Chavez-DeRemer v. Nab, LLC, No. 2:21-cv-00984-JAD-EJY (Aug. 11, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Lori Chavez-DeRemer v. NAB, LLC, Asia Trinh, and Nicole Brown
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Nevada (NV)
Court
Nevada Supreme Court
Decided
Aug. 11, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Plaintiff v. NAB, LLC, Asia Trinh, and..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2308676Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Nevada.Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Plaintiffv.NAB, LLC, Asia Trinh, and Nicole Brown, DefendantsCase No. 2:21-cv-00984-JAD-EJY|Filed 08/11/2025[ECF Nos. 161, 164]Order Denying Defendants’ Motionsto Stay Execution of JudgmentU.S. District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey*1 In this Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) case, thiscourt entered a $690,005.78 judgment in favor of Secretaryof Labor Lori Chavez-DeRemer and against NAB, LLC,Nicole Brown, and Asia Trinh for violations of the FLSA'sminimum-wage and overtime provisions. Brown and Trinhnow move to stay execution of that judgment under FederalRule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 62(b) without posting asupersedeas bond, arguing that they are financially unable todo so. The United States opposes. Because Brown and Trinhdo not establish that they are entitled to such relief, I denytheir motion.DiscussionA. The court may, in its discretion, waive FRCP 62(d)’sbond requirement under limited circumstances.FRCP 62(b) permits a judgment debtor to stay the executionof a money judgment pending appeal if she posts asupersedeas bond or other security in the judgment amount.1“The posting of a bond protects the prevailing plaintiff fromthe risk of a later uncollectible judgment and compensateshim for delay in the entry of the final judgment.”2 Courtshave discretion to waive the bond requirement or requiresome other form of security to stay execution.3The Ninth Circuit has not articulated a test to guide thisdiscretion, but district courts within this circuit typically relyon the standards set out in the Fifth and Seventh Circuitsto determine when a departure from FRCP 62(d)’s full-bond requirement is warranted. In Poplar Grove Planting &Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., the Fifth Circuitheld that the burden should be on the party moving fora departure from “the usual requirement of a full securitysupersedeas bond” to “objectively demonstrate the reasonsfor such a departure.”4 And the Seventh Circuit has heldthat waiver of the bond requirement may be appropriate intwo types of cases: (1) when “the defendant's ability to paythe judgment is so plain that the cost of the bond wouldbe a waste of money” and (2) the “opposite case” in which“the requirement would put the defendant's other creditors inundue jeopardy.”5 The Seventh Circuit has articulated someconsiderations to guide a court's discretion when determiningwhether to waive the bond requirement:(1) the complexity of the collectionprocess; (2) the amount of timerequired to obtain a judgment afterit is affirmed on appeal; (3) thedegree of confidence that the districtcourt has in the availability of fundsto pay the judgment; (4) whetherthe defendant's ability to pay thejudgment is so plain that the cost ofa bond would be a waste of money;and (5) whether the defendant is insuch a precarious financial situationthat the requirement to post a bondwould place other creditors of thedefendant in an insecure position.6*2 Generally, if a court determines that waiver of a fullsupersedeas bond is warranted, it requires some other security—like a lien on real property or other assets—to protect theprevailing plaintiff from being unable to collect on a judgmentwhen the appeal concludes.7Brown and Trinh argue only that they face extreme financialhardship, and they contend that such hardship alone justifiesa stay without bond. Brown claims that she has “no savings,no steady income, ... owns no real property, ... and has beenunable to maintain regular employment.”8 Trinh contendsthat she also “has no savings, owns no real estate, and has
Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Plaintiff v. NAB, LLC, Asia Trinh, and..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2been financially impacted by this prolonged litigation.”9But neither defendant provides any documentation to supportthose claims. Nor have they demonstrated that their financialsituation would place their obligations to “other creditors”at risk, offered any alternative form of security to coverthe judgment, or advanced any argument that they will bemore able to pay after appeal.10 In short, general financialhardship does not excuse a judgment debtor from paying avalidly executed judgment, and Brown and Trinh provide nolegitimate reason why the Secretary of Labor's attempts tocollect on that judgment should wait until after the appealprocess concludes. So I deny their motion to stay executionof judgment without posting a supersedeas bond.B. The parties are warned that using generative AI toolslike ChatGPT may result in sanctions.*3 The Secretary has pointed to at least one case cited inTrinh's brief that doesn't exist.11 Incidents of fake authoritycited in briefs have skyrocketed in recent months, and theculprit is usually the use of generative AI software likeChatGPT to conduct legal research and write briefs. WhileAI tools can be useful in many respects, and this court doesnot prohibit litigants from using them, the parties are warnedthat those services pull information from across the web—including from unreliable sources—and may hallucinate (ormake up fake) legal precedent.When a pro se litigant or attorney signs any filing before thiscourt, she certifies that “the claims, defenses, and other legalcontentions are warranted by existing law ....”12 The partiesare advised that using AI to research and write their briefs mayviolate this rule if they rely on hallucinated or inaccurate legalcitations to support their arguments. Parties must verify thatthe authorities they cite are accurate and real before presentingthem to this court. There will be consequences, includingsanctions, for the continued reliance on inaccurate or fakeauthority in legal briefs submitted to this court.ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Brown and Trinh'smotions to stay execution of the monetary judgment pendingappeal [ECF Nos. 161 & 164] are DENIED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2308676Footnotes1Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b).2NLRB v. Westphal, 859 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1988).3See Int'l Telemeter Corp. v. Hamlin Int'l Corp., 754 F.2d 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that “the courthas discretion to allow other forms of judgment guarantee” under FRCP 62); Matter of Combined MetalsReduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 192 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that FRCP 62(b) permits a party to obtain a stay “asa matter of right by posting a supersedeas bond,” and finding that because no bond was posted, “the grantor denial of the stays was a matter strictly within the judge's discretion”).4Poplar Grove Planting & Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979).5Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Telegraph Co., 786 F.2d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 1986).6Dillion v. City of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 904–05 (7th Cir. 1988). Brown and Trinh both rely on the law thatapplies when determining whether staying an injunction is appropriate pending appeal. See ECF No. 161at 3; ECF No. 164 at 3 (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)—a case analyzing whether to staythe ordered removal of an undocumented immigrant under the factors traditionally used to analyze requests
Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Plaintiff v. NAB, LLC, Asia Trinh, and..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3for preliminary injunctive relief—to support its legal statements). Brown and Trinh do not seek to stay theinjunction portion of this court's judgment, so their chosen law is inapplicable here.7See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing, 786 F.2d at 797 (noting that the alternatives to posting bond would be toallow the prevailing party to execute the judgment, “or to allow the posting of alternative security”); BrooktreeCorp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (permitting defendant to“provide real property security in an appropriate amount” to protect the prevailing party's interest).8ECF No. 161 at 2.9ECF No. 164 at 6.10Both defendants use large portions of their briefs and replies relitigating issues that this court has ruled onand which are not open to reconsideration in this court. I will not consider those arguments here because theyare irrelevant to the limited question of whether the defendants have objectively demonstrated reasons tostay execution of the monetary judgment against them without requiring that they post a supersedeas bond.Any arguments concerning the factual findings and legal conclusions must be raised on appeal.11See ECF No. 170 at 4 n.1.12Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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