Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP (Aug. 27, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Judicial District. Washoe County Rafael CAPPUCCI v. MAUPIN
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Nevada (NV)
Court
Nevada Supreme Court
Decided
Aug. 27, 2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 4662709 (Nev.Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)District Court of Nevada,Second Judicial District.Washoe CountyRafael CAPPUCCI, an Individual; and Dieter Berndt, an Individual, et al., Plaintiffs,v.MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY, LLP, a Nevada Law Firm; Christopher M. Stanko, Esq.;Michaelle D. Rafferty, Esq.; and Edward F. Krzanowski; Does I-X, Inclusive, Defendants.No. CV25-02309.November 30, 2025.*1 Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.Dept. No. 15Order Granting Special Motion to DismissDavid A. Hardy, Judge.This matter came before this Court on the Special Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, MAUPIN, COX & LEGOY,a Professional Corporation, CHRISTOPHER M. STANKO, ESQ., MICHAELLE D. RAFFERTY, ESQ., and EDWARD F.KRZANOWSKI, on October 10, 2025. The plaintiffs, Rafael Cappucci and Dieter Berndt filed an opposition to this motion onOctober 29, 2025. The defendants filed a Reply on November 4, 2025.On November 5, 2025, this Court conducted an in-person hearing on this motion in accordance with NRS 41.660(3)(f) (Courtmust rule on a special motion to dismiss within 20 judicial days after the motion is served upon the plaintiff).1 The plaintiffsappeared pro se. The defendants appeared individually and by and through their attorney of record, Thomas P. Beko, Esq.2After hearing from all parties in this matter, and deeming itself fully apprised of the premises of this case, the Court finds andconcludes as follows:I. Summary of the Case and Claims:The plaintiffs' action was premised entirely upon two letters sent by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The first letter, sent onJuly 11, 2025, was a common pre-litigation demand letter. A copy of that letter was attached as Exhibit “A” to the plaintiffs'Complaint. The second letter, dated August 27, 2025, and attached as Exhibit “C” to the plaintiffs' Complaint, was in reply to aJuly 28, 2025 response letter sent by the plaintiffs to the defendants. A copy of the plaintiffs' responsive letter was attached tothe Complaint as Exhibit “B.” The plaintiffs alleged that the sending of these two letters constituted tortious conduct under thevarious legal theories asserted in the Complaint. Inter alia, the plaintiffs alleged that the letters threatened them with criminalprosecution and/or referral to criminal authorities if the plaintiffs did not immediately tender the sum of $1,000,000.00.Based upon these factual premises, the plaintiffs asserted claims sounding in 1) Elder Exploitation, 2) Intentional Infliction ofEmotional Distress, 3) False Light and Defamation Per Se, 4) Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage,
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.25) Abuse of Process, and 6) Breach of Fiduciary Duty. The plaintiffs further sought various forms of declaratory relief whichessentially asked the Court to make a legal determination that they were not legally liable under the various legal claims thedefendants referred to in their July 11, 2025 demand letter.On the same day the plaintiffs filed their Complaint, they also filed an ex parte, emergency motion for temporary restrainingorder and preliminary injunction seeking various forms of injunctive relief, including an order prohibiting the defendants fromsending further threatening or coercive communications to the plaintiffs, prohibiting defendants from threatening or implyingcriminal prosecution, preventing defendants from interfering with their ongoing business operations, and various other orderspertaining to discovery and evidence preservation. On September 30, 2025, this Court entered an order denying the Plaintiffs' exparte motion, essentially without prejudice, and directing the defendants to file a responsive paper when they filed an answer orotherwise made an appearance in the case. For the reasons set forth below, this plaintiffs' ex parte motion has been rendered moot.*2 As noted above, the defendants filed a timely special motion to dismiss on October 20, 2025.3 In that special motion, thedefendants sought dismissal under several different legal theories which included arguments based upon Nevada's Anti-SLAPPlaws (NRS 41.660(2)), the Barton Doctrine, the absolute Litigation Privilege, the Quasi-Judicial Immunity, and NRCP 12(b)(5)arguing that the facts alleged did not state a legally viable claim for relief. For the reasons set forth below, this Court concludesthat these defenses are applicable and appropriate.Before addressing the legal defects in the plaintiffs' action, the Court believes it appropriate to first discuss some fatal factualflaws in the plaintiffs' Complaint and moving papers that simply cannot be reconciled with the true state of facts which wereeasily ascertainable by the plaintiffs before this action was filed. In fact, those conflicting facts were contained in the two lettersthat were attached to each of the plaintiffs' filings.First and foremost, throughout their Complaint, the plaintiffs repeatedly alleged that through the two dispositive letters, thedefendants threatened to commence criminal prosecutions against them or otherwise refer them for criminal prosecution.4 Theyrepeated these same allegations in their motion for TRO and in their opposition to t\'he defendants special motion to dismiss. Id,info. 4. They even repeated these allegations in the letter they sent in response to the defendants' July 11, 2025 demand latter.These assertions are simply not true and proof of that fact was easily discoverable by nothing more than a cursory review of thetwo letters which the plaintiffs alleged contained these threats. Again, these letters were attached to each of the plaintiffs' filings.At first blush, this Court might be inclined to simply assume that these errors were the result of misplaced reliance upon ArtificialIntelligence (“AI”); however, this Court directly asked the plaintiffs if they relied solely upon AI in the preparation of theirfilings, to which they stated “no,” that they had conducted their own independent investigation. Moreover, the plaintiffs eachdeclared to this Court that they had “personally prepared, reviewed, and verified each filing and citation.” See, Opp. p. 36, l.8. They further asserted that their choice to use “lawful drafting aids” was no different than using “spell-check or a researchdata base.” Id.5 Given these representations, the Court has no choice but to conclude that these were knowing and intentionalmisrepresentations that were intended to mislead the Court.