although the testimony attrial reflects that the projectile was damaged, Boackle testifiedthat a projectile's outer covering can sometimes separate fromthe core of the bullet when the gun is fired or when theprojectile hits something hard, like “bone, glass, [or] metal.”As for the shell casing that Harris claims law enforcementcollected from his bedroom, Chief Deputy Flowers testified attrial and denied that a shell casing was recovered from Harris'shome¶27. Chief Deputy Flowers also testified regarding hisinvestigation of the shooting. After Chief Deputy Flowersdeveloped suspects, he issued arrest warrants for theDefendants. Chief Deputy Flowers testified that heinterviewed Eloby in July 2013, and during that timeEloby implicated Green as the person who shot Williams.Chief Deputy Flowers recorded his 2013 interview withEloby. Eloby also provided a written statement. ChiefDeputy Flowers admitted that “throughout the years, [therecorded interview] got misplaced.” However, Eloby's writtenstatement was entered into evidence at trial.¶28. During cross-examination, counsel for the Defendantsquestioned Chief Deputy Flowers about his law enforcementtraining for conducting an investigation. Chief DeputyFlowers agreed that he was trained to keep up with everythingrelevant to each investigation and include the informationin a report. Counsel for the Defendants asked Chief DeputyFlowers about the recordings of his interviews with variouswitnesses to the shooting. Chief Deputy Flowers testifiedthat over the course of the years, the recordings had been“misplaced.”¶29. Chief Deputy Flowers also testified that as he conductedhis investigation in this case, he made notes on a sticky padand a notepad to help him prepare his offense report. ChiefDeputy Flowers admitted that after he prepared his offensereport, he did not include his handwritten notes in the case file,explaining, “That was years ago.” When asked by counselfor the Defendants where he put his handwritten notes, ChiefDeputy Flowers answered, “I don't know where I put them ....Probably [threw] them away.” Chief Deputy Flowers did not
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5recall when he threw the notes away, explaining, “This hasbeen over 12, 13 years.” However, Chief Deputy Flowerstestified that the offense report he prepared contained theinformation from his handwritten notes.¶30. Counsel for Defendants also questioned Chief DeputyFlowers about arrest warrants he issued for people other thanthe Defendants, namely, Tasha Green and Vanquilla Johnson.Chief Deputy Flowers stated that he did arrest Tasha andVanquilla and interviewed them regarding the shooting. ChiefDeputy Flowers testified that he recalled taking a writtenstatement from Tasha and Vanquilla and that their statements“should” be incorporated into the case file. Upon reviewingthe case file, Chief Deputy Flowers clarified that he didnot take written statements from Tasha and Vanquilla. Whenasked about previously testifying that he had taken writtenstatements from Tasha and Vanquilla, Chief Deputy Flowersexplained that the misstatement was due to the long amountof time that had passed since the interviews.*6 ¶31. After Chief Deputy Flowers's testimony, counsel forthe Defendants moved for a mistrial and a motion to dismiss intandem on the grounds of due process violations and speedytrial violations. The Defendants argued that the State's failureto turn over Chief Deputy Flowers's handwritten statementsand notes from the interviews with witnesses Tasha andVanquilla constituted a due process violation under Brady v.Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).2 The Defendants also arguedthat the State's failure to preserve certain evidence and thedestruction of evidence violated their due process rights. TheDefendants asserted they were unaware that the statementsand notes existed until trial. The Defendants admitted thatthe content of Chief Deputy Flowers's notes was unknown,but counsel for the Defendants argued that “that there isa very strong potential that all this evidence had potentialimpeachment value upon at least one possible witness, if notmore.” The Defendants maintained that if the trial court didnot grant their motion, then they were entitled to a spoliation-of-evidence instruction based on Chief Deputy Flowers'sintentional destruction of evidence.¶32. In response, the State argued that the Defendants’ claimsregarding the preservation of evidence did not rise to the levelof a due process violation.