Swinney v. Jhoc, Inc. (2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Mississippi (MS)
Court
Mississippi Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Page 1 of 13 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COPIAH COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI PATRICK SWINNEY PLAINTIFF VS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2025--0135 JHOC, INC. d/b/a PREMIER TRANSPORTATION; DERWIN SULLIVAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND JOHN DOE(S) 1-10 DEFENDANTS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT THIS MATTER, having come before this Court on June 22, 2026 on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and after reviewing the motion, responses,1 and hearing arguments in support and in opposition thereto, the Court finds as follows: I. Facts and Procedural Background Plaintiff’s response includes the following statement of facts: Plaintiff, Patrick Swinney, was hired by Pinnacle Employer Group, LLC (“Pinnacle”) at a job fair in November 2024. Pinnacle is a temporary staffing agency that merely supplies labor to client companies. One such client, Defendant JHOC, Inc. d/b/a Premier Transportation (“Premier”), operates a warehouse facility in Hazlehurst where it loads and unloads tractor-trailers for distribution to local retailers. After his hire, Pinnacle assigned Plaintiff to work at Premier’s facility. Although Plaintiff’s paycheck came from Pinnacle, Premier exercised complete control over every material aspect of his work. (Bold for emphasis). Premier trained Plaintiff on Premier’s equipment, dictated his daily assignments, supervised his performance, and required him to follow Premier’s procedures on Premier’s loading dock. Premier personnel, not Pinnacle, determined what freight Plaintiff was to load or unload, how he was to perform those tasks, and what equipment he was required to use. While performing these duties for Premier, operating a Premier forklift inside a 1 The Court considered the following pleadings and exhibits: Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits; Defendants’ Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 17, 2026; and Defendants’ Reply to Plaintiff’s Second Response to Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court ruled on Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Response filed on June 17, 2026 by separate order. Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 1 of 13
Page 2 of 13 Premier trailer at Premier’s loading dock, Plaintiff was injured as a direct result of the negligence of Premier employee Derwin Sullivan. (MEC #20 Plaintiff’s Response and Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment) (emphasis in bold supplied by Plaintiff, emphasis by underline added by the Court). Plaintiff’s original response to the motion for summary judgment contained very similar language. Plaintiff described the work he preformed as “integral to Premier’s business operations.” (MEC #17 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment). Plaintiff stated his on-site supervisor, Barbara Ray, was a Premier employee. Id. Plaintiff’s statement of facts in his responses is supported by his deposition testimony. During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he showed up at a job fair, talked a recruiter, and “went to work the same night.” (MEC #15-1, p. 13). Plaintiff testified that he drove himself to Premier’s warehouse and performed Premier’s work for approximately three months before he was injured. Pinnacle maintained a workers’ compensation policy and initiated a workers’ compensation claim regarding Plaintiff’s injury. Premier and Derwin Sullivan (Defendants) argue that Plaintiff was a “borrowed servant,” that workers’ compensation is Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy, and that Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed. In his first response, Plaintiff did not address the arguments regarding the borrowed servant doctrine or the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions. Instead, Plaintiff argued that discovery was incomplete, that summary judgment should not be granted before the completion of discovery, and that Premier should be held liable in tort for the negligence of its employee. Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 2 of 13
Page 3 of 13 In his second response, Plaintiff attempted2 to argue that the borrowed servant doctrine does not apply and that the motion for summary judgment should be denied. II. Law and Analysis A. Summary Judgment Standard Courts determine whether summary judgment is proper by considering whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c) (Thomson Reuters, 2026). A fact is material if it “tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties.” Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., 935 So. 2d 393, 398 (Miss. 2006). Issues of fact exist when one can draw more than one reasonable inference from uncontradicted facts. Ladnier v. Hester, 98 So. 3d 1025, 1029 (Miss. 2012). “Where there are undisputed facts which are susceptible to more than one interpretation, summary judgment is inappropriate.” Mladineo v. Schmidt, 52 So. 3d 1154, 1160 (Miss. 2010). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1028. If there is any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the benefit goes to the nonmoving party. Id. However, the nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial. Pigg v. Express Hotel Partners, LLC, 991 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Miss. 2008). Mississippi appellate courts have consistently held: On a summary-judgment motion, “[t]he moving party bears the burden of persuasion to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact,” Rainer v. River Oaks Hosp. LLC, 282 So. 3d 751, 754 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), “and that they are entitled to summary judgment based upon the established facts[.]” Karpinsky v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84, 89 (Miss. 2013). Once the 2 Plaintiff’s second response is addressed more thoroughly in section III. Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 3 of 13
Page 4 of 13 defendant has met its summary-judgment burden, the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff in opposition of the motion. Rainer, 282 So. 3d at 755. “To withstand summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present sufficient proof to establish each element of each claim.” Whiting v. Univ. of S. Miss., 62 So. 3d 907, 914 (Miss. 2011) (overruled on other grounds by Springer v. Ausbern Constr. Co., 231 So. 3d 980 (Miss. 2017)). “[Rule] 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Frazier, 102 So. 3d at 345. Mixon v. Berry, 351 So. 3d 983, 987 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Frazier v. McDonald’s Rests. of Miss. Inc., 102 So. 3d 341, 345 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)). “The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Yazoo City v. Hampton, 386 So. 3d 355, 357 (Miss. 2024) (quoting Collins v. City of Newton, 240 So. 3d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 2018)); Duckworth v. Warren, 10 So. 3d 433, 436-37 (Miss. 2009). “The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits.” M.R.C.P. 56(c) (Thomson Reuters, 2026). “Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.” M.R.C.P. 56(f) (Thomson Reuters, 2026) (emphasis added). B. Borrowed-Servant Doctrine “The borrowed-servant doctrine is a common-law rule that a servant, in general employment of one person, who is temporarily loaned to another person to do the latter’s work, becomes, for the time being, the servant of the borrower, although he remains in the general employment of the lender.” Dawson v. Burgs, 373 So. 3d 759, 763 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting James v. Dedeaux, 217 So. 3d 785, 787 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Gorton v. Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 4 of 13
Page 5 of 13 Rance, 52 So. 3d 351, 359 (Miss. 2011)); see also Baldwin v. Kelly Servs. Inc., 121 So. 3d 275, 277 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). Mississippi Appellate Courts have consistently held: Under the Workers’ Compensation Act, an employer’s liability “to pay compensation [under the Act] shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee.” Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-9. Therefore, an employer covered by the Act who obtains workers’ compensation coverage in compliance with the Act is immune from liability in tort for injuries sustained by an employee in the course and scope of her employment. In addition, our Supreme Court has held that a worker “may be employed by more than one employer and both employers gain immunity from common-law negligence actions.” N. Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So. 2d 1278, 1282 (Miss. 1995). The Court stated that this immunity applies and “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where a temporary employment agency assigns an employee to another employer and the employee performs the normal work of the second employer and is controlled and supervised by that employer.” Id. Adams v. Hinds Cnty School Dist., 421 So. 3d 336, 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (emphasis added); Dawson, 373 So. 3d 759; James, 217 So. 3d 785. Courts must apply three criteria to determine if the Plaintiff is a borrowed servant and workers’ compensation is Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy: “(1) whose work is being performed, (2) who controls or has the right to control the workman as to the work being performed, and (3) whether the workman voluntarily accepted the special employment.” Adams, 421 at 339 (quoting James, 217 at 787). In determining supervision, the Court looks at the actual conditions at the worksite. Id. (citing James, 217 at 787); see also Dawson, 373 So. 3d at 764. A) M.R.C.P. 56(f) In his first response, Plaintiff argued that summary judgment should not be granted because discovery was not complete. Rule 56(f) requires the party opposing the motion to state, in an affidavit, the reasons he cannot “present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.” M.R.C.P. 56(f) (Thomson Reuters, 2026). Plaintiff did not attach any affidavits to Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 5 of 13
