Pridgen v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC (Mar. 16, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Shaquan Pridgen v. Amazon.com Services LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New Jersey (NJ)
Court
New Jersey Supreme Court
Decided
Mar. 16, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 735250Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOT FOR PUBLICATIONUnited States District Court, D. New Jersey.SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff,v.AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC Defendant.No. 25cv7589 (EP) (JRA)|Filed 03/16/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.OPINIONEvelyn Padin, U.S.D.J.*1 Plaintiff Shaquan Pridgen proceeds pro se and bringsfour counts against Defendant Amazon.com Services LLC(“Amazon”) under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (“ADA”). D.E. 1 (“Complaint” or“Compl.”). Amazon moves to dismiss part of Count I andall of Counts II, III, and IV from Pridgen's Complaintpursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). D.E.19-11 (“Motion to Dismiss” or “MTD.”). Pridgen opposesAmazon's Motion to Dismiss. D.E. 21 (“MTD Opposition”).Amazon replies in support of its Motion to Dismiss. D.E. 24.Separately, Pridgen also moves for a preliminary injunctionseeking to enjoin Amazon from taking any payroll actionwithout judicial review and to compel Amazon to refundcertain wages and to audit Plaintiff's payment history. D.E.33 (“Motion for a Preliminary Injunction” or “PI Mot.”)at 5. Amazon opposes Pridgen's Motion for a PreliminaryInjunction. D.E. 41. Pridgen replies in support of his Motionfor a Preliminary Injunction. D.E. 45.The Court decides the Motion to Dismiss and the Motion fora Preliminary Injunction without oral argument. See Fed. R.Civ. P. 78(b); L. Civ. R. 78.1(b). For the reasons set forthbelow, the Court will GRANT Amazon's Motion to Dismiss,DISMISS part of Count I and all of Counts II, III, and IV ofPridgen's Complaint without prejudice, and DENY Pridgen'sMotion for a Preliminary Injunction.I. BACKGROUNDA. Factual Background2Pridgen began working for Amazon in 2017. Compl. 1.After experiencing a “clinically diagnosed mental healthcollapse” in August 2024, Plaintiff took medical leave fromhis job at Amazon and collected short term disability pay.Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. Pridgen alleges that the working conditionsat Amazon triggered his mental breakdown. Id. Pridgenvisited a behavioral health physician who diagnosed himwith depression and attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder.D.E. 19-2, Ex. B (“Health Assessment”) at 21.34 Thephysician found that Pridgen's general behavior functioning,language and thought functioning, emotional functioning,and cognitive functioning were impaired. Id. The physicianindicated that Pridgen's sensory, mobility, and medicalcapabilities would suffer whenever Pridgen's medicine woreoff and that Pridgen's executive functioning and mental healthcapabilities were diminished in some part. Id. at 24.*2 Pridgen's physician specified that Pridgen would not beable to work more than forty hours in one week nor morethan ten hours in one day. Id. at 24–25. Pridgen's physicianalso indicated that Pridgen would need an extended breakperiod during work hours for up to sixty minutes and thathe would need three intermittent absences per month. Id.Pridgen's physician did not indicate that any other limitationson Pridgen's ability to work were needed. See id. at 24–26.Pridgen returned to work in January 2025 with theapproved accommodations. See Compl. 6. His approvedaccommodations provided for: a maximum of ten hoursfor any shift, a maximum of forty hours for any workweek, access to three intermittent absences per month,and an additional hour-long break during work hours. Id.Pridgen's workload included physical labor, floor presence,documentation, and audit requirements.5 Id. 8. Accordingto Pridgen, however, Amazon did not reduce his workload in amanner commensurate with the reduction in his time working.Id.Within a manner of days, Pridgen alleges he received a formaldisciplinary warning. Id. 10. Pridgen thereafter requested
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2some kind of investigation from Amazon leadership and anassessment of different employees’ workloads. Id. ¶¶ 11–14.Pridgen claims that no investigation or assessment were everperformed. Id.On February 5, 2025, Amazon forcibly removed Pridgenfrom the workplace and placed him back on medical leavebased on an “accommodation conflict.” Id. 15. Pridgenalleges that this second leave period was misclassified bypayroll and erroneously combined with his prior short termdisability period. See id. ¶¶ 16, 40. Due to this error, Pridgenexperienced a lapse in pay and benefits. Id. 17. He wasalso audited by the IRS. Id. Pridgen alleges that this error“severely destabilized his home life, credit, and ability to payfor ongoing [medical] care.” Id. 18. At some point, Amazonapproved Pridgen for medical leave through July 16, 2025.See id. 21.Pridgen attempted to resolve his issues with Amazoninternally but after failing to reach a resolution, he filed acharge of discrimination with the EEOC on February 28,2025. See Compl. 