City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, No. 20250340 (Feb. 12, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
CITY OF DICKINSON v. Seth Neil HELGESON
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
North Dakota (ND)
Court
North Dakota Supreme Court
Decided
Feb. 12, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Crothers (J.) (unanimous Court)
City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, --- N.W.3d ---- (2026)2026 ND 34 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 392303Supreme Court of North Dakota.CITY OF DICKINSON, Plaintiff and Appelleev.Seth Neil HELGESON, Defendant and AppellantNo. 20250340|Filed February 12, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, SouthwestJudicial District, the Honorable William A. Herauf, Judge.Attorneys and Law FirmsChristina M. Wenko and Stephen A. Fetch, Dickinson, ND,for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.Seth Neil Helgeson, Dickinson, ND, defendant and appellant;submitted on brief.OpinionCrothers, Justice.*1 [¶1] Seth Neil Helgeson appeals after a jury foundhim in violation of Dickinson Municipal Code § 58-705 forfailure to display license plates.1 Helgeson appeals fromthe district court's order designating him a vexatious litigant.He claims the district court lacked jurisdiction to determinehe was a vexatious litigant. He also claims the vexatiouslitigant designation violates his constitutional rights. TheCity of Dickinson claims Helgeson's appellate brief containsfictitious cases and asks us to sanction Helgeson by orderinghim to pay the City's attorney's fees in this matter. We affirmand sanction Helgeson $500.00.I[¶2] In March 2025, the automobile driven by Helgesonwas stopped and Helgeson was cited for failure to displaylicense plates in violation of Dickinson Municipal Code §58-705. The case was transferred from municipal to districtcourt for a jury trial. During pre-trial proceedings, Helgesonmoved to disqualify the prosecutor, to continue the trial, forrehearing of the denial of the motion to continue, and to stayproceedings. He also made motions in limine, three motionsto dismiss, and a motion to disqualify the judge. A juryultimately found Helgeson “guilty” of the underlying trafficviolation. In September 2025, the district court designatedHelgeson a vexatious litigant. Helgeson appeals the vexatiouslitigant order, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to makethat finding.[¶3] Whether the proceedings were criminal or civil in natureis a question of law. “Questions of law are fully reviewableon appeal.” Muhlbradt v. Pederson, 2020 ND 187, 8,947 N.W.2d 922. This Court reviews a vexatious litigantdesignation for an abuse of discretion. Glaum v. State, 2024ND 86, 15, 6 N.W.3d 603. “A court abuses its discretionwhen it acts arbitrarily, unconscionably, or unreasonably;when it misinterprets or misapplies the law; or when itsdecision is not the product of a rational mental process leadingto a reasoned determination.” Id. We review an allegedviolation of a constitutional right under a de novo standard.State v. Kirkpatrick, 2012 ND 229, 22, 822 N.W.2d 851(citing State v. Sorenson, 2009 ND 147, 16, 770 N.W.2d701).II[¶4] Helgeson claims the underlying proceeding for aviolation of Dickinson Municipal Code § 58-705 is criminal,so the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine he was avexatious litigant. Rule 58, N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R., providesthe basis and procedure for designating a litigant vexatious.Under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(2)(a), litigation is definedas:[A]ny civil or disciplinary actionor proceeding, including smallclaims actions, any appeal from anadministrative agency, any review ofa referee order by the district court,and any appeal to the supreme court.
