Sigal v. Croner (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Clark County Jeremy E. SIGAL v. Evan CRONER
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Nevada (NV)
Court
Nevada Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
T. (Justice), joined by Nevada (Justice)
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 4738760 (Nev.Dist.Ct.) (Trial Order)District Court of Nevada.Clark CountyJeremy E. SIGAL, an individual, Plaintiff,v.Evan CRONER, an individual; Lauren Croner, anindividual, Does I through X, inclusive, Defendants.No. A-25-922719-C.September 22, 2025.*1 Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.Dept. No.: 5Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Special Motionto Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Pursuant to NRS 41.660David T. Blake, Esq., Nevada State Bar No. 11059, Wolfe & Wyman LLP, 6757 Spencer Street, Las Vegas, NV 89119, Tel: (702)476-0100, Fax:(949) 475-9203, dtblake@ww.law; Chatree M. Thongkham, Esq., Nevada State Bar No. 11875, Klinedinst Pc,5940 South Rainbow Blvd., Las Vegas, NV 89118-2540, Tel: (702) 859-4000, cthongkham@klinedinstlaw.com, for defendantsEvan Croner and Lauren Croner.Evan D. Schwab, Nevada Bar No. 10984, Email: evan@schwablawnv.com, Schwab Law Firm PLLC, 7455 Arroyo CrossingParkway, Suite 220, Las Vegas, Nevada 89113, for plaintiff.Veronica M. Barisich, District Court Judge.The Special Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint filed by Defendants Evan and Lauren Croner came beforethe Court on August 18, 2025. Having reviewed the pleadings, arguments, applicable law, and good cause, the Court FINDSand ORDERS as follows:RELEVANT LAWA “SLAPP suit” is a “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” It is a meritless lawsuit that a party initiates to chill adefendant's exercise of his 1st Amendment speech rights. Stubbs v. Strickland, 129 Nev. 146, 297 P.3d 326 (2013). When aplaintiff files a SLAPP suit, Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute, NRS 41.660, allows defendant to file a special motion to dismiss inresponse to the action. Id. “This special motion to dismiss functions as a motion for summary judgment and allows the districtcourt to evaluate the merits of the alleged SLAPP claim.” Id. Under the Anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant may file a specialmotion to dismiss if the defendant can show “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim is based upon a good faithcommunication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of publicconcern.” NRS 41.660(3)(a).
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2NRS 41.637(4) defines a “[g]ood faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition or the right to free speech in directconnection with an issue of public concern” as any “[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public interestin a place open to the public or in a public forum, which is truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”“When a party moves for a special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute, it bears the initial burden of productionand persuasion; this means the moving party must first make a threshold showing that the lawsuit is based on ‘good faithcommunication[s made] in furtherance of the right to [free speech].” See NRS 41.650; John v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 125Nev. 746, 219 P.3d 1276 (2009). If a defendant makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show “withprima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim.” NRS 41.660(3)(b). If the nonmoving party successfully meetsits burden, then the case proceeds to discovery and, potentially, trial. Otherwise, the district court must dismiss the action, andthat dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. Id.Under NRS 41.670, if the anti-SLAPP motion is granted, the Court MUST award reasonable costs and attorney's fees and upto $10,000 for other damages.Therefore, it is a two-step analysis: (1) Defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim is based upona good faith communication in furtherance of free speech in connection with an issue of public concern; then, if that burden isestablished, the burden shifts and (2) Plaintiff must show a probability of prevailing on the claim.FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW*2 Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) asserting causes of action including defamation, false light, intentionalinfliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), abuse of process, tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, publicdisclosure of private facts, abuse of intimate image, and assault (two incidents).On August 1, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to NRS 41.660 (Nevada's Anti-SLAPP statute) and NRCP 12(b)(5). The motion attaches the Thongkham