21; D.E. 19-2, Ex. D (“Charge ofDiscrimination”) at 34. In his Charge of Discrimination,Pridgen alleged that Amazon: (1) failed to provide himwith reasonable accommodations; (2) imposed on him anexcessive and unrealistic workload; (3) retaliated againsthim for reporting his workplace concerns; (4) caused himemotional distress; (5) subjected him to unsafe workingconditions, which resulted in a car accident; and (6) causedstrain to his family relationships and quality of life. Id. at 32–33.Pridgen then amended his charge of discrimination with theEEOC on April 21, 2025. D.E. 19-2, Ex. E (“AmendedCharge of Discrimination”). In his Amended Charge ofDiscrimination, Pridgen alleged again that Amazon retaliatedagainst him and failed to provide him with reasonableaccommodations. Id. at 37. Pridgen also provided newclaims alleging that Amazon: (1) subjected him to a hostilework environment; (2) constructively discharged him; (3)financially sabotaged him; (4) caused him to suffer a newmental health breakdown; and (5) engaged in bad faithbehavior while mediating his prior claims with the EEOC. Id.at 37–39.*3 Pridgen states that the EEOC provided him with a noticeof his right to sue, D.E. 1-2, but he did not attach it to hisComplaint or his MTD Opposition. Nor did Amazon providea copy of it with their Motion to Dismiss (although theydo not contest its existence). See MTD at 9. To the extentthat Pridgen has filed his notice of right to sue elsewhere onthe docket amongst his many disjointed filings, this Courtcautions Pridgen that Judges “are not pigs searching fortruffles and are unwilling to search through the massiverecord that has been developed in this case to find evidenceof ... alleged violations.” United States v. Winkelman, 548 F.Supp. 2d 142, 150 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2008). Any documentgermane to Pridgen's pleadings should be submitted togetherwith those pleadings.6 Accordingly, to the extent Pridgenhas filed a copy of his notice to sue somewhere, the Courtcannot consider it because it was not included with the parties’relevant filings.B. Procedural HistoryPridgen filed his Complaint against Amazon on June 4, 2025.Compl. Pridgen's Complaint asserts four counts.7 CountI is a retaliation claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12203. Compl. ¶¶ 24–26. Count II is a failure to providereasonable accommodation claim brought pursuant to 42U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Id. ¶¶ 27–30. Count III is a hostilework environment claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). Id. ¶¶ 31–33. Finally, Count IV is a disparate impactclaim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3) and forwhich Pridgen seeks to certify a class. Id. ¶¶ 34–37.Since filing his Complaint, Pridgen has submitted variousmotions and filings requesting emergency relief, discovery-related conferences, and to supplement the record. See,e.g., D.Es. 5 (“Notice of Preservation Correspondence”), 9(“Letter Motion Requesting Early Judicial Conference”), 11(“Motion for Protective Order”), 25 (“Emergency Noticeof Retaliatory Leave Extension and Imminent Harm”), 28(“Notice of Ongoing Harm and Emergent Intent to SeekPreliminary Injunctive Relief”). This Court admonishedPridgen and instructed him that his attempts to improperlysupplement the record through haphazard filings wereimproper and would not be considered. D.E. 40 (citing Fed.R. Civ. P. 15(a)). Accordingly, this Court denied many ofPridgen's inappropriate and premature motions and requestsbut left pending his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction andAmazon's Motion to Dismiss. See D.E. 40. The Court decidesthose motions now.II. LEGAL STANDARDA. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint toprovide “a short and plain statement showing that the pleaderis entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegationmust be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).The allegations must also “give the defendant notice of whatthe ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conleyv. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).*4 At the pleading stage, these burdens are “minimal.”Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019)(quoting Frazier v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68(3d Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Leatherman v.Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intel. Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163(1993)). And while a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are liberallyconstrued, Rule 8’s requirements are nevertheless binding.Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 329, 246 (3d Cir.2013).B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6)Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a courtaccepts all well-pled factual allegations as true, construes thecomplaint in the plaintiff's favor, and determines “whether,under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiffmay be entitled to relief.” Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d at 233(quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7(3d Cir. 2002)). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a courtmust consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to thecomplaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedlyauthentic documents if the complainant's claims are basedupon these documents.