City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, --- N.W.3d ---- (2026)2026 ND 34 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2“Litigation” does not include criminalactions.*2 [¶5] The jury found Helgeson violated DickinsonMunicipal Code § 58-705(a), which states:[N]o person may operate or drivea vehicle on the public highwaysof the State, unless the vehicle hasa distinctive number assigned to itby the Department, and two numberplates, bearing the distinctive numberconspicuously displayed, horizontallyand in an upright position, one onthe front and one on the rear of thevehicle ....Section 39-06.1-02(1), N.D.C.C., provides when a trafficviolation is noncriminal:An individual cited, in accordancewith sections 39-07-07 and 39-07-08for a traffic violation under state lawor municipal ordinance, other than anoffense listed in section 39-06.1-05,is deemed to be charged with anoncriminal offense.[¶6] Section 39-06.1-05, N.D.C.C., lists the offenses exceptedfrom N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-02. This list of exceptions does notinclude the failure to display a license plate. Because failureto display plates is not listed in N.D.C.C. § 39-06.1-05, theviolation is noncriminal. Helgeson's claim that the underlyingproceeding was criminal is legally incorrect. The district courthad authority under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 to designatehim a vexatious litigant.III[¶7] Helgeson claims the district court erred in finding him avexatious litigant. Rule 58, N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R., allowsthe court to designate a litigant as vexatious if the court finds,by the preponderance of the evidence, there is a sufficientbasis to do so. This Court reviews an order finding a vexatiouslitigant for an abuse of discretion. Glaum, 2024 ND 86, 15,6 N.W.3d 603.[¶8] “Vexatious conduct” is defined as activity that:(1) serves primarily to harass ormaliciously injure another party inlitigation; (2) is not warranted underexisting law and cannot be supportedby a good faith argument for anextension, modification, or reversalof existing law; (3) is imposedsolely for delay; (4) hinders theeffective administration of justice; (5)imposes an unacceptable burden onjudicial personnel and resources; or(6) impedes the normal and essentialfunctioning of the judicial process.N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(2)(c). A vexatious litigant is anindividual who:(1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period,has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained at least twolitigations that: (A) involved vexatious conduct on the partof the litigant and (B) were finally determined adversely tothat person;(2) After a litigation has been finally determined against theperson, the person has repeatedly relitigated or attemptedto relitigate either: (A) the validity of the determinationagainst the same party or parties as to whom the litigationwas finally determined; or (B) the cause of action, claim,controversy, or any of the issues of fact or law, determinedor concluded by the final determination against the sameparty or parties as to whom the litigation was finallydetermined;(3) In any litigation, the person repeatedly: (A) filesunmeritorious motions, pleadings, or other papers; (B)conducts unnecessary discovery; or (C) engages in anyother tactics, and such conduct is frivolous or intended tocause unnecessary burden, expense, or delay; ...*3 N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(2)(d) (cleaned up). Thedistrict court found Helgeson made many claims and motions
City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, --- N.W.3d ---- (2026)2026 ND 34 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3that were not meritorious or supported by good faitharguments. The court also found Helgeson engaged in “tacticsand conduct that are frivolous.”[¶9] Our review of the record shows Helgeson engaged in anextensive, mostly needless, and groundless pretrial motionspractice that included requests to disqualify the prosecutor, tocontinue the trial, to rehear denial of the continuance motion,and to stay the case. Helgeson also filed motions in limine,three motions to dismiss, and a motion to disqualify thejudge. The docket for this relatively simple traffic offensecontains 277 entries, the majority of which were generated byHelgeson's motions practice. Our review of the record showsthe district court did not act arbitrarily, unconscionably, orunreasonably by entering the vexatious litigant order. Nordid the court misinterpret or misapply the law. The court,therefore, did not abuse its discretion in finding Helgeson wasa vexatious litigant.IV[¶10] Helgeson claims the district court violated his equalprotection rights, First Amendment rights, right to opencourts, and federal and state due process rights by designatinghim a vexatious litigant.