Page 6 of 13 either of his responses. Plaintiff argued in his first response that only one deposition had been taken and that Plaintiff “has yet to depose potential witness and/or defendants pertinent to Plaintiff’s claims of liability.” (MEC #17). Plaintiff does not state the reasons he has not conducted this discovery. The docket reveals that Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 15, 2025 and Defendants answered on July 11, 2025. The parties served written discovery requests and responses to each other between August 2025 and February 2026. The notice to take Plaintiff’s deposition was filed on October 9, 2025, and Plaintiff was deposed on October 14, 2025. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on March 17, 2026. Plaintiff has not filed any notices to take any depositions. The Court finds that Plaintiff had ample time to depose “potential witness and/or defendants.” Additionally, the facts Defendants rely on in their Motion are largely derived from Plaintiff’s deposition testimony. Pursuant to Plaintiff’s statement of facts in his responses to the Motion for Summary Judgment, the facts are not in dispute. B) Borrowed Servant Doctrine To determine whether one is a borrowed servant, the Court must apply three criteria: “(1) whose work is being performed, (2) who controls or has the right to control the workman as to the work being performed, and (3) whether the workman voluntarily accepted the special employment.” Adams, 421 So. 3d at 339. Pursuant to Plaintiff’s responses to the motion for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, it was Premier’s work that was being performed. In his response, Plaintiff states in bold font “Premier exercised complete control over every material aspect of [Plaintiff’s] work.” (MEC #20). Plaintiff’s deposition testimony supports this statement. Plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes that he voluntarily Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 6 of 13
Page 7 of 13 accepted the special employment. Plaintiff argues that the agreement between Pinnacle and Premier stated that Plaintiff was an independent contractor and not to be considered an employee of Premier. Plaintiff argues, therefore, that he cannot be considered a borrowed servant. Defendant argued that the language in the agreement relied on by Plaintiff is virtually identical to the agreement in Dawson, 373 So. 3d 759. Defendant included the Temporary Staffing Agreement (agreement) as an exhibit to the motion for summary judgment. (MEC #15-2). The agreement refers to Premier as “CLIENT” and states, in part: “CLIENT obtains the benefit of the borrowed servant doctrine and the exclusive remedy provisions of applicable worker’s compensation statutes.” (MEC #15-2 p. 2) (emphasis added). The agreement refers to Pinnacle as “AGENCY,” and to the temporary worker as “AGENCY Temps.” The agreement states, in part: “It is understood and agreed that each of the parties hereto as well as the AGENCY temps are independent contractors and that the AGENCY and any AGENCY Temp is not, and shall not be deemed to be the agent, distributor, employee or representative of CLIENT.” (MEC #15-2 p. 9). “All personnel supplied or used by AGENCY (including without limitation all AGENCY Temps) shall be deemed employees or subcontractors of AGENCY and will not be considered employees, agents or subcontractors of CLIENT for any purpose whatsoever.” (MEC #15-2 p. 10). Dawson is on point. Dawson involved workers assigned by temporary employment agencies to work at a Dollar General warehouse. The circuit court agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine applied and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. The court quoted portions of the agreement between the temporary Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 7 of 13
Page 8 of 13 employment agency and Dollar General and it contained language very similar to the present matter, including stating that the temporary worker “shall perform the services hereunder as an independent contractor” and would not be an employee of Dollar General. Dawson, 373 So. 3d at 761. The court held “the reality of the workplace and the parties’ actions in carrying out a contract can impliedly modify, alter or waive express contract provisions.” Id. at 764 (quoting James, 217 So. 3d at 787-88); N. Elec. Co., 660 So. 2d at 1282). The Court found that the actual conditions of the workplace showed that the temporary agency workers were under the control and supervision of Dollar General and that the borrowed servant doctrine applied. Id. The Court affirmed summary judgment because the worker’s exclusive remedy was worker’s compensation. Id. In the present matter, the agreement specifically states that Defendants shall have the benefit of the borrowed servant doctrine and the workers’ compensation exclusivity provisions. Additionally, the reality of the workplace shows that Plaintiff was under the control and supervision of Premier. The Court finds that all three criteria are met and Plaintiff was a borrowed servant. Mississippi appellate courts have held that “temporary employment situations present a clear-cut case.” Adams, 421 So. 3d at 340 (quoting James, 217 So. 3d at 788). “Summary judgment is appropriate where a temporary employment agency assigns an employee to another employer and the employee performs the normal work of the second employer and is controlled and supervised by that employer.” Id. (quoting N. Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So. 2d at 1282). III. Misrepresentations of the Law in Plaintiff’s Second Response The Court suspects that counsel for Plaintiff used generative artificial intelligence (AI) without checking for the accuracy of the information provided by AI in Plaintiff’s Response and Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 8 of 13
