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Powell v. Borough of Bergenfield
(2026)
Case details
Full caption
Zena L. Powell v. The Borough of Bergenfield
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New Jersey (NJ)
Court
New Jersey Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Majority
Padin (J.) (unanimous Court)
Case
2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
Document
44
Filed
05/12/26
Page
1
of
9
PagelD:
374
NOT
FOR
PUBLICATION
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
DISTRICT
OF
NEW
JERSEY
ZENA
L.
POWELL,
Plaintiff,
No.
23cv21399
(EP)
(JRA)
v.
OPINION
THE
BOROUGH
OF
BERGENFIELD
and
THE
BOROUGH
OF
BERGENFIELD
POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
PADIN,
District
Judge.
Pro
se
Plaintiff
Zena
L.
Powell
(“Plaintiff”
or
“Powell”)
alleges
the
Borough
of
Bergenfield
(“Bergenfield”)
and
the
Borough
of
Bergenfield
Police
Department
(“BBPD”)
discriminated
against
her
due
to
her
disabilities
in
violation
of
Title
II
of
the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act
(“ADA”),
42
U.S.C.
$
12101
et
seq..
and
Section
504
of
the
Rehabilitation
Act
of
1973,
29
U.S.C.
$
794
(the
“Rehabilitation
Act”
or
“RA”).
D.E.
36
(“Amended
Complaint”
or
“Am.
Compl.”).
This
Court
previously
dismissed
Plaintiff’s
complaint,
D.Es.
1,
3,
&
4
(collectively
referred
to
as
the
original
“Complaint”)
without
prejudice
and
gave
her
45
days
to
amend.
D.Es.
30
(“MTD
Opinion”
or
“MTD
Op.”)
&
31
(“MTD
Order”).
Plaintiff
then
filed
the
Amended
Complaint
late.
See
Dkt.
Following
a
dispute
between
the
parties
regarding
the
timeliness
and
futility
of
Plaintiff’s
Amended
Complaint,
this
Court
ultimately
allowed
Plaintiff
to
proceed
with
the
Amended
Complaint.
D.E.
35.
Defendants
now
move
to
dismiss
the
Amended
Complaint
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6).
D.E.
39-3
(“Motion”
or
“Mot.”)."
Plaintiff
opposes
the
!
Defendants
filed
their
Notice
of
Motion
at
D.E.
39.
No.
(JRA)
and
Judge.
of
and
of
Department
due
of
42
and
504
of
29
Act”
“RA”).
36
Complaint”
and
gave
amend.
30
Complaint
between
and
Complaint
Rule
Civil
Case
2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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44
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Motion.
D.E.
4
2
(“Opposition”
or
“Opp’n”).
Defendants
reply.
D.E.
43
(“Reply”).
The
Court
decides
the
Motion
without
oral
argument.
See
Fed.
R.
Civ.
P.
78(b);
L.
Civ.
R.
78.1(b).
For
the
reasons
below,
the
Court
will
GRANT
Defendants’
Motion
and
DISMISS
Plaintiff’s
Amended
C
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
without
prejudice.
L
BACKGROUND?
3
Powell
is
a
former
resident
of
Bergenfield
who
has
been
handicapped
since
2016.
Am.
Compl.
§
5.
S
h
e
alleges
that
Bergenfield
fails
to
provide
a
program
for
evaluating
requests
for
personalized
on-street
parking
spaces.
Id.
T
1.
As
a
result
o
f
Bergenfield’s
failure
to
provide
adequate
accessible
parking,
Plaintiff
has
“repeatedly”
b
e
e
n
issued
parking
tickets,
a
n
d
therefore
experiences
“emotional
distress,
financial
hardship,
and
threats
of
incarceration
for
unpaid
parking
tickets.”
/d.
4|
13,
16.
1L
LEGAL
STANDARD
Pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6),
a
court
accepts
all
factual
allegations
as
true,
construes
the
complaint
in
the
plaintiff’s
favor,
a
n
d
determines
“whether,
under
a
n
y
reasonable
reading
of
the
complaint,
the
plaintiff
may
be
entitled
to
relief.”
