Lipe v. Albuquerque Pub. Schools (Oct. 1, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
D. New Mexico. TATIA LIPE v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC EDUCATION
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New Mexico (NM)
Court
New Mexico Supreme Court
Decided
Oct. 1, 2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
TATIA LIPE, Plaintiff, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2855760Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. New Mexico.TATIA LIPE, Plaintiff,v.ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLSand NEW MEXICO DEPARTMENTOF PUBLIC EDUCATION, Defendants.1:23-cv-00899-GBW-JMR|Filed 10/08/2025AMENDED ORDER GRANTINGMOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIMEJENNIFER M. ROZZONI United States Magistrate Judge*1 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on DefendantAlbuquerque Public Schools’ Motion for Extension ofTime to Supplement its Discovery Responses to Plaintiffs’Discovery to Defendant Albuquerque Public Schools, filedOctober 1, 2025. Doc. 150. Therein, Defendant requesteda 10-day extension of time to produce the supplementaldiscovery responses it was compelled to produce by October3, 2025. Id. The Court granted the motion without grantingPlaintiff an opportunity to respond on October 2, 2025. Doc.151.That same day, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff'sNotice of Preserved Objections and Request for AppropriateRelief.” Doc. 152. In that filing, Plaintiff requested “that theCourt deem all objections and arguments set forth in theattached unfiled opposition [to Defendant's motion for anextension of time] (Exhibit A) as preserved for the record.” Id.at 2. Plaintiff's filing is procedurally irregular. Plaintiff couldhave filed a response before the Court issued its decisionon the Defendant's motion, though the Court acknowledgesthere was a relatively short time frame to do so. Alternatively,Plaintiff could have objected to the Court's order granting theextension. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(a). Both procedures wouldhave preserved Plaintiff's argument for appeal. See UnitedStates v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1221 n.8 (10th Cir. 2024)(“[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, a party needsto alert the court to the issue and seek a ruling.”) (quotationomitted). Instead, Plaintiff filed a preservation notice thatlikely does not actually preserve her arguments because itdoes not “seek a ruling.”1 See id. Nevertheless, because theCourt issued its order prior to the deadline within whichPlaintiff had to respond, the Court amends its decision to takeinto account Plaintiff's intended response (Doc. 152-1).Having reviewed the motion, Plaintiff's response, and therelevant law, the Court does not alter its decision. See Doc.151. Defendant's motion is GRANTED.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) provides that theCourt may extend a deadline for “good cause.” FED. R. CIV.P. 6(b)(1)(A). If a motion to extend a deadline is filed “afterthe time has expired,” then the moving party must also showexcusable neglect. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B). Rule 6(b)(1)must “be liberally construed to advance the goal of tryingeach case on the merits.” Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390,394 (10th Cir. 2016). Indeed, “an application for extensionof time under Rule 6(b)(1)(A) normally will be granted inthe absence of bad faith on the part of the party seekingrelief or prejudice to the adverse party.” Wright & Miller,4B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1165 (4thed.).*2 Here, there is good cause to extend the deadlinefor Defendant's supplemental responses to discovery by amodest ten days. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(A). The Courtordered Defendant to substantially supplement its discoveryresponses, which is inherently resource intensive. Defensecounsel stated that the “law clerk working on this matterwas called away” due to a “tragedy.” Doc. 150. While theCourt agrees with Plaintiff that defense counsel, not her lawclerk, bears the responsibility for timely compliance withCourt orders, see Doc. 152-1 at 5 (“[C]ounsel of recordbear a nondelegable responsibility for compliance with courtorders.”), it is also reasonable that defense counsel may haveenlisted her law clerk for assistance with the formidable taskof supplementing Defendant's discovery responses. There isno indication that Defendant's request was made in bad faith.And Plaintiff will not suffer meaningful prejudice because ofa ten-day extension of time. Given the unexpected event inthe law clerk's personal life, the short length of the proposedextension, and the burdensome nature of the task, the Courtfinds that Defendant has shown good cause for an extensionof the deadline to supplement its discovery responses.Now, the Court turns to Plaintiff's arguments. First, Plaintiffargues that “APS has had ample time and notice to comply”with the Court's order compelling APS to supplement its