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230(3d Cir. 2010). Courts may not consider “[f]actual claims andassertions raised by a defendant.” Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30F.4th 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2022).To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a plaintiff's claimsmust be facially plausible, meaning that “the pleaded factualcontent allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.at 556). Although there is no “ ‘probability requirement,’” plaintiff's claims must do more than present “a sheerpossibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The allegations must amount to“more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at555.Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can chooseto begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are nomore than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumptionof truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “While legal conclusionscan provide the framework of a complaint, they must besupported by factual allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitalsof the elements of a cause of action, supported by mereconclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65A preliminary injunction is “ ‘an extraordinary remedy’ and‘should be granted only in limited circumstances.’ ” See KosPharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004)(quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program,Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994)). Such extraordinaryrelief should be granted only if a party shows:(1) a likelihood of success on themerits; (2) that it will suffer irreparableharm if the injunction is denied; (3)that granting preliminary relief willnot result in even greater harm tothe nonmoving party; and (4) that thepublic interest favors such relief.Id. (citing Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153,158 (3d Cir. 1999)). The first two factors are particularlycritical and must be met before a preliminary injunction mayissue. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176, 179 (3dCir. 2017). If these gateway factors are met, courts may thenconsider the remaining two factors and determine whether “inits sound discretion ... all four factors, taken together, balancein favor of granting the requested preliminary relief.” Id. at179.III. DISCUSSION*5 Amazon moves to dismiss Counts II, III, and IVin full, and Count I to the extent Count I is premisedupon constructive discharge. Amazon also moves to dismissPridgen's class allegations in Count IV, with prejudice. For thereasons specified below, the Court will GRANT Amazon'sMotion to Dismiss, DISMISS all Counts specified withoutprejudice, and DISMISS Pridgen's class allegations withprejudice. For related reasons, the Court will also DENYPridgen's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4A. The Court Will Dismiss Any ConstructiveDischarge Claim in Count ITo the extent Claim I is premised upon constructive discharge,Pridgen fails to state a claim for relief because such a claimbegins to accrue only when the employee provides notice ofhis resignation.8 Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 564 (2016).Because Pridgen does not contend he has actually resigned orstopped working for Amazon and there is no indication thathe has notified Amazon that he intends to resign, he cannotclaim constructive discharge.Accordingly, to the extent Pridgen brings a constructivedischarge claim as part of Count I, the Court will GRANTAmazon's Motion to Dismiss with respect to any constructivedischarge claim in Count I and DISMISS that constructivedischarge claim without prejudice.B. The Court Will Dismiss Count IIPridgen does not state a claim for failure to provide reasonableaccommodations under the ADA. Compl. 27–30. Toestablish a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA, aplaintiff must show: (1) he was disabled within the meaningof the ADA and his employer knew it; (2) he requested anaccommodation or assistance; (3) his employer did not makea good faith effort to assist; and (4) he could have reasonablybeen accommodated. Capps v. Mondelez Glob. LLC, 847 F.3d144, 157 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Armstrong v. Burdette TomlinMem'l Hosp., 438 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006)).According to Pridgen, Amazon failed to provide him withreasonable accommodation by refusing to reduce his assignedworkload. Compl. ¶¶ 8–9, 27–30. But according to Pridgen'sComplaint, Amazon provided Pridgen with all “approvedaccommodations” including: (1) “[a] 10-hour maximumshift”; (2) “[a] 40-hour maximum workweek;” (3) “[a]nadditional 60-minute break”; and (4) “[t]hree allowableintermittent absences per month.” See id. 6. Pridgennevertheless complains that although his shift was shortened,his workload was not commensurately reduced. Id. 8.Pridgen further complains that this resulted in increasedpressure at work “in direct contradiction to his medicallyapproved limits.” Id. Pridgen's allegations are inadequate forat least two reasons.First, Pridgen does not allege