Strong v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs. (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Nebraska (NE)
Court
Nebraska Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
John M. Gerrard (J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLCUnited States District Court, D. Nebraska. | January 15, 2025 | Slip Copy | 2025 WL 100904Document Detailsstandard Citation:Strong v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, No. 8:24-CV-352, 2025WL 100904 (D. Neb. Jan. 15, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 100904Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: "2025 WL 100904"Jurisdiction:NebraskaDelivery DetailsDate:May 18, 2025 at 7:06 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineAttorneys and LawFirms (p.1)MEMORANDUMAND ORDER(p.1)All Citations (p.7)
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 100904Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Nebraska.Mike K. STRONG andMaureena J. Strong, Plaintiffs,v.RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENTSERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendants.8:24-CV-352|Signed January 15, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsMike K. Strong, Gretna, NE, Pro Se.Maureena J. Strong, Gretna, NE, Pro Se.Rodney Kleitsch, South Law, P.C., Waukee, IA, forDefendants.MEMORANDUM AND ORDERJohn M. Gerrard, Senior United States District Judge*1 The plaintiffs, Mike and Maureena Strong,are frequent fliers (or filers) with the Court. Theirbevy of lawsuits relate to a property located inGretna, Nebraska, and attempts by creditors to enforcea security interest in the property. This case isno different, although the Strongs allege that newwrongful acts purportedly occurred after the previouslawsuits terminated. See filing 5 at 3.There are four defendants this time: two relatedmortgage servicing companies, Rushmore LoanManagement Services, LLC (“Rushmore Loan”), andRushmore Servicing; a lawyer who represented thosecompanies, Liliana Shannon; and Shannon's law firm,Southlaw, P.C. Shannon allegedly represented theRushmore defendants during foreclosure proceedingsin state court, and during one of the Strongs'bankruptcy proceedings. See filing 5 at 1. Thedefendants have jointly moved to dismiss. Filing 7;filing 12. The defendants have also asked this Courtto sanction the Strongs and restrict their ability to filelawsuits in this Court related to the Gretna property.See filing 7 at 3.I. STANDARD OF REVIEWTo survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state aclaim, the text of the plaintiff's complaint must containenough factual allegations to nudge the plaintiff'sclaims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2007). A plaintiff's claims are plausible if thefacts alleged allow the Court to reasonably inferthat the defendant could be held responsible for themisconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,679 (2009). Whether a plaintiff is represented or prose, the plaintiff's complaint must allege specific factssufficient to state a claim. See Martin v. Sargent, 780F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).The Court will liberally construe pro se complaints,and these litigants are held to a lesser pleadingstandard. Topchian v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.,760 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2014). If the essence ofan allegation is discernible, although pleaded without“legal nicety,” the Court will construe the complaint ina way that allows the claim to be evaluated within theproper legal framework. Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912,915 (8th Cir. 2004). While the Court must accept astrue all facts pleaded by the pro se party, and grant allreasonable inferences in their favor, see Gallagher v.City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 2012),determining whether a complaint states a plausibleclaim for relief requires the Court to draw on its judicialexperience and common sense. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court is normally limited to consideringthe facts alleged in the complaint. However, theCourt may consider exhibits attached to the complaintand materials that are necessarily embraced by thepleadings without converting the motion. Mattes v.ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8thCir. 2003). Documents necessarily embraced by thepleadings include those whose contents are alleged ina complaint and whose authenticity no party questions,but which are not physically attached to the pleading.Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2(8th Cir. 2012). The Court may also take notice ofpublic records, such as prior court proceedings. Levy v.Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007).II. BACKGROUND*2 The following timeline is based on the facts in theStrongs' complaint, accepted as true for the purposes ofthe pending motions to dismiss, and the relevant stateand bankruptcy court proceedings. See filing 5; Levy,477 F.3d at 991.• January 2021: Rushmore Loan, represented byShannon and Southlaw, sued the Strongs in statecourt. See filing 7-1 at 25; case no. CI 21-2476(Dist. Ct. of Sarpy Cnty, Neb.).• July 2023: The state court entered judgment infavor of Rushmore Loan, ordering a judgmentlien on the Gretna property. See filing 7-1 at 26.The Strongs moved the state court to vacate orset aside its judgment. See filing 7-1 at 29. Thatmotion was promptly denied. Filing 7-1 at 29.The Strongs then appealed the judgment to theNebraska Court of Appeals. Filing 7-1 at 32; seecase no A-24-770 (Neb. Ct. App.).• August 2023: The Strongs filed for bankruptcy,allegedly to prevent the imminent judicialforeclosure sale. Filing 5 at 3; case no. BK23-80695 (Bankr. D. Neb.). In bankruptcy court,the Strongs filed an adversary complaint againstRushmore Loan, Rushmore Servicing, and U.S.Bank. See case no. BK 23-8023 (Bankr. D.Neb.). Those defendants were jointly representedby Shannon and Southlaw. The Strongs soughtdeclaratory judgment nullifying the state courtOrder of Sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed theadversary complaint with prejudice. See case no.BK 23-80695 (Bankr. D. Neb.).• September 2023: Rushmore Loan transferred itsinterest in the Gretna property to RushmoreServicing. Filing 5 at 19.• January 2024: The Nebraska Court of Appealsissued its mandate dismissing the Strongs' appealfrom the July 2023 summary judgment order. Seefiling 7-1 at 36; see also Rushmore Loan Mgmt.Servs. LLC v. Strong, 32 Neb. App. xiii, No.A-23-763 (summarily dismissing appeal for lackof jurisdiction).• August 2024: The state court executed an order ofsale of the Gretna property in favor of RushmoreLoan. Filing 5 at 15-17. The Strongs submittedan “Emergency Motion to Vacate Order of Sale,”which was denied. The Strongs appealed, andthat appeal is currently pending. See case no.A-24-877 (Neb. Ct. App.).The Strongs allege that Shannon and Southlaw madefalse statements to the bankruptcy court regarding therelationship between Rushmore Loan and RushmoreServicing, as well as purportedly misrepresenting theStrongs as “serial filers.” Filing 5 at 6. They allegea litany of legal theories, including state-law tortslike abuse of process and malicious prosecution, andviolations of statutes like the Fair Debt CollectionPractices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. See filing 5 at4-10.The Strongs request compensatory and punitivedamages, a declaration that the sheriff's sale wasunlawful and void, reversal or annulment of thesheriff's sale, and restoration of the Strongs' rights andinterest in the Gretna property. Filing 5 at 10-11.III. DISCUSSION1. Motion to Join and Default JudgmentShannon and Southlaw seek to dismiss the claimsagainst them based on both lack of jurisdiction andfor failure to state a claim. Filing 7. The Rushmoredefendants filed a “ditto” motion, and expressed thatthe legal arguments contained in the other defendants'brief were equally applicable to the claims againstRushmore. See filing 12. Citing nonexistent cases,1the Strongs assert that joining another party's motionwithout argumentation is insufficient. See filing 13 at1.*3 It's true that the local rules require that a motionbe supported by a brief filed and served togetherwith a motion. NECivR 7.1(a)(1)(A). But a brief isnot required if a motion raises no substantial issue
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3of law and relief is in the Court's discretion. Rule7.1(a)(1)(B). Here, the motion at issue requests thatthe Court apply the already-filed motion to dismissto the Rushmore defendants. All of the defendantsare jointly represented. The Court agrees with theRushmore defendants that duplicative briefing on thesame issues is unnecessary. See filing 12 at 1. TheCourt will consider the Rushmore defendants under thelegal arguments raised in the other defendants' motionto dismiss.The Strongs have also moved for default judgmentagainst Rushmore. See filing 11 (incorrectly filed as“Administrative Record”). But the Strongs have failedto comply with the procedural requirements to obtainsuch a judgment: They did not obtain a clerk's entry ofdefault, nor did they submit an affidavit stating that theparty against whom the default judgment is requestedis not an infant or incompetent person. See NECivR55.1(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 55.Nor does it seem that the Strongs could obtain theclerk's entry of default, anyway. While the summonsfor the allegedly-defaulted defendants was issued onSeptember 25, 2024, the Strongs have not adducedany evidence that service was executed on that day.On the contrary, Rushmore has provided receipts thatit was not served until October 7, 2024. Filing 16 at3. Further, there is no way that the Strongs can showprejudice from relying on the “default.” See Johnsonv. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir.1998). The motion for default judgment (filing 11) isdenied.2. State Court Judgment and Sheriff's SaleThe Strongs request that this Court “vacate and setaside” a state court order issuing a sheriff's sale of theGretna property. Filing 5 at 6. That order is currentlyunder appeal. See case no. A-24-877 (Neb. Ct. App.).The Strongs further request that this Court restore theStrongs' interest in the Gretna property, apparentlyasking this Court to undo the state court's judgmentin favor of the Rushmore defendants. Filing 5 at 10.But despite the Strongs' assertions about jurisdiction,2there are a number of issues with litigation in federalcourt intended to “nullify” a state court order.To start, a federal court lacks jurisdiction over “casesbrought by state-court losers complaining of injuriescaused by state-court judgments rendered before thedistrict court proceedings commenced and invitingdistrict court review and rejection of those judgments.”Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp. v. S. Farm BureauCas. Ins. Co., 855 F.3d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 2017) (theRooker-Feldman doctrine); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257.And a federal court must abstain when there is aparallel criminal prosecution, or particular state civilproceedings akin to a criminal prosecution, ongoingin a state court. See Sprint Comm., Inc. v. Jacobs,571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (Younger abstention). Thiswould include civil enforcement proceedings, where ajudgment creditor seeks to execute its rights. See id.;Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987).Of course, just because a federal plaintiff raises thesame or similar issues as decided in a state courtproceeding does not mean dismissal or abstention arewarranted. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi BasicIndus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005); Sprint Comm.,571 U.S. at 77. Federal courts are obligated to exercisetheir jurisdiction ... if they have it. A party that presentsan independent claim, even one contrary to a statecourt's order, is able to pursue that claim in federalcourt.*4 But the Strongs don't present an independent claimregarding the allegedly “wrongful” sheriff's sale—thealleged damages, and the requested relief, flow directlyfrom the state court's order. The Strongs contendthat they do not “directly” challenge the state court'srulings. See filing 8 at 3. But that's just nonsense, andcontradictory to the relief they request. See filing 5 at 6.Moreover, that order is currently under appeal, basedon alleged problems with standing that the Strongspresented to the state court. See filing 7-1 at 41.This Court cannot interfere with the state court's civilenforcement proceedings until they are fully resolved.See Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 17.3 And to the extentthe Strongs ask this Court to undo the Sarpy CountyDistrict Court's July 2023 judgment, that claim isbarred by Rooker-Feldman.Notwithstanding Rooker-Feldman and Younger, theStrongs argue that the defendants perpetrated a fraudon the foreclosure court, violating federal criminal law.See filing 5 at 5; 18 U.S.C. § 152. But an alleged
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4violation of a criminal law does not create a privatecause of action. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Schwarting,894 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200 (D. Neb. 2012) (collectingcases). And the Eighth Circuit has not recognizeda fraud-on-the-court exception to Rooker-Feldman.Fielder v. Cr. Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031,1035-36 (8th Cir. 1999). The Court cannot take anyaction related to the state court's orders.The Strongs also advanced the same claims, regardingthe defendants' lack of standing and other deficienciesin the summary judgment order, to the bankruptcycourt in an adversary proceeding. In the adversaryproceeding, the Strongs sought declaratory judgmentvoiding the sheriff's sale and the state court's order.See case no. BK 23-8023 (Bankr. D. Neb.). Thebankruptcy court dismissed the claims with prejudice.This dismissal implicates the doctrine of res judicata.The bankruptcy court was a federal proceeding, sofederal principles of res judicata apply. Cf. Brown v.Kansas City Live, LLC, 931 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir.2019). A plaintiff is precluded from relitigating anyclaims already pursued, or which might have beenpursued in the earlier proceeding. Lane v. Peterson,899 F.2d 737, 742 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court is barredfrom hearing claims if: (1) a prior judgment wasrendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) theprior judgment was a final judgment on the merits, and(3) the same cause of action and the same parties ortheir privies were involved in both cases. Id.All of the elements are met here. The bankruptcycourt judgment came from a competent court, andthe judgment was on the merits. And the Rushmoredefendants were parties to the adversary complaint.Res judicata does not preclude the Strongs frompursuing claims against Shannon and Southlaw—butthe facts alleged related to those defendants appearto seek damages for alleged misleading statementsmade during the bankruptcy proceedings, and thoseallegations cannot support the requested relief tovacate or undo the state court orders. Res judicataprecludes this Court's review of alleged deficiencies inthe state court judgment.Based on Younger abstention and the doctrines ofRooker-Feldman and res judicata, the Strongs areunable to pursue the claims intended to undo the statecourt's orders.3. Other Claims(a) FDCPAThe Strongs assert that the defendants violated federallaw by refusing to release a lien in response to awritten request to do so. See filing 5 at 7. Theyadditionally argue that the defendants misrepresentedthe relationship between the Rushmore defendants inbankruptcy court and in state court in order to collectthe debt.*5 The FDCPA generally prohibits debt collectorsfrom using “any false, deceptive, or misleadingrepresentation or means in connection with thecollection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e;Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A., 869 F.3d 685,694 (8th Cir. 2017). But the Eighth Circuit has notaddressed whether foreclosure activities constitutedebt collection under the FDCPA, and at least one courtin this circuit has determined it does not. See Gray v.Four Oak Court Ass'n, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887(D. Minn. 2008). There's a legal distinction between a“debt” and a security interest like a mortgage or a lien,and the FDCPA may not apply to the latter. See id.Even if the FDCPA did apply, there's no basis toinfer that the defendants violated the statute whenthey ignored a baseless letter from the Strongsrequesting that the lien be released. The Courtis further unpersuaded that the defendants' allegedrepresentation that Mike Strong is a “serial filer” wasfalse. While considering a motion to dismiss, the Courtmust accept the plaintiff's allegations as true. But theCourt may take judicial notice of other lawsuits. ThisCourt previously referred to Strong as a vexatiouslitigant. See Strong v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., No.8:17-cv-485, 2018 WL 3321438, at *1 (D. Neb. July 5,2018). Based on common sense and prior proceedings,see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, the defendants' allegedstatement was not false or misleading.And the fact that Shannon and Southlaw referred to theRushmore defendants' interest as harmonized duringthe foreclosure and bankruptcy proceeding cannot be
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5characterized as misleading. As the defendants pointout, under Nebraska law, “[i]n the case of any ...transfer of interest, the action may be continued in thename of the original party.” Filing 7-1 at 17 n.1 (citingNeb. Rev. Stat. § 25-322). There is no basis to infer thatthe defendants made false or misleading statementsregarding the relationship between Rushmore Loanand Rushmore Servicing. Rushmore Loan initiatedthe foreclosure action, and Nebraska law enables thatoriginal party to continue the lawsuit, even after asubsequent transfer of interest.The Strongs seek to benefit from legal technicalitiesthey simply don't understand. The FDCPA wasintended to prevent abusive, deceptive, and unfairpractices by debt collectors. § 1692. The Strongs'allegations fall far short of alleging any such practice,even drawing all inferences in their favor and liberallyconstruing their complaint. A lawyer is obligated tozealously represent her client, and there's no indicationthat Shannon did anything but. The Strongs have failedto state a claim under the FDCPA.