CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Judicial District. Washoe County COMMNV, LLC v. UPRISE LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Nevada (NV)
Court
Nevada Supreme Court
Decided
2025
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2331539 (Nev.Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)District Court of Nevada,Second Judicial District.Washoe CountyCOMMNV, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, Plaintiff,v.UPRISE LLC, a Nevada limited liability company, et al., Defendants.No. CV23-02123.August 6, 2025.*1 Dept. No.: 15Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.Order Directing Personal Appearance to Explain Potential Misuse of Generative Artificial IntelligenceDavid A. Hardy, Judge.Time is one of this Court's most precious resources. It is finite and must be efficiently allocated among many voluminous matters.Only with sufficient chambers time can this Court meet the “high standards”1 imposed by the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct.It is obligated to perform its judicial duties with thoroughness and preparation. NCJC Rule 2.5, cmt. 1. That obligation compelsit to “seek the necessary docket time” to fulfill its adjudicative responsibilities. NCJC Rule 2.5, cmt. 2. It must afford everymatter a degree of intellectual rigor and time investment commensurate with the complexities presented. This Court's ever-increasing caseload2 and trial calendar winnow its chambers time, making the limited availability it does have for substantivereview of complex matters invaluable. Counsel for Uprise, LLC (“Uprise”) have caused this Court to devote substantial timeto a matter in which they apparently chose not to invest commensurate effort themselves.Uprise's opposition appears to contain fictitious authorities and rely on artificialintelligence without human intelligence, cognition, or experiential wisdomOn May 16, 2025, Great Midwest Insurance Company (“GMIC”) filed a motion for summary judgment against Uprise.3Uprise filed its opposition on May 30, 2025, to which GMIC replied 14 days later. The motion implicates factually complexcircumstances and nuanced legal questions that pertain to a unique area of law. These intricacies compelled this Court to readand re-read the moving papers and the authorities upon which the parties relied. During its review, this Court discovered severalanomalies in Uprise's filing. It has conducted additional research and cannot find several of the decisions Uprise cites. Otherdecisions Uprise cites do exist but are referenced for propositions for which they do not stand, or ascribed to possess nonexistentlanguage. Several of these apparently fictitious or misrepresented references pertain to legal principles central to the questionsraised in the summary judgment motion. For the parties' convenience, this Court lists the authorities at issue:1. “Amwest Surety Ins. Co. v. U.S., 28 Fed. Cl. 593 (1993)”
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 Uprise attributes the following quote to the “Amwest” decision: “Sureties are compensated for their risk and are not to betreated as volunteers. As such, any ambiguity in the bond is resolved against the surety.”4This Court cannot locate a case withthe citation “28 Fed. Cl. 593.” It cannot find the quoted language in any decision— state or federal — available on Westlaw.It discovered several decisions with an identical name, though none were issued by the United States Court of Federal Claims,and none include the language Uprise quotes or stand for the proposition Uprise references.5 The “Amwest” decision appearsto be fictitious.2. “Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Town of Cloverdale, 699 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Cal. 1988)”Uprise cites “Argonaut” for the quote: “A performance bond is a form of suretyship in which a surety agrees to be responsiblefor the debt or default of another.”6This Court cannot locate a case with the citation “699 F. Supp. 855.” It cannot find adecision issued in 1988 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California with a case title that includes the term“Argonaut.” It cannot find the quoted language in any case available on Westlaw. It discovered a Seventh Circuit decision witha similar name authored by Judge Posner, Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Town of Cloverdale, Ind., 699 F.2d 417, 418 (7th Cir. 1983). Butwhile some general suretyship principles are discussed in the case, the Seventh Circuit Argonaut decision centers on a narrowsuretyship issue and does not include the language Uprise quotes. The “Argonaut” decision Uprise cites appears to be fictitious.3. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 181 P.3d 670 (2008)Uprise cites Buzz Stew for the quote: “Motions to dismiss are not favored where the complaint sufficiently sets forth thefactual allegations establishing all necessary elements of a claim for relief.”7Buzz Stew is a real Nevada decision but the quotedlanguage appears nowhere therein.4. Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259 (2000)8*3 Uprise cites Calloway for the quote: “A party who has materially breached a contract may not maintain an action againstthe other party for its subsequent failure to perform.”9Calloway is a real Nevada Supreme Court decision. It also discussescontractual breach principles. But the language Uprise quotes does not appear in the decision.5. Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 21 Cal. 4th 28 (Cal. 1999)Uprise quotes Cates as stating: “A surety may be liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing where itsconduct frustrates the obligee's rights under the bond.”10Cates is a real decision and similar language appears in the concurrence,seeCates, 21 Cal. 4th at 78 (“[T]he courts of other states … have concluded that surety insurers are liable in tort for bad faithfailure to perform for an obligee on a construction performance bond of the type at issue here.”), but the language Uprise quotesis not in the published decision.6. “City of Los Angeles v. Allied Contractors, Inc., 55 Cal. 2d 535 (1961)”Uprise cites “Allied” for the quote: “A surety bond is to be construed in favor of the party to be protected, and against thesurety.”11This Court cannot locate a decision with the citation “55 Cal. 2d 535.” It cannot locate a state or federal decision withthe same case name. It cannot locate the quoted language in Westlaw. The “Allied” decision appears to be fictitious.7. Crane v. Continental Tel. Co., 105 Nev. 399, 775 P.2d 705 (1989)
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Uprise parenthetically references Crane for the proposition that the “notice pleading standard [is] satisfied where the pleadingsfairly put the other party on notice of the claims[.]”12Crane is a real Nevada decision. And it does address a district court'sdecision to dismiss a complaint. But Nevada's notice pleading standard is not referenced in the decision. Instead, Crane discussesNevada's statutory provisions governing judicial review of agency decisions and how a plaintiff cannot avoid the provisions byfiling a complaint instead of a petition. Crane does not stand for the proposition Uprise recites.8. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Douglas Asphalt Co., 338 F. App'x 886 (11th Cir. 2009)As discussed in footnote 33 of this Court's order resolving GMIC's summary judgment motion, this is a real case, but Uprise'spin cite refers to a page that does not exist, nor does Douglas stand for the legal proposition Uprise discusses.9. “General Ins. Co. of Am. v. City of Boulder City, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D. Nev. 2006)”Uprise cites “City of Boulder City” for the quote: “Because a surety bond is a contract of insurance, its terms are strictlyconstrued against the surety.”13 This Court cannot locate any decision with the citation “427 F. Supp. 2d 1275.” It cannot locatethe quoted language in Westlaw. It cannot find a published decision with the same or similar name. Though there are dozensof Ninth Circuit decisions that involve City of Boulder City as a named party, none also include General Insurance Companyof America in their titles. This decision appears to be fictitious.10. J.A. Jones Constr. v. Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 120 Nev. 277 (2004)Uprise describes Lehrer as providing the following principle: “Under Nevada law, any ambiguity in a bond is construed againstthe surety, the party that drafted it.”14Lehrer is a real Nevada decision. But it discusses surety bonds only in passing and does notdiscuss the general principle of construing ambiguous terms against a contract's drafter. Though Lehrer discusses some generalcontractual principles, it does not stand for the proposition Uprise describes.11. “K&G Constr. Co. v. Harris, 164 F. Supp. 469 (D. Md. 1958), aff'd, 223 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1955)”*4 Uprise cites “Harris” for the quote: “Where one party to a contract hinders, prevents, or makes impossible performance bythe other party, the latter's failure to perform is excused.”15This Court cannot find a decision with the cite “164 F. Supp. 469” oran affirmance with the cite “223 F.2d 431.” It appears substantively identical language is set forth in Professor Williston's treatiseon contracts and has been frequently recited by several courts. See, e.g., Tabatabai v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co., 664 F.3d 663, 666(7th Cir. 2011); Trillium Transportation Fuels, LLC v. Integral Energy, LLC, No. CIV-20-1197-PRW, 2023 WL 5198513, at *1n.1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 11, 2023) (not reported). And there is a Maryland state court decision of the same name. SeeK&G Const.Co. v. Harris, 164 A.2d 451 (Md. 1960). But the quoted language does not appear in that decision. Also of note is the “Harris”decision Uprise cites, which appears to be a federal district court decision, is described to have been issued in 1958 and affirmedby the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1955. This is nonsensical. The “Harris” decision Uprise cites appears to be fictitious.12. “Metro. Water Dist. of So. Cal. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 2010 WL 11595764 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2010)”Uprise cites refers to “Metro. Water Dist.” for the holding that “a contractor's abandonment of work constituted a default thatobligated the surety to perform under the bond.”16 The Westlaw citation exists but corresponds to a separate case. SeeWritersGuild of Am., W., Inc. v. Golden Harvest Films, Inc., No. CV1001099SJOAGRX, 2010 WL 11595764 (C.D. Cal. May 24, 2010)(not reported). Golden Harvest involves the confirmation of an arbitration award flowing from a dispute between a televisionindustry labor union and a film producer and makes no reference to suretyship law. This Court cannot find a case that sharesthe name of the decision Uprise cites; it appears to be fictitious.