Phillips
v.
Cnty.
of
A
l
l
e
g
h
e
n
y
,
515
F
.
3
d
2
2
4
,
233
(
3
d
Cir.
2008)
(citation
modified).
As
Plaintiff
is
proceeding
pro
se,
the
Court
holds
the
Amended
C
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
to
a
less
stringent
standard
than
o
n
e
drafted
by
an
attorney.
See
Haines
v.
K
e
r
n
e
r
,
404
U
.
S
.
519,
520
(1972).
However,
the
Court
need
not
“credit
a
pro
se
plaintiff’s
‘bald
assertions’
or
‘legal
conclusions.””
Grohs
v.
Yatauro,
9
8
4
F.
Supp.
2
d
273,
?
The
facts
in
this
section
are
taken
f
r
o
m
the
well-pled
factual
allegations
in
the
Amended
Complaint,
which
the
Court
p
r
e
s
u
m
e
s
to
be
true
for
purposes
o
f
resolving
the
motion.
See
Ashcrofi
v.
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009).
*The
allegations
in
the
Amended
C
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
are
substantially
similar
to
those
in
the
Complaint,
and
the
Court
refers
to
its
MTD
O
p
i
n
i
o
n
for
a
full
factual
background.
The
Court
briefly
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
z
e
s
the
relevant
facts
here.
42
Complaint
She
of
been
and
and
any
Allegheny,
F.3d
224,
(3d
Complaint
one
Kerner,
U.S.
984
2d
from
presumes
of
Complaint
Opinion
summarizes
Case
2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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282
(D.N.J.
2013)
(quoting
Morse
v.
Lower
Merion
Sch.
Dist.,
132
F.3d
902,
906
(3d
Cir.
1997)).
“In
deciding
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
motion,
a
court
must
consider
only
the
complaint,
exhibits
attached
to
the
complaint,
matters
of
public
record,
as
well
as
undisputedly
authentic
documents
if
the
complainant’s
claims
are
based
upon
these
documents.”
Mayer
v.
Belichick,
605
F.3d
223,
230
(3d
Cir.
2010).
To
survive
a
Rule
12(b)(6)
challenge,
the
plaintiff’s
claims
must
be
facially
plausible,
meaning
that
the
well-pled
facts
“allow[]
the
court
to
draw
the
reasonable
inference
that
the
defendant
is
liable
for
the
misconduct
alleged.”
Igbal,
556
U.S.
at
678
(citing
Bell
Atl.
Corp.
v.
Twombly,
550
U.S.
544,
556
(2007)).
The
allegations
must
be
“more
than
labels
and
conclusions,
and
a
formulaic
recitation
of
the
elements
of
a
cause
of
action
will
not
do.”
Twombly,
550
U.S.
at
555.
“[A]
court
considering
a
motion
to
dismiss
can
choose
to
begin
by
identifying
pleadings
that,
because
they
are
no
more
than
conclusions,
are
not
entitled
to
the
assumption
of
truth.”
Igbal,
556
U.S.
at
679.
Finally,
“[w]hile
legal
conclusions
can
provide
the
framework
of
a
complaint,
they
must
be
supported
by
factual
allegations.”
Id.
III.
ANALYSIS
Defendants
argue
that
the
Amended
Complaint
should
be
dismissed
because
Plaintiff
(1)
fails
to
cure
the
deficiencies
in
the
Complaint,
(2)
does
not
plead
a
claim
of
deliberate
indifference,
and
(3)
lacks
standing
to
pursue
an
action
for
injunctive
relief
under
the
ADA.
Plaintiff
opposes
the
Motion,
arguing
that
she
has
cured
the
deficiencies
identified
in
this
Court’s
MTD
Opinion,
has
properly
alleged
deliberate
indifference,
and
maintains
standing
based
on
her
desire
to
return
to
Bergenfield.
See
Opp’n.
As
explained
below,
the
Court
disagrees
with
Plaintiff,
and
will
therefore
GRANT
the
Motion.