Page 9 of 13 Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (MEC #20).3 Plaintiff’s response misattributes analyses, quotations, and holdings to otherwise genuine citations. Plaintiff’s response states: The Mississippi Supreme Court has made this principle explicit, holding that “whether a worker is a “borrowed servant” is generally a question of fact to be decided by the jury.” Gorton v. Rance, 52 So. 3d 351, 359 (Miss. 2011). (MEC #20 p. 4). Gordon v. Rance is a real opinion from the Mississippi Supreme Court. However, this Court has scoured the opinion and the purported quoted language cannot be found anywhere in the opinion. In fact, the general issue - whether a worker is a borrowed servant is for the jury to decide – is not discussed at all in the opinion. The word “jury” is not found anywhere in the opinion. The Court searched for any Mississippi appellate opinion with the quoted language, or similar language, and could not find one. Plaintiff next cites Starcher v. Byrne, but failed to include the citation. Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So. 2d 737 (Miss. 1997) is a real opinion from the Mississippi Supreme Court. Plaintiff’s response states: In Starcher v. Byrne, the Mississippi Supreme Court expressly recognized that disputes concerning a borrowed-servant relationship turn on factual issues such as control, supervision, and the circumstances of the worker’s assignment, and therefore are properly resolved by the trier of fact rather than by the court as a matter of law. The Court declined to decide “borrowed servant” status on summary judgment, emphasizing that these elements “are inherently factual inquiries” that must be evaluated based on the evidence presented at trial. Under Starcher, when the parties dispute who exercised control, who supervised the work, or how the worker was placed on the assignment, the issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law and must be submitted to the jury. Id. (MEC #20 p. 4-5) (emphasis in bold in original). 3 The Court used Thomson Reuters Westlaw Precision and the Mississippi Supreme Court Decisions Hand Down Lists found at courts.ms.gov for the appellate opinions discussed in this section of the order. Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 9 of 13
Page 10 of 13 Starcher did not hold, expressly or impliedly, that the borrowed servant doctrine is properly resolved by the trier of fact rather than by the court as a matter of law. That was not even an issue in the case. Starcher never mentions “summary judgment.” The word “inherently” is not found in the opinion. Whether the issue should be submitted to the jury simply was never discussed in the opinion. The only place in the opinion where the Mississippi Supreme Court talked about questions of fact decided by the jury is: As to the “captain of the ship” doctrine, there may well be instances where the doctrine would be properly applicable, but this is not one of those instances. The Starchers wish this Court to decide as a matter of law issues which are in reality questions of fact, and were properly decided by a jury below. Therefore, we decline to adopt the “captain of the ship” doctrine in this case. Starcher, 687 So. 2d at 742. In that portion of the opinion, the Appellant/Plaintiff asked the Supreme Court to adopt the “captain of the ship” doctrine, which other states have adopted regarding the control a surgeon has in an operating room. Mississippi has not adopted the doctrine, and the Supreme Court declined to do so in that case. The questions of fact for the jury in Starcher were regarding whether the surgeon was negligent. It had nothing to do with whether a trial court can determine if the borrowed servant doctrine applies such that the workers’ compensation commission has exclusive jurisdiction. Plaintiff also cites James v. Dedeaux, 242 So. 3d 905, 909-10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). The correct citation for James v. Dedeaux is 217 So. 3d 785 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), and this Court cited the opinion in its discussion above. Plaintiff’s response states: The Mississippi Court of Appeals has repeatedly reaffirmed this rule, emphasizing that the “borrowed servant” doctrine is “fact driven” and that summary judgment is appropriate only where the material facts are undisputed. James v. Dedeaux, 242 So. 3d 905, 909–10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). (MEC #20 p. 5). James does discuss the borrowed servant doctrine and held: “Summary Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 10 of 13