¶33. After hearing arguments from counsel, the trial courtdenied the motions for a mistrial and dismissal. In applyingthe relevant factors for destruction or spoliation of evidence,the trial court found “[t]here is no clear indication thatany of the evidence that is no longer available possessesany exculpatory value.” The trial court explained that thediscovery made available by the State did not indicate that anystatements or information from Tasha and Vanquilla wouldhave been exculpatory concerning the murder and robbery atissue. As to whether the evidence was of such a nature that theDefendants would be unable to obtain comparable evidenceby other reasonably available means, the trial court weighedthis prong heavily—but not fully—in favor of the Defendants.The trial court explained that no one had presented anyevidence to show that Tasha and Vanquilla were unavailableto be interviewed. Finally, the trial court found no evidenceto show that Chief Deputy Flowers destroyed the evidencein bad faith. The trial court acknowledged that Chief DeputyFlowers did misplace, lose, and even destroy some evidence,but the trial court determined that this was a result of thepassage of time and not a deliberate effort to destroy evidence.¶34. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial courtdid not abuse its discretion in denying Brown's motionfor a mistrial or dismissal. Brown failed to show that theevidence at issue possessed apparent exculpatory value.Regarding Chief Deputy Flowers's interviews with Tashaand Vanquilla, Brown presented no evidence to show thatthey were unavailable to be interviewed; accordingly, Brownfailed to show that he was unable to obtain comparableevidence by other reasonably available means. Finally, therecord contains no evidence that Chief Deputy Flowersdestroyed any evidence in bad faith. Robinson, 247 So. 3d at1234 (¶56).B. Violation of Right to a Speedy Trial¶35. Brown also argues that his constitutional right to a speedytrial was violated.3¶36. “The United States and Mississippi Constitutionsguarantee criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial.”Newell v. State, 175 So. 3d 1260, 1269 (¶9) (Miss. 2015)(citing U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miss. Const. art. 3, §26 (1890)). When examining whether a defendant's rightto speedy trial was violated, we apply the four-part testdeveloped by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Id. The Barker test requiresconsideration of the following factors: “(1) the length ofdelay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) whether the defendantasserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether thedefendant has been prejudiced by the delay.” Id. (citing
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33). The Barker Court explained thatthe four factors are “related factors and must be consideredtogether with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”Id. at 533.*7 ¶37. The record reflects that Eloby filed a pre-trial motionto dismiss due to the violation of his right to a speedy trial. Atthe May 2021 hearing on the motion, Brown announced thathe was joining the motion to dismiss. On February 22, 2022,the trial court entered an order denying Eloby and Brown'smotion.¶38. “A trial judge's ruling on a speedy-trial claimencompasses questions of fact, including whether there was‘good cause’ for a delay and whether the defendant has beenprejudiced by any delay.” Berryman v. State, 337 So. 3d 1116,1126 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting State v. Woodall,801 So. 2d 678, 680-81, 687 (¶¶7, 29, 31) (Miss. 2001)).“We must affirm the trial judge's factual findings if they aresupported by substantial, credible evidence[,] ... [and] [w]ewill reverse the trial judge's factual findings only if there isno probative evidence to support them and they are clearlyerroneous.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).1. Length of the Delay¶39. “The constitutional right to a speedy trial attaches whena person has been accused. Therefore, the speedy-trial clockbegins running ‘with the defendant's arrest, indictment, orinformation,’ whichever occurs first.” Berryman, 337 So.3d at 1126 (¶34) (citation omitted) (quoting Stark v. State,911 So. 2d 447, 450 (¶7) (Miss. 2005)). “ ‘[A]ny delayexceeding eight months is presumptively prejudicial’ andrequires analysis of the remaining Barker factors.” Id. at1126-27 (¶34).¶40. Here, the record shows that Brown was originallyindicted in April 2015 and that he was arrested in February2019. The trial took place in January 2024. The delay in thiscase was greater than eight months; therefore, we find that thetrial court correctly considered the remaining Barker factorsin assessing Brown's speedy trial claim.2. Reasons for the Delay¶41. “Once the delay is deemed presumptively prejudicial,the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidencejustifying the delay and to persuade the trier of fact of thelegitimacy of these reasons.” McBride v. State, 61 So. 3d138, 142 (¶9) (Miss. 2011). “This Court must then determinewhether the delay is attributable to the State or the defendant.”Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1127 (¶36). “Different reasonsfor delay are assigned different weights.” Id. “Deliberateattempts to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense areweighed heavily against the State.” Id. However, “[d]elayscaused by the defense, such as requests for continuances, willtoll the running of the speedy-trial clock for the length oftime attributable to the continuance.” Courtney v. State, 275So. 3d 1032, 1042 (¶27) (Miss. 2019). Likewise, “[a]greedcontinuances are weighed against the defense.” Id. at 1042(¶29).