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In re Cherry-Crockette
(2026)
Case details
Full caption
In re Nicholia Cherry-Crockette
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New Jersey (NJ)
Court
New Jersey Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Case
25-21600-VFP
Doc
169
Filed
05/20/26
Entered
05/20/26
12:16:18
Desc
Main
Document
Page
1
of
20
ILED
May
20,
2026
Jeanne
A.
Naughton,
CLERK
United
States
Bankruptcy
Court
Newark,
NJ
By:
.
fran
Filqueiras,
Couttroom
Deputy
UNITED
STATES
BANKRUPTCY
COURT
DISTRICT
OF
NEW
JERSEY
In
Re:
Case
No.:
25-21600
(VFP)
Nicholia
Cherry-Crockette,
Chapter:
13
Hearing
Date:
April
2,
2026
Debtor.
Judge:
Vincent
F.
Papalia
OPINION
DENYING
MOTION
FOR
SANCTIONS
FOR
WILLFUL
VIOLATION
OF
THE
AUTOMATIC
STAY
FOR
PUBLICATION
Appearances:
Nicholia
Cherry-Crockette
Steven
P.
Kelly,
Esq.
59
Morris
Street
STERN
&
EISENBERG
East
Orange,
NJ
07017
1120
Rt.
73
Pro
se
Mt.
Laurel,
NJ
08054
Counsel
for
Rocket
Mortgage,
LLC
Jk/a
Quicken
Loans,
LLC
HONORABLE
VINCENT
F.
PAPALIA,
Bankruptcy
Judge
L
INTRODUCTION
This
matter
comes
before
the
Court
on
the
pro
se
Debtor’s
Motion
for
Sanctions
against
Rocket
Mortgage,
LLC
for
Willful
Violation
of
the
Automatic
Stay
(the
“Sanctions
Motion™)
filed
December
3,
2025.!
For
the
reasons
stated
in
this
Opinion,
the
Sanctions
Motion
is
DENIED.
!
Dkt.
No.
29
Naughton,
25-21600
THE
Judge
Motion
Case
25-21600-VFP
Doc
169
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violation
or,
whether
despite
that
regulation,
Rocket’s
communication
with
the
Debtor
violated
the
automatic
stay.
At
the
Initial
Hearing,
the
Court
found
that
the
Debtor
had
failed
to
meet
her
burden
of
establishing
a
willful
violation
of
the
automatic
stay
under
11
U.S.C.
§
362(k).
Additionally,
the
Court
noted
that
even
if
there
had
been
a
willful
stay
violation,
the
Debtor
had
failed
to
establish
any
actual
damages
resulting
from
the
violation.
Considering
that
the
Debtor
was
appearing
pro
se,
the
Court
permitted
the
Debtor
to
supplement
her
Motion
as
to
these
matters.
”
The
Debtor
filed
her
supplemental
brief
*
on
March
3,
2026,
and
Rocket
filed
its
reply*
on
March
20,
2026.
The
Court
did
not
authorize
any
further
submissions,
but
the
Debtor
nevertheless
filed
a
Reply
to
Respondent’s
Supplemental
Submission
on
March
27,
2026.°
For
the
sake
of
completeness,
the
Court
will
address
the
Debtor’s
unauthorized
submission
as
part
of
this
Opinion.
IV.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
The
Debtor
filed
her
chapter
13
petition
on
October
31,
2025
and
listed
Rocket
as
a
creditor.
Rocket
filed
a
Proof
of
Claim
on
December
22,
2025
asserting
a
secured
claim
in
the
amount
of
$439,231
based
on
a
mortgage
on
the
Debtor’s
property
in
East
Orange,
New
Jersey.
On
November
6,
2025,
Rocket
sent
the
Debtor
a
notice
outlining
potential
loss
mitigation
options
available
to
the
Debtor
and
addressing
other
related
matters
(the
“Notice™).
The
Notice
is
the
sole
?
The
Debtor
did
not
list
any
damage
amounts
in
the
Sanctions
Motion,
but
in
her
supplemental
submission
she
asserted
actual
damages
in
the
amount
of
$500;
emotional
distress
damages
in
the
amount
of
$7,500;
and
punitive
damages
in
the
amount
of
$10,000.