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.413. “Miller v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Nevada, 38 Nev. 389, 149 P. 929 (1915)”Uprise cites “Miller” for the general rule that “a party that materially breaches a contract cannot demand performance fromthe non-breaching party.”17 The Nevada Reports and Pacific Reporter citations exist but correspond with two separate cases,neither of which is titled “Miller v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Nevada.” SeeEx parte Crosby, 38 Nev. 389, 149 P. 989 (1915);Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 47 Utah 346, 149 P. 929 (Utah 1915). Crosby involves a habeas corpus petitionchallenging the enforcement of Nevada criminal laws upon a person arrested within an Indian reservation. Midway, a Utahdecision, discusses water appropriation rights. Neither decision references contract principles. This Court cannot locate anydecision with the name “Miller v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Nevada.” It appears to be fictitious.14. “Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 117 N.M. 292 (1994)”Uprise cites “Sheehan” for the quote: “A party who prevents the occurrence of a condition precedent to his or her obligationunder a contract cannot rely on the failure of that condition to avoid liability.”18 There is a New Mexico decision associated withthe citation, but the case name is different. SeeWestland Dev. Co. v. Romero, 117 N.M. 292, 871 P.2d 388 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).And Westland discusses the distinction between abuse of process and malicious prosecution claims; it makes no reference tocontract law. Curiously, there is a Nevada decision with an identical name to the case Uprise cites. SeeSheehan & Sheehan v.Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481, 117 P.3d 219 (2005). But the language Uprise quotes is not in that decision. The caseUprise references appears to be fictitious.15. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. City of Green River, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Wyo. 2000)*5 Uprise cites City of Green River for the following quote: “A surety who undertakes to guarantee performance stands in theshoes of the principal and cannot escape liability merely because it did not itself participate in the underlying breach.”19Cityof Green River is a real decision that includes legal principles from which the quoted language might be derived, but the quotedoes not itself appear in the decision.16. “Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Nelson Excavating & Paving Co., 2000 WL 1510061 (D. Kan. Sept. 14, 2000)”Uprise cites “Transamerica” for the following quotation: “The obligee does not breach the bond by taking action to protect itsinterests when the surety fails to fulfill its obligations.”20 The Westlaw number links to a one sentence, unpublished LouisianaCourt of Appeals disposition. SeeCaballero Planting Co. v. Hymel, 1999-2006 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 771 So. 2d 322. ThisCourt discovered a Nevada decision with the same name, Transamerica Premier Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 110 Nev. 951, 878 P.2d 314(1994), which Uprise also cites in its opposition. But the Nevada Transamerica decision does not include the language Upriseattributes to the apparently fictional federal “Transamerica” decision. And the quotation Uprise does attribute to the NevadaTransamerica decision— “A claim for bad faith exists where the surety fails to properly investigate or unreasonably refuses topay a legitimate claim, acting in disregard of known facts[]”21 — does not appear in the case either. The federal “Transamerica”case appears to be fictitious.17. “Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Highland P'ship, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (D. Utah 2012).”Uprise cites “Highland” for the quotation: “Sureties are bound by the plain terms of the bond, and any ambiguity is construedagainst the surety.”22This Court cannot locate a decision with the citation “859 F. Supp. 2d 1375.” It located four decisions with
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5identical names, but none include the language Uprise quotes.23 It cannot find the quoted language Uprise references in anystate or federal decision. The “Highland” decision Uprise quotes appears to be fictitious.18. “Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 843 (2012)”Uprise cites “Travelers v. U.S.” for the quote: “Surety has no greater rights than the principle under the contract.”24 This Courtcan find no decision with the citation “103 Fed Cl. 843.” It cannot find the quote in any state or federal decision. It found aUnited States Court of Federal Claims decision with an identical name, seeTravelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. U.S., 75 Fed.Cl. 696, 702 (2007), but the decision does not include the language Uprise uses in its opposition.25 The “Travelers v. U.S.”case Uprise cites appears to be fictitious.19. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dormitory Auth.-State of N.Y., 735 F. Supp. 2d 42, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)*6 Uprise cites Dormitory for the quote: “The obligations of a surety on a bond are to be interpreted like those of an insurerand are therefore strictly construed against the surety and in favor of the obligee.”26Dormitory is a real decision, but it doesnot include the language Uprise quotes.20. U.S. ex rel. Acoustical Concepts, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 635 F. Supp. 2d 434, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)Uprise cites Acoustical Concepts for the quote: “A performance bond surety stands in the shoes of its principal and is liable tothe obligee for actual losses resulting from non-performance under the contract.”27Acoustical Concepts is a real decision butdoes not include the language Uprise quotes. Nor can this Court find the quoted language in any other federal or state decisions.21. “U.S. ex rel. JMB Constr., Inc. v. O'Neil Const. Co., 2002 WL 31556376 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2002)”Uprise cites “O'Neil” for the holding: “Where the surety had actual notice and failed to act, it cannot later complain that noticewas not ‘formal’ enough.”28 The Westlaw citation exists but corresponds with a different case. SeeU.S.v. Barbato, No. 00 CR.1028 (SWK), 2002 WL 31556376 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2002) (not reported). Barbato involves criminal sentencing issues andmakes no reference to surety law. This Court cannot find a similarly named decision. “O'Neil” appears to be fictitious.22. “U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Town of Chateaugay, 375 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)”Uprise cites “Town of Chateaugay” for the quote: “Surety cannot claim reimbursement unless it has performed or completed thework under the bonded contract.”29The citation “375 N.Y.S.2d 159” exists but corresponds with a different case. SeeMarbarryAssocs., Inc. v. Steinberg, 50 A.D.2d 600, 375 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). Steinberg is a brief memorandum decisionthat discusses a bill of particulars and makes no reference to surety law. Though Town of Chateaugay is a named party inseveral New York decisions, none include U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company in their title. Nor can this Court locate the quotedlanguage in any state or federal decision. The “Town of Chateaugay” decision appears to be fictitious.23. United States ex rel. Martin Steel Constructors, Inc. v. Avanti Constructors, Inc., 750 F.2d 759 (9th Cir.1984)Uprise cites Martin for the quote: “A party cannot condition its performance on payment that is not yet due.”30Martin is a realcase but does not include this quotation.