(b) State Law TortsNor do the purported false or misleading statementsstate a claim for relief under any other tort underNebraska law. The Strongs pled a variety of legaldoctrines, citing inapplicable Nebraska statutes andcases. See generally filing 5. But it is the facts alleged,not the legal theories offered, which state a claim forrelief. The Court has liberally construed the Strongs'complaint and has considered if any cause of actionexists based on the facts alleged. The Strongs havefailed to allege even an inference of wrongdoing on thepart of any of the defendants.Specifically, the Strongs pled a number of “counts”which don't reflect actual causes of action.These include: Count I, Wrongful Sheriff's Sale;Count II, Promoting Wrongful Sheriff's Sale andMisrepresenting Plaintiff as a Serial Filer; Count III,Failure to Release Lien; Count IV, Dereliction of Duty;and Count V, Damages for Credit and Reputation.See filing 5 at 4-9. But none of these are actuallyindependent causes of action. Some of the “counts”contain facts which might be considered as maliciousprosecution or abuse of process, separately listed as“Count VI” and “Count VII.”*6 But the facts alleged support neither a maliciousprosecution nor an abuse of process claim. Anessential element of malicious prosecution is that theproceedings must have terminated in the plaintiff'sfavor. McKinney v. Okoye, 842 N.W.2d 581, 591 (Neb.2014). The Strongs cannot make such a showing here—they have lost every lawsuit in which the presentdefendants have been involved. Abuse of process isnot a particularly well-developed tort under Nebraskalaw. See Gordon v. Comm. First St. Bank, 587 N.W.2d343, 351 (Neb. 1998). But at a minimum, it requires aplaintiff to establish two elements: “the existence of anulterior purpose and an act in the use of the process notproper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.”Id. The Strongs have not identified any ulterior motivesor irregular process, or any facts that support evenan inference of this element of their abuse of processclaim.“Dereliction of duty” might be construed as a claimfor malpractice, or breach of a fiduciary duty. But thefacts alleged appear to refer to Southlaw's failure toproperly train or oversee Shannon, and are presented asa theory of why Southlaw should be legally responsiblefor Shannon's actions. It's a theory of liability, but isnot a standalone legal theory to afford relief.Nor can any of the facts alleged support a claimfor malpractice or breach of a fiduciary duty. There'sno indication that Shannon or Southlaw breachedany duty, fiduciary or otherwise, owed to an adverseparty in a foreclosure action. See Sickler v. Kirby,805 N.W.2d 675, 691 (Neb. 2011) (starting point fordetermining an attorney's duty to a third party iswhether the third party was an intended beneficiaryof an attorney's service); Miller v. Farmers andMerchants Bank, No. A-15-459, 2016 WL 2978594,at *4 (Neb. Ct. App. May 17, 2016) (no fiduciaryrelationship between a mortgagor and mortgagee).Finally, there's no basis to infer that the defendants didanything wrong when they ignored the Strong's requestto release the lien. The defendants are free to exercisetheir legal rights granted by the judgment in their favor,which includes legal action related to the judgmentlien. The Strongs have failed to state a claim regarding
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6the alleged “failure to release the lien” or the allegedfailure to respond to the Strongs' letter regarding thelien.4. Unsupported ClaimsTo support their lacking legal theories, the Strongscited to several cases the Court is unable to find.Strangely, while the case names the Strongs cite exist,the actual citation is completely different. For example,the Strongs cite United States v. Bortnovsky, 820 F.3d572 (2d Cir. 2016), filing 13 at 1, but the appropriatecase citation for that case name is (presumably) 683 F.Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), and the citation provideddirects to United States v. Tagliaferri, 820 F.3d 568(2d. Cir. 2016). And neither case supports the Strongs'purported legal proposition. While once might be amistake, the Strongs' briefing has several similar errors(mismatched case names and citations irrelevant to thelegal proposition purported).The Court is highly suspicious that the Strongsutilized generative artificial intelligence in draftingtheir complaint and briefs, which is known to resultin the sort of fictional or “hallucinatory” citations theStrongs provide. See, e.g., Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F.Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). The Strongs should takenotice of the fact that such conduct, if repeated, couldsubject them to sanctions, even as pro se litigants. SeeRubio v. D.C., No. 23-cv-719, 2024 WL 4957373, at*4 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2024); Vargas v. Salazar, No. 4:23-CV-4267, 2024 WL 4804091, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Nov.1, 2024); Martin v. Hawai'i, No. 24-cv-294, 2024 WL3877013, at *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 20, 2024). Even pro selitigants are bound by Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), see Carmanv. Treat, 7 F.3d 1379, 1382 (8th Cir. 1993), and citingimaginary law violates that rule, see Park v. Kim, 91F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024).*7 And even if the Strongs' cited cases or statutesexisted, or said what they are purported to say, theStrongs cannot survive the defendants' motion todismiss. The Strongs are not permitted to shop aroundthe same set of facts to different courts or judges in thehopes of getting a different answer. And there are nofacts that support even an inference of wrongdoing onthe part of the defendants. The present lawsuit is justanother attempt to delay the inevitable legal outcome:removing the Strongs from their Gretna property. Noneof the Strongs' arguments indicate that they are entitledto remain in a home for which they have not paid.IV. SANCTIONSIt's clear the Strongs are uninterested in ceasing theirmalicious and vexatious litigation. The defendantshave requested that this Court sanction the Strongsto prevent them from filing more meritless lawsuits.4A district court is vested with discretion to imposesanctions upon a party under its inherent disciplinarypower. Bass v. Gen. Motors Corp., 150 F.3d 842, 851(8th Cir. 1998). But there is a strong policy againstdepriving a party of his day in court. Id. A party'saffinity for litigation, standing alone, does not providea sufficient reason for filing restrictions. Ruderer v.U.S., 462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1972).That said, if a court determines that a party is actingin bad faith, or if a party has already been afforded afull opportunity to present his claims and further suitson these claims would uselessly consume the Court'stime, filing restrictions may be appropriate. See id.;Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991).Such restrictions must be narrowly tailored to afford aparty the right to access the courts. See Bass, 150 F.3dat 851; Van Deelen v. City of Kansas City, 262 Fed.App'x 723, 724 (8th Cir. 2007).At this point ... the Court will not impose filingrestrictions on the Strongs. However, if they continueto pursue claims with the intent to delay, hinder,or harass those attempting to exercise their legalrights with regard to the Gretna property, this Courtwill strongly consider both monetary sanctions andnarrowly-tailored filing restrictions. See Chambers,501 U.S. at 45.Accordingly,IT IS ORDERED:1. Shannon and Southlaw's motion to dismiss andfor sanctions (filing 7) is granted in part.
Strong v. Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.72. Rushmore Loan and Rushmore Servicing'smotion to join the motion to dismiss (filing 12) isgranted.3. The Strongs' motion for default judgment (filing11) is denied.4. The Strongs' complaint is dismissed in its entirety.5. A separate judgment will be entered.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 100904Footnotes1The Court suspects that the Strongs utilized generative artificial intelligence in drafting their pleadings andbriefs. This suspicion is discussed more below.2The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable tolegal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.3And even once those proceedings resolve, any attack would be collateral; this Court has no authority toundo a state court judgment under these circumstances.4That said, it's unclear to the Court how, exactly, the Strongs are still residing in the Gretna property. Seefiling 7-1 at 2. The defendants represented that the lender purchased the property at a judicial foreclosuresale. See filing 7-1 at 11. It's unclear if the defendants have attempted to remove the Strongs from theproperty. Sanctions are likely unwarranted if these or future defendants fail to demonstrate sufficient effortsto exercise their rights.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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