any facts showing that he wasentitled to a reduced workload or that he was subject toany “medically approved limits” for pressure at work. Healleges that he was entitled to “reduced duties,” but the onlylimits that Pridgen's physician imposed appear related to theduration of his shifts, breaks, and his permitted absences. Seeid. ¶¶ 8, 28.Indeed, the Health Assessment Pridgen references in hisComplaint provides no indication that Pridgen is entitledto a reduction in workload. If anything, the conclusionsprovided by Pridgen's behavioral physician indicate theopposite. Pridgen's physician explicitly specified that nolimitations to Pridgen's job functions or environment werenecessary.9 See D.E. 19-2 at 25–26 (writing “N/A” inresponse to “Changes to Job Functions” and “Changes toWork Environment”). Just because Pridgen's workload maycause him stress does not mean that his disability entitleshim to a reduction in workload. The ADA does not requireemployers to provide employees with a particular preferred orrequested accommodation. Yovtcheva v. City of PhiladelphiaWater Dep't, 518 F. App'x 116, 122 (3d Cir. 2013) (quotingGile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996)).Indeed, “[t]he law is clear that” even if plaintiffs are “entitledto reasonable accommodations,” plaintiffs are not entitled to“the accommodation of [their] choice.” Keyhani v. Trusteesof Univ. of Pa., No. 17-3092, 2019 WL 2568279, at *3 (E.D.Pa. June 21, 2019).*6 It therefore appearing that Amazon addressed alllimitations provided for by Pridgen's physician, Pridgen failsto state an ADA claim for failure to accommodate. SeeHofacker v. Wells Fargo Bank Nat'l Assoc., 179 F. Supp.3d 463, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (dismissing ADA failure toaccommodate claim in part because “Defendant addressed allthe limitations that her physician placed on her”).Second, even if the Court could construe the limitationson Pridgen's ability to work to implicitly require a reducedworkload, Pridgen has not described his work responsibilitieswith adequate specificity for the Court to determine whetherhis claims of disproportionate work are plausible.10 Forexample, Pridgen alleges that his work responsibilitiesincluded “continuous floor presence” but it does not seemplausible that Amazon is requiring Pridgen to provide morethan ten hours’ worth of “continuous floor presence” in tenhours’ time. See Compl. 9. Pridgen also claims that hiswork responsibilities included physical labor, documentation,and audits. Id. But Pridgen does not explain whetherhe means that he had to fill out a certain quantity ofdocumentation or complete certain audits or whether he refersto documentation and audits that Amazon or third-partyentities collected and performed on Pridgen. See, e.g., id. ¶¶
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.517 (Pridgen complaining that he was selected for “an IRSaudit adding ... documentation burdens”), 31 (complainingthat Amazon “punitively monitored” him). Nor does Pridgenexplain what kind of labor he had to engage in. Pridgentherefore fails to state a claim for failure to provide reasonableaccommodation.11Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Amazon's Motion toDismiss with respect to Count II and DISMISS Count IIwithout prejudice.C. The Court Will Dismiss Count IIIPridgen fails to state an ADA hostile work environment claimagainst Amazon. Compl. ¶¶ 31–33. To state a claim under theADA for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must allege:[(1) he] is a qualified individualwith a disability under the ADA;(2) [h]e was subject to unwelcomeharassment; (3) the harassment wasbased on h[is] disability or request foran accommodation; (4) the harassmentwas sufficiently severe or pervasive toalter the conditions of her employmentand to create an abusive workingenvironment; and (5) the employerknew or should have known of theharassment and failed to take prompteffective remedial action.Wright v. Providence Care Cntr., LLC, 822 F. App'x 85, 95 (3dCir. 2020) (citing Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Se. Pa.,168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999)). Courts must look at thetotality of the circumstances, including “the frequency of thediscriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physicallythreatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; andwhether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's workperformance.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23(1993).*7 Pridgen's Complaint is devoid of any specific factsthat give rise to a plausible ADA hostile work environmentclaim. Although pro se litigants are entitled to liberalconstruction of their pleadings, they must neverthelesscomply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mala, 704F.3d at 246. Here, Pridgen's conclusory allegations that hewas “[p]unitively monitored; [a]rbitrarily disciplined;” andsubjected to an environment that was “[e]motionally andphysically unsustainable,” fail to provide any notice as towhat Pridgen's grounds are for his hostile work environmentclaim. Compl. ¶¶ 31-33. Pridgen includes one allegationthat he received a formal disciplinary warning, but he doesnot state who provided it, when, how, what it said, or whyhe believes his disability motivated the warning. Id. 10.Pridgen's single allegation is not enough. See, e.g., Govan v.Amazon, Inc., No. 22-4403, 2023 WL 2025034, at *4 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 15, 2023) (“Absent any factual allegations explainingwhy the supporting feedback document or any allegeddisciplinary action was motivated by Govan's disability,the Complaint cannot support a plausible claim under theADA.”). Count III therefore fails to even satisfy Rule 8’srequirement that plaintiffs provide defendants with notice asto what grounds their claims are based on.Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Amazon's Motion toDismiss with respect to Count III and DISMISS Count IIIwithout prejudice.D. The Court Will Dismiss Count IVPridgen seeks to bring a claim against Amazon for disparateimpact discrimination under the ADA on behalf of a class.Compl. 34–37. Pridgen, however, does not state a claimfor disparate impact-based discrimination under the ADA,nor can he bring a class action based on disparate impact-based discrimination under the ADA. The Court will thereforeGRANT Amazon's Motion to Dismiss with respect toCount IV and DISMISS Pridgen's class allegations in CountIV with prejudice and the merits of his disparate impactdiscrimination claim brought on his own behalf in Count IVwithout prejudice.As an initial matter, it is well established that non-attorneyplaintiffs who proceed pro se may not serve as classrepresentatives in a putative class action. See, e.g., Hoganv. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 158–59 (3d Cir. 2009); Ezekoyev. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB, 179 F. App'x 111, 113 (3d Cir.2006); Doyle v. Fla. Health Sol, Inc., No. 17-12231, 2018 WL11711375, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2018) (collecting cases).Plaintiff proceeds pro se and is not an attorney. As long asPridgen remains unrepresented, Pridgen cannot, therefore,bring a putative class action.12 Because amendment wouldbe futile, see Parkell v. Doe, No. 25-723, 2025 WL 2199988,at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 1, 2025) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's classallegations with prejudice because he was unrepresented),
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6the Court will DISMISS Pridgen's class allegations withprejudice.Putting aside Pridgen's inability to represent a class, Pridgencannot bring any claim for disparate impact—whether onbehalf of himself or on behalf of a class—because theclaim exceeds the scope of the charges of discriminationhe submitted to the EEOC. The parameters of a plaintiff'sdiscrimination case before a district court is “defined bythe scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonablybe expected to grow out of the [plaintiff's] charge ofdiscrimination.” Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256,263 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ostapowicz v. Johnson BronzeCo., 541 F. F.2d 394, 398–99 (3d Cir. 1976)). As a result, aplaintiff's failure to raise a practice or policy that causes adisparate impact in an EEOC charge of discrimination willdoom any disparate impact claim later brought before thedistrict court. Ptasznik v. Univ. of Pa., 523 F. App'x 156, 160(3d Cir. 2013).*8 In his Complaint, Pridgen alleges that Amazonmechanically “impose[d] identical benchmarks on all AreaManagers, regardless of disability status or return-from-leavestatus” and that this policy “disproportionately impact[ed]employees who return from protected medical leave or holdactive accommodations.” Compl. ¶¶ 34–35. But absent fromeither of Pridgen's charges of discrimination is any referenceto this policy or any other that caused (or could have caused)a disparate impact. Charge of Discrimination at 32–34;Amended Charge of Discrimination at 36–40. Pridgen onlycomplained about: (1) Amazon's failure to enforce Pridgen'sapproved accommodations; (2) Amazon's assignment of workto Pridgen that was “disproportionately higher than [his]colleagues”; (3) Amazon's retaliatory conduct in responseto Pridgen's complaints about his accommodations andworkload; (4) Pridgen's resulting emotional distress anddiminished quality of life; and (5) Amazon's unreasonableexpectations of Pridgen's ability to manage a standardworkload. Charge of Discrimination I at 32–34; Charge ofDiscrimination II at 36–40. Pridgen's complaints all concernAmazon's conduct only insofar as it individually impactedPridgen. Accordingly, because Pridgen makes “no referenceto allegations of other similarly situated employees beingharmed by [any] polic[y],” Pridgen's disparate impact claimfalls outside the scope of his charges of discrimination and isthus unexhausted.13 Ptasznik, 523 F. App'x at 161.The Court will therefore GRANT Amazon's Motion toDismiss with respect to Count IV and DISMISS Pridgen'sclass allegations in Count IV with prejudice and the CountIV as brought on Pridgen's own behalf without prejudice.If Pridgen receives a notice to sue based upon a charge ofdiscrimination that encompasses a disparate impact claim,Pridgen may replead Count IV.E. The Court Will Deny Pridgen's Motion for aPreliminary InjunctionPridgen moves for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Amazonfrom causing him “further financial harm, proceduraldisadvantage, and ADA-based retaliation.” PI Mot. at 2. Tothe extent Pridgen's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction seeksrelief based on Counts II through IV, the Court will DENYthat relief as moot. See KDDI Global LLC v. Fisk TelecomLLC, No. 17-5445, 2017 WL 5479512, at *7 (D.N.J. Nov. 15,2017) (collecting cases dismissing motions for a preliminaryinjunction as moot after granting a motion to dismiss).To the extent Pridgen's Motion for a Preliminary Injunctionrests on his allegations of retaliation—which Amazon did notmove to dismiss—Pridgen fails to show either a likelihoodof success on the merits or irreparable harm. The Court willtherefore DENY the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.1. No likelihood of success on the meritsA prima facie claim of retaliation under the ADA requiresshowing that (1) a plaintiff engaged in “protected activity”;(2) the plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employmentaction; and (3) a causal connection between the protectedactivity and the adverse employment action exists. See Moorev. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir.2006). Pridgen argues that because he pursued EEOC action,Amazon withheld his wages. See PI Mot. at 3–4. But likePridgen's Complaint, his Motion for a Preliminary Injunctionis scant when it comes to detail. Pridgen provides no evidenceat all that Amazon intentionally withheld his wages inresponse to Pridgen's EEOC filing or in response to anyother protected activity. See, e.g., id. at 3 (citing unattached“Exhibits D, E, F, G, H”). Pridgen's Motion for a PreliminaryInjunction and Complaint instead indicate that any delayin receiving wages was attributable to non-discriminatoryreasons. See id. (arguing that Amazon withheld wagesbecause of Pridgen's non-attendance at work); Compl. 16(alleging that Pridgen's pay was disrupted because his secondleave period was misclassified as short term disability).
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Pridgen has therefore failed to show a likelihood of successon the merits of his retaliation claim. This Court accordinglyfinds that Pridgen is not entitled to the extraordinary relief ofa preliminary injunction that he asks for.2. No irreparable harm*9 A preliminary injunction should not issue “unless themoving party shows that it specifically and personally risksirreparable harm.” Liberty Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. FordMotor Co., 562 F.3d 553, 557 (3d Cir. 2009). Injuries fullycompensable by monetary damages are not irreparable. Id.Pridgen has not shown he risks irreparable harm.For one, Pridgen complains of lost wages but concedesthat “Amazon issued Plaintiff a separate check forunderpayment ....” PI Mot. at 4 (emphasis removed). Ittherefore appears that Amazon has already addressed andresolved at least some of Pridgen's lost wages.Next, Pridgen avers that underpayment continues yet providesno evidence of what pay remains missing or for how much.On this record, the Court could not compel Amazon to payany underpayments even if it did find that Pridgen was likelyto prevail on the merits of his retaliation claim.Finally, Pridgen must do more than simply allege he is entitledto lost pay for a preliminary injunction to issue. Reilly, 858F.3d at 179 n.4 (“[T]he availability of money damages for aninjury typically will preclude a finding of irreparable harm.”).In his Complaint, Pridgen contends that the lapse in pay“severely destabilized his home life, credit, and ability to payfor ongoing [medical] care.” Id. 18. But for purposes ofinjunctive relief, Pridgen must prove—not just allege—thatabsent the requested relief, he will face irreparable harm thatcannot be remedied by monetary damages. Reilly, 858 F.3d at179 n.4. Pridgen, however, makes no such showing.Because Pridgen's Motion for a Preliminary Injunctiondoes not satisfy either of the first two factors needed fora preliminary injunction to issue, the Court will DENYPridgen's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Reilly, 858F.3d at 176.IV. CONCLUSIONHaving determined that Pridgen does not state a claim forrelief under Count I for constructive discharge or underCounts II, III, or IV at all, the Court will GRANT Amazon'sMotion to Dismiss and DISMISS part of Count I (to theextent it includes a constructive discharge claim), and all ofCounts II, III, and IV. The Court will specifically DISMISSPridgen's class allegations based on Count IV with prejudiceand will DISMISS Counts II, III, and IV as it is broughton Pridgen's behalf without prejudice. And because Pridgen:(1) pleads no plausible claim for relief based on constructivedischarge or based on Counts II, III, or IV; and (2) fails toshow either a likelihood of success on the merits of Count Ior irreparable harm, the Court will DENY Pridgen's Motionfor a Preliminary Injunction.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 735250Footnotes1For convenience, the Court refers to the memorandum of law that Amazon filed in support of its motion todismiss as its “Motion to Dismiss.” Amazon filed its notice of motion at D.E. 19.2For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations of the Complaint as trueand draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Pridgen. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008).3Generally, “a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.However, an exception to the general rule is that a document integral or explicitly relied upon in the complaintmay be considered without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.” In re Burlington CoatFactory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Here, Pridgen's Complaint includes an exhibit