3
Dkt.
No.
120-2
4
Dkt.
No.
135
*
Dkt.
No.
146
w
March
amount
November
amount
damages
amount
Case
25-21600-VFP
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12:16:18
Desc
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4
of
20
basis
for
the
Debtor’s
claim
that
Rocket
violated
the
automatic
stay.®
The
Notice
is
comprised
of
six
pages.”
The
first
page
states,
in
its
entirety:
Hi
Nicholia
Cherry-Crockette
&
Michael
Crockette,
We
know
you're
in
bankruptcy
or
have
received
a
bankruptcy
discharge,
and
this
is
not
an
attempt
to
get
you
to
pay.
We
are
required
to
send
this
notice.
However,
we
have
resources
that
can
help
you,
whether
you've
had:
*
À
financial
challenge
*
A
loss
of
income
*
A
serious
life
event
We
collect
all
the
information
needed
to
accurately
understand
your
current
situation
and
find
the
best
solution
for
you.
If
a
valuation
is
obtained
in
connection
with
your
application,
you're
entitled
to
a
free
copy.
Please
return
your
application
by
December
6,
2025.In
the
event
you
need
additional
time
to
work
with
your
attorney
or
a
trustee,
please
feel
free
to
call
us
as
we
are
here
to
help.
If
you
have
other
mortgages
secured
to
this
property,
consider
contacting
the
mortgagees
of
those
mortgages
to
discuss
loss
mitigation
options.
Sincerely,
Your
Account
Resolution
Team
AccountResolution@RocketMortgage.com
The
second
through
fifth
pages
of
the
Notice
contain
“Information
About
Avoiding
Foreclosure.”
The
sixth
and
final
page
of
the
Notice
is
the
Servicemembers
Civil
Relief
Act
Notice
Disclosure,
known
as
a
HUD-92070,
which
is
also
a
required
disclosure
in
the
foreclosure
context.
V.
ANALYSIS
6
At
the
Initial
Hearing,
the
Debtor
stated
that
the
Notice
was
not
the
only
communication
she
received
from
Rocket
while
in
bankruptcy,
but
her
supplemental
submission
does
not
mention
any
further
communication
and
there
is
no
evidence
before
the
Court
that
there
were
any.
7
Sanctions
Motion,
Ex.
A.
[Dkt.
No.
29-3]
know
However,
needed
mortgages
Account
Case
25-21600-VFP
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169
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12:16:18
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inform
the
Debtor
about
her
options
to
avoid
foreclosure.
The
Notice
also
advised
that
any
foreclosure
would
have
to
take
place
in
accordance
with
applicable
law.
That
the
Debtor
chose
to
focus
on
certain
aspects
of
the
Notice
to
support
her
apparent
belief
that
it
was
coercive
is
not
determinative.
As
the
Court
found
in
Brown,
it
is
the
nature
of
the
communication
itself
and
not
the
debtor’s
subjective
understanding
of
it
that
controls.*°
The
foregoing
case
citations
should
not
be
understood
to
mean
that
this
Court
is
finding
that
a
disclaimer
shields
all
communications
by
a
lender
to
a
debtor/borrower
from
potentially
violating
the
stay
or
discharge
injunction.*!
Quite
to
the
contrary,
numerous
cases
have
found
a
violation
of
the
stay
or
discharge
injunction
despite
a
disclaimer,
where
evidence
of
coercion
or
t.*
In
this
case,
the
Debtor
has
not
presented
the
Court
with
any
evidence
of
harassment
is
present
alleged
coercion
or
harassment
beyond
the
sending
of
the
Notice—and
only
the
Notice.
As
already
noted,
the
Court
does
not
find
the
contents
of
the
Notice
to
be
per
se
or
otherwise
coercive
or
harassing.
S.
The
Inapplicable
or
Non-Existent
Cases
Cited
by
Debtor
In
her
supplemental
submission,
the
Debtor
cites
three
cases
in
support
of
her
position
that
there
is
a
willful
stay
violation.