¶42. On appeal, the State maintains that the trial docketreflects that the majority of the delay is attributed to theDefendants’ motions for continuance of the trial date. Therecord reflects that the Defendants were initially indictedon April 20, 2015. The Defendants filed approximatelytwelve motions for continuances, which the trial court grantedon June 23, 2015; November 20, 2015; March 14, 2016;February 28, 2019; July 7, 2019; February 26, 2020; June 24,2020; October 26, 2020; April 22, 2021; October 8, 2021; andFebruary 10, 2022. The trial docket shows that over half of theorders granting continuances were agreed upon by the State.Eloby also filed a motion for a mental evaluation, which thetrial court granted on February 24, 2016.*8 ¶43. The court granted the motions for continuancesthat Brown and his co-defendants filed. This Court has heldthat “[g]enerally, continuances granted to a codefendant forgood cause operate as good-cause delays as to jointly chargeddefendants.” Harris v. State, 174 So. 3d 314, 319 (¶23) (Miss.Ct. App. 2015). On appeal, Brown “offered no evidence thathis codefendant's continuances were not for good cause.”Id. Additionally, the record reflects that Brown did not seeka severance from his co-defendants, nor did he object tothe continuances. See Bates v. State, 886 So. 2d 4, 8 (¶11)(Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that a defendant's failure toseek a severance or object to continuances granted to hiscodefendant cut against the defendant's speedy-trial claim).¶44. In its order denying Brown's motion to dismiss, thetrial court assessed this prong and held that “[t]he practicalreality of the court's congested docket, Eloby's pendingmental evaluation and the (agreed) continuances should notbe weighed against the State.” The trial court properly found
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7that the delays from the continuances should not be weighedagainst the State. See Harris, 174 So. 3d at 319 (¶24).3. Assertion of Right to a Speedy Trial¶45. “Although it is the State's duty to ensure that thedefendant receives a speedy trial, a defendant has someresponsibility to assert this right.” Taylor v. State, 162 So. 3d780, 785 (¶10) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Bateman v. State, 125So. 3d 616, 630 (¶49) (Miss. 2013)). The Mississippi SupremeCourt has held that “a defendant's failure to demand a speedytrial between his arrest and indictment is ‘critical’ to theanalysis of a speedy-trial claim.” Id. The supreme court hasweighed this prong against a defendant where the defendantallows a “significant amount of time to pass after arrest beforedemanding a speedy trial[.]” Id. (quotation marks omitted).¶46. On appeal, Brown maintains that he “consistently raisedand preserved his speedy trial objection and joined the motionto dismiss on that ground.” However, the trial court docketbelow does not reflect that Brown filed any speedy trialmotions. As acknowledged above, the record shows that atthe May 2021 pre-trial motion hearing on Eloby's motion todismiss due to the violation of his right to a speedy trial,Brown announced that he was joining Eloby's motion. Thesupreme court has clarified that “the filing of a motion todismiss does not equate to an assertion of the right to a speedytrial.” Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073, 1087 (¶39) (Miss.2010).¶47. After our review, we find that this factor weighs againstBrown.4. Prejudice¶48. “The final prong of Barker encompasses two aspects:actual prejudice in defending the case and interference withthe defendant's liberty.” Bateman, 125 So. 3d at 631 (¶51).“The three main considerations in determining whether theaccused was prejudiced by a lengthy delay are: (1) preventingoppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety andconcern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility thatthe defense will be impaired.” Id. (internal quotation marksomitted). The defendant “bears the burden of showing actualprejudice, since the defendant is clearly in the best positionto show prejudice under this prong.” Reed v. State, 191 So.3d 134, 141 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotationmarks omitted).¶49. Here, Brown argues that he was prejudiced by thedelayed trial in multiple ways. First, Brown claims that thedestruction of Chief Deputy Flowers's original notes and theinability to retrieve original recordings of witness statementsmaterially impaired his ability to cross-examine, challenge,and impeach the State's evidence and witnesses. Brownalso asserts that the “faded memories” of key witnessesundermined the integrity of the fact-finding process. Finally,Brown claims that he endured anxiety and suffered reputationharm while awaiting trial.