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Gafni v. Refunds
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
Morris Gafni v. Rapid Foreclosure Refunds et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New York (NY)
Court
New York Court of Appeals
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM
GAFNI,
JOHN
DOE,
and
MARY
DOE,
Defendants.
Supreme
Court,
Queens
County,
New
York.
|
November
21,
2025
|
Slip
Copy
|
2025
WL
3292291
Document
Details
standard
Citation:
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM
GAFNI,
JOHN
DOE,
&
MARY
DOE,
Defendants.,
No.
703853/2024,
2025
WL
3292291
(N.Y.
Sup.
Ct.
Nov.
21,
2025)
All
Citations:
Slip
Copy,
2025
WL
3292291
(Table),
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
Search
Details
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Query:
adv:
(openai
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chatgpt
"google
gemini"
"westlaw
cocounsel"
"large
language
model")
(hallucinat!
fake
fictitious
spurious
nonexistent
"non-existent"
"made
up"
imagined
/p
(gpt
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"artificial
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chatgpt
chaton
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openai
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"mata
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claude
llm
llms))
(hallucinat!
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+3
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"legal
case")
&
DATE(aft
1/1/2023)
Jurisdiction:
New
York
Delivery
Details
Date:
November
27,
2025
at
12:52
PM
Delivered
By:
Client
ID:
NOCLIENTID
Outline
Attorneys
and
Law
Firms
(p.
1
)
Opinion
(p.
1
)
All
Citations
(p.
8
)
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2025
WL
3292291
Unreported
Disposition
NOTE:
THIS
OPINION
WILL
NOT
APPEAR
IN
A
PRINTED
VOLUME.
THE
DISPOSITION
WILL
APPEAR
IN
THE
REPORTER.
This
opinion
is
uncorrected
and
will
not
be
published
in
the
printed
Official
Reports.
Supreme
Court,
Queens
County,
New
York.
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM
GAFNI,
JOHN
DOE,
and
MARY
DOE,
Defendants.
Index
No.
703853/2024
|
Decided
on
November
21,
2025
Attorneys
and
Law
Firms
For
Plaintiff
Morris
Gafni:
NINA
KHAIMOVA
LAW
OFFICE
OF
NINA
KHAIMOVA,
P.C.
8515
Main
Street,
Suite
4,
Briarwood,
NY
11435
718-551-2430
nina@khaimlaw.com
For
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni:
YORAM
GAFNI
Pro
Se
Opinion
Karen
Lin
,
J.
*1
The
following
e-filed
documents,
listed
by
NYSCEF
document
number
(Motion
004)
59,
60,
61,
62,
63,
64,
65,
66,
67,
68,
69,
70,
71,
72,
79,
80,
84,
85,
86,
87,
88,
89,
90,
91,
92,
93,
94,
95,
96,
97
were
read
on
this
motion
to/for
JUDGMENT
-
SUMMARY.
Upon
the
foregoing
documents,
it
is
ordered
that
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni's
motion
and
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
cross-motion
are
determined
as
follows:
Plaintiff
Morris
Gafni
commenced
this
action
on
July
31,
2024,
seeking
declaratory
and
injunctive
relief
to
remove
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
dated
November
16,
2023,
and
recorded
on
November
29,
2023,
in
the
City
Register
of
the
City
of
New
York,
Queens
County,
under
CRFN
2023000313206,
for
the
subject
property
located
at
147-12
75th
Avenue,
Flushing,
New
York
11367
(Block:
6683,
Lot:
5)
(hereinafter
the
Property).
Plaintiff
moves
for
an
order:
i)
pursuant
to
CPLR
3212
,
granting
summary
judgment
against
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
for
the
relief
sought
in
the
complaint
and
dismissing
the
affirmative
defenses;
ii)
pursuant
to
CPLR
3211
,
dismissing
the
counterclaims;
iii)
pursuant
to
CPLR
3215
(a)
,
for
default
judgment
against
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC
(hereinafter
Rapid
Foreclosure)
and
Yoram
Gafni;
iv)
terminating
and
canceling
the
Memorandum
of
Lease;
v)
pursuant
to
Real
Property
Law
(RPL)
§
329
to
remove
the
Memorandum
of
Lease;
and
vi)
granting
special
damages
in
an
amount
to
be
determined
by
this
Court
for
defendants'
slander
of
title
claim.