[¶11] This Court has discussed the due process andconstitutional considerations associated with a vexatiouslitigant designation. In Rath v. Rath, we weighed theconstitutional implications of being designated a vexatiouslitigant:“[A] court may restrict an individual's right to access thestate's legal system in light of the rights of the public andnecessities of the occasion.” Smith v. Erickson, 2019 ND48, 12, 923 N.W.2d 503. In Smith, we concluded finding aperson is a vexatious litigant and entering a pre-filing orderdoes not violate that person's constitutional right to accessthe court system.We have long held courts have the inherent authority tocontrol dockets to stem abuses of the judicial process andto maintain the integrity of the court. See, e.g., Holkesvig v.Grove, 2014 ND 57, 17, 844 N.W.2d 557; Fed. Land Bankof St. Paul v. Ziebarth, 520 N.W.2d 51, 58 (N.D. 1994);see also Holkesvig v. VandeWalle, 2016 ND 107, 11, 879N.W.2d 728.2022 ND 105, ¶¶ 36-37, 974 N.W.2d 652 (cleaned up).In Rath, this Court upheld the constitutionality of thevexatious litigant statute. Id. 38. The required findings,filing requirements, and notice to the litigant were sufficientprocedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations.Id. These same considerations apply here, and Helgeson'sconstitutional challenges to N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 arewithout merit.V[¶12] The City requests sanctions by way of an award ofattorney's fees against Helgeson for his use of fictitious casesin his appellate brief. The City claims six cases in Helgeson'sbrief do not exist. Granting sanctions lies entirely in thediscretion of this Court. Ihli v. Lazzaretto, 2015 ND 151, 21,864 N.W.2d 483.[¶13] Rule 28(l), N.D.R.App.P., requires briefs submitted tothis Court be “concise, presented with accuracy, logicallyarranged with proper headings, and free from burdensome,irrelevant or immaterial matters.” Rule 13, N.D.R.App.P.,provides, “[t]he supreme court may take appropriate actionagainst any person failing to perform an act required by ruleor court order.” “Determining whether to administer sanctionsfor not complying with the Rules of Appellate Procedure restswholly within our discretion.” Ihli, 2015 ND 151, 21, 864N.W.2d 483.*4 [¶14] In reviewing the City's allegations, we determineHelgeson cited several nonexistent cases. His offeredcitations lead to different cases that do not support his claims,and a search of the provided case names also is fruitless.The table below lists Helgeson's fictitious citations and thegenuine cases the citations refer to:Helgeson'sOffered Citation Case withCorrespondingState Reporter Case withCorrespondingRegional Reporter Case withSimilar Titles State ex rel. Olsonv. City of Fargo, 250N/A People v. Marshall,73 Mich.App. 97,Olson v. City of W.Fargo, 305 N.W.2d821 (N.D. 1981)
City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, --- N.W.3d ---- (2026)2026 ND 34 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4N.W.2d 558 (N.D.1977) 250 N.W.2d 557,558 (1976) State v. $44,140.00U.S. Currency, 2003ND 28 657 N.W.2d829 Jensen v. State,2003 ND 28 State v. Rhodes, 657N.W.2d 823, 829(Minn. 2003) State v. $44,140.00U.S. Currency, 2012ND 176, 820 N.W.2d697 State v. Clark, 2022ND 85 999 N.W.2d632 Energy Transfer LPv. N. Dakota Priv.Investigative & Sec.Bd., 2022 ND 85,973 N.W.2d 394 State v. Nelson, 999N.W.2d 632 (N.D.2023) State v. Clark, 2012ND 135, 818 N.W.2d739 State v. Rogers,2006 ND 85 712N.W.2d 841 In re Mertz, 2006 ND85, 712 N.W.2d 849 State ex rel.Stenehjem v.FreeEats.com Inc.,712 N.W.2d 828,841 (N.D. 2006) State v. Rogers,2007 ND 68, 730N.W.2d 859 State v. Schneider,2016 ND 198 885N.W.2d 811 In re Adoption ofA.J.S. & N.J.S.,2016 ND 198 State v. Davis, 371Wis.2d 737, 885N.W.2d 807, 811(Wis. Ct. App. 2016) State v. Schneider,2014 ND 198, 855N.W.2d 399 [¶15] The record also shows Helgeson submitted falsecitations to the district court. Helgeson does not defendor explain his use of fictitious cases, but instead arguesthe City's brief contains incorrect citations. He correctlyclaims the appellee's brief miscites State v. Kovalevich, 2023ND 206, 997 N.W.2d 628, as a 2003 case, and People v.Marshall, 73 Mich.App. 97, 250 N.W.2d 557 (1976) asa 1994 case. He makes other meritless claims against theCity, alleging citation errors. Helgeson wrongly argues weshould “disregard Appellee's claim that Appellant relied onnonexistent authority” because of citation errors in the City'sbrief.