*3 Beyond the underlying factual flaws contained in the plaintiffs' Complaint and moving papers, the plaintiffs' opposition tothe defendants' special motion contains numerous errors of law. Having examined the plaintiffs at some length regarding theirlack of knowledge of the law as it pertains to decedents' estates and trusts, the Court is left with the unmistaken impression thatthe misguided arguments contained in their opposition are the direct result of their blind reliance upon AI in the preparation oftheir brief. Although it is truly difficult to decipher the disjointed and repetitive arguments contained in their 58-page opposition,it appears that their claims are based upon an erroneous belief that somehow the defendants lacked the legal right or jurisdictionto pursue claims on behalf of the estate of the decedent, Richard Whiston. Those arguments included assertions that Krzanowski,as the court appointed Executor of Mr. Whiston's Will and Estate, and as the Trustee of Mr. Whiston's Trust, and his attorneyssomehow required the direct approval of the probate court in Carson City before they could pursue recovery of assets of theWhiston Estate. Clearly, this is incorrect.6
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3The plaintiffs also erroneously asserted that the defendants were required to assert a “creditor's claim” against them as part ofthe administration of the Whiston Estate before they could pursue recovery of the Estate's assets. They further argued that if, infact, a valid creditor's claim existed against them, the probate court in Carson City would have provided them with some formof notice before the defendants sent their demand letter. Again, the plaintiffs are wrong.Next, the plaintiffs assert that the defendants' demand letters were somehow wrongful because they mischaracterized the transferof funds from Mr. Whiston as a loan rather than an investment in the plaintiffs' business enterprises. Again, this is both legallyand factually erroneous. First, the defendants never claimed there was an unpaid loan, their writings appear to recognize thenature of the transfer from Mr. Whiston to the company. Secondly, and more importantly, even if they had mischaracterized thetransfer, it would not render their letters wrongful or unlawful.Lastly, the plaintiffs asserted that because they had provided certain corporate or business records to the defendants reflectingthe operation of their various businesses, that this somehow rendered the defendants' action unlawful or unsupportable.7 Theserecords simply do not render the defendants' demand letter wrongful or unlawful. As this Court explained to the plaintiffsduring the hearing, the defendants' letters did not deny them any due process rights associated with notice and a hearing, andthey would receive all those rights in the event that the defendants actually chose to move forward with a legal action againstthe plaintiffs in accordance with the demand letter. The plaintiffs at that time would be able to present whatever defense theybelieved was appropriate and supported through their business records. Early production of those records did not render thedemand or reply letters wrongful.*4 In rendering this decision, the Court believes it important to address a number of underlying legal principles. They includethe following:1. This Court honors the right of pro se litigants to participate in court proceedings. See, Jordan v. State ex rel. Dep't of MotorVehicles & Pub. Safety, 121 Nev. 44, 55-56, 110 P.3d 30, 39 (2005), abrogated on other grounds byBuzz Stew, LLC v. City of N.Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008) (emphasizing importance of ensuring that all litigants, including those appearingpro se or proceeding in forma pauperis, are afforded meaningful access to state courts). However, as orally noted at the hearing,pro se litigants may be given some leniency in the interpretation of their moving papers,8 but they are still required to presentcogent points and authorities. See, e.g., Rodriguez v . Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 659, 428 P.3d 255,259 (2018), holdingmodified on other grounds byWillard v. Berry-Hinckley Indus., 136 Nev. 467, 469 P.3d 176 (2020) (directing district courts to“assist pro se litigants as much as reasonably possible,” but noting that “a pro se litigant cannot use [his or her] alleged ignoranceas a shield to protect [him or her] from the consequences of failing to comply with basic procedural requirements” (citationomitted)); Houston v. Schwartz, No. 87670, 2024 WL 3841620, at * 1 (Nev. Aug. 14, 2024) (unpublished disposition) (notingthat a litigant's pro se status “does not absolve [him or her] of the responsibility to cogently” present arguments (citing Edwardsv. Emperors Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 319, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1282, 1288 n.38 (2006)).As was explained to the plaintiffs during the November 5, 2025 hearing, their Complaint and all moving papers completelyfailed to present cogent arguments supported by valid legal authority. In this case, the plaintiffs' Complaint and moving paperscontained innumerable citations to legal authority that this Court had previously described as “hallucinated citations.” See,Order Denying Ex Parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, p. 2, ll. 1-2.2. This dispute reveals, yet again, the improvident use of ChatGPT and other forms of artificial intelligence.9 Artificialintelligence can be a powerful tool for lawyers and litigants - if it is an adjunct to human intelligence and not the predominatesource of legal knowledge.3. The breadth and depth of properly used AI is astounding. While proper use of AI is astounding, it cannot be the sole source forlitigation actions. When a pro se litigant uses AI as the lawyer in a case, he or she assumes the risks of error, imposes significantburdens upon the court and opposing counsel, and is ultimately responsible for the financial and case-ending consequences of