declaration attesting to the nature, forum, and good-faith basis of the challengedcommunications, and itemizes counsel's time and rate for fee-shifting under NRS 41.670.The motion identifies three communication groupings that underlie Plaintiff's claims: (a) statements in a June 23, 2025Temporary Protective Order (“TPO”) filing in Las Vegas Justice Court (Sigal v. Croner, Case No. 25P04112); (b) a writtencomplaint and related communications to the DUI Court Coordinator (Amanda Pearson) and other governmental bodies; and(c) community-safety communications within the Turnberry Towers community. See FAC ¶¶ 5, 7 10, 22 27, 35, 46 58, 64(d),65 66, 72 77, 90.A. PRONG ONE-DEFENDANTS ESTABLISH PROTECTED ACTIVITY (NRS 41.637)The FAC addresses statements made in a TPO filing on June 23, 2025 (e.g., allegations of harassment, stalking, unsolicitedexplicit images, safety concerns). The Court FINDS that those are written statements made in a judicial proceeding and “inconnection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body,” and are absolutely privileged under the litigation privilegeand NRS 41.637(3). See Cucinotta v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 129 Nev. 323 (2013); Delucchi v. Songer, 133 Nev. 290 (2017).The FAC addresses communications to the DUI Court Coordinator (Amanda Pearson) and law-enforcement/regulatory entitiesthat report alleged probation noncompliance and public-safety concerns. The Court FURTHER FINDS petitioning governmentregarding court-supervised programs constitutes protected activity. See Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, 693 F.3d 795 (9thCir. 2012) (persuasive); Shapiro v. Welt, 389 P.3d 267 (Nev. 2017).
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Next, the FAC addresses alleged statements within the Turnberry Towers community regarding Plaintiff's sobriety, safety, orfitness to participate in a shared governance environment pertain to matters of community safety and housing governance, andtherefore to issues of public interest. See Kosor v. Olympia Cos., LLC, 136 Nev. 705, 709 (2020) (HOA meetings and governanceissues are public fora on public interest).Under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 118 Nev. 706, 720 (2002),individuals who voluntarily inject themselves into public controversies assume the status of public figures for the limited scopeof those controversies. As clarified in Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 68 (2021), an individual's prominence in a communitycan establish limited-purpose public figure status. Here, the FAC self-describes Plaintiff as a “public figure and entrepreneurialleader” whose reputation is essential to his livelihood (FAC 1). Public-figure status further situates these communicationswithin public concern.The Thongkham declaration attests the statements were believed true or made without knowledge of falsity, with basesdescribed. Therefore, based upon the available evidence, the Court FINDS such declarations suffice at prong one to demonstrate“good faith” under NRS 41.635. See Williams v. Lazer, 137 Nev. at 440-42. The Court FINDS that Defendants have met ProngOne for each category of challenged communication and NRS 41.637(1)-(4) applies.B. PRONG TWO-PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SHOW PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING*3 Under NRS 41.660(3)(b), Plaintiff must adduce prima facie evidence supporting each essential element of each claim andovercoming applicable privileges and defenses. Conclusory averments and speculation are insufficient. See Abrams v. Sanson,136 Nev. 83, 91 (2020); Panik, 538 P.3d at 1155 56. Given Plaintiff's pleaded public-figure status (FAC 1), claims soundingin defamation/false light require clear and convincing evidence of actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard).See Wynn v. Associated Press, 555 P.3d 272, 277 (Nev. 2024); Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65 (2021).The Court FINDS that Plaintiff tenders no authenticated communications, third-party confirmations, or documentary proofthat any statement was false, let alone made with actual malice. The pleadings include conclusory and broad language. Themotion-referenced Dylan Davidson declaration lacks foundation, specifics, and personal-knowledge detail and reads as legalconclusions, which carry no weight at this stage. See Clauson v. Lloyd, 103 Nev. 432 (1987).Statements and exhibits in the TPO proceeding are litigation-privileged and cannot furnish liability for defamation, false light,public disclosure of private facts, abuse of intimate image, or IIED where the same conduct is the basis of both claims. SeeCucinotta, Delucchi; cf. Fei Fei Fan v. Yan Yao Jiang, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118139 (D. Nev.).Distribution element (abuse of intimate image). Attaching an image as an exhibit to a court filing does not constitute“distribution” to the public within the meaning of NRS 200.780 et seq. The litigation privilege independently bars liability forevidence submitted to a court.The Court FINDS that Plaintiff identifies no widespread dissemination “to the public at large” beyond limited adjudicative orquasi-adjudicative fora. See Doe v. Beasley Broad. Grp., Inc., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1358 (D. Nev. 2015).Based on the foregoing, the Court dismisses the causes of action for defamation, false light, public disclosure of private facts,and abuse of intimate image.C. PLAINTIFF'S REMAINING CAUSES OF ACTION1. IIED