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8index for exhibits he did not file with his Complaint. See D.E. 1-2. Instead, he represented that they were“available for inspection or submission upon request.” Id. Pridgen references some of these exhibits in hisComplaint. Those exhibits include at least: (1) the Health Assessment; and (2) Pridgen's two charges ofdiscrimination filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 21,27–30, Amazon, through an affidavit, has provided a sworn copy of the missing Health Assessment andcharges of discrimination. D.E. 19-2 at 1–2. The Court may therefore consider these documents.4The Court refers to the page numbers generated by the Court's Case Management / Electronic Case Filessystem (“CM/ECF”) in its citations to the exhibits filed within D.E. 19-2.5Pridgen does not provide context for what these responsibilities entailed or how they subjected Pridgen toincreased productivity expectations.6In his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Pridgen represents that he “is preparing a master indexed ExhibitLog, which will include all exhibits filed to date (A through AO), and respectfully requests that the Courtconsider this reference log for the purposes of all pending and future motions ....” PI Mot. at 3. Plaintiff maynot treat the Court's docket as a repository for the discovery he wishes to produce and then expect the Courtto consider it all in response to every future filing. Pridgen must be specific, must provide citations, and mustorganize his filings. In addition, Pridgen may not prematurely file documents with notice that at some point inthe future, he will provide evidence. The Court will consider such filings untimely and incomplete.7In his MTD Opposition, Pridgen mentions the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination and the New JerseyConscientious Employee Protection Act. MTD Opp'n at 2–3. “[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not beamended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo,Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988). The Court therefore only considers those claims that Pridgen assertsin his Complaint.8Pridgen brought a separate constructive discharge claim in his Amended Charge of Discrimination that wasseparate from his other claims. See D.E. 19-2 at 36. He does not explicitly refer to constructive dischargein his Complaint.9The record Pridgen submitted shows that Amazon addressed each limitation his physician imposed onPridgen's ability to work. Compare D.E. 19-2 at 25 (Pridgen's physician specifying that Pridgen could notwork more than ten hours a day, forty hours a week, that Pridgen needed an extended break each shift forup to sixty minutes, and that Pridgen should be permitted to take three intermittent days off a month), withCompl. 6 (alleging Pridgen returned to work subject to a ten-hour maximum shift, a forty-hour maximumwork week, an hour-long break each shift, and three intermittent absences per month).10Pridgen references a formal disciplinary warning that he received that was “tied directly to metrics outlined”by Amazon's work standards, Compl. 10, but Pridgen neither provides the formal disciplinary warning or acopy of Amazon's work standards in connection with either his Complaint or MTD Opposition.11In his MTD Opposition, Pridgen argues that Amazon compelled Pridgen to work outside of his scheduledhours. MTD Opp'n at 6. These allegations, however, appear nowhere in Pridgen's Complaint and thereforecannot be considered. See supra n.7.12Pridgen nevertheless argues that “[c]ourts routinely permit pro se plaintiffs to plead class claims ....” MTDOpp'n at 7. Pridgen cites “Lewis v. City of Trenton, 2020 WL 6204330” for this proposition. Id. The casePridgen cites, however, does not exist. This Court does not tolerate hallucinated citations. Litigants who usegenerative artificial intelligence must disclose such use to this Court and litigants must review the filingsfor accuracy. See Section I.B of the Undersigned's Judicial Preferences. This Court warns Pridgen that iffuture filings include hallucinated citations, this Court will strike those filings and they will not be considered.
SHAQUAN PRIDGEN Plaintiff, v. AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Pridgen may also be subject to other sanctions. Pridgen's citation to non-existent authority bolsters the Court'sconclusion that Pridgen could not adequately represent the interests of other litigants.13The Court reiterates that although Amazon does not contest the existence of any EEOC notice to sue, Pridgendid not attach one to his Complaint or MTD Opposition and the Court cannot determine which charge ofdiscrimination was exhausted, if either.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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