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni,
appearing
pro
se
,
opposes
and
cross-moves
for
an
order:
i)
denying
plaintiff's
motion
for
summary
judgment
and
default
judgment
in
its
entirety;
ii)
pursuant
to
CPLR
3211
(a)
(7)
and
3212
,
dismissing
plaintiff's
complaint
for
failure
to
state
a
claim
upon
which
relief
can
be
granted;
iii)
pursuant
to
CPLR
3211
(a)
(8)
and
1001
(a)
,
dismissing
plaintiff's
complaint
for
failure
to
join
necessary
parties;
iv)
damages
for
emotional
distress
and
health-
related
issues;
and
v)
pursuant
to
22
NYCRR
§
130-1.1
,
sanctioning
plaintiff
and
plaintiff's
counsel
for
frivolous
litigation
tactics.
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
also
seeks
relief
on
behalf
of
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure,
which
is
appearing
without
an
attorney,
for
time
to
either
obtain
legal
representation
or
dissolve
the
LLC,
contending
that
"the
financial
constraints
and
identical
interests
of
the
sole
member
and
the
LLC,
pro
se
representation
should
be
permitted."
The
underlying
facts
are
as
follows.
On
May
25,
1972,
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni
and
Doris
Gafni
purchased
the
Property
jointly
as
husband
and
wife.
The
deed
was
recorded
on
May
30,
1972
(hereinafter
the
1972
Deed).
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
On
October
1,
2023,
Doris
Gafni,
with
power
of
attorney
to
act
on
Morris
Gafni's
behalf,
executed
a
lease
agreement
dated
October
1,
2023
(hereinafter
the
lease),
as
the
landlord
that
leased
the
Property
to
defendant
Yoram
Gafni,
their
son,
as
the
tenant.
The
lease
reflects
a
lease
term
of
25
years,
commencing
October
1,
2023
through
September
30,
2048,
with
an
annual
rent
of
one
dollar
($1.00)
per
year.
The
lease
contained
a
purchase
option,
which
states:
"Yoram
Gafni
shall
have
the
option
to
purchase
the
demised
property,
located
at
147-12
75th
Avenue,
Flushing,
New
York
11367
at
any
time
during
this
lease
for
One
($1.00)
Dollar
by
giving
notice
of
such
exercise
of
this
option
to
Doris
Gafni
and/or
Morris
Gafni."
The
lease
also
contained
a
right
of
first
refusal
which
provided
that,
upon
receiving
written
notice
of
a
bona
fide
written
offer
or
purchase
agreement
for
the
sale
of
the
Property,
Yoram
Gafni
"shall
have
the
right
to
notify
Landlord
that
it
is
exercising
its
Right
of
First
Refusal
and
will
purchase
the
Property
for
the
purchase
price
of
One
($1.00)
Dollar."
On
the
same
date,
October
1,
2023,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
assigned
the
lease
between
himself,
as
tenant,
and
Doris
Gafni,
as
landlord,
to
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure.
Also
on
the
same
date,
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
entered
into
a
lease
with
defendant
Yoram
Gafni,
wherein
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
represents
itself
as
landlord
and
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
as
tenant.
Defendants
then
recorded
this
lease
between
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
as
landlord
and
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
as
tenant,
in
a
Memorandum
of
Lease
dated
November
16,
2023
(hereinafter
Memorandum
of
Lease),
on
November
29,
2023.
On
July
8,
2024,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
sought
to
exercise
his
right
under
the
lease
to
purchase
the
Property
for
$1.00.
On
July
17,
2024,
Morris
Gafni,
through
his
attorney,
rejected
Yoram
Gafni's
exercise
of
the
purchase
option.
Summary
Judgment
on
Plaintiff's
Causes
of
Action
*2
It
is
well
established
that
the
proponent
of
a
summary
judgment
motion
must
establish
a
prima
facie
case
showing
of
entitlement
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law,
submitting
sufficient
evidence
to
demonstrate
the
absence
of
any
material
issues
of
fact
(
see
Alvarez
v
Prospect
Hospital
,
68
NY2d
320
[1986]
).
Once
this
demonstration
has
been
made,
the
burden
shifts
to
the
party
opposing
the
motion
for
summary
judgment
to
produce
evidence,
in
admissible
form,
sufficient
to
establish
the
existence
of
material
issues
of
fact
which
require
a
trial
of
the
action
(
see
Zuckerman
v
City
of
New
York
,
49
NY2d
557
[1980]
).
Where
there
is
no
genuine
issue
to
be
resolved
at
trial,
the
case
should
be
summarily
decided
(
see
Andre
v
Pomeroy
,
35
NY2d
361,
364
[1974]
).