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4AI' s misuse. In this case, the plaintiffs' Complaint and moving papers are replete with citations to case law that simply doesnot exist. They also repeatedly quote language that purports to appear in cited cases when, in fact, such language also doesnot exist. They cite cases for identified legal propositions which are clearly erroneous and they even attribute certain case lawto the defendants when the defendants did not actually cite the identified law.10 The plaintiffs filings contain more than 170misrepresented citations. They are not meaningless errors. In every instance, the plaintiffs' misrepresentations are designed andintended to persuade this Court to render a decision that favors the plaintiffs and harms the defendants. And, despite the easeby which many can be summarily disproven, the task to do so is very labor intensive and time consuming; a venerable wasteof precious judicial resources and the defendants' time and money.*5 4. Here, plaintiffs demonstrated no personal familiarity with the law they seek to apply. Their pleading and moving paperswere generated entirely by a machine. This point must be emphasized: this Court and opposing counsel have been forcedto interact with and attempting to understand machine-based legal absurdities. Plaintiffs' use of ChatGPT resulted in legalincoherence, hallucinated citations, irrelevant arguments, and unnecessary expenditures of time. This Court adopts by referenceall arguments defendants made about artificial intelligence in their reply motion.II. Analysts and Legal Conclusions:Although there is no legally coherent complaint, request for restraint/injunction, and opposition to the motion to dismiss, thisCourt has independently reviewed and evaluated defendants' motion. It finds, concludes and orders as follows:A. The Defendants' Special Anti-SLAPP Motion to Dismiss:This Court finds that the court-appointed executor and trustee's communications made through retained legal counsel inanticipation of litigation are protected by Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes.Nevada's “Anti-SLAPP” statutes, NRS 41.635, et seq., provide a remedy to defendants faced with “Strategic Lawsuits AgainstPublic Participation.” These statutes were enacted to prevent abuse of the judicial process through groundless civil actions.Pursuant to Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute, if a lawsuit arises as a result of a good faith communication in furtherance of theright to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern, the person(s) against whom thelawsuit is brought may file a special motion to dismiss. See, NRS 41.660(1)(a)&(3)(a). “Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes aim toprotect First Amendment rights by providing defendants with a procedural mechanism to dismiss meritless lawsuits that a partyinitiates primarily to chill a defendant's exercise of his or her First Amendment free speech rights' before incurring the costs oflitigation.” Willick v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark, 138 Nev. 158, 163, 506 P.3d 1059, 1063-64 (2022).Upon the filing of such a Motion, the Court must engage in a two-part analysis. First it must determine if the moving partyhas established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a claim is based upon a good faith communication in furtherance ofthe right to petition (or free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern). Then if that burden is met, the Courtmust determine whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated, with prima facie evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claim.See,NRS 41.660(3)(a) and (b). This Court finds that the defendants' prelitigation demand letters fall within the protections ofNRS 41.637(3).Pursuant to NRS 41.637, “Good faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in directconnection with an issue of public concern” includes any “[C]ommunication that is aimed at procuring any governmentalor electoral action, result or outcome,” and any “[W]ritten or oral statement made in direct connection with an issue underconsideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law “Id. “[A] movingparty seeking protection under NRS 41.660 need only demonstrate that his or her conduct falls within one of [these] fourstatutorily defined categories of speech, rather than address difficult questions of First Amendment law.” Coker v. Sassone, 135Nev. 8, 12, 432 P.3d 746, 749 (2019).
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5*6 “[I]n order for a statement to be protected under NRS 41.637(3), which requires a statement to be 'in direct connectionwith an issue under consideration by a … judicial body,' the statement must (1) relate to the substantive issues in the litigationand (2) be directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” Putin v. Ton Vinh Lee, 134 Nev. 722, 726, 429 P.3d 1248,1251 (2018). The alleged conduct of the defendants in this matter is precisely the type of activity which has previously beenfound to be protected by Anti-SLAPP laws. See, 1st & Trinity Super Majority, LLC v. Milligan, 657 S.W.3d 349, 376 (Tex.App. 2022) (receiver appointed to act as the independent arm of the court could take whatever actions he saw fit to protectassets in receivership, and having established defense of immunity, was protected from suit by Texas version of Anti-SLAPPstatute); Mardeusz v. Lace, 2018 WL 3194271, at *5-7 (Cal. Ct. App., June 29, 2018) (court-appointed receiver in ongoingcivil litigation, who was directed by court to take control of and sell certain property, was protected from suit by aggrieved heiralleging contract interference and abuse of court process by extrinsic fraud by Anti-SLAPP statute); Bassi v. Hales, 2022 WL4355275, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App., Sept. 20, 2022) (complaint alleging professional negligence against court-appointed accountantwho prepared reports in dissolution proceedings stricken under Anti-SLAPP); Gruntz v. Wiley, 2009 WL 4264343, at *1 (Cal. Ct.App., Nov. 30, 2009) (claims which arose from the actions taken by court-appointed special master dismissed due to violatingAnti-SLAPP); Bisno v. Levine, 2017 WL 3048557, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., July 19, 2017) (conduct in carrying out the terms ofthe Settlement Agreement could not be separated from the Settlement Agreement itself, and thus claims relating to inequitabledistribution of profits under Settlement Agreement failed due to Anti-SLAPP).The alleged conduct and communication by the Trustee/Executor11 (and his counsel) is precisely the type of petitioning activitywhich has previously been found to be protected by Anti-SLAPP laws. See, Pilkington v. Liggett, (No. 87936-COA), 569 P.3d214,2025 WL 1426817, at *6-7 (Nev. App. May 16, 2025) (unpublished disposition) (affirming dismissal, pursuant to Anti-SLAPP protections, of suit against court-appointed trustee acting to preserve and account for trust assets); Haacke v. Herrera,No. E080450, 2024 WL 4706894, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2024), review denied (Jan. 29, 2025) (affirming an order grantingthe anti-SLAPP motion of two attorneys accused of aiding and abetting trustee's fraud and noting that “all communicative actsperformed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are perse protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute.”); 1st & Trinity Super Majority, LLC v. Milligan, 657 S.W.3d349, 376 (Tex. App. 2022) (receiver appointed to act as the independent arm of the court could take whatever actions he sawfit to protect assets in receivership, and having established defense of immunity, was protected from suit by Texas version ofAnti-SLAPP statute).12Case law from influential California courts further supports this conclusion. As was stated in the case