None
of
those
cases
involved
a
legally
required
notification
such
as
what
is
at
issue
here,
nor
did
any
of
those
cases
analyze
the
sufficiency
of
a
disclaimer
in
the
particular
circumstances
of
the
case.
#
Td.
#1
In
re
Kirby,
599
B.R.
427,
44445
(B.A.P.
1st
Cir.
2019)
(noting
that
the
inclusion
of
a
bankruptcy
disclaimer
does
not
insulate
a
creditor
from
liability
for
a
stay
violation
but
finding
on
those
facts
that
there
was
no
violation
of
the
discharge
injunction)
42
See,
e.g.,
Sears
Roebuck
&
Co.
v.
Epperson
(In
re
Epperson),
189
B.R.
195,
198-99
(E.D.
Mo.
1995);
In
re
Youngkin,
2014
Bankr.
LEXIS
765,
at
*16
(Bankr.
E.D.N.C.
Feb
27,
2014)
(finding
that
in
spite
of
the
disclaimer,
the
mortgagee’s
monthly
informational
statement
violated
the
discharge
injunction
because
it
was
“nothing
more
than
a
cleverly
disguised
form
meant
to
induce
payment
of
funds
[from
the
debtor]
to
the
mortgagee].”)
15
Notice—and
Roebuck
Epperson
Case
25-21600-VFP
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to
be
on
point,
Joubert
does
not
stand
for
that
proposition.
In
Joubert,
the
Third
Circuit
was
addressing
the
issue
of
whether
§
105(a)
of
the
Bankruptcy
Code
affords
a
debtor
a
private
cause
of
action
to
remedy
alleged
violations
of
§
506(b).
At
no
point
in
the
case
does
it
discuss
the
proposition
of
law
for
which
the
Debtor
cited
it.
Finally,
the
Debtor
argues
that
Rocket’s
reliance
on
15
U.S.C
$
1692c(c)
(failure
to
file
a
cease
communication
notice)
is
irrelevant.
The
Court
agrees.
The
existence
or
non-existence
of
a
cease
communication
notice
forms
no
part
of
its
reasoning
for
why
sending
the
Notice
was
not
a
stay
violation.
Further,
there
were
no
notices
from
the
Debtor
to
Rocket
to
cease
communicating
and
no
further
communications
were
sent
in
any
event.
6.
Rocket
Did
Not
Willfully
Violate
the
Stay
As
noted
above,
to
successfully
plead
a
cause
of
action
for
a
willful
violation
of
the
stay
under
11
U.S.C.
§
362(k),
a
debtor
must
“show,
by
a
preponderance
of
the
evidence,
that:
(1)
a
violation
of
the
stay
occurred;
(2)
the
creditor
had
knowledge
of
the
bankruptcy
case
when
acting;
and
(3)
the
violation
caused
actual
damages.”>*
Under
$
362(k),
conduct
that
violates
the
automatic
stay
is
willful
if
the
creditor
knew
of
the
stay
and
if
the
creditor's
conduct
that
violated
the
automatic
stay
was
intentional
>
Here,
the
Debtor
has
proven
only
one
of
those
three
elements—that
Rocket
had
knowledge
of
the
bankruptcy
filing
on
November
6
when
it
mailed
the
Notice
to
the
Debtor.
The
Notice
itself
directly
acknowledges
the
bankruptcy
filing
by
noting
in
the
opening
line:
“We
know
you’re
in
bankruptcy
or
have
received
a
bankruptey
discharge,
and
this
is
not
an
attempt
to
4
Kaushas
v.
Popple
Constr.,
Inc.
(In
re
Kaushas),
616
B.R.
57,
62
(Bankr.
M.D.
Pa.
2020)
S
Id.
18
remedy
November
element—
Kaushas
Case
25-21600-VFP
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Conclusion
I'he
Debtor
has
the
burden
to
demonstrate
by
a
preponderance
ol
the
evidence
that
a
willful
stay
violation
occurred,
and
she
has
not
met
that
burden.
For
the
reasons
stated,
the
Sanctions
Motion
is
DIENIED.
The
Court
will
enter
an
Order
in
accordance
with
this
Opinion.
May
20,
2026
-
A
Hon.
Vincent
F.
preponderance
DIENIED.
20
Provenance
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