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4To recover on a claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, a plaintiff must prove: (1) extreme and outrageous conducton the part of the defendant (2) intent to cause emotional distress or reckless disregard for causing emotional distress; (3) that theplaintiff actually suffered extreme or severe emotional distress; and (4) causation. Miller v. Jones, 114 Nev. 1291, 1299-1300,970 P.2d 571 (Nev. 1988). Filing a TPO, reporting to a court officer, or raising safety concerns in a shared-residential governancecontext is not “extreme and outrageous” as a matter of law; Plaintiff also fails to plead/establish severe emotional distress withcompetent proof. See Jordan v. State ex rel. DMV, 121 Nev. 44, 52 (2005). In addition, Plaintiff did not allege that he soughtmedical or psychiatric assistance, and there was no verifiable indicia of the alleged severity of the emotional distress. As aresult, this claim shall be dismissed.2. Abuse of ProcessThe Court in LaMantia v. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 38 P.3d 877 (2002), noted that the elements of an abuse of process claim are:(1) an ulterior purpose by the defendant other than resolving a legal dispute, and (2) a willful act in the use of the legal processnot proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.Here, the First Amended Complaint alleges no improper post-filing act. Alleging that the TPO was filed with ill intent or badmotive is insufficient, as there must be “a willful act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular conduct of theproceeding.” Id. at 30. As a result, the abuse of process claim shall be dismissed.3. Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage*4 The Court FINDS that Plaintiff does not identify a specific contract or sufficiently definite prospective relationship, nornon-privileged intentional acts causing disruption and damages. The broad wording of a publishing and revenue partnershipwas used. See J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 269, 271 (2003); Wichinsky v. Mosa, 109 Nev. 84, 89 90 (1993).Therefore, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff fails Prong Two. No claim is supported by prima facie evidence of falsity, actualmalice, essential elements, or an ability to overcome privileges.4. Assault COAsNRCP 12(b)(5) governs a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court must acceptall factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of LasVegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). Allegations of a complaint are sufficient to assert a claim for relief ifthe allegations give fair notice of the nature and basis of the legally sufficient claim and relief requested. Breliant v. PreferredEquities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 846, 858 P.3d 1258, 1260 (1993). Dismissal is proper if it appears beyond a doubt that plaintiffcould prove no set of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief. Buzz Stew, 124 Nev. at 228, 181 P.3d 672. Additionally,NRCP 8(a) allows notice pleading, where all that is required in a complaint is a short and plain statement of the grounds for thecourt's jurisdiction, claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, a demand for the relief sought, and at least $15,000 inmonetary damages sought. “As a general rule, the court may not consider matters outside the pleading being attacked.” Breliantv. Preferred Equities Corp., 109 Nev. 842, 847, 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (1993).The Court FINDS that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a claim for assault, includingthreatening gestures and the apparent present ability to cause harmful or offensive contact, creating imminent apprehension ofsuch contact. See Burns v. Mayer, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Nev. 2001); Anstedt v. State, 89 Nev. 163, 509 P.2d 968, 969(1973). The Court notes that at this stage, it must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all infers inthe plaintiff's favor. The Court FINDS that the allegations, taken as true, establish apprehension of imminent harmful contactsufficient to state a claim under Nevada law at this stage.