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.624. “United States ex rel. S. Rental Tool Co. v. White Pine Cortstr. Co., 299 F. Supp. 135 (D. Idaho 1969)”Uprise cites “White Pine” for the quote: “The liability of the surety is commensurate with that of its principal and it is generallyheld that a surety on a performance bond is liable for damages resulting from a contractor's breach of the construction contract.”31This Court cannot find a decision associated with the cite “299 F. Supp. 135.” It cannot find a decision with a similar name.Though some similar language appears in other decisions, see, e.g., T&R Painting Constr., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,Cal. Rptr. 2d 199, 203 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“[The California civil code] flatly provides that a surety's liability is commensuratewith the liability of its principal.”), this Court cannot locate the quote as Uprise recites it. “White Pine” appears to be fictitious.Inclinations and guiding principles*7 At least fourteen of the decisions Uprise cites appear to be fictitious. Several other decisions Uprise references are real, butUprise either misquotes these cases or squarely misrepresents their holdings. It is one thing to inadvertently misquote decisionsor provide an improper citation—litigants and courts alike might be excused for errantly omitting a word or even transposinglanguage or citation information between decisions. It is quite another when a consistent pattern arises in a party's moving papers.The pattern of irregularities associated with Uprise's references leads this Court to strongly suspect that its opposition containsseveral fictitious decisional authorities and language manufactured with the use of generative artificial intelligence (“AI”). Theapparently fictitious decisions Uprise cites bear “all the markings of … hallucinated case[s] created by generative [AI] tools suchas ChatGPT and Google Bard[.]” U.S. v. Hayes, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2025), reconsideration denied, No. 2:24-CR-0280-DJC, 2025 WL 1067323 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2025). Uprise's references appear legitimate at first glance. They includeappropriate identifying information (reporter citations, court identifications, issuance dates, etc.) and are generally formattedproperly. But close review reveals the associated citations are linked to cases with distinct names that have no relevance to theproposition for which they are cited. These cases are likely the product of generative AI and are probably fake.32AI use in the Nevada legal community is not new. Nor is AI an inherently inappropriate tool. A lawyer may use it for innocuouspurposes like discovery review or complex legal research;33 but he or she may “easily trample over the lines of professionalethics if [he or she is] not careful using [AI] and other technologies.”34 One of the principal dangers lawyers may encounterin using generative AI is the fact these tools “can fabricate or ‘hallucinate’ legal precedent.” Romero v. Goldman Sachs BankUSA, No. 1:25-CV-2857-GHW, 2025 WL 1916119, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2025). That generative AI may create nonexistentauthorities and implicate ethical issues is a problem acknowledged at the national level35 and specifically recognized by theNevada State Bar36—as one federal bankruptcy judge put bluntly, “any lawyer unaware that using generative AI platforms todo legal research is playing with fire is living in a cloud.” In re Martin, No. 24 B 13368, 2025 WL 2017224, at *6 (Bankr.N.D. Ill. July 18, 2025).*8 The presentation of AI generated citations and language in court filings presents several weighty concerns. Presentingfictitious authorities endangers “the fair administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial system.” Johnson v. Dunn, No.2:21-CV-1701-AMM, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2025 WL 2086116, at *1 (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2025). As noted in Judge Castel'slandmark opinion addressing AI use in court filings, the submission of fake opinions creates several ills:The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The [c]ourt's time is taken from other importantendeavors. The client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to thereputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation ofa party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system.And a future litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Judge Castel's remarks about the judiciary are prescient.As attorneys' use of AI proliferates, the commensurate risk that more filings will include hallucinated legal citations places
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7immense burdens and risks on the judiciary. If opposing counsel does not raise the alarm and only the Court happens tonotice potentially fictitious citations, it must devote substantial chambers time and resources to investigating those references,researching precedent regarding attorney AI misuse, and writing an appropriate order. These tasks compel the Court to divert itsmost precious and ever-shrinking resource—time—away from the affected case's substantive issues and from other litigants.37Further, if neither counsel nor this Court are alerted to the use of hallucinated filings, there exists a very real risk that its decisionwill be rendered based on assumptions driven by non-existent cases, or worse, that it will enter a written order containinghallucinated decisions,38 thus lending legitimacy to nonexistent law and drawing the judiciary's integrity—and that of the legalprofession as a whole—into serious question and ill repute. That is not to say courts are not ultimately responsible for the ordersthey enter. But the risk should not manifest in the first place and is one practitioners in a self-regulating profession should notcreate. SeeGarner v. Kadince, Inc., –––P.3d ––––, 2025 WL 1481740, at *3 (Utah Ct. App. May 2025) (“Opposing counselcannot be required to independently verify the veracity of each citation in another's court filings. And [Nevada] courts cannotbe charged with independently checking the veracity of each citation in an attorney's filings. Our system of justice must be ableto rely on attorneys complying with their duty of candor to the court.”). Just as lawyers are governed by the rules of professionalconduct, judges are governed by the Code of Judicial Conduct. One can imagine the myriad violations, criticism, and potentialcareer-ending sanctions that would arise if a judge pushed moving papers through a generative AI tool and signed a generatedorder without any regard to the order's legal accuracy or reflection of the judge's human intelligence.