Wagner v. Robinson (2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New Mexico (NM)
Court
New Mexico Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Jacqueline R. Medina (C. J.) (unanimous Court)
Corrections to this opinion/decision not affecting the outcome, at the Court's discretion, can occur up to the time of publication with NM Compilation Commission. The Court will ensure that the electronic version of this opinion/decision is updated accordingly in Odyssey. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 CHANTELLE WAGNER, 2 Petitioner-Appellee, 3 v. No. A-1-CA-43187 4 DOUGLAS W. ROBINSON, 5 Respondent-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANDOVAL COUNTY 7 Allen R. Smith, District Court Judge 8 Chantelle Wagner 9 Corrales, NM 10 Pro Se Appellee 11 Douglas W. Robinson 12 Corrales, NM 13 Pro Se Appellant 14 Pregenzer, Baysinger, Wideman & Sale, P.C. 15 Margaret A. Graham 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 Guardian Ad Litem 18 MEMORANDUM OPINION 19 MEDINA, Chief Judge. 20 {1} Respondent Douglas W. Robinson, a self-represented litigant, appeals from 21 the district court’s order regarding guardian ad litem fees. We issued a notice of 22 proposed summary disposition, proposing to affirm. The GAL filed a memorandum 23 Court of Appeals of New MexicoFiled 6/29/2026 11:34 AM
2 in support, and Respondent filed a memorandum in opposition and an amended 1 memorandum in opposition, all of which we have duly considered. We remain 2 unpersuaded that our initial proposed disposition was incorrect, and we therefore 3 affirm. 4 {2} Respondent asserts that we must liberally construe his filings due to his status 5 as a self-represented litigant. [AMIO 2] However, while we view pleadings by self-6 represented litigants with tolerance, a self-represented litigant, nevertheless, “is held 7 to the same standard of conduct and compliance with court rules, procedures, and 8 orders as are members of the bar.” Camino Real Env’t. Ctr., Inc. v. N.M. Dep’t of 9 Env’t, 2010-NMCA-057, 21, 148 N.M. 776, 242 P.3d 343 (internal quotation 10 marks and citation omitted); see Bruce v. Lester, 1999-NMCA-051, 4, 127 N.M. 11 301, 980 P.2d 84 (same); see also Corona v. Corona, 2014-NMCA-071, 28, 329 12 P.3d 701 (stating that appellate courts are under no obligation to review unclear or 13 undeveloped arguments). Additionally, we note that much of the legal authority 14 upon which Respondent relies either does not exist or does not support his 15 contentions. Regardless of whether a litigant is self-represented or uses an artificial 16 intelligence tool to prepare filings, litigants have an obligation to provide accurate 17 and valid information to this Court. See Woodhull v. Meinel, 2009-NMCA-015, 30, 18 145 N.M. 533, 202 P.3d 126 (explaining that a self-represented litigant “must 19 comply with the rules and orders of the court and will not be treated differently than 20
3 litigants with counsel”); cf. Rule 16-303(A)(1) NMRA (“A lawyer shall not 1 knowingly[] make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a 2 false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 3 lawyer.”). 4 {3} Respondent continues to challenge the district court’s December 9, 2025 5 order, asserting that the district court erred in issuing an order that required 6 Respondent pay his share of GAL fees. Specifically, Respondent makes the 7 following assertions of error: the GAL abused her office and acted improperly 8 [AMIO 6; MIO 14]; the district court failed to issue adequate findings and comply 9 with procedural requirements [MIO 11]; and the GAL fee judgment is not 10 enforceable against him [MIO 11]. Respondent also asserts the district court erred 11 in denying all his pending motions based on his failure to comply with a prior order 12 identifying him as a vexatious litigant. [MIO 10] 13 {4} Our proposed disposition suggested that the district court’s order was in 14 accordance with its earlier order appointing a GAL and that Respondent had not 15 identified facts in the record that suggest the GAL’s actions were so improper that 16 she failed to satisfy her duty under Rule 1-053.3(A) NMRA. [CN 8] Respondent 17 responded by claiming that he could provide “evidence of abuse of office and 18 numerous [f]ederal, civil and parenting rights and children’s code violations made 19 by the GAL.” [AMIO 6] Respondent also claims the GAL committed what he 20
4 characterizes as “material omission[s],” including failure to document and a lack of 1 advocacy, billing for services not performed, and misidentifying the child in a 2 parenting plan. [MIO 6-8, 14] Additionally, Respondent suggests that the district 3 court judge having appointed the GAL in other cases over the course of several years 4 has a “pre-existing relationship” with the GAL, indicative of impermissible 5 partiality. [AMIO 4-5] 6 {5} As discussed in our proposed disposition, however, Respondent has not 7 identified facts in the record to support his claims regarding the GAL’s actions. 8 [CN 9] Instead, he presents them as bare assertions without identifying if, when, or 9 how he presented evidence of such omissions or failures to the district court. Those 10 assertions are not evidence. See Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, 51, 145 N.M. 11 451, 200 P.3d 104 (recognizing that “mere assertions and arguments . . . are not 12 evidence”). It is not our obligation to search the record and case law to develop a 13 workable understanding of the issues or to find support for any allegations of error. 14 See id. 72 (“We will not search the record for facts, arguments, and rulings in order 15 to support generalized arguments.”). Moreover, Respondent has provided no facts 16 regarding the number of available GALs in the jurisdiction, the number of cases in 17 which a GAL was appointed, or the availability of other GALs during that time. In 18 addition, Respondent has not identified any authority to suggest that the number of 19 times a GAL is appointed by a certain judge is alone sufficient to suggest a GAL 20