282
2013)
of
Rule
misconduct
556
678
U.S.
than
formulaic
not
do.”
U.S.
motion
no
of
must
by
Complaint
of
Case
2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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A.
Powell
Again
Fails
to
State
an
ADA
or
Rehabilitation
Act
Claim
This
Court
previously
dismissed
Plaintiff’s
Complaint
for
failure
to
state
an
ADA
claim.
MTD
Opinion
at
4-6.
Powell’s
Amended
Complaint
asserts
substantially
similar
allegations
to
her
Complaint.
Defendants
argue
that
Powell’s
Amended
Complaint
did
not
cure
the
deficiencies
in
her
Complaint.
Mot.
at
9-10.
The
Court
agrees.
First,
to
establish
a
violation
of
Title
II
of
the
ADA
or
the
Rehabilitation
Act,
a
plaintiff
must
demonstrate
that:
“(1)
they
are
handicapped
or
disabled
as
defined
under
the
statutes;
(2)
they
are
otherwise
qualified
to
participate
in
the
program
at
issue;
and
(3)
they
were
precluded
from
participating
in
a
program
or
receiving
a
service
or
benefit
because
of
their
disability.”
CG
v.
Pennsylvania
Dep
't
of
Educ..
734
F.3d
229,
235
(3d
Cir.
2013)
(citing
Chambers
ex
rel.
Chambers
v.
Sch.
Dist.
of
Phila.
Bd.
of
Educ.,
587
F.3d
176
(3d
Cir.
2009)).
The
Third
Circuit
has
explained
that
“[w]ith
limited
exceptions,
the
same
legal
principles
govern
ADA
and
RA
claims.”
Id.
at
235-36.
Additionally,
a
Plaintiff
bringing
claims
under
the
RA
must
demonstrate
that
the
entity
that
she
alleges
discriminated
against
her
receives
federal
funding
and
that
her
disability
was
the
sole
reason
for
the
discrimination.*
29
U.S.C.
§
794(a);
CG,
734
F.3d
at
235
n.10.
The
Court
previously
rejected
Powell’s
assertion
that
Defendants’
failure
to
create
or
maintain
a
program
for
assessing
requests
for
personalized
accessible
parking
spaces
on
public
streets
constitutes
disability
discrimination
under
the
ADA.
MTD
Opinion
at
6.
In
statements
almost
identical
to
Plaintiff’s
Complaint,
Plaintiff
concedes
in
her
Amended
Complaint
that
Bergenfield
stated
“that
no
program
existed
for
such
accommodations,”
not
that
she
was
denied
*
While
Plaintiff
now
alleges
her
claims
under
both
the
ADA
and
Rehabilitation
Act,
her
Amended
Complaint
is
limited
to
allegations
under
the
ADA.
Plaintiff
makes
only
passing
references
to
the
Rehabilitation
Act
and
does
not
make
any
claims
regarding
whether
Defendants
receive
federal
funding
or
whether
the
alleged
discrimination
was
based
solely
on
Plaintiff’s
status
as
a
disabled
individual.
Therefore,
Plaintiff
does
not
sufficiently
plead
a
claim
under
the
RA.
Powell
or
Complaint
an
Opinion
Complaint
Complaint
of
of
must
were
from
235
2013)
587
must
reason
U.S.C.
F.3d
Opinion
Complaint
accommodations,”
now
her
Complaint
and
whether
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access
to
a
program
provided.
Am.
Compl.
§
12.
Therefore,
Powell’s
Amended
Complaint
again
fails
to
state
an
ADA
or
Rehabilitation
Act
claim.
However,
Powell
will
be
afforded
one
more
opportunity
to
cure
her
pleadings.’
Second,
this
Court
previously
dismissed
Plaintiffs
ADA
claim
on
the
grounds
that
she
failed
to
adequately
allege
that
Defendants
violated
the
ADA
by
providing
an
insufficient
number
of
accessible
parking
spaces.