Cancellation
of
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
The
Court
will
first
address
plaintiff's
first
cause
of
action
to
cancel
the
Memorandum
of
Lease.
In
support
of
the
motion,
plaintiff
submits,
among
other
things:
i)
his
affidavit
in
support;
ii)
an
attorney
affirmation
in
support;
iii)
the
1972
Deed;
iv)
the
Memorandum
of
Lease;
v)
email
correspondence
between
plaintiff's
counsel
and
defendant
Yoram
Gafni;
vi)
email
correspondence
with
Part
24;
vii)
a
Medicare
letter
addressed
to
plaintiff
dated
November
8,
2024;
viii)
an
envelope
and
notice
of
purchase
dated
July
8,
2024;
ix)
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
demand
to
close
dated
July
15,
2024;
x)
adjournment
requests;
and
xi)
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
consent
on
NYSCEF.
Plaintiff
attests
in
his
affidavit
that
he
is
93
years
old,
that
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
is
his
son,
and
the
recording
of
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
on
the
Property
has
clouded
the
Property's
title.
Plaintiff
further
attests
that
he
has
never
heard
of
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure,
that
Rapid
Foreclosure
is
not
the
owner
of
the
Property,
and
the
1972
Deed
is
the
last
deed
of
record,
which
shows
that
he
is
the
proper
owner
of
the
Property
with
his
late
wife,
Doris
Gafni,
who
passed
away
on
October
15,
2023.
Plaintiff
attests
that
since
he
is
the
owner
of
record
of
the
Property,
he
is
the
only
party
who
has
authority
to
enter
into
any
leases.
Accordingly,
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
is
"not
in
any
position
to
enter
into
any
leases
or
OPTION
TO
PURCHASE
agreements."
Plaintiff
further
attests
that
he
wishes
to
sell
the
Property
and
distribute
the
proceeds
among
his
grandchildren,
including
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
son,
before
he
passes
away.
Upon
review
of
the
submissions
presented,
including
the
1972
Deed
as
the
last
recorded
deed,
plaintiff
has
demonstrated,
prima
facie,
that
he
is
the
proper
owner
and
his
entitlement,
as
a
matter
of
law,
to
the
cancellation
of
the
Memorandum
of
Lease.
A
deed
is
documentary
evidence
of
ownership
(
see
Fleming
v
Kamden
Props
.,
LLC,
41
AD3d
781,
782
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
[2d
Dept
2007]
;
Rodriguez
v
Peterson
,
163
AD2d
467,
468
[2d
Dept
1990]
;
Peldman
v
Podolsky
,
148
AD2d
686,
687
[2d
Dept
1989]
).
Conveyance
of
property
to
a
husband
and
a
wife
creates
a
tenancy
by
the
entirety
(
see
Cruz
v
Cruz
,
213
AD3d
805,
806
[2d
Dept
2023]
;
Ciaccio
v
Wright-Ciaccio
,
211
AD3d
900,
902
[2d
Dept
2022]
;
Scarison,
Inc.
v
Paracha
,
7
AD3d
605,
606
[2d
Dept
2004]
).
Where
property
is
held
in
a
tenancy
by
the
entirety
and
one
spouse
dies,
the
surviving
spouse
receives
the
fee
interest
in
its
entirety
by
operation
of
law,
free
and
clear
of
any
debts,
claims,
liens
or
other
encumbrances
as
against
the
deceased
spouse
(
see
Ciaccio
,
211
AD3d
at
903
;
Cormack
v
Burks
,
150
AD3d
1198,
1199
[2d
Dept
2017]
;
Lacroix
v
Limogene
,
132
AD3d
817,
818
[2d
Dept
2015]
).
Where
an
instrument
is
improperly
recorded
related
to
real
property
or
interest,
RPL
§
329
provides
for
the
cancellation
of
such
instrument
of
record
by
the
owner,
stating:
*3
An
owner
of
real
property
or
of
any
undivided
part
thereof
or
interest
therein
or
an
owner
of
rent
to
accrue
from
a
tenancy
or
subtenancy
thereof,
may
maintain
an
action
to
have
any
recorded
instrument
in
writing
relating
to
such
real
property
or
interest
therein,
other
than
those
required
by
law
to
be
recorded,
or
any
recorded
assignment
of
rent
to
accrue
from
a
tenancy
or
subtenancy
of
such
property
or
interest
therein
declared
void
or
invalid,
or
to
have
the
same
canceled
of
record
as
to
said
real
property,
or
his
undivided
part
thereof
or
interest
therein,
or
as
to
the
rent
to
accrue
therefrom
belonging
to
him.