*9 ¶50. The State argues that none of Brown's claims ofprejudice rises to the level of actual prejudice under Barker.The State also maintains that Brown was incarcerated forunrelated charges during approximately four years of thepretrial period, which further undercuts his claim of pretrialoppression. See Wall v. State, 718 So. 2d 1107, 1113 (¶26)(Miss. 1998) (recognizing that a defendant cannot claimanxiety of incarceration when serving time for another crime).We agree, and we find that Brown failed to meet his burdenof showing actual prejudice.5. Summary of the Barker Factors¶51. “In weighing the Barker factors, we must considerthe ‘totality of the circumstances,’ and ‘no one factor isdispositive.’ ” Berryman, 337 So. 3d at 1131 (¶53) (quotingPrice v. State, 898 So. 2d 641, 648 (¶11) (Miss. 2005)).¶52. Of the four Barker factors, only the length of delay in thiscase favors Brown. As discussed, much of the delay in thiscase is attributed to the Defendants’ motions for a continuanceof the trial date. Furthermore, Brown failed to assert his rightto a speedy trial, and he has not shown actual prejudice.Because we find no constitutional speedy trial violation in thiscase, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Brown'smotion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation.II. Testimony Regarding the Taurus 9mm Firearm¶53. Brown next argues that the trial court abused itsdiscretion by admitting into evidence the Taurus 9mmfirearm, as well as testimony from Officer Nelson regardingthe Taurus 9mm firearm. Brown asserts that the probativevalue of the testimony regarding the firearm was substantially
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice and misleadingthe jury.¶54. We review a trial court's decision to admit or excludeevidence for an abuse of discretion. Roberson v. State, 199So. 3d 660, 668 (¶32) (Miss. 2016). “Relevance is a thresholdrequirement of admissibility.” Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968,992 (¶44) (Miss. 2007); MRE 402. Evidence is consideredrelevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more orless probable than it would be without the evidence” and if“the fact is of consequence in determining the case.” MRE401. The supreme court has held that “Rule 401 is construedbroadly in favor of admitting evidence with even slightprobative value.” Ross, 954 So. 2d at 993 (¶44). However,relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value issubstantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of thefollowing: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleadingthe jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presentingcumulative evidence.” MRE 403. We recognize that thedecision of whether to exclude relevant evidence under Rule403 “is committed to the broad discretion of the trial judge,and our standard of review is highly deferential.” Wallace v.State, 369 So. 3d 83, 89 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).¶55. As discussed above, Officer Nelson testified that heperformed a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Eloby was thepassenger, and the firearm was discovered under Eloby's seat.Eloby was charged with possession of a handgun by a minor.At trial, Eloby's counsel objected to Officer Nelson testifyingregarding the discovery of the gun under Eloby's seat duringthe traffic stop. Counsel argued, “[T]here is no indicationthat this particular gun was actually tied to the murder[,]”and counsel referenced the report from Boackle regarding theprojectile and the gun. Counsel argued that any testimonyfrom Officer Nelson about confiscating the gun from Eloby“would be overly prejudicial and confusing to the jury.” Afterhearing arguments from counsel, the trial court found thatOfficer Nelson's testimony had probative value and overruledEloby's objection.*10 ¶56. Later, during Boackle's testimony, the Stateintroduced into evidence the Taurus 9mm firearm recoveredfrom Eloby during the traffic stop in Horn Lake the dayafter the shooting. Boackle tested the projectile and firearmand concluded that the projectile “bears similarities in classcharacteristics with those produced by the gun.” However,due to the condition of the projectile, Boackle could notpositively include or exclude it as having been shot fromEloby's Taurus 9mm firearm.¶57. Despite Brown's statement that the trial court “allowedthe firearm into evidence over objection[,]” the transcriptreflects that none of the Defendants objected to the admissionof the firearm into evidence. “A defendant's failure to objectto the admission of evidence at trial waives his right to raisethe issue on appeal”; accordingly, we find that Brown waivedany argument regarding admission of the actual firearm intoevidence. Smith v. State, 398 So. 3d 875, 890-91 (¶29) (Miss.Ct. App. 2023). We therefore limit our analysis to whetherthe trial court erred in admitting Officer Nelson's testimonyregarding the firearm.¶58. Brown argues that the testimony regarding the firearmallowed the State to unfairly imply a connection betweenEloby's gun and Brown's involvement in the shooting. Brownmaintains that he had no connection to the firearm, andtherefore this testimony unfairly prejudiced the jury againsthim and undermined the integrity of the proceedings.