The
Court
explained
that
the
ADA
Accessibility
Guidelines
(“ADAAG”)
$
208.1
require
a
minimum
number
of
accessible
spots
based
on
the
fota/
number
of
parking
spots.
MTD
Opinion
at
5.
In
assessing
Plaintiff’s
allegations,
the
Court
found
that
“Powell
alleges
that
there
are
more
than
100
residents
and
only
two
[accessible]
spaces,
and
therefore
Bergenfield
violates
the
ADA.
However,
Powell
does
not
allege
how
many
total
spaces
are
provided.”
Id.
Powell’s
Amended
Complaint
again
fails
to
allege
the
total
number
of
parking
spaces
provided.
The
only
allegation
in
Powell’s
Amended
Complaint
concerning
the
number
of
accessible
parking
spaces
is
that
there
are
“at
least
ten
disabled
individuals
on
Plaintiff’s
block
alone,”
with
only
two
accessible
on-street
parking
spaces
for
the
area.
Am.
Compl.
9.
Powell
still
does
not
allege
how
many
rotal
spaces
are
provided.
The
Court
re-emphasizes
that
the
total
number
of
spaces
is
essential
to
determining
whether
Defendants
are
in
compliance
with
the
ADA'’s
requirements.
MTD
Opinion
at
5;
Theodore
v.
99
Restaurants,
LLC,
No.
18-368,
2019
WL
4861201,
at
*3
(D.N.H.
Oct.
2,
2019).
As
Powell’s
allegations
depend
on
the
number
of
accessible
parking
spaces
per
disabled
individual,
the
Court
still
cannot
discern
an
ADA
violation
for
failure
to
provide
accessible
parking
within
the
required
ratios
under
$
208.2.
In
sum,
having
*
The
Court
instructs
Powell
that
failure
to
cure
the
deficiencies
identified
herein
and
in
the
MTD
Opinion
will
result
in
a
dismissal
with
prejudice.
program
Compl.
Complaint
afforded
grounds
by
of
Opinion
and
and
Complaint
of
Complaint
of
Compl.
of
whether
compliance
ADA'’s
Opinion
Theodore
No.
4861201,
depend
on
of
sum,
and
Opinion
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2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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f
o
u
n
d
that
Plaintiff
failed
to
state
an
ADA
or
RA
claim,
the
Court
will
GRANT
Defendant’s
Motion
and
DISMISS
Plaintiff’s
ADA
a
n
d
RA
claims.
B.
Plaintiff
Fails
to
P
l
e
a
d
Deliberate
Indifference
Plaintiff
also
seeks
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
o
r
y
damages
“for
the
harm
suffered
b
y
Plaintiff
d
u
e
to
the
Defendants’
discrimination.”
Am.
Compl.,
Prayer
for
Relief
at
C.
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiff
alleges
deliberate
indifference
“in
a
conclusory
fashion”
a
n
d
call
Plaintiff’s
allegations
“threadbare
and
formulaic.”
Motion
at
15-18.
The
Court
agrees.
To
recover
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
o
r
y
damages
u
n
d
e
r
the
ADA,
a
plaintiff
must
prove
intentional
discrimination
u
n
d
e
r
a
deliberate
indifference
standard.
Durham
v.
Kelley,
82
F.4th
217,
2
2
5
(3d
Cir.
2023).
The
standard
for
deliberate
indifference
requires
Plaintiff
to
prove
“(1)
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
that
a
federally
protected
right
is
substantially
likely
to
be
violated
.
.
.
a
n
d
(2)
failure
to
act
despite
that
knowledge.”
S.H.
v.
Lower
Merion
Sch.
Dist.,
7
2
9
F.3d
248,
2
6
5
(3d
Cir.
2013).
Plaintiff
does
not
make
allegations
to
support
a
claim
of
deliberate
indifference.
Plaintiff
alleges
only
that
“Defendants’
conduct
was
intentional
a
n
d
carried
out
with
deliberate
indifference
to
the
rights
o
f
Plaintiff.”
Am.
Compl.
4
23.