*9 Using AI generated authority in court filings also risks detrimentally affecting the bar generally, the quality of legalpractitioners, and clients' interests. Those entrusted with a law license must follow “high standards of diligence, professionalism,and competence.” Cuzdey v. State, 103 Nev. 575, 578, 747 P.2d 233, 235 (1987). The rules that govern the practice of law flowfrom the authority and trust that society vests in attorneys: “Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound touphold the laws.” Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1883). The reverent duty to uphold the law is impressed upon all those whoswear the attorney's oath in Nevada, see SCR 73, and is the touchstone from which the bar draws its professional standards.As the Nevada Supreme Court noted over a century ago:When this court grants a license to a person to practice law, the public, and every individual coming in contact with thelicensee in his professional capacity, have a right to expect that he will demean [himself or herself] with scrupulous propriety,as one commissioned to a high and honorable office. A person enjoying the rights and privileges of an attorney and counselorat law must also respect the duties and obligations of the position.In re Schnitzer, 33 Nev. 581, 112 P. 848, 852 (1911) (quoting People ex rel. Skelton v. Brown, 30 P. 338, 340 (Colo. 1892)).Several procedural and ethical rules flow from and regulate an attorney's duties to his or her client and the judiciary. These rulesinclude, for instance, the duty of competence to one's client and candor to the court, see NRPC 1.1; NRPC 3.3, as well as NRCP11's requirement that lawyers ensure their filings are accurate and “warranted by existing law[.]”Each of these rules—and the legal profession's integrity they are designed to protect — may be implicated when a lawyersubmits a court filing that uses fictitious legal references. A lawyer does his or her client a disservice and risks falling belowbasic duties of competence if he or she presents fictitious authority in a filing; one cannot exercise the “legal knowledge,skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary”39 for a client's representation if his or filings contain nonexistentauthority.40 Such conduct may also run afoul of counsel's duty of candor.41 And a lawyer's “gatekeeping role … to ensurethe accuracy of [his or her] filings” under NRCP 11 is not satisfied if he or she uses “non-existent judicial opinions with fakequotes and citations created by … artificial intelligence tool[s.]” Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 448 (discussing NRCP 11's federalcounterpart, FRCP 11).*10 That is not to say lawyers cannot use AI to enhance their practice. But excessive reliance on AI tools is a practice nolawyer should entertain,42 especially if that reliance results in the presentation of hallucinated authorities in a court of law.43And as useful as AI tools may be, the platform underlying generative AI tends to undermine its research accuracy,44 and AIultimately cannot replace the law's inherent human aspects:
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Machines cannot fully replace key actors in court. Judges, for example, measure the sincerity of a defendant's allocution atsentencing. Nuance matters: Much can turn on a shaking hand, a quivering voice, a change of inflection, a bead of sweat, amoment's hesitation, a fleeting break in eye contact. And most people still trust humans more than machines to perceive anddraw the right inferences from these clues. Appellate judges, too, perform quintessentially human functions. Many appellatedecisions turn on whether a lower court has abused its discretion, a standard that by its nature involves fact-specific gray areas.Others focus on open questions about how the law should develop in new areas. AI is based largely on existing information,which can inform but not make such decisions.Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., U. S. Sup. Ct., 2023 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary 6 (2023), PDF availableat: https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx.45 Neither the judiciary nor counsel should blindlyrely on AI. It will likely prove a useful tool in coming years. But a technology predicated on existing data will necessarily reflectthe consensus interpretations from the information on which it is built. It cannot grasp the nuances of written decisions to createfundamentally new interpretations of written decisions. It cannot understand the emotional nuances of a courtroom. GenerativeAI may have its place in the legal profession, but that place does not include its use to present fictitious authorities in a court oflaw. SeegenerallyByoPlanet Int'l, LLC v. Johansson, No. 0:25-CV-60630, –––F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2025 WL 2091025, at *2 (S.D.Fla. July 17, 2025) (“[A] lawyer who wishes to use AI ethically must ensure that the legal propositions and authority generatedare trustworthy. The lawyer has a duty to check all the cases and quotations for accuracy. Anything less is to abdicate one's duty,waste legal resources, and lower the public's respect for the legal profession and judicial proceedings.”).Conclusion*11 This Court has devoted substantial time navigating legal rabbit holes of counsel's apparent creation. It identifies itsconcerns but makes no conclusions