¶59. However, the supreme court has held that “[w]hen thereis evidence that a weapon could have caused an injury andsome connection between the defendant and the weaponexists, the weapon will be deemed relevant and admissible.”Ross, 954 So. 2d at 993 (¶46). Green testified that he, Brown,Eloby, and Jones committed the robbery at issue and thatEloby shot and killed Williams during the robbery. Testimonyat trial shows that the firearm at issue was confiscated fromEloby during a traffic stop. Green testified that Eloby toldGreen that his gun “got confiscated.”¶60. After our review, we find that “[b]ecause there wasevidence that the gun could neither be included or excluded asthe weapon that caused [Williams's] death, and that [Brown'sco-defendant Eloby] exercised dominion and control overthe gun ..., there was sufficient proof that the [testimonyregarding the] gun was relevant.” Rhodes v. State, 676 So.2d 275, 283-84 (Miss. 1996). We therefore find that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Nelson'stestimony regarding the Taurus 9mm firearm.III. Admission of Evidence of Brown's Other Crimes,Wrongs, or Acts4¶61. Brown argues that the trial court erred in admittingevidence of his other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Brown arguesthat this testimony was irrelevant, highly prejudicial, andimpacted the jury's perception of Brown's character.
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9¶62. “Generally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or actsis prohibited to prove a person's character in order to showhe acted in accordance with that character.” Culberson v.State, 419 So. 3d 926, 940 (¶59) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025); MRE404(b)(1). However, under Mississippi Rule of Evidence404(b)(2), evidence of other crimes may be admissible “foranother purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent,preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake,or lack of accident.” MRE 404(b)(2). Before a trial courtadmits such evidence, the court “must find (1) the evidence isoffered for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b) ..., and(2) the evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicialeffect under Rule 403 ....” Parks v. State, 228 So. 3d 853, 868(¶58) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). We review a trial court's decisionto admit evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, oracts for an abuse of discretion. Bradshaw v. State, 371 So. 3d822, 836 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).*11 ¶63. The State maintains that the testimony aboutBrown's other wrongs, crimes, or acts was properly admittedunder Rule 404(b) to demonstrate a common plan, intent,and motive relevant to the charged offense. The State assertsthat the evidence was offered for a non-character purpose andwas highly probative of a broader scheme involving the fouraccomplices and their charged acts.¶64. The record indicates that Brown submitted a motion inlimine to exclude evidence of his other wrongs, crimes, or actsand that Eloby and Jones joined the motion. The trial courtheld a pretrial hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the Stateannounced that it intended to offer evidence of Brown's othercrimes to prove “intent, preparation, motive, and plan and ...modus operandi.” The State explained that Green wouldtestify that the details of the shooting and robbery at issue are“identical” to subsequent crimes that Green and Brown hadcommitted in other counties, namely, that Brown was alwaysinvolved in the preparation of the robbery and always drove tothe location and that Green and another person would alwaysexit the vehicle and commit the robbery. The trial court deniedBrown's motion and ruled that pursuant to Rule 404(b), theState could introduce evidence of Brown's criminal activityfor the limited purposes of intent, plan, preparation, motive,and opportunity and “to tell a complete story of the eventsleading to the subject incident.”¶65. During Green's testimony, Brown's counsel renewed herobjection to Green testifying about Brown's other crimes. Thetrial court overruled the objection and allowed the testimonyfor the limited purpose of showing motive, opportunity,intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absenceof mistake or accident. The trial court referenced its priorwritten order and stated that the court had already made adetermination that the testimony's “probative value is notoutweighed by any prejudice that it will cause.”¶66. At trial, Green testified that he was currently serving timefor aggravated assault, kidnapping, robbery, and attemptedrobbery. Green stated that these charges arose from crimesthat occurred approximately a month after the shootingand robbery at issue in this case. One incident occurredin Tallahatchie County on September 7, 2012, and anotherincident occurred in Leflore County on September 11, 2012.Green testified that Brown was also involved in these crimesand that Brown had served time for convictions stemmingfrom these crimes.