[¶16] This Court does not appreciate the extra work caused byerroneous citations contained in any party's brief. However,the errors in Helgeson's brief go far beyond a mistake incitation. Five of his cases are fictitious. “Fake or nonexistentlegal citations typically are the result of AI ‘hallucinations.’ ”Mezu v. Mezu, 267 Md.App. 354, 346 A.3d 181, 189 (2025)(citing Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P., 114 Cal.App.5th426, 336 Cal. Rptr. 3d 897, 911 (2025)). By this statementand citation, we do not criticize the use of AI or AI-assistedtools. To the contrary, we encourage and embrace the useof technology to improve the work product of all litigants,whether represented or self-represented.[¶17] Like our sister states, we view the use of AI-related technology as a means of improving access tothe courts. See, e.g., Illinois Supreme Court, Policy onArtificial Intelligence (2024) (noting the use of AI canimprove access to justice and “should not be discouraged”if it is reviewed and falls within ethical guidelines); ChiefJustice G. Richard Bevan, AI in the Courts: BalancingTradition and Innovation, Idaho State Bar (Dec. 29,2025), https://isb.idaho.gov/blog/ai-in-the-courts-balancing-tradition-and-innovation-by-chief-justice-g-richard-bevan(“We cannot ignore technology that may serve people betteror help us work more efficiently.”); Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'lAss'n as Tr., Igloo Series Trust, 783 F. Supp. 3d 959, 960 (N.D.Tex. 2025) (“AI is a powerful tool, that when used prudently,provides immense benefits.’ AI also ‘may ultimately prove ahelpful tool to assist pro se litigants in bringing meritoriouscases to the courts,’ ....”).*5 [¶18] That said, the use of technology, especiallydeveloping technology like AI, requires careful use andscrupulous verification of the arguments and authoritiesgenerated by anyone using the tool. Evenstad v. Buchholz,1997 ND 141, 8, 567 N.W.2d 194 (“[O]ur statutes andrules on procedure will not be modified or applied differentlymerely because a party not learned in the law is acting prose.”). For our purposes here, it does not matter whetherHelgeson's fictitious cases and erroneous citations were AI-generated or the result of careless work. Rather, regardless
City of Dickinson v. Helgeson, --- N.W.3d ---- (2026)2026 ND 34 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5of how the errors came to be, he is responsible for theconsequences of his errors, namely the additional workloadon the appellee and the courts to address them.[¶19] The City requests sanctions against Helgeson for aviolation of N.D.R.App.P. 28(l). The City did not providean affidavit or otherwise specify how much in attorney'sfees it expended in connection with Helgeson's fictitiouscitations and meritless claims regarding the City's citations.We award the City $500.00 from Helgeson as a sanction forhis misconduct, and warn all litigants that using erroneouscitation to authority, and providing courts with citation tofictitious cases, exposes the filing party to the imposition ofsanctions appropriate under the circumstances.VI[¶20] The district court had authority to find Helgeson avexatious litigant because the underlying proceedings werenoncriminal, and the district court did not abuse its discretionin designating him a vexatious litigant under N.D. Sup. Ct.Admin. R. 58. Helgeson's constitutional challenge to hisvexatious litigant designation is without merit. We affirm thedistrict court's order designating Helgeson a vexatious litigantand grant the City's request for sanctions against Helgeson forciting non-existent cases and using erroneous case citations.[¶21] Lisa Fair McEvers, C.J.Daniel J. CrothersJerod E. TufteJon J. JensenDouglas A. BahrAll Citations--- N.W.3d ----, 2026 WL 392303, 2026 ND 34Footnotes1The verdict form and judgment state Helgeson was found “guilty” of the violation. However, use of the word“guilty” is a misnomer because the charge is a noncriminal infraction. The appropriate disposition was forhim to have been adjudicated in violation of the ordinance. See Andre v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 295N.W.2d 128, 131 (N.D. 1980) (relating to the “admission or adjudication of a traffic violation”).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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