of Lunada Biomedical v.Nunez, 230 Cal. App. 4th 459, 472, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784, 794 (2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted):*7 Correspondence made in anticipation of litigation contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration can be apetitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Thus, statements, writings, and pleadings in connection with civillitigation or in contemplation of civil litigation are covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, and that statute does not require anyshowing that the litigated matter concerns a matter of public interest.Id.; See also, Leizorto, LLC v. Corvino, No. B313565, 2022 WL 3907862, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2022) (“As a generalrule, a demand letter or other communication sent in anticipation of litigation constitutes speech or petitioning activity protectedunder the anti-SLAPP statute.”) (citing Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1115, 969 P.2d 564,569–70 (1999)). And though these cases are from the state of California, and are based upon California law, Nevada nonethelessrelies heavily on the same to interpret its own Anti-SLAPP statutes. See, e.g., Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. at 11, 432 P.3d at749 (“This court has repeatedly recognized the similarities between California's and Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, routinelylooking to California courts for guidance in this area.”).Having satisfied their obligation to demonstrate their conduct met the first prong of NRS 41.637, the burden then shifts to theplaintiffs to prove with prima facie evidence, a probability of prevailing on the claim. See,NRS 41.660(3)(a) and (b). The secondprong of an anti-SLAPP analysis as been described as “requiring the plaintiff to show that his claim has at least minimal merit.”
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Wynn v. Associated Press, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 56,555 P.3d 272, 278 (2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1434, 221 L. Ed. 2d 556(2025) (internal quotations omitted). “Minimal merit exists when the plaintiff makes a sufficient prima facie showing of factsto sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” Id., (internal quotations omitted).In this case, the plaintiffs have completely failed to make this showing. First, the conduct alleged simply does not satisfy thesubstantive law elements required to prove any one of the tort claims they have alleged against defendants. The plaintiffs havefailed to provide any legal authority to the Court which could theoretically support their claims and the Court is aware of nosuch authority. Second, and more important to the defendants' Anti-SLAPP motion, the conduct alleged against the defendantsfalls squarely within established privileges thereby providing complete and total protection against civil liability. As the NevadaSupreme Court held in Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. 437, 443, 495 P.3d 93, 99 (2021), “a plaintiff cannot show a probability ofprevailing on his claim if a privilege applies to preclude the defendant's liability.” In this case, even if the conduct alleged mightotherwise satisfy the requisite elements of any tort claim asserted, the conduct is protected by the privileges detailed belowthereby making it impossible for the plaintiffs to prove any probability of success on the merits.B. The Barton Doctrine provides total immunity to the defendants:“The Barton Doctrine is a federal common law rule that requires a party to obtain leave of the bankruptcy court before bringingsuit in a non-appointing court against a trustee for acts done in his or her official capacity.” Bertsch v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in &for Cnty. of Clark, 133 Nev. 240, 244, 396 P.3d 769, 772-73 (2017). Overtime, the doctrine has been applied outside the contextof bankruptcy proceedings and now applies to all court-appointed officers. Id., at 244, 773.*8 In Bertsch, the doctrine was applied to protect a court-appointed accountant in his capacity as a special master, where theduties and responsibilities were designated by the appointing court, and required a degree of discretionary judgment. Id., at 245,773. The accountant was called upon as a person with expertise “to evaluate and report on accounting issues to assist the districtcourt in its neutral analysis of the legal issues presented in the case.” Id. As such, this court appointee “played an integral rolein the judicial process and performed duties sufficiently similar to other court-appointed officials who have benefitted fromthe Barton Doctrine.” Id.The Nevada Supreme Court also cited to public policy considerations underlying the Doctrine which are equally apt here:Exposure to liability could deter a court-anointed professional's acceptance of court appointments or color theirrecommendations. Controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The loserin one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unlawful animus.Id., 133 Nev. at 246, 396 P.3d at 773-74 (internal citations omitted); see also, Nazareno v. Cardello, 2021 WL 2194570, at *3(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021) (“[T]he purpose of the Barton Doctrine is to give effect to the appointing court's strong interest inprotecting the trustee from personal liability for acts taken within the scope of the trustee's official duty.”).The Bertsch Court went on to rule that the Barton Doctrine applied to “court-appointed accountants in the capacity of specialmaster, and that an individual must seek leave of the appointing court when suing a court-appointed special master in a non-appointing court for actions taken within the scope of the court-derived authority.” Id., 133 Nev. at 246, 396 P.3d at 774. Tofail to obtain such leave renders a resulting action “jurisdictionally improper.” Id., at 244, at 772. This lack of jurisdiction canbe traced to the appointing court's exclusive in rem jurisdiction over the property administered by the court-appointed receiver,trustee or officer. In re WRT Energy Corp., 402 B.R. 717, 721 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2007) (citing, Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126,26 L.Ed. 672 (1881)); see also, In re Kashani, 190 B.R. 875, 884 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he nonappointing court may notentertain suits against the trustee for acts done in the trustee's official capacity without leave from the appointing court becausethe other court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”).And “[i]n states … that treat the rule as jurisdictional [such as Nevada], the prior-leave requirement applies even to a separatelawsuit filed in the same court that appointed the receiver.” Considine v. Murphy, 297 Ga. 164, 167, 773 S.E.2d 176, 179 (2015).