TATIA LIPE, Plaintiff, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2discovery responses. Doc. 152-1 at 2, 4. Plaintiff also arguesthat she has been prejudiced by Defendant's pattern of delay.Id. at 5. The Court agrees with Plaintiff and discussed bothpoints in the original order granting Defendant's motionfor an extension of time. See, e.g., Doc. 151 at 2 (“Noparty should be required to wait nearly a year for discoveryresponses.... Defendant's failure to thoroughly respond toPlaintiff's discovery requests has unnecessarily delayed thismatter and has no doubt needlessly increased the costs of thislitigation.”). However, even in light of these factors, it wouldbe unreasonable to deny the Defendant such a short extensionof time that was requested in good faith.Plaintiff also argues that Defendant has not shown “excusableneglect.” Doc. 152-1 at 4–5. But because Defendant requestedan extension of time before the deadline expired,2 “excusableneglect” is not the appropriate legal standard. See FED. R.CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B).Plaintiff also makes arguments related to sanctioning theDefendant. But again, a response to Defendant's motion is notthe appropriate mechanism by which to request sanctions. SeeFED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2) (“A motion for sanctions must bemade separately from any other motion....”).Plaintiff also requests, without citation to any relevantlegal authority, that the Court impose eight conditions onthe extension of time. See Doc. 152-1 at 7–8. Some ofthese conditions are duplicative of existing orders. See,e.g., id. (requesting a “[f]ull, verified supplementation by[the] final deadline” and “no rolling production after thefinal deadline”). Some of these conditions are unrelatedto the extension request. See, e.g., id. (requesting thatDefendant provide a “[p]rivilege log,” a “[p]roductiontransparency” certification, and participate in a post-production “[c]ompliance conference”). And some are inplain contradiction with each other. For example, Plaintiffrequests that the Court order Defendant to partially producewhatever responsive material it has immediately, id. at 7,but then requests that the Court order Defendant provide“[u]nified” responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Id. TheCourt does not see the need to impose any of Plaintiff'sproposed conditions.Finally, the Court is compelled to note that Plaintiff's briefingbears signs that counsel continues to neglect to properlyreview her filings and may be continuing to inappropriatelyuse generative artificial intelligence (“AI”) to draft herfilings. Plaintiff's counsel has already been sanctioned oncefor the inappropriate use of AI. See Doc. 149. To beclear, the use of generative AI is not in and of itselfproblematic, but an attorney must diligently review AI-generated briefing to ensure its accuracy and compliancewith Rule 11. See Formal Ethics Advisory OpinionNo. 2024-004, STATE BAR OF NEW MEXICO (Sept.24, 2024), https://www.sbnm.org/Portals/NMBAR/GenAI%20Formal%20Opinion%20-%20Sept_2024_FINAL.pdf(providing guidance on the ethical use of generative artificialintelligence in the legal practice).*3 While Plaintiff's briefing no longer contains fabricatedcitations, it does contain several “legal contentions” that aresimply not “warranted by existing law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). For example, in the legal standard section of the brief,Plaintiff supplies the following rule statement: “Withholdingresponsive material that are ready for production, whileseeking additional time for other items, is itself sanctionableunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b).” Doc. 152-1 at 4. Rule 37(b)makes no such statement. Nor is the Court aware of, andPlaintiff does not provide, any case law that supports thisproposition.3 Notably, throughout this litigation, Plaintiff'sbriefing has contained significant citations to case law.However, this most recent filing contains no case citations.Because of the syntactic similarity to Plaintiff's prior briefing,the Court is concerned that Plaintiff may have used the samegenerative AI to draft this response brief, but in lieu ofverifying the legal contentions, just removed any citations tocase law. Without reaching any conclusions as to counsel'sbehavior in this instance, the Court once again cautionsPlaintiff's counsel to be more diligent with her briefing.In summary, Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time toSupplement its Discovery Responses to Plaintiffs’ Discoveryto Defendant Albuquerque Public Schools (Doc. 150) isGRANTED. Defendant's supplemental discovery responsesare due October 13, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2855760
TATIA LIPE, Plaintiff, v. ALBUQUERQUE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Footnotes1Plaintiff cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 46 as the legal basis for the notice. Doc. 152 at 2. However,Rule 46 is plainly inapplicable here. See United States v. Williams, No. 2:15-CV-00054-RJS-DBP, 2023 WL11960837, at *17 (D. Utah Sept. 30, 2023) (“As is clear from the Rule's history and decades of settled TenthCircuit precedent, Rule 46 applies to trial practice.”).2Plaintiff also argues—referencing the October 3, 2025, production deadline: “APS waited until October 1to seek more time. This reflects a lack of diligence under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).” Doc. 152-1 at 4. TheCourt disagrees. Requesting an extension of time two days in advance, particularly in light of an unforeseenemergency, is hardly an “eleventh-hour extension request.” See id. at 7.3Plaintiff provides several other unsupported or inaccurate rule statements. However, because the Courtwishes to urge more diligent conduct, rather than further sanction counsel, the Court will not belabor the point.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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