¶67. During Green's testimony, the State asked Green if he hadany knowledge of Brown's other bad acts. Green answeredthat he did have knowledge of other crimes Brown hadcommitted, and Green explained that he had knowledge ofthese crimes because he, too, had been involved. The Stateasked Green about the crime that occurred on September7, 2012. Green testified that Brown provided him with “theinformation and the spot.” The State then asked, “And that'sthe same plan that you guys had when you were here inSunflower County?” (referring to the shooting and robbery atissue). Green answered, “Yes.”¶68. The State also asked Green about the crime that occurreda few days later on September 11, 2012. Green statedthat in that incident, Brown provided the “[i]nformation,transportation, and weapon and mask.” Green clarified thatBrown informed Green of a store that had illegal slotmachines in the back of the store. Brown drove Green to thestore, dropped him off, and Green robbed the store.*12 ¶69. At the conclusion of Green's testimony, the trialcourt gave the jury the following limiting instruction:Members of the jury, the Court allowedevidence of other robberies allegedlycommitted by Defendants Green andBrown to be admitted into evidencein this case. You may consider thisevidence only as to Defendants Greenand Brown for the limited purposeof intent, plan, preparation, motive,
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10and opportunity. You may not inferthat they acted in conformity with theprior acts or that they are, therefore,guilty of the charge for which theyare presently on trial. You cannot, andmust not, consider the evidence againstthe defendants who did not participatein these other robberies.¶70. Upon review, we find that the trial court properlyapplied Rule 403 to the evidence of Brown's other robberies.The trial court found that the probative value of Green'stestimony regarding the other robberies was not substantiallyoutweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See MRE 403.The trial judge also instructed the jury that the evidenceregarding the other robberies was admitted for the limitedpurpose of showing intent, plan, preparation, motive, andopportunity. See Taylor v. State, 362 So. 3d 1117, 1121 (¶12)(Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Accordingly, we find no abuse ofdiscretion.IV. Admission of Eloby's Redacted Confession intoEvidence¶71. Next, Brown argues that the trial court erred in admittingEloby's redacted confession into evidence. Brown claimsthat Eloby's confession implicated Brown in the shooting.Because Eloby did not testify at trial, Brown asserts thatadmitting Eloby's confession into evidence violated Brown'sright to confront witnesses against him, as guaranteed underthe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution andArticle 3, Section 26, of the Mississippi Constitution.¶72. We review a ruling on an objection under theConfrontation Clause de novo. Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290,296 (¶18) (Miss. 2008). Both the United States Constitutionand the Mississippi Constitution guarantee a defendant ina criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnessesagainst him. U.S. Const. amend. VI (applicable to the statesthrough U.S. Const. amend. XIV); Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26.This right is violated when the State introduces testimonialevidence from a witness who does not testify at trial andwhom the defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).¶73. However, this Court has recognized that theConfrontation Clause “is not violated by the admission ofa nontestifying co-defendant's confession at a joint criminaltrial, even though the defendant is linked to the confessionby other evidence properly admitted against the defendant”at trial “when the co-defendant's confession is redacted” toremove not only the defendant's name, but any referenceto him, and when “the jury is given a proper limitinginstruction not to use the co-defendant's confession againstthe defendant.” Anderson v. State, 5 So. 3d 1088, 1094 (¶7)(Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S.185, 191 (1998)); see also Strahan v. State, 729 So. 2d 800,804 (¶14) (Miss. 1998) (“It was clearly not a violation ofStrahan's confrontation rights for the trial court to conduct ajoint trial and admit the co-defendants’ redacted statements.The record reflects that all references to Strahan were deletedfrom those statements.” (citations omitted)). In the recentcase Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023), the UnitedStates Supreme Court further clarified that the admission ofa nontestifying co-defendant's confession does not violatethe Confrontation Clause “where (1) the confession has beenmodified to avoid directly identifying the nonconfessingcodefendant and (2) the court offers a limiting instruction thatjurors may consider the confession only with respect to theconfessing codefendant.” Id. at 640.