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5D. ATTORNEY'S FEES, COSTS, AND STATUTORY PENALTY (NRS 41.670)[Attorney's fees section left blank pursuant to Court's instruction]E. RULE 11 SANCTIONS REGARDING AI GENERATED HOLDINGSUnder Nevada Rule of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 11(c), sanctions may be imposed if the court determines that Rule 11(b) hasbeen violated. The rule requires that the party subject to sanctions be given notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond.Specifically, Rule 11(c)(3) allows the court to issue sanctions on its own initiative by ordering the attorney, law firm, or party toshow cause why their conduct has not violated Rule 11(b). Nevada courts have consistently held that due process requires noticeand an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed. In Valley Health System, LLC v. Estate of Doe, the Nevada SupremeCourt emphasized that due process is satisfied when the accused party is informed of the charges and given an opportunityto respond, either through written submissions or at a hearing. Valley Health System, LLC v. Estate of Doe by and throughPeterson, 134 Nev. 634 (2018).*5 The Nevada Supreme Court has affirmed that district courts have broad discretion to impose sanctions for litigationmisconduct, including under Rule 11. A New York federal judge imposed a $5,000 fine on attorneys who submitted a briefwith AI-generated fake cases. Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). Since then, the Courts have notshied away from imposing monetary sanctions for similar misconduct. See., e.g., Gauthier v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No.1:23-CV-281 WL 4882651 (E.D. Tex. 2024) (imposing a $2,000 sanction); Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc., 348 F.R.D. 489 (D.Wyo. 2025) (imposing a $3,000 sanction); Mid Cent. Operating Eng'rs Health & Welfare und v. HoosierVac LLC, No. 2:24-CV-00326-JPH-MJD, 2025 WL 574234 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (recommending a $15,000 sanction).At the August 18, 2025, hearing, Defendants' counsel represented that several authorities cited in Plaintiff's Opposition appearedto be AI-generated and did not accurately reflect controlling law, including Pope v. Fellhauer, 2021 WL 535563; LaMantiav. Redisi, 118 Nev. 27, 30 (2002); Wells v. Maroulis, 2022 Nev. Unpub. LEXIS 283; and Taylor v. Colon, 136 Nev. 434, 438(2020). Upon its own review, the Court finds there is a basis to these concerns.However, the Court FINDS that while there is sufficient concern to caution Plaintiff's counsel, the Court is not finding thatit rises to the level of currently grounds to issue a show cause hearing under NRCP 11(c)(3). However, the Court FURTHERFINDS that any future submission of inaccurate, fictitious, or AI-generated citations will result in the issuance of a show causehearing and potential sanctions under NRCP 11.ORDERTherefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants' Special Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's First AmendedComplaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN PART.The Court FINDS that Defendants' challenged statements are protected under NRS 41.637, and Plaintiff failed to demonstratea probability of prevailing under NRS 41.660(3)(b).It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's assault claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) is DENIED.The assault claims alleged in the First Amended Complaint shall proceed.It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are awarded attorney's fees and costs pursuant to NRS 41.670(1)(a) in the amountof [AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEE AWARD].
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is ordered to pay an additional penalty of $500.00 to Defendants pursuant to NRS41.670(1)(b).It is FURTHER ORDERED that the attorney's fees and statutory penalty must be paid within 30 days of entry of this order.IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no show cause hearing shall issue at this time.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's counsel is expressly cautioned that any future submission of inaccurate or AI-generated authorities will result in an order to show cause pursuant to NRCP 11(c)(3) and the imposition of appropriate sanctions,up to and including monetary sanctions and/or other disciplinary measures.IT IS SO ORDEREDDated this 22nd day of September, 2025By:<<signature>>District Court Judge628 DCC 0C76 7E4FVeronica M. BarisichDistrict Court JudgeRespectfully submitted by:/s/ David BlakeDavid T. Blake, Esq.Nevada State Bar No. 11059WOLFE & WYMAN LLP6757 Spencer StreetLas Vegas, NV 89119Tel: (702) 476-0100Fax:(949) 475-9203dtblake@ww.lawChatree M. Thongkham, Esq.Nevada State Bar No. 11875
Sigal v. Croner, 2025 WL 4738760 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7KLINEDINST PC5940 South Rainbow Blvd.Las Vegas, NV 89118-2540*6 Tel: (702) 859-4000cthongkham@klinedinstlaw.comAttorneys for DefendantsApproved as to form and content:/s/Evan D. SchwabNevada Bar No. 10984Email: evan@schwablawnv.comSCHWAB LAW FIRM PLLC7455 Arroyo Crossing Parkway, Suite 220Las Vegas, Nevada 89113Attorneys for PlaintiffEnd of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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