As
this
statement
is
a
legal
conclusion,
the
Court
will
not
credit
this
item.
Grohs,
984
F.
Supp.
at
2
8
2
(quoting
M
o
r
s
e
,
132
F.3d
at
906).
Therefore,
Plaintiff
has
not
pleaded
a
n
y
allegations
that
support
a
claim
for
deliberate
indifference.
Plaintiff’s
briefing
suggests
that
she
g
a
v
e
Bergenfield
“repeated
notice,
including
a
handwritten
demand
letter.”
Opp’n
at
14.
Plaintiff
is
instructed
that
she
may
not
amend
her
pleadings
through
briefing.
Pennsylvania
ex
rel.
Zimmerman
v.
PepsiCo,
Inc.,
8
3
6
F.2d
173,
181
(
3
d
Cir.
1988)
(“[I]t
is
axiomatic
that
the
complaint
may
not
b
e
amended
by
the
briefs
in
o
p
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
to
a
m
o
t
i
o
n
to
dismiss.”)
(internal
quotations
and
citation
omitted).
B
u
t
the
Court
will
give
Powell
one
more
opportunity
to
cure
her
pleadings.
As
a
result
o
f
Plaintiff’s
failure
to
plead
deliberate
found
and
Plead
compensatory
by
due
and
compensatory
under
under
225
knowledge
and
729
265
and
of
282
Morse,
any
gave
836
(3d
be
opposition
motion
But
of
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2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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indifference,
the
Court
will
GRANT
Defendant’s
Motion
and
DISMISS
Plaintiff’s
claim
for
compensatory
damages.
C.
Plaintiff
Lacks
Standing
for
Injunctive
Relief
as
Pled
Finally,
the
Court
considers
Defendants’
contention
that
Plaintiff
lacks
standing
to
assert
a
claim
for
prospective
injunctive
relief.
Mot.
at
19.
Powell
requests
that
the
Court
“[o]rder[]
Defendants
to
adopt
and
implement
a
policy
for
residential
accessible
on-street
parking
upon
request
by
qualified
disabled
residents.”
Am.
Compl.,
Prayer
for
Relief
at
B.
Defendants
argue
that
Plaintiff
lacks
standing
to
seek
injunctive
relief,
as
she
“no
longer
resides
in
Bergenfield.”
and
therefore
“she
is
not
subject
to
the
alleged
harm.”®
Mot.
at
19.
Plaintiff
contends
in
her
briefing
that
though
she
moved
from
Bergenfield
to
Fort
Lee,
she
maintains
standing
based
on
a
claim
that
she
is
deterred
from
returning
to
Bergenfield.
Opp’nat
16—19.
The
Court
agrees
with
Defendants:
As
currently
pled,
Plaintiff
lacks
standing
to
bring
a
claim
for
prospective
injunctive
relief.
“Absent
Article
III
standing,
a
federal
court
does
not
have
subject
matter
jurisdiction
to
address
a
plaintiff’s
claims,
and
they
must
be
dismissed.”
Davis,
824
F.3d
at
346
(quoting
Taliaferro
v.
Darby
Twp.
Zoning
Bd.,
458
F.3d
181,
188
(3d
Cir.
2006)).
A
plaintiff
can
establish
that
their
case
presents
a
controversy,
and,
consequently,
that
they
have
standing,
by
demonstrating:
(1)
an
injury
in
fact,
(2)
a
sufficient
causal
connection
between
the
injury
claimed
and
the
conduct
complained
of,
and
(3)
a
likelihood
that
a
favorable
decision
would
redress
the
party's
complained-of
injury.
Lujan
v.
Defenders
of
Wildlife,
504
U.S.
555,
560-61
(1992).
6
Defendants
improperly
move
to
dismiss
Plaintiff’s
request
for
injunctive
relief
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(6).
Because
“[s]tanding
is
a
jurisdictional
matter,”
a
motion
for
dismiss
for
lack
of
standing
is
properly
brought
pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(1).
Davis
v.
Wells
Fargo,
824
F.3d
333,
346
(3d
Cir.