5 breached a fiduciary duty. See State v. Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, 60, 327 P.3d 1 1129 (“[A]ppellate courts will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support 2 of the issue and that, given no cited authority, we assume no such authority exists.”); 3 see also United Nuclear Corp. v. Gen. Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094, 418, 96 N.M. 4 155, 629 P.2d 231 (providing that bias or prejudice must “stem from an extrajudicial 5 source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge 6 learned from [their] participation in the case” in order to be disqualifying (internal 7 quotation marks and citation omitted)). The mere possibility of a conflict is 8 insufficient to warrant reversal, see State v. Martinez, 2001-NMCA-059, 24, 130 9 N.M. 744, 31 P.3d 1018, and we conclude Respondent has failed to identify facts in 10 the record to support his assertion of error regarding the GAL’s actions. 11 {6} Next, Respondent asserts the district court did not satisfy “mandatory 12 procedural requirements” or make any of the “required findings.” [MIO 11] 13 Specifically, Respondent asserts the district court erred in awarding GAL fees 14 without holding an “ability-to-pay hearing” and issuing findings regarding his ability 15 to pay. [MIO 12] Respondent continues to rely on NMSA 1978, Section 40-4-16 11.1(C) (2008) as support, as well as Rule 1-053.3(K). [MIO 12] As discussed in 17 our proposed disposition, however, Section 40-4-11.1 pertains to child support 18 guidelines, and it in no way supports Respondent’s assertion regarding a mandatory 19 “ability to pay” hearing for GAL fees. [CN 6] See Section 40-4-11.1(C) (defining 20
6 “income” and “gross income” for purposes of the child support guidelines). Rule 1-1 053.3(K) similarly fails to support Respondent’s assertions regarding the district 2 court holding a hearing or issuing findings regarding Respondent’s ability to pay. 3 See Rule 1-053.3(K) (requiring that an order appointing a GAL and stating the 4 GAL’s hourly rate provide for itemized statements, and designate the manner in 5 which the parties bear the fees and costs). We are therefore unpersuaded. 6 {7} Respondent also asserts that the GAL fee judgment is not enforceable against 7 him because federal law bars enforcement against him as a social security disability 8 beneficiary. [MIO 11; AMIO 6] In our proposed disposition, we noted that 9 Respondent had provided no evidence pertaining to his income or assets that might 10 have demonstrated he was unable to pay the GAL fees through means other than his 11 social security income. [CN 3] Accordingly, the proposed disposition suggested that, 12 even assuming the federal exemption applied to the facts of this case, Respondent 13 failed to demonstrate that he would qualify for any such exemption. In response, 14 Respondent asserts that social security is his “sole income stream” and that 15 “[v]oluntary prior payments under a court order do not constitute a waiver.” 16 [MIO 11] Respondent does not, however, indicate anywhere in the record proper 17 where he demonstrated to the district court that social security was his sole source 18 of income. See Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, ¶¶ 51, 72. Neither does he cite any authority 19 to support his assertions regarding waiver. See Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, 60. 20
7 Accordingly, we conclude Respondent has failed to demonstrate reversible error. 1 See State v. Mondragon, 1988-NMCA-027, 10, 107 N.M. 421, 759 P.2d 1003 (“A 2 party responding to a summary calendar notice must come forward and specifically 3 point out errors of law and fact,” and the repetition of earlier arguments does not 4 fulfill this requirement.”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State 5 v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, 3, 297 P.3d 374. 6 {8} In addition to granting the GAL’s request for accrued fees, the district court’s 7 December 9, 2025 order denied Respondent’s pending motions based on 8 Respondent’s failure to comply with the district court’s vexatious litigation order. 9 [RP 1430] The vexatious litigation order prohibited Respondent from filing any 10 future motions that are redundant, have previously been ruled upon, or are barred 11 under the doctrine of res judicata without first tendering them to the district court to 12 evaluate for merit and new circumstances. [RP 1296] Respondent now asserts the 13 district court erred when it denied his “already-pending substantive 14 motions . . . raising GAL misconduct, false allegations, evidence withholding, the 15 knife-fight report, the November 2024 suppressed disclosure, and void judgment” 16 without conducting an individual merits analysis. [MIO 10] We disagree. 17 {9} As stated in our proposed disposition, it is well-established that the district 18 court has the authority to curtail litigants from abusing the process of the district 19 court and exercise control over its own docket. See Lepiscopo v. Hopwood, 1990-20