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7In other words, even if this suit had been brought in the District Court in Carson City, the plaintiffs would still need to get theprobate judge to sign off for such a suit to proceed. See also, Pilkington v. Liggett, 569 P.3d 214, 2025 WL 1426817, at *4(affirming dismissal of suit against temporary trustee pursuant to Anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, and noting that “theBarton doctrine… requires litigants to obtain leave of court before suing a court appointed trustee....”).Moreover, the Barton Doctrine not only protects the court-appointed Executor, Mr. Krzanowski, the doctrine also protects hiscounsel because “the protection that the leave requirement affords the Executor and the estate would be meaningless if it couldbe avoided by simply suing the Executor's attorneys.” In re MF Glob. Holdings Ltd., 562 B.R. 866, 874 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017)(cleaned up). See also, Conway v. Smith Dev., Inc., 637 B.R. 811, 815 (E.D. Va. 2021) (“The Barton Doctrine is a court createdrequirement that leave of the court must be obtained before a party can sue a trustee for the trustee's actions in administeringan estate. The Barton Doctrine applies to attorneys hired by the trustee of an estate.”) (internal citation omitted); Nazarenov. Cardello, No. 20CV2242DRHAYS, 2021 WL 2194570, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021) (“The Barton Doctrine extends toattorneys who represent the bankruptcy estate, not only to the trustee himself.”). The Doctrine has also been extended to claimsfor injunctive relief. S.E.C. v. First Choice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 3:00-CV-446-RLM-CAN, 2015 WL 1565107, at *2 (N.D.Ind. Apr. 8, 2015) (“Rule 65(d) doesn't limit or contradict the Barton Doctrine.”). As such, all claims against both the Executor/Trustee and his counsel are completely barred by the Doctrine.C. The Quasi Judicial Immunity also bars the plaintiffs' claims:*9 “Quasi-judicial immunity is a common law principle that shields court-appointed individuals who perform functionsintegral to the judicial process from suit based on their performance of these functions.” Pilkington v. Liggett, 569 P.3d 214, 2025WL 1426817, at *6 (Nev. App. 2025) (citing State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct, 118 Nev. 609, 616, 55 P.3d 420, 424 (2002)). TheNevada Supreme Court has previously applied quasi-judicial immunity to a court-appointed Special Advocate who representedtwo minor children in a custody case because the advocate aided the court in its judicial function, and thus was integral tothe judicial process. Foster v. Washoe Cty., 114 Nev. 936, 944,964 P.2d 788, 793 (1998). The Nevada Supreme Court further,and correctly, concluded that denial of absolute immunity to such advocates would likely deter people from accepting suchappointments in the future. Id.And of course, absolute quasi-judicial immunity has been extended to court-appointed trustees for acts committed within thescope of their work:The doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity affords court-appointed trustees and receivers absolute immunity. Our case lawteaches that absolute judicial immunity generally immunizes persons… who, pursuant to court appointment, administer theaffairs of litigants. For instance, trustees appointed in a bankruptcy proceeding are afforded absolute immunity. A trustee orreceiver derives his immunity from the judge who appointed him. Thus, the trustee also loses his immunity if he acts in theclear absence of all jurisdiction. Further actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership or the fundsin the hands of the receiver, and his contracts, malfeasances, negligences, and liabilities are official, and not personal, andjudgments against him as a receiver are payable only from the funds in his hands.***The act forming the basis for liability must be done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction rather than in excess of a judicialofficer's authority. To determine if a receiver is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, the threshold inquiry is whether the preciseact is a normal judicial function. Whether a public official is entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law.Amsel v. Gerrard, 2018 WL 4704034, at *5 (D. Nev., Sept. 30, 2018) (internal citations, quotations and punctuation omitted); seealso, In re McKenzie, 497 B.R. 514, 523 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (trustee afforded quasi-judicial immunity for actions taken in pursuitof possible assets of the estate, which fell within the broad scope of the trustee's duties and obligations); Pilkington v. Liggett,
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8569 P.3d 214, 2025 WL 1426817, at *6-7 (Nev. App. 2025) (affirming dismissal of suit against court-appointed temporarytrustee based on Anti-SLAPP and application of quasi-judicial immunity); Walker Mgmt., Inc. v. Affordable Communities ofMissouri, 912 F.Supp. 455, 457-58 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (receiver was entitled to absolute immunity from suit alleging fraud andnegligence since operating within sphere of his order of appointment.“Once an officer of the court has been found to be within the class protected by absolute quasi-judicial immunity, that officerwill not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority;rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Church of Scientology Int'lv. Kolts, 846 F. Supp. 873, 886 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (internal quotations omitted; emphasis in original); see, also, Mullis v. U.S.Bankruptcy Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.1987) (court-appointed bankruptcy trustee enjoys the same immunity as doesthe judge who appointed him unless “he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”).*10 Additional reasons for allowing absolute judicial immunity include: (1) the need to save judicial time in defending suits;(2) the need for finality in the resolution of disputes; (3) to prevent deterring competent persons from taking office; (4) toprevent the threat of lawsuit from discouraging independent action; and (5) the existence of adequate procedural safeguardssuch as change of venue and appellate review.Duff v. Lewis, 114 Nev. 564, 569, 958 P.2d 82, 85 (1998).For the purposes of quasi-judicial immunity analysis, “court appointed officers who represent the estate are the functionalequivalent of a trustee.” In re Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). And moreover, “[t]hedoctrine of judicial immunity also applies to court-approved attorneys for the trustee.” Id. And quasi-judicial immunity has beenextended to claims of declaratory and injunctive relief as well. See, e.g., Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d at1391 (quasi-judicial immunity barred suit for damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, against bankruptcy trustee).Here, nothing described in plaintiffs' Complaint reflects an action taken in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Mr. Krzanowski andhis retained counsel were instrumental in protecting estate and trust assets which is part and parcel of their duties. This