*13 ¶74. At a pretrial hearing, Brown's counsel fileda motion in limine seeking to exclude any mention ofEloby's confession. Brown's counsel argued that admitting theconfession into evidence violates the Confrontation Clause,stating:If Eloby does not take the stand,even if [the State] blacks out ordoes not mention the names of thecodefendants, ... there's no opportunityto cross-examine him on the statementand the facts surrounding the statementor why he even gave it if he's nottaking the stand, and it would be moreprejudicial than probative to allowthat.However, Brown's counsel agreed that Brown's rights wouldnot be violated if the State redacted Eloby's statement toexclude any mention of Brown.¶75. After reviewing Eloby's confession, Brown's counselrealized that Eloby never mentioned Brown at all. Counsel
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11then moved to withdraw the motion in limine as to Brown,and the following exchange occurred:[Brown's counsel]: After looking back over Mr. Eloby'swritten statement, he does not implicate my client, heonly implicates Jabrandon Green. So I will withdraw thismotion.THE COURT: You're going to withdraw the motion?[Brown's counsel]: Yes, ma'am.....THE COURT: Let me get this straight. Motion in Limine 4filed by Mr. Brown is withdrawn as to Mr. Brown.[Brown's counsel]: Yes, ma'am.Our review of the record confirms that in his written statementto police officers, Eloby implicated himself and claimed thathe acted with Jones and Green.¶76. During Chief Deputy Flowers's direct testimony, thetrial court held a bench hearing about the written confessionand ultimately approved the redacted language. The redactedconfession removed any reference to Jones and onlymentioned Eloby and Green. The trial court acknowledged theDefendants’ objection to admission of the written confession,but the court explained that it could not allow the Defendants,who chose to be tried jointly rather than have their trialssevered, “to hamstring the State from evidence that theyshould be able to get in ... [just] because [the confession]applies to more than one defendant.” The Defendantsagreed to the redaction that was made but maintained theirConfrontation Clause objection.¶77. At trial, Chief Deputy Flowers testified about hisinvestigation of the shooting and how he developed suspects.Chief Deputy Flowers explained that he received a tip fromanother law enforcement officer advising him to speak to aman named Davontay Brown. Chief Deputy Flowers testifiedthat after speaking with Davontay Brown, he looked upthe Facebook pages of Green, Eloby, Brown, and Jones.After examining the Facebook pages, Chief Deputy Flowersinterviewed Eloby in connection with the shooting. Elobywaived his Miranda5 rights and provided an oral and writtenstatement.¶78. During Chief Deputy Flowers's testimony, the Stateentered Eloby's redacted written confession into evidence.Chief Deputy Flowers also testified about the details Elobyprovided in his oral statements, namely, that Eloby toldChief Deputy Flowers that he went with Green and “twomore individuals” to Harris and Williams's house in Drew,Mississippi. Eloby's counsel objected to Chief DeputyFlowers's language regarding “two more individuals.” Duringa bench conference, Brown's counsel argued that ChiefDeputy Flowers had already testified that he looked at theFacebook pages of Brown and Jones, and “[t]here is no waythe jury can look past the implication” that Chief DeputyFlowers is referring to Jones and Brown as the two otherindividuals Eloby referred to in his oral statement. However,the trial court pointed out that counsel for the Defendantsnever made a contemporaneous objection to Chief DeputyFlowers's testimony about the Facebook pages he visited.Brown's counsel then objected, and the trial court overruledher objection.*14 ¶79. After Chief Deputy Flowers testified, the trial courtgave the jury the following limiting instruction: “Membersof the jury, the Court allowed the statement of ... Eloby tobe admitted into evidence in this case. You may considerthat statement as evidence only against the defendant Eloby.It should not be considered as evidence against defendants[Jones] or [Brown].”¶80. The State argues that because Eloby's redacted statementdid not incriminate Brown and because it was accompaniedby a proper limiting instruction, its admission did not violatethe Confrontation Clause. We agree. The ConfrontationClause applies to “ ‘witnesses’ against the accused.”Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).Because Eloby did not name Brown at all in his writtenconfession, Eloby was not Brown's “accuser” for purposes ofthe Confrontation Clause.¶81. Regarding Chief Deputy Flowers's testimony that hevisited Brown and Jones's Facebook pages as part of hisinvestigation into the shooting and his testimony that Elobystated that he went to Harris and Williams's house with “twomore individuals,” the transcript confirms that Brown failedto object to Chief Deputy Flowers's testimony regarding theFacebook pages. The transcript also reflects that Brown cross-examined Chief Deputy Flowers and had the opportunity toask him about Eloby's statement, but Brown failed to do so.¶82. Because Eloby's redacted statement did not incriminateBrown and because it was accompanied by a proper limitinginstruction, we find that the trial court's admission of Eloby's
