Santree v. Hines (Sept. 17, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Santree v. Eveangel Hines
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
North Carolina (NC)
Court
North Carolina Supreme Court
Decided
Sept. 17, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
SANTREE NC LLC, Plaintiff, v. EVEANGEL HINES, Defendant., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2658502Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTE: THIS OPINION WILL NOT APPEARIN A PRINTED VOLUME. THE DISPOSITIONWILL APPEAR IN THE REPORTER.An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Courtof Appeals does not constitute controlling legalauthority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permittedin accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3)of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.Court of Appeals of North Carolina.SANTREE NC LLC, Plaintiff,v.EVEANGEL HINES, Defendant.No. COA25-252|Filed 17 September 2025Editor's Note: This decision contains citation referencesthat are incorrect or do not actually exist. These invalidcitations appeared in the original court opinion and have beenpreserved as written since they are part of the official record.Any links to these invalid citations have been removed.Pitt County, No. 24CVD002919-730Appeal by Defendant from Judgment entered 22 October2024 by Judge Mario E. Perez in Pitt County District Court.Heard in the North Carolina Court of Appeals 6 August 2025.Attorneys and Law FirmsThe Law Offices of George Oliver, PLLC, by George MasonOliver, for Plaintiff-Appellee.Eveangel Hines, pro-se Defendant-Appellant.Panel consisting of Judges COLLINS, HAMPSON, andFREEMAN.OpinionPER CURIAM.*1 Defendant Eveangel Hines appeals from a Judgmententered on 22 October 2024 finding Defendant materiallybreached the lease agreement and ordering Defendant tovacate the property. For the reasons below, we dismiss theappeal.I. Factual and Procedural BackgroundDefendant and Plaintiff Santree NC, LLC, initially entered alease agreement on 22 October 2022 and have consistentlyrenewed the agreement on a yearly basis. Defendant mostrecently renewed the lease on 24 July 2024 for one year.The lease has always contained a Crime Free Agreement,which states, “Tenant, any member of the Tenant's household,or a guest or other person under Tenant's control shall notengage in criminal activity, regardless of whether it occurs onCommunity grounds[.]”On 15 September 2024, Defendant and her girlfriend becameinvolved in an altercation with a food delivery driver andher boyfriend, which led to either Defendant or her girlfriendpointing a firearm at the boyfriend. Police were calledin response to the altercation. Defendant initially failedto cooperate with law enforcement and subsequently wascharged with Assault by Pointing a Gun, Resisting andObstructing a Public Officer, and Possession of a Firearm bya Felon.On 16 September 2024, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letterof Notice to Terminate Tenancy informing her she mustvacate the premises due to the violation of the Crime FreeAgreement. Defendant did not vacate the premises.On 3 October 2024, the Pitt County Small Claims Courtordered Defendant be removed from the premises. Defendantappealed the order on 9 October 2024. On 22 October2024, the trial court entered a Judgment ejecting Defendantbased on a material breach of her lease agreement withPlaintiff. Defendant was ordered to vacate the premises withintwenty days. Defendant gave written Notice of Appeal on 1November 2024.II. AnalysisOn appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in grantingsummary judgment in favor of Plaintiff for numerous reasons,including: (1) a “lack of substantial evidence supporting [the]eviction”, (2) the existence of “clear factual disputes,” and(3) she did not breach the lease agreement because she wasnot convicted of a crime. Defendant also appears to suggest
SANTREE NC LLC, Plaintiff, v. EVEANGEL HINES, Defendant., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the eviction may have been retaliatory, in violation of N.C.Gen. Stat. § 42-37.1. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing the trial courtdid not err in granting its Motion for Summary Judgment andfurther contends Defendant has committed numerous Rulesviolations in her brief.Our Supreme Court has instructed that our “ ‘rules ofprocedure are necessary ... in order to enable the courtsproperly to discharge their dut[y]’ of resolving disputes.”Dogwood Dev. and Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp.Co., Inc., 362 N.C. 191, 193, 657 S.E.2d 361, 362 (2008)(alterations in original) (quoting Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C.788, 790, 156 S.E. 126, 127 (1930)). “[P]arties who defaultunder the rules ordinarily forfeit their right to review on themerits.” Id. at 194, 657 S.E.2d at 363 (citation omitted).