court-appointed Executor/Trustee is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity, and so are his counsel. The Court would note thatit is unclear whether this quasi-judicial immunity would apply to a trustee when the trust is merely a beneficiary of the probateestate and the trustee was not appointed by the Court, however, the uncertainty of this point of law is immaterial as all actionstaken by the court-appointed Executor and his counsel would fall squarely within the quasi-judicial immunity.Due to this additional immunity afforded to this Executor/Trustee and his counsel, the plaintiffs cannot establish a probabilityof prevailing on their claims thereby implicating the Anti-SLAPP protection.D. The Litigation Privilege also likely applies as an additional protection to the defendants:Finally, this Court concludes that the litigation privilege likely applies to the defendants in this case, but there exists a questionas to whether the privilege would extend to conduct outside the defamation context. If the Court were to apply the Californiaauthorities presented by the defendants, the privilege would apply and protect the defendants from all claims asserted. However,the Court finds that dismissal under this defense theory is not necessary because dismissal of all claims is warranted pursuantto the Barton Doctrine and quasi-judicial immunity as set forth above.It is nonetheless worth noting that the Nevada Supreme Court has recognized “the longstanding common law rule thatcommunications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged so long as they are in someway pertinent to the subject of controversy.” Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 99 Nev. 56, 60, 657 P.2d, 101, 104(1983). Application of the privilege is a question of law for the district court to resolve, and where operative, the privilege isas an absolute bar to all claims stemming from a judicially-related communication. Clark County Sch. Dist. v. VESI, 125 Nev.374, 386, 213 P.3d 496, 502 (2009). The scope of the privilege is broad and doubts are to be resolved in favor of its application.VESI, 125 Nev. at 382, 213 P.3d at 502.
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9*11 Whether the absolute litigation privilege applies is a question of law reviewed de novo. Additionally' the absolutelitigation grivilege applies at the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis because a plaintiff cannot show a probability ofprevailing on his claim if a privilege applies to preclude the defendant's liability. The litigation privilege applies to statementsmade during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. The privilege applies only where the judicial proceedingis (1) contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration and (2) the communication is related to the litigation. Ifapplicable, the litigation privilege serves as a complete bar to defamation claims based on privileged statements. Additionally,while Nevada has not applied the privilege beyond the defamation context, California courts recognize that the absolutelitigation privilege applies broadly to any tort except malicious prosecution.Edgeworth Fam. Tr. v. L. Off. of Daniel S. Simon, (No. 87649), 574 P.3d 950, 2025 WL 2488038, a *3 (Nev. Aug. 28, 2025)(internal cites, quotations, and punctuation omitted). “The privilege applies as long as the statements are in some way pertinentto the subject of the controversy.” Greenberg Traurig v. Frias Holding Co., 130 Nev. 627, 630, 331 P.3d 901, 903 (2014). Thedistrict court must conduct a “case-specific, fact-intensive analysis” to determine whether the privilege applies to the statementsat issue. Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. 437, 442, 495 P.3d 93, 99 (2021). “Further, it applies to any publication required or permittedby law in the course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even though the publication is made outsidethe courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved.” Moore v. Conliffe, 7 Cal.4th 634, 641, 871 P.2d 204,208 (1994). “Pursuant to the litigation privilege, communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedingsare absolutely privileged, rendering those who made the communications immune from civil liability.” Tipping Point Gaming,LLC v. Caesars Enter. Servs., LLC, (No. 85603, No. 85822), 549 P.3d 1199, 2024 WL 2972295, at *2 n.1 (Nev. June 12, 2024)(unpublished disposition).“The litigation privilege can also apply to statements made ‘preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding.”’ Shephard v.Meadows, (No. 85830), 548 P.3d 779, 2024 WL 2237740, *4 (Nev. May 16, 2024) (quoting Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428,433, 49 P.3d 640, 644 (2002)). See also, Sims v. Souily-Lefave, No. 2:24-CV-00831-CDS-EJY, 2025 WL 1101123, at *2 (D.Nev. Apr. 14, 2025) (“The litigation privilege extends to communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding andthose made in good faith contemplation of proceedings.”) (internal quotations omitted). As noted above, California law clearlyprovides that the “classic prelitigation demand letter is precisely the type of statement that the litigation privilege is intendedto protect since it represents the first step toward litigation and the purpose of the litigation privilege is to provide the utmostfreedom of access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” Aronson v. Kinsella, 58Cal. App. 4th 254, 270, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 315 (1997) (quotations omitted).Moreover, “[t]he privilege protects both ‘an attorney or a nonattorney’ so long as the communication at issue is ‘related toongoing litigation or future litigation contemplated in good faith.”’ In re Afrand, No. 2:25-CV-00285-APG, 2025 WL 2521152,at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 1, 2025) (quoting Williams v. Lazer, 495 P.3d 93, 100 (Nev. 2021)). The privilege is also quite broad,and should be applied liberally, with any doubt resolved in favor of the privilege's application. Id. The litigation privilege alsonaturally applies to claims demanding injunctive relief. See, Smith v. Craig, No. 219CV00824GMNEJY, 2019 WL 4781852, at*5 (D. Nev. Sept. 30, 2019) (“[T]here is no injunctive relief that the Court could fashion which would not implicate principlesof the absolute litigation privilege, public redress, and Nevada's Anti-SLAPP laws.”); Rubin v. Green, 4 Cal. 4th 1187,1204, 847P.2d 1044,1054 (1993) (plaintiff could not avoid bar of litigation privilege by pleading his claim as one for injunctive relief).*12 And finally, the protection extends to statements made in prelitigation demand letters, and further extends to the Trustee/Executor's attorneys. See also, In re Davis, 312 B.R. 681 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2004) (litigation-privilege-protected trustee allegedto have made defamatory statements within the course of his court-appointed duties).For each of the reasons set forth above, the Court finds and concludes that the defendants' Special Motion to Dismiss ismeritorious and compels a dismissal, with prejudice of all claims contained within the Complaint.THEREFORE, IT IS FIEREBY ORDERED, that the defendants' Special Motion to Dismiss is granted, WITH PREJUDICE.