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause under thefederal or state constitutions.V. Weight of the Evidence¶83. Finally, Brown argues that he is entitled to a new trialbecause the jury's verdict is against the overwhelming weightof the evidence. For challenges to the weight of the evidence,this Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorableto the verdict and [will] disturb the verdict only when it is socontrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that toallow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.”Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 289 (¶1) (Miss. 2017). “Wedo not reweigh evidence. We do not assess the witnesses’credibility. And we do not resolve conflicts between evidence.Those decisions belong solely to the jury.” Id. In addition, we“review the trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trialfor an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 292 (¶21).¶84. In light of all the evidence discussed above, we cannotsay that the jury's verdict was contrary to the overwhelmingweight of the evidence. Green testified that he, Brown, Jones,and Eloby drove to Harris and Williams's residence with theintention of robbing the house. Green testified that Browndrove everyone in his silver Pontiac car. Brown drove past thehouse to make sure the coast was clear, and then he parkedhis car on a gravel road, out of sight. Green testified that he,Eloby, and Jones carried guns and wore ski masks. Banksand Harris testified that the men who robbed the house andshot Williams were wearing masks. The trial court admittedevidence of Brown's other crimes under Rule 404(b) todemonstrate a common plan, intent, and motive relevant to thecharged offense. Green testified that he and Brown committedother robberies shortly after the robbery and shooting at issue.Green's testimony reflected that these subsequent robberieshad the same plan, intent, and motive as the robbery andshooting at issue, namely, that Brown provided Green andthe other participants with the information, transportation,weapons, and masks for the robberies.*15 ¶85. Our caselaw is clear that the jury was entitledto assess the credibility of the witnesses, including Green,and resolve the conflicts in the evidence. Id. at 289 (¶1).Accordingly, because the jury's verdict was not against theoverwhelming weight of the evidence, we find that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion by denying Brown's motionfor a new trial.CONCLUSION¶86. After our review, we find no violation of Brown'sdue process rights; therefore, the trial court properly deniedBrown's motions for mistrial and dismissal regarding theseclaims. As to the admission of testimony regarding the Taurus9mm firearm or evidence of Brown's other crimes, we find noabuse of discretion. We also find that the admission of Eloby'sredacted confession did not violate the Confrontation Clause.Finally, we find that the jury's verdict was not contrary tothe overwhelming weight of the evidence. Accordingly, weaffirm Brown's convictions and sentences.¶87. AFFIRMED.BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS,McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER,WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.All Citations--- So.3d ----, 2026 WL 670733Footnotes1We will further discuss Chief Deputy Flowers's testimony and Brown's claim regarding the State's evidencein our analysis below.2On appeal, Brown maintains that the failure to turn over interview notes and handwritten statements wasa Brady violation. However, the testimony at trial shows that this evidence was either destroyed or did notexist; therefore, the State could not turn over this evidence. This issue is more appropriately addressed by
EDWIN TERRELL BROWN A/K/A EDWIN BROWN A/K/A..., --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13using the three-prong test above to determine whether the State's failure to preserve evidence violated thedefendant's right to due process, as set forth in Robinson, 247 So. 3d at 1234 (¶56).3Brown does not assert that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-1(Rev. 2020).4In the State's appellate brief, the State asserts that regarding this issue, Brown cites three cases that do notexist and five others that his brief misattributes false facts, analyses, quotations, and holdings to otherwisegenuine citations. Brown also cites seven cases for quotations that do not appear in those opinions. Inthe reply brief, Brown's counsel acknowledged these errors, which included “phantom cases” and incorrectcitations.5Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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