2016).
Therefore,
the
Court
analyzes
Defendant’s
motion
to
dismiss
Plaintiff
s
injunctive
relief
for
lack
of
standing
under
Rule
12(b)(1).
Motion
and
compensatory
Standing
Mot.
implement
by
“no
from
from
“Absent
have
824
346
have
by
an
complained
Lujan
560-61
of
Because
Davis
824
346
motion
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2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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Courts
in
this
District
apply
a
four-factor
test
when
analyzing
whether
an
ADA
plaintiff
alleges
a
sufficient
injury
for
standing
purposes.
Wittmann
v.
Island
Hosp.
Mgmt.,
No.
09-3698,
2011
WL
689613,
at
*5
(D.N.J.
Feb.
18,
2011)
(compiling
cases).
“Courts
consider:
(1)
the
plaintiff’s
proximity
to
the
defendant’s
place
of
public
accommodation;
(2)
the
plaintiff’s
past
patronage;
(3)
the
definiteness
of
the
plaintiff’s
plan
to
return;
and
(4)
the
plaintiff’s
frequency
of
nearby
travel.”
Id.
Powell
alleges
that
she
“had
to
move
from
[her]
residence
and
relocate
to
Fort
Lee[,]
New
Jerey
[sic]
to
stop
the
ticketing
issue
in
Bergenfield.”
Am.
Compl.
(
24.
But
Powell
does
not
make
any
allegations
regarding
her
plans
to
return
to
Bergenfield,
including
the
definiteness
of
her
plan
to
return
and
the
frequency
of
traveling
there.
Therefore,
the
Court
will
GRANT
Defendant’s
Motion
and
DISMISS
Plaintiffs
claim
for
injunctive
relief
as
pled.
D.
Plaintiff’s
Apparent
Use
of
Generative
Artificial
Intelligence
Finally,
when
reviewing
Plaintiff’s
Opposition,
the
Court,
like
Defendants,
identified
several
inaccurate
quotations
and
citations.
Namely,
Plaintiff
includes
quotations
from
real
cases,
but
the
quotations
are
fabricated.
Defendants
list
numerous
examples.
See
Reply
at
2-3.
The
presence
of
fabricated
quotations
in
a
brief
is
a
sign
that
the
brief’s
author
may
have
used
generative
artificial
intelligence
(“GAI”).
Pursuant
to
Section
I(B)
of
the
Undersigned’s
Judicial
Preferences,
if
a
party
uses
GAI
in
any
court
filings,
they
must
include
a
mandatory
disclosure
that:
“(1)
identifies
the
GAI
program:
(2)
identifies
the
portion
of
the
filing
drafted
by
the
GAI;
and
(3)
certifies
that
the
GAI
work
product
was
diligently
reviewed
by
a
human
being
for
accuracy
and
applicability.”
While
it
seems
that
Plaintiff
utilized
GAI
in
drafting
her
Opposition,
Plaintiff
has
not
provided
such
disclosure.
Furthermore,
to
the
extent
Plaintiff
has
filed
a
brief
with
fabricated
quotations,
she
may
have
violated
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
11(b).
That
rule
“imposes
.
.
.
an
affirmative
duty
to
conduct
an
‘inquiry
reasonable
under
the
circumstances’
to
ensure
that
their
(1)
‘[filings
are]
whether
Wittmann
Mgmt.,
No.
of
accommodation;
of
from
and
But
of
traveling
and
Generative
and
from
Reply
of
mandatory
by
and
While
Furthermore,
has
with
“imposes
an
Case
2:23-cv-21399-EP-JRA
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44
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9
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382
accompanies
this
Opinion.
Dated:
May
12,
2026
s
Evelyn
Padin,
U.S.D.J.
law
by
have
and
contentions
No.
Rule
Penn
from
Skoorka
sua
No.
2025
2484188,
(M.D.
2025)
Given
Rule
by
IV.
reasons
above,
Defendants’
D.E.
Complaint
have
45
days
Order
accompanies
Provenance
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