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10DATED this 30th day of November, 2025.<<signature>>David A. HardyDistrict Court JudgeFootnotes1This hearing date and time was scheduled by the consent of the parties upon consultation with this Court's Judicial Assistant.2The defendant Edward F. Krzanowski resides out of state and therefore appeared only through counsel.3Pursuant to NRS 41.660(2), a special motion to dismiss must be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint. The plaintiffs'Proof of Service filed on October 21, 2025, demonstrated that service on the defendants was perfected on September 29, 2025.Thus, the defendants' special motion was filed well within the 60-day time period. Oddly, the plaintiffs argued in opposition to thedefendants' special motion to dismiss that the motion was not filed in a timely fashion. See, Opp. p. 25, ll. 8-11. Clearly, there wasno factual or lawful basis for this objection and the Court believes this is just one more patent example of the ills of reliance uponAI in litigation. This subject will be address herein below.4See, Complaint, p. 1, ll. 8-9; p. 7, ll. 4-6; p. 9. ll. 16-18; p. 10, l. 26; p. 12. ll. 26-27; p. 13.1. 12; p. 14, ll. 8-9, 16-18, 22-25; Exhibit D,Timeline of Threats, p. 2, l. 26, and in the narrative on their police report, p. 2. These same allegations were repeated in the plaintiffs'opposition to the defendants' special motion to dismiss. See, Opp., pp. 2, ll. 2-4; p. 3, ll.9-10; p. 4, ll. 11-13;p. 6, l.7; p. 11, ll. 8-9,and p. 13, ll. 7-9. They also appear throughout the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO and injunction. See, e.g., Motion for TRO p. 2, l. 14,19; p. 5, l.18; p. 6, l. 25, and p.7, ll. 2,18.5The plaintiffs further revealed their awareness of the obligations of NRCP 11, which they explicitly noted required all parties tocertify that their “filing was made after a reasonable inquiry and that the facts and law have support.” Id., at ll. 6-7 (emphasis added).6The plaintiffs raised a related argument that because the Executor and Trustee did not reside in the state of Nevada, he could notofficially act in Washoe County where the defendants' letters were sent. Again, this argument is wholly unsupported or unsupportableas there is no limitation of the “jurisdiction” of the Executor to recover estate property.7The records the plaintiffs produced included a Nevada State Business License, corporate business charter, 2020 bylaws, board minutes,balance sheets and profit and loss statements. See, Exhibit C to Plaintiffs' Opposition. What they failed to disclose is the circumstanceswhich prompted the transfer in the first instance and what happened to the assets of the company after the transfer was made. Theyalso do not reflect the basis tor which cash resources of the company, presumably Mr. Whiston's funds, were used to make loans fromthe company to the plaintiffs, which loans mysteriously disappeared on the company's books and records. A common tax evasionscheme in business entities is the improper description of a money transfer as a loan so that the recipient can argue that the receipt ofsuch funds was not taxable income to the recipient. Records of such loans are thereafter often conveniently lost or destroyed and therecipient never repays the loan nor discloses the receipt of the funds as income – a perfect, but unlawful tax evasion scheme. It was thisvery scheme which resulted in Mr. Berndt's prior federal criminal conviction as was shown in the Judgment and Memorandum of PleaAgreement (Section IV Factual Stipulation Relevant to Sentencing) produced by the defendants in Exhibit 4 attached to their replybrief, which while not evidence of wrongdoing in the present matter, raised defendants' reasonable concerns that a similar situationmay have occurred as to Mr. Whiston's investment.8See, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007), citing approvingly in Lizarraga-Salazar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. ofClark, No. 86725-COA, 2023 WL 8250299, at *2 (Nev. App. Nov. 28, 2023) (unpublished disposition) (noting that pleadings anddocuments filed by pro se litigants are “to be liberally construed and are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings draftedby lawyers (citation and quotation omitted)).
