that the subject of every bill shall be clearly expressed in its title.
Being unsatisfied with the result and the reasoning on which it rests, we granted certiorari.
As to sovereign immunity, that doctrine, insofar as it has been created by courts, seems headed for a deserved repose. Courts and scholars can find little reason for it, and its historical basis is of doubtful validity. This case is not an appropriate •one in which to review or reconsider court-created sovereign immunity because the immunity which the court below held had been created stemmed from an act of the legislature.
The Court of Appeals oversimplified the effect of the statute in holding that it created absolute sovereign immunity. Although the court was considering legislature-created immunity, court-created immunity already existed except as to proprietary activities. Barker v. City of Santa Fe, 47 N.M. 85, 136 P.2d 480 (1943). The opinion in Barker had not been handed down when the statute was enacted, but that case merely declared existing law, albeit in a more definitive manner than its predecessors. Even as to torts committed in pursuance of proprietary functions, immunity was not simply created by the statute, although by compliance with it a procedure which amounts to about the same thing is brought about.
For purposes of this case, we will accept the premise that immunity was affected by the .statute and in some instances, expanded, and proceed to consider the question of whether Article IV, § 16 was violated by failure to make mention of it in the title of the act.
Article IV, § 16 has often been considered by this court. No rtseful purpose would be served by reviewing those decisions. We are not disposed to broaden its operation. We approve the guideline stated by the United States Supreme Court in Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 2 S. Ct. 391, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1882):
"The objections should be grave, and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable, before the judiciary should disregard a legislative enactment upon the sole ground that it embraced more than one object, or if but one object, that it was not sufficiently expressed by the title.”
We said in Grant et al. v. State, 33 N.M. 633, 275 P. 95 (1929):
“A title need not disclose the means and instrumentalities provided in the body of the act for accomplishing its purpose. Provisions reasonably necessary for attaining the object of the act embraced in the title are considered as included in the title. (Citation omitted.)”
The title need not set forth details of an enactment.
“Particulars are to be found in the act, not in the caption.” 1A Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 18.11 (4th ed. 1972).
Plowever the details of a statute must be germane or related to the subject matter expressed in the title.
“This should not cause difficulty, for, 'when the general purpose of the act is declared, the details provided for the accomplishment of that purpose will be regarded as necessary incidents,’ ” Id.
In City of Albuquerque v. Campbell, 68 N.M. 75, 358 P.2d 698 (1960), we said, speaking of the same statute now under consideration, that:
“ [t]he law as adopted was intended under the conditions set forth therein to authorize insurance by municipal corporations *
That statement is hard to dispute and, if true, would seem to establish that the statute’s subject was insurance rather than sovereign immunity.
Our present inquiry, by the literal terms of Article IV, § 16, is whether sovereign immunity was the “subject” of the statute in question. It was not. Sovereign immunity was affected only incidentally. This being so, failure to mention it in the title of the statute does not violate Article IV, § 16. Crosthwait v. White, 55 N.M. 71, 226 P.2d 477 (1951); Bureau of Reve