Page 11 of 13 judgment is appropriate where a temporary employment agency assigns an employee to another employer and the employee performs the normal work of the second employer and is controlled and supervised by that employer.” James, 217 So. 3d at 788. The opinion does not state the facts must be undisputed. It appears Plaintiff is relying on the dissent and representing it to be the holding of the majority. Plaintiff cites Dawson v. Burgs, 373 So. 3d 759, 764–65 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), which this Court discussed above. Plaintiff’s response states: The first and most critical element is the existence of a contract of hire, and Mississippi courts have held that such a contract cannot be implied where the staffing agency retains the employment relationship and provides workers’ compensation coverage. Dawson v. Burgs, 373 So. 3d 759, 764-65 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). (MEC #20 p. 5). Dawson does not discuss any “elements,” let alone critical elements. The Court cannot find language in Dawson to support Plaintiff’s statement. In fact, contrary to Plaintiff’s statement, Dawson stated: “the reality of the workplace and the parties’ actions in carrying out a contract can impliedly modify, alter or waive express contract provisions.” Dawson, 373 So. 3d at 764. Plaintiff cites Northern Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1995),4 cited by this Court as N. Elec. Co. v. Phillips. Plaintiff’s response states: Mississippi law also limits the scope of the “borrowed servant” doctrine. The doctrine shields a borrowing employer only from vicarious liability for the worker’s negligence, not from liability for the employer’s own independent negligence. Phillips, 660 So. 2d at 1281-82. (Bold for Emphasis). Thus, even where “borrowed servant” status is established, the borrowing employer remains liable for its own negligent acts or those of its direct employees. (MEC #20 p. 5-6). The Court has not found a discussion of “vicarious liability” or “independent 4 This opinion is not available on the Mississippi Supreme Court Decisions Hand Down Lists found at courts.ms.gov. Opinions older than February 22, 1996 are not available. Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 11 of 13
Page 12 of 13 negligence” in N. Elec. Co. Plaintiff has misstated the holding in N. Elec. Co. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the borrowed servant doctrine applied, and that workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy. N. Elec. Co. 660 So. 2d at 1282. Plaintiff’s response states: Mississippi courts have held that the entity claiming immunity must be the entity that provided coverage. Dawson, 373 So. 3d at 764-65. Where the staffing agency, not the alleged borrowing employer, paid the premiums, maintained the policy, and initiated the claim, the borrowing employer is not entitled to immunity. (MEC #20 p. 6). Dawson made no such holding. In Dawson, the temporary staffing agency paid for the worker’s compensation coverage. In Adams, the temporary staffing agency paid for the worker’s compensation coverage. Plaintiff’s response states: The Mississippi Supreme Court in Northern Electric Co. v. Phillips stressed that whether a worker qualifies as a borrowed servant “depends upon the facts of each case.” 660 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1995). (MEC #20 p. 7). That language is simply not found in N. Elec. Co. v. Phillips. While the opinions cited by Plaintiff exist, Plaintiff’s response attributes contrived analyses, nonexistent quotations, and false holdings to them. These cases do not support the propositions offered by Plaintiff. AI is a powerful tool, that when used prudently, provides immense benefits. When used carelessly, it produces frustratingly realistic legal fiction that takes inordinately longer to respond to than create. While one party can create a fake legal brief at the click of a button, the opposing party and court must parse through the case names, citations, and points of law to determine which parts, if any, are true. Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., 778 F. Supp. 3d 879, 880 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 16, 2025). IV. Conclusion Plaintiff’s own statements of facts admit the first two criteria required for the borrowed Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 12 of 13
Page 13 of 13 servant doctrine to apply: (1) whose work is being performed and (2) who controls or has the right to control the workman as to the work being performed. While Plaintiff’s responses to the motion do not specifically admit the third criteria - (3) whether the workman voluntarily accepted the special employment – Plaintiff’s deposition testimony establishes that he voluntarily accepted the special employment. The Court finds that Plaintiff was a borrowed servant. Therefore, workers’ compensation is Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 6th day of July, 2026. ______________________________ TOMIKA H. IRVING CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE Case: 15CI1:25­cv­00135­THI     Document #: 23      Filed: 07/06/2026     Page 13 of 13
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