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.119The misuse of artificial intelligence is the current cause célébre as legal periodicals, bar materials, and courts across the country arewrestling with its prevalence. See also, Order, dated August 6, 2025, Case No. CV23-02123.10CASE/STATUTE/RULES THAT DO NOT EXIST: Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurant, 130 Nev. 669, 678 (2014) (oneinstance) (name real, but citation and description fake); Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP, 319 B.R. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (oneinstance); Nevada Rule of Evidence 408 (four instances); In re Estate of Curtis, 83 Nev. 214 (1967) (seven instances); In re Estateof Blackburn, 136 Nev. 612 (2020) (one instance); Bertsch v. Araujo, 137 Nev. 53 (2021) (one instance); Klepper v. State Farm,135 Nev. 787, 798 (2019) (one instance); Hettinga v. Nevada Department of Business & Industry, 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 45, 495 P.3d1237,1242 (2021) (one instance); NRS 136 390 (two instances); NRS 136.410 (two instances); NRS 138.160 (two instances); Lundahlv. Eighth Judicial District Court. 127 Nev. 851, 860 (2011) (one instance); McCabe v. Rattlesnake Club, Inc., 109 Nev. 635, 637(1993) (one instance).QUOTATIONS OF LAW THAT DO NOT EXIST:Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP, 319 B.R. 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (oneinstance); NRPC Rule 3.1 (one instance); United States v. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 1989) (one instance); Abrams v. Sanson,136 Nev. 83 (2020) (four instances); Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428 (2002) (seven instances); Coker v. Sassone, 135 Nev. 8, 12 (2019)(three instances), NRS 141.050 (one instance); Bertsch v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 133 Nev. 240 (2017) (three instances); In reEstate of Black, 132 Nev. 73, 80, 367 P.3.d 416 (2016) (two instances); In re Harris, 590 F.3d 730, 742 (9th Cir. 2009) (two instances);NRS 138.160(1) (one stance); Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 433 (2002) (one instance).MISREPRESENTED PROPOSITION OF LAW:Clark v. Robinson, 113 Nev. 949, 951-52 (1997) (five instances); United Statesv. Davis, 873 F.2d 900, 902 (6th Cir. 1989) (one instance); NRS 86.505(2) (one instance); Tulsa Professional Services, Inc. V. Pope,485 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1988) (six instances); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Restaurant. 130 Nev. 669, 678 (2014) (one instance);Pegasus v. Reno News Papers, 118 Nev. 706, 720 (2002) (two instances); Brando v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 646 (1981) (one instance);In re Estate of Black. 132 Nev. 73 (2016) (two instances); J.A. Jones Constr. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 120 Nev. 277, 290 (2004)(two instances); Building & Constr. Trades v. State Apprenticeship Council, 108 Nev. 605, 609 (1992) (one instance); NRS 205.320(one instance):MGM Grand Hotel v. Imperial Glass, 533 F.2d 486, 489 (9th Cir. 1976) (one instance); Abrams v. Sanson, 136 Nev.83 (2020) (thirteen instances); Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428 (2002) (nineteen instances); NRCP 6 (one instance); WDRC 10 (oneinstance); In re Estate Curtis, of 83 Nev. 214 (1967) (seven instances); NRS 143.165 (six instances); NRS 143.175 (one instance);NRS 141.050 (one instance); NRS 147.010 (two instances) (though cited several times [5], more or less accurately, re mailing notice);LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27 (2002) (three instances); In re Estate of Blackburn, 136 Nev. 612 (2020) (one instance); Bertsch v.Araujo, 137 Nev. 53 (2021) (one instance); NRS 147.040(1) (five instances); Bertsch v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 133 Nev. 240(2017) (nine instances); Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 134 Nev. 604, 606 427 P.3d 113 (2018) (one instance); Barton v.Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) (25 times) (every time they say it requires direct court supervision for doctrine to apply): NRS 136.010(one instance); NRS 143.040 (two instances): In re Estate of Richard M. Whiston, Case No. 22PBT000121B (First Judicial DistrictCourt, Carson City) (two instances); In re Crown Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2005) (one instance); In re Harris, 590F.3d 730, 741 (9th Cir. 2009) (two instances); Chowdhry v. NLVH, Inc., 109 Nev. 478, 484, 851 P.2d 459, 462 (1993) (two instances);Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448, 851 P.2d 438 (1993) (one instance); Nevada Association Services, Inc. v. Eighth JudicialDistrict Court, 130 Nev. 949, 952 (2014) (one instance); NRS 136.390 (two instances): NRS 136.410 (two instances); In re Kashani.190 B.R. 875 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (one instance): NRS 155.020(4) (five instances); Clark Ctv. Sch. Dist. v. VESI, 125 Nev. 374. 386(2009) (one instance); NRS 138.160 (two instances): NRS 138.045 (one instance); In re VistaCare Group, LLC, 678 F.3d 218 (3d Cir.2012) (one instance); Greenberg Traurig v. Frias Holding Co., 130 Nev. 627 (2014) (one instance); Shapiro v. Welt, 133 Nev. 35, 389P.3d 262 (2017) (one instance); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (one instance); Lundahl v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 127Nev. 851, 860 (2011) (one instance); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (two instances); NRS 47.130 (one instance); McCabev. Rattlesnake Club, Inc., 109 Nev. 635, 637 (1993) (one instance); NRS 53.045 (one instance); NRS 239B.030 (one instance).11“[C]ourt appointed officers who represent the estate are the functional equivalent of a trustee.” Bear Tooth Mountain Holdings LP v.ML Manager LLC, No. 2:13-CV-01734-RCJ, 2015 WL 3935278, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 26, 2015).12And to whatever extent this Court may feel that those two demand correspondences might not be a petitioning activity, then due tothe fact that they involved the activities of a court-appointed trustee/executor which are now alleged to be criminal, there is evenan argument available that this suit touches on a matter of public concern under NRS 41.637(4). See, Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v.Cox, 740 K3d 1284 1292 (9th Cir 2014) (holding that allegations of a bankruptcy trustee's commission of fraud were statementsconnected to a matter of public concern, since “[p]ublic allegations that someone is involved in crime generally are speech on a
Cappucci v. Maupin, Cox & Legoy, LLP, 2025 WL 4662709 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12matter of public concern.”); Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 68, 481 P.3d 1222, 1227 (2021) (noting that Nevada defines “an issueof public concern broadly....”).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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