until counsel has an opportunity to be heard. But persuasive authority from courts that haveaddressed similar circumstances lead this Court to believe that Uprise's counsel referenced fictitious authorities. Some of theseauthorities blatantly contradict existing law. That some might recite accurate legal principles is of no consequence. SeeJohnson,2025 WL 2086116, at *16 (“At the threshold, the court rejects the invitation to consider that actual authorities stand for theproposition that the bogus authorities were offered to support. That is a stroke of pure luck for these lawyers, and one that didnot remediate the waste and harm their misconduct wrought.”).Counsel for Uprise whose names appear in the signature block of the opposition to GMIC's motion for summary judgment— Daniel A. Mann, Esq. and Jan K. Tomasik, Esq. — shall personally appear in the Department 15 courtroom and explainhow this order is erroneous. They should also be prepared to address appropriate sanctions, such as monetary, referral to theNevada State Bar, or removal from this case. This Court will separately invite the Washoe County Bar President to appear andobserve the proceedings.46IT IS ORDERED, that Daniel A. Mann, Esq. and Jan K. Tomasik, Esq. shall personally appear at 3:00PM, on September 5,2025 before Judge Hardy in the Department 15 courtroom.IT IS SO ORDERED.Dated: August 6, 2025.<<signature>>David A. Hardy, District Court Judge
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Footnotes1Azucena v. State, 135 Nev. 269, 273, 448 P.3d 534, 538 (2019).2The Nevada Supreme Court recognized the judiciary's burgeoning case-load over 50 years ago. SeeMcNair v. Sheriff, Clark Cnty.,89 Nev. 434, 436-37, 514 P.2d 1175, 1176 (1973) (“Almost five years ago, this court unanimously determined to limit continuancesstrictly, not only in district court, but at the justice court stage of criminal proceedings. This seemed essential to prevent prosecutingand defense attorneys from destroying our justice courts' capacity to meet an ever-increasing caseload. Then, as now, we believedour criminal justice system can ill afford to bestow on prosecutors, or on defense counsel, largesse through continuances for whichno cause is shown.”).3This Court resolves Great Midwestern's motion in a separate order.4Uprise's Opp. to GMIC's Mot. for Summ. J. 6:1-3.5SeeAmwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming dismissal of a surety company's complaint against the IRSregarding levied property for failure to comply with statutory notice requirements); Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. United States, 870 F.Supp. 432 (D. Conn. 1994) (discussing priority of a surety's payment rights flowing from a performance and payment bond as theyrelate in priority to an IRS levy), adhered to on reconsideration, No. CIV. 3:92CV221(PCD), 1995 WL 452992 (D. Conn. May 10,1995); Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. U.S., 108 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition) (discussing federal tax hen priority inrelation to a surety company's wrongful levy claim); Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. U.S., No. IP 92-1580-C, 1993 WL 355451 (S.D. Ind. June15, 1993) (not reported) (dismissing surety plaintiff's claim for wrongful levy and declaratory relief against the U.S. government forlack of subject matter jurisdiction), aff'd, 28 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1994); Amwest Sur. Ins. Co. v. U.S., No. CIV. 3:92CV221(PCD), 1995WL 452992 (D. Conn. May 10, 1995) (not reported) (discussing a surety's rights to undisbursed contract proceeds, the distinctionbetween payment and performance bonds as it pertains to equitable hens, and hen priority).6Uprise's Opp. to GMIC's Mot. for Summ. J. 4:15-17.7Id. at 17:16-18.8Uprise does not include the Nevada Reports citation in its reference to Calloway. The full cite for the decision, including the NevadaReports citation, reads: Calloway v. City of Reno, 116 Nev. 250, 993 P.2d 1259 (2000).9Uprise's Opp. to GMIC's Mot. for Summ. J. 14:9-11.10Id. at 16:3-5.11Id. at 4:17-18.12Id. at 18:4-6.13Id. at 5:28-6:1.14Id. at 10:8-10.15Id. at 14:19-21.16Id. at 6:13-16.17Id. at 14:5-8.18Id. at 14:15-18.19Id. at 11:16-19.20Id. at 5:3-6.
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1021Id. at 16:5-8.22Id. at 4:19-21.23SeeTravelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Highland P'ship, Inc., No. 10CV2503 AJB POR, 2011 WL 4381629 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 20,2011) (not reported); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Highland P'ship, Inc., No. 10CV2503 AJB DHB, 2013 WL 878754 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (not reported); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Highland P'ship, Inc., No. 10CV2503 AJB DHB, 2012 WL3307208 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012) (not reported); Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Highland P'ship, Inc., No. 10CV2503 AJBDHB, 2012 WL 5928139 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012) (not reported).24Uprise's Opp. to GMIC's Mot. for Summ. J. 13:10-11.25This Court located several other similarly named district court decision; none include the language Uprise quotes. SeeU.S. v. TravelersCas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 22-CV-00242 DHU/JHR, 2023 WL 8436248 (D.N.M. Dec. 5, 2023) (not reported); U.S. v. TravelersCas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 6:12-CV-182-ORL-DAB, 2014 WL 12633603 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2014) (not reported); U.S. v. TravelersCas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. 22-CV-00242 DHU/JHR, 2023 WL 5275382 (D.N.M. Aug. 16, 2023) (not reported); U.S. v. TravelersCas. & Sur. Co. of Am., No. CV DLB-22-2789, 2024 WL 2922800 (D. Md. June 10, 2024) (not reported); U.S. v. Travelers Cas. &Sur. Co. of Am., No. CV 118-210, 2021 WL 3824834, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 26, 2021) (not reported); U.S. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur.Co. of Am., No. 1:22-CV-242 DHU/KRS, 2023 WL 1474851 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2023) (not reported); U.S. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur.Co. of Am., No. 22-CV-00242 DHU/JHR, 2023 WL 4453849 (D.N.M. July 11, 2023) (not reported); U.S. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur.Co. of Am., No. L22-CV-00242-DHU-JHR, 2024 WL 2883592 (D.N.M. Mar. 5, 2024) (not reported); U.S. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur.Co. of Am., No. 8:15-CV-48, 2015 WL 9216569 (D. Neb. Dec. 17, 2015) (not reported).26Uprise's Opp. to GMIC's Mot. for Summ. J. 5:25-27.27Id. at 10:27-11:1.28Id. at 7:12-14.29Id. at 13 n.7.30Id.31Id. at 10:23-26.32CfRomero v. Goldman Sachs Bank USA, No. 1:25-CV-2857-GHW, 2025 WL 1916119, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2025) (cleaned up)(“Upon review of [p]laintiffs filing, however, the [c]ourt notes that two of [plaintiff's key citations are erroneous. First, [p]laintiffcites to ‘In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2020).’ A case exists with that citation, but the opinion has nothing todo with what evidence can be presented in a reply brief—the topic for which [p]laintiff cites it. What is more, the opinion does nothave the quotation that [p]laintiff asserts can be found in it: ‘[A] reply brief cannot introduce new evidence or arguments that shouldhave been included in the opening motion.’ See Dkt. No. 51 at 2. Second, [p]laintiff's citation to Beckford v. City of New York, No.12-cv-9231, 2015 WL 5521435, at *6 27 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2015), appears to be completely fictitious. There is no case on Westlawpublished at ‘2015 WL 5521435.’ The Westlaw database identifies two cases with the caption ‘Beckford v. City of New York,’ but thecase numbers are not 12-cv-9231. And neither of those cases address issues related to reply briefs—the subject for which [p]laintiffcites them. SeeBeckford v. City of New York, No. 16-cv-7486 (DLC), 2019 WL 1437612 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2019); Beckford v. Cityof New York, No. 85-cv-206, 1988 WL 101331 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 1988). Plaintiff's use of a fictitious citation and quotation bearsthe emblems of the use of a generative artificial intelligence tool.”).33Seealso Tom Askeroth, Esq. & Matt Granda, Esq., Ethics and AI, Nevada Lawyer, Nov. 2023, at 9 [hereinafter Askeroth, Ethics andAI] (“Legal technologists predict that ChatGPT and other LLMs will allow lawyers to save time on tedious tasks, while increasingtheir productivity with higher quality work.”).34Amanda Hunt, Esq., Weaving Professional Ethics With Artificial Intelligence, Nevada Lawyer, Nov. 2023, at 12 [hereinafter Hunt,Weaving Professional Ethics].
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1135SeeWadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489, 497 (D. Wyo. 2025) (“It is also well-known in the legal community that AI resourcesgenerate fake cases.”); Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:24-CV-7399 (LGD), 2025 WL 1195925, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,2025) (“In recent years, courts across the country have continued to receive submissions littered with AI-generated ‘case’ citations… [t]his epidemic of citing fake cases has continued unabated, and, by way of example, the undersigned has identified at least fourreported cases in the recent weeks confronting this very same issue.”). Even Chief Justice John Roberts acknowledged the problem inhis 2023 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, noting AI use “requires caution and humility” and has been used by some lawyers“to submit briefs with citations to non-existent cases.” Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., U. S. Sup. Ct., 2023 Year-End Report onthe Federal Judiciary 5 (2023), PDF available at: https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx.36Though this Court is unaware of any Nevada appellate authority discussing the problems of generative AI, the Nevada State Barnoted the issue nearly two years ago in its official publication, the Nevada Lawyer magazine. See Hunt, Weaving Professional Ethics,supra note 34, at 13 (footnotes omitted) (“Generative AI, by design, generates; this is great for creating ideas, but AI is willing toinvent cases. Most courts do not accept invented cases as precedent. For example, many artificial intelligence models are found tohave an inherent bias or known to be inaccurate at times. It is imperative that a lawyer is aware of the potential flaws of the technologyyou are using so they do not rely on faulty information.”); Askeroth, Ethics and AI, supra note 34, at 8 (“Because of the power andtransformative nature of advanced AI, it is important to evaluate ethical considerations associated with its use to maintain the integrityof the legal profession and the public's trust in the judicial system … [b]y contemplating these ethics in advance, the legal communitycan thoughtfully adopt AI in ways that uphold our legal community's commitment to the ethical practice of law.”).37Cf. Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:24-CV-7399 (LGD), 2025 WL 1195925, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2025) (“[T]hisentire matter has been a waste of the [c]ourt's resources. The [c]ourt undertook a review of the [r]eply with the intention of resolvinga routine matter of civil procedure. Instead, the [c]ourt has been left with no choice but to survey the case law regarding attorneymisconduct relating to the use of AI.”); Johnson v. Dunn, No. 2:21-CV-1701-AMM, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2025 WL 2086116, at*11 (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2025) (“Even in cases like this one, where lawyers who cite AI hallucinations accept responsibility andapologize profusely, much damage is done. The opposing party expends resources identifying and exposing the fabrication; the courtspends time reviewing materials, holding hearings, deliberating about sanctions, and explaining its ruling; the substance