“[T]he occurrence of default under the appellate rulesarises primarily from the existence of one or more of thefollowing circumstances: (1) waiver occurring in the trialcourt; (2) defects in appellate jurisdiction; and (3) violationof nonjurisdictional requirements.” Id.*2 In the case sub judice, Defendant has committednumerous non-jurisdictional violations of our Rules ofAppellate Procedure. For instance, in her brief, Defendantfailed to: (1) provide a table of authorities pursuant to Rule28(b)(1) and 26(g); (2) provide ground for appellate reviewpursuant to Rule 28(b)(4); (3) provide a statement of thefacts with citations to the record on appeal pursuant to Rule28(b)(5); (4) provide proof of service pursuant to Rule 28(b)(9) and 26(d); and (5) provide a Certificate of Compliancepursuant to Rule 28(j)(2). While “only in the most egregiousinstances of nonjurisdictional default will dismissal of theappeal be appropriate[,]” id. at 200, 657 S.E.2d at 366(citations omitted), “in certain instances noncompliance witha discrete requirement of the rules may constitute a defaultprecluding substantive review.” Id. (citing N.C.R. App. P.28(b)(6)). We believe this is such a case.In addition to these non-jurisdictional violations, Defendanthas abandoned her arguments due to her significant violationof Rule 28(b)(6). Rule 28(b)(6) of our Rules of AppellateProcedure states, in pertinent part: “Issues not presented in aparty's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument isstated, will be taken as abandoned.” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6)(2024). An appellant avoids abandonment of an issue whenshe complies with the Rule's mandate that “The body of theargument ... shall contain citations of the authorities uponwhich the appellant relies.” Id.Defendant's opening brief did not include any citation tocaselaw within the argument section. Additionally, while thelist of “issues presented” includes a citation to N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 42-37.1, which applies to retaliatory evictions, the briefdoes not present any arguments that Defendant's eviction wasretaliatory.After Plaintiff pointed out these violations in Defendant'sopening brief, Defendant filed a reply brief containingsome legal citations. However, these citations either do notaccurately support Defendant's argument or cite cases thatdo not exist. For example, Defendant cites Cheek v. Poole,to argue “trial courts must evaluate all relevant statutorydefenses before issuing an eviction order,” “substantialcompliance with appellate rules is sufficient to warrantreview,” and “Rule 56(c) ... mandates that all evidence bereviewed in the light most favorable to the state.” However,Cheek does not mention statutory defenses, substantialcompliance with rules, or Rule 56(c). See Cheek v. Poole, 121N.C. App. 370, 465 S.E.2d 561 (1996). Defendant also citesState v. Boggess, 258 S.E.2d 319 (N.C. 1979), but no caseby that name was published by the Supreme Court of NorthCarolina in 1979. Our Supreme Court did publish a case by thename of State v. Boggess in 2004; however, that opinion doesnot stand for any of the issues discussed in Defendant's brief.See State v. Boggess, 358 N.C. 676, 600 S.E.2d 453 (2004).Many courts have noted the increased use of artificialintelligence in briefs, which can lead to numerous errors whennot properly reviewed. See, e.g., Garner v. Kadince, Inc.,571 P.3d 812 (Utah Ct. App. 2025) (per curiam) (sanctioningattorney for citing nonexistent caselaw generated usingartificial intelligence); Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC,778 F.Supp.3d 879 (N.D. Miss. 2025) (sanctioning prose appellant where he submitted numerous false citationsobtained using artificial intelligence to the court in hiscomplaint and in subsequent filings). The fabrications andmiscited cases in Defendant's brief strongly suggest the useof artificial intelligence. Regardless, the lack of relevantcitations to legal authorities means Defendant has abandonedall legal arguments on appeal pursuant to Rule 28(b)(6).Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.DISMISSED.Report per Rule 30(e).
SANTREE NC LLC, Plaintiff, v. EVEANGEL HINES, Defendant., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2658502 (Table)End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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