8 NMCA-044, 4, 110 N.M. 30, 791 P.2d 481 (“Where a litigant has a history of filing 1 meritless, vexatious lawsuits, however, and where that pattern unduly burdens the 2 judicial system, courts can constitutionally restrict the litigant’s access to the 3 courts.”); In re Mokiligon, 2005-NMCA-021, 10, 137 N.M. 22, 106 P.3d 584 (“[I]f 4 the court views [a party’s] actions as vexatious and tying up the court’s resources, 5 there is nothing to prevent the court, in the exercise of controlling its docket, from 6 requiring [a party] to have [their ] pleadings reviewed before [ [they are] allowed to 7 file them to determine whether they have merit.”). Respondent has not identified 8 which, if any, of his many motions was already pending when the district court 9 entered the vexatious litigant order. We decline Respondent’s invitation to undertake 10 such a task, particularly considering the number of motions Respondent filed in the 11 district court leading up to the vexatious litigation order. See In re Est. of Heeter, 12 1992-NMCA-032, 15, 113 N.M. 691, 831 P.2d 990 (“This [C]ourt will not search 13 the record to find evidence to support an appellant’s claims.”). 14 {10} Respondent’s remaining assertions of error pertain to two district court orders: 15 one entered on April 12, 2024, and one entered on March 23, 2026. [AMIO 2-5; 16 MIO 12] As discussed in our proposed disposition and recognized by Respondent, 17 the December 9, 2025 order that is being appealed in this case does not make any 18 alteration to or modification of custody or visitation. [CN 2; MIO 10] The April 12, 19 2024 order adopted the GAL’s third supplemental recommendations, made one 20
9 modification regarding supervised visitation, and denied five of Respondent’s 1 motions. [RP 924] Respondent now seeks to relitigate matters decided in the April 2 12, 2024 order, pertaining to custody and visitation, arguing the December 9, 2025, 3 fee judgment derives from the April 12, 2024 order, and therefore must be reviewed. 4 [MIO 12; AMIO 2] We disagree. 5 {11} The proper mechanism for seeking review of the district court’s custody and 6 visitation determination was through the timely filing of a notice of appeal. See Rule 7 12-201 NMRA; NMSA 1978, § 40-10A-314 (2001) (providing that an appeal may 8 be taken from a final order in custody matters in accordance with appellate 9 procedures in other civil cases). Respondent did not seek any such review. Instead, 10 Respondent filed numerous successive motions to reconsider. [RP 905, 961, 999, 11 1051, 1078, 1119, 1236, 1299] Successive motions to reconsider, filed after thirty 12 days of the underlying judgment, do not extend the time for appealing the underlying 13 judgment and do not permit the moving party to directly appeal the underlying 14 judgment. See Rule 12-201(D)(1)(c); Rule 1-060(B)(6) NMRA; Deerman v. Bd. of 15 Cnty. Comm’rs, 1993-NMCA-123, 16, 116 N.M. 501, 864 P.2d 317 (stating that 16 “Rule [1-0]60(B) is not to be used as a substitute for appeal” and concluding that “a 17 motion pursuant to Rule [1-0]60(B)(1) to correct an error of law by the district court 18 must be filed before the expiration of the time for appeal”). Additionally, 19 Respondent has not provided any citation to authority that suggests it is proper for 20
10 this Court to look beyond the scope of the December 9, 2025, fee judgment. See 1 Curry v. Great Nw. Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party 2 cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority 3 exists.”). We therefore conclude that Respondent’s assertions of error regarding the 4 April 12, 2024 order, present no basis for reversal. 5 {12} Regarding Respondent’s assertions of error in the district court’s order issued 6 on March 23, 2025, insofar as Respondent challenges the district court entering an 7 order regarding custody—a matter unrelated to the fee issue being appealed—8 because the district court had jurisdiction to do so, we discern no error. [Order 9 Denying Respondent’s Notice of Void Judgment and Request to Restore 50/50 10 Custody at 1, Wagner v. Robinson, No. D-1329-DM-2015-00208 (13th Jud. Dist. 11 Ct. Mar. 23, 2026)]. See generally Flores v. McLain, 2024-NMCA-079, 18, 557 12 P.3d 1049 (recognizing that family court proceedings involve continuing jurisdiction 13 to modify orders); NMSA 1978, § 40-10A-202 (2001) (providing for exclusive, 14 continuing jurisdiction over child-custody determination). 15 {13} We conclude that Respondent’s repetition of earlier arguments and 16 presentation of conclusory assertions without identifying facts in the record to 17 support them does not demonstrate the error he claims on appeal. See Aetna Fin. Co. 18 v. Gaither, 1994-NMSC-082, 15, 118 N.M. 246, 880 P.2d 857 (stating that the 19 appellants’ “bald assertion of error by the court is insufficient; simply alleging an 20
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