Here,
it
is
uncontroverted
that
the
last
recorded
deed
was
the
1972
Deed,
which
reflects
that
the
Property
was
conveyed
to
"MORRIS
GAFNI
AND
DORIS
GAFNI,
his
wife"
as
tenants
by
the
entirety.
When
Doris
Gafni
died
on
October
15,
2023,
the
Property
passed
to
Morris
Gafni,
who
received
the
fee
interest
in
its
entirety
by
operation
of
law.
Where,
as
here,
the
record
reflects
that
no
subsequent
deeds
were
recorded,
and
no
documentary
evidence
of
the
conveyance
of
ownership
to
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
on
or
prior
to
the
date
of
the
Memorandum
of
Lease,
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
is
improper
as
it
misrepresents
that
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
is
the
landlord.
Accordingly,
plaintiff
has
demonstrated,
prima
facie,
that
he
is
the
proper
owner
in
fee
of
the
Property,
not
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure,
and,
therefore,
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
should
be
canceled,
pursuant
to
RPL
§
329
.
The
burden
then
shifts
to
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
to
produce
evidence,
in
admissible
form,
sufficient
to
raise
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact.
In
his
opposition
and
cross-motion,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
submits,
among
other
things,
i)
a
power
of
attorney
dated
December
15,
2017;
ii)
the
lease
between
Doris
Gafni
and
Yoram
Gafni
dated
October
1,
2023;
iii)
the
assignment
and
assumption
of
the
lease;
iv)
the
lease
between
defendants
Rapid
Foreclosure
and
Yoram
Gafni
dated
October
1,
2023;
and
v)
the
notice
to
exercise
of
option
dated
July
8,
2024.
Upon
review
of
the
submissions
presented,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
has
failed
to
raise
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact.
Significantly,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
raises
no
opposition
to
plaintiff's
contention
that
neither
Rapid
Foreclosure
nor
he
are
the
record
owners
and
lacked
the
standing
or
the
authority
to
record
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
against
the
Property.
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
provides
no
evidence,
such
as
a
valid
deed,
that
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
possessed
any
ownership
interest
in
the
Property
as
the
landlord
on
or
prior
to
the
date
of
the
Memorandum
of
Lease.
Although
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
proffers
the
assignment
and
assumption
of
the
lease
between
him,
as
the
tenant,
and
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure,
on
October
1,
2023,
as
evidence
of
ownership
rights,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
was
only
able
to
assign
his
rights
and
interest
as
the
tenant
(
see
TPZ
Corp.
v
Dabbs
,
25
AD3d
787,
789
[2d
Dept
2006]
;
In
re
Stralem
,
303
AD2d
120,
122
[2d
Dept
2003]
).
Inasmuch
as
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
he
exercised
a
purchase
option
pursuant
to
the
lease
terms,
the
record
clearly
reflects
that
he
did
not
attempt
to
exercise
this
option
until
July
8,
2024,
which
was
months
after
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
at
issue
was
recorded
on
November
29,
2023.
While
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends,
among
other
things,
that
summary
judgment
is
premature
because
of
discovery,
the
mere
hope
or
speculation
that
evidence
sufficient
to
defeat
the
motion
for
summary
judgment
might
be
uncovered
during
further
discovery
is
an
insufficient
basis
to
deny
the
motion
(
see
Hope
v
Our
Holy
Redeemer
Roman
Catholic
Church
,
219
AD3d
595,
596
[2d
Dept
2023]
).
Accordingly,
the
branch
of
plaintiff's
motion
for
summary
judgment
to
cancel
the
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
Memorandum
of
Lease
is
canceled
pursuant
to
RPL
§
329
is
granted.
*4
Slander
of
Title
The
Court
will
next
address
plaintiff's
second
cause
of
action
for
slander
of
title.
"The
elements
of
a
cause
of
action
to
recover
damages
for
slander
of
title
are
(1)
a
communication
falsely
casting
doubt
on
the
validity
of
[the]
complainant's
title,
(2)
reasonably
calculated
to
cause
harm,
and
(3)
resulting
in
special
damages"
(
Irizarry
v
Rosselli
,
229
AD3d
778,
780
[2d
Dept
2024]
,
quoting
39
Coll.
Point
Corp.
v
Transpac
Capital
Corp.
,
27
AD3d
454,
455
[2d
Dept
2006]
).
"The
wrongful
filing
for
record
of
a
document
which
casts
a
cloud
upon
another's
title
to
or
interest
in
realty
is
clearly
such
an
act
of
publication
as
to
give
rise
to
an
action
for
slander
of
title,
if
provable
damages
result"
(
id.