of the caseis delayed; and public confidence about the trustworthiness of legal proceedings may be diminished.”).38This risk has manifested in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Shahid v. Esaam, No. A25A0196, ––– S.E.2d ––––, 2025 WL 1792657, at*1-*3 (Ga. Ct. App. June 30, 2025) (vacating a trial court's order, which “appear[ed] to have been prepared” by counsel, that cited“bogus cases” generated by AI and included “blatant misstatement[s] of the law”). Indeed, mere weeks before this order's entry, afederal judge withdrew his opinion in a complex securities suit after counsel “identified ‘pervasive and material inaccuracies' in theruling[,]” such as reference to nonexistent decisional authorities. Nicole Banas, Judge rescinds ruling in biopharma investor suit afterCooley flags errors, July 2025, 2025 WL 2102218 (discussing In re CorMedix Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 21-cv-14020, text orderentered (D.N.J. July 23, 2025)). Though Nevada courts are discouraged from “adopting verbatim orders and findings of fact preparedby prevailing parties[,]” it is simultaneously well-recognized that “asking litigants to submit proposed orders is a customary practicethat is often necessary for the timely administration of justice.” Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. Adv. Op. 44, 537 P.3d 476, 484 (Nev. App.2023). The prospect that some Nevada trial courts may—or already have—enter orders prepared by counsel containing hallucinatedAI citations is extremely concerning.39NRPC 1.1.40See, e.g., Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:24-CV-7399 (LGD), ––– F. Supp. 3d. ––––, 2025 WL 1195925, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.Apr. 24, 2025) (“Clients hire attorneys to perform legal research, investigate the merit of their claims, and provide the best argumentin support of their case to the [c]ourt. The [c]ourt cannot permit attorneys to delegate these fundamental tenants of the attorney-clientrelationship to an AI platform and submit the product to the [c]ourt without review. Lawyers in the State of New York are taskedwith ‘provid[ing] competent representation to a client.’ N.Y. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1(a). ‘Competent representationrequires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.’ Id. Thus, in turningto AI to perform a task she should have undertaken on her own, [p]laintiff's counsel did not fully live up to that duty.”).41See, e.g., Johnson v. Dunn, No. 2:21-CV-1701-AMM, ––– F. Supp. 3d ––––, 2025 WL 2086116, at *14 (N.D. Ala. July 23, 2025)(“Further, it is unclear to the court that Alabama Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3 applies to the misconduct at issue here. On theone hand, inserting into court filings unverified legal citations generated by AI is wholly inconsistent with the duty of candor thatRule 3.3 enumerates. On the other hand, by its terms Rule 3.3 forbids only knowing misstatements of law, and these false statements
CommNV, LLC v. Uprise, LLC, 2025 WL 2331539 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12occurred because none of the three attorneys at issue bothered to verify the hallucinated citations (and two of them did not know thatthe citations had been generated by AI).”). This Court notes Nevada's equivalent professional conduct rule, NRPC 3.3, also containsa knowledge requirement. See NRPC 3.3(a) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly …”).42SeeIn re Martin, No. 24 B13368, 2025 WL 2017224, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 18, 2025) (“[N]o lawyer should be using ChatGPTor any other generative AI product to perform research without verifying the results. Period.”); Lacey v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,No. CV 24-5205 FMO (MAAX), 2025 WL 1363069, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2025) (“Even with recent advances, no reasonablycompetent attorney should out-source research and writing to this technology - particularly without any attempt to verify the accuracyof that material.”).43SeeMid Cent. Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare Fund v. HoosierVac LLC, No. 2:24-CV-00326-JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 574234, at *2(S.D. Ind. Feb. 21, 2025) (citation and quotations omitted) (“It is one thing to use AI to assist with initial research, and even non-legalAI programs may provide a helpful 30,000-foot view. It is an entirely different thing, however, to rely on the output of a generativeAI program without verifying the current treatment or validity —or, indeed, the very existence — of the case presented. Confirminga case is good law is a basic, routine matter and something to be expected from a practicing attorney. As noted in the case of an expertwitness, an individual's “citation to fake, Al-generated sources … shatters his credibility.”), report and recommendation adopted asmodified, No. 2:24-CV-00326-JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 1511211 (S.D. Ind. May 28, 2025).44SeeIn re Martin, 2025 WL 2017224, at *7 (quoting Adam Zewe, Explaind: Generative AI, MIT NEWS (Nov. 9, 2023), https://news.mit.edu/2023/explained-generative-ai-1109) (“[G]iven the nature of generative AI tools, I seriously doubt their utility to assistin performing accurate research (for now). ‘Generative’ AI, unlike the older ‘predictive” AI, is ‘a machine-learning model that istrained to create new data, rather than making a prediction about a specific dataset. A generative AI system is one that learns togenerate more objects that look like the data it was trained on.”’).45SeealsoCalifornia v. U.S., 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978) (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Comm Law 1 (1881)) (“[T]he life of thelaw is not logic but experience[.]”).46Messrs. Mann and Tomasik shall also read Johnson v. Dunn No. 2:21-CV-1701-AMM, ––– F. Supp. 3d. ––––, 2025 WL 2086116(N.D. Ala. July 23, 2025) before they appear.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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