).
"It
has
generally
been
held
that
the
cause
of
action
to
recover
damages
for
slander
of
title
based
upon
the
recording
of
an
unfounded
claim
to
the
property
of
another
does
not
arise
until
damages
actually
result,
so
that
the
period
of
limitations
begins
to
run,
not
from
the
date
of
the
initial
recording,
but
from
the
time
a
prospective
sale
is
lost
because
of
the
cloud
on
plaintiff's
title"
(
Hanbidge
v
Hunt
,
183
AD2d
700,
701
[2d
Dept
1992]
).
Upon
review
of
the
submissions
presented,
plaintiff
has
failed
to
make
a
sufficient
showing
of
damages
and
establish,
prima
facie,
his
entitlement
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law
for
slander
of
title.
Accordingly,
the
branch
of
plaintiff's
motion
for
summary
judgment
for
slander
of
title
is
denied.
Summary
Judgment
on
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
Affirmative
Defenses
The
Court
now
turns
to
the
branch
of
plaintiff's
motion
seeking
dismissal
of
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
affirmative
defenses.
In
his
verified
amended
answer
and
counterclaims,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
lists
eleven
affirmative
defenses,
which
are
"1)
Failure
to
state
a
claim
upon
which
relief
may
be
granted;
2)
Plaintiff's
own
conduct,
or
by
the
conduct
of
its
agents,
representatives,
and
consultants
bar
this
action;
3)
Plaintiff
lacks
of
capacity
and
or
standing
to
sue
as
Defendant
exercised
defendant's
option
to
purchase
the
demised
property
from
the
Plaintiff;
4)
Waiver
and
estoppel;
5)
Plaintiff's
Unclean
Hands;
6)
Plaintiff
failed
to
comply
with
his
own
obligations;
7)
Claims
are
barred
in
whole
or
in
part
by
the
existence
of
a
lease
dated
October
1,
2023
in
which
plaintiff
is
a
party,
agreed
to
same,
and
has
a
copy
of
said
lease;
8)
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
name
an
indispensable
party
to
the
lawsuit;
9)
Plaintiff
does
not
have
standing
to
bring
this
complaint
in
that
he
is
not
the
current
full
Legal
and
Equitable
owner
of
the
property;
10)
Plaintiff
has
failed
to
meet
all
conditions
precedent
to
bringing
this
action.
By
failing
to
attach
a
document
upon
which
it
relies;
and
11)
Plaintiff
failed
to
notify
the
Defendant,
Yoram
Gafni,
prior
to
his
attempt
to
sell
the
property
as
required."
Under
CPLR
3211
(b)
,
"[a]
party
may
move
for
judgment
dismissing
one
or
more
defenses,
on
the
ground
that
a
defense
is
not
stated
or
has
no
merit."
A
court
should
grant
a
motion
to
dismiss
affirmative
defenses
if
the
"defenses
are
without
merit
as
a
matter
of
law
because
they
either
do
not
apply
under
the
factual
circumstances
of
[the]
case,
or
fail
to
state
a
defense"
(
Bank
of
Am.,
N.A.
v
414
Midland
Ave.
Assocs.,
LLC
,
78
AD3d
746,
748
[2d
Dept
2010]
).
"[W]here
affirmative
defenses
'merely
plead
conclusions
of
law
without
any
supporting
facts,'
the
affirmative
defenses
should
be
dismissed
pursuant
to
CPLR
3211
(b)
"
(
id.
at
750
,
quoting
Fireman's
Fund
Ins.
Co.
v
Farrell
,
57
AD3d
721,
723
[2d
Dept
2008]
).
However,
"it
is
well
established
that
a
party
may
'remedy
any
defects'
in
a
pleading
by
submitting
evidence
in
opposition
to
a
motion
to
dismiss"
(
Lewis
v
U.S.
Bank
N.A.
,
186
AD3d
694,
697
[2d
Dept
2020]
,
quoting
Benjamin
v
Yeroushalmi
,
178
AD3d
650,
653
[2d
Dept
2019]
).
*5
In
the
case
at
bar,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
verified
amended
answer
and
counterclaims
merely
plead
conclusions
of
law
without
any
supporting
facts.
However,
to
the
extent
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
remedies
these
defects
in
his
opposition
papers
and
provide
factual
support,
it
will
be
considered.
First
Affirmative
Defense:
"Failure
to
state
a
claim
upon
which
relief
may
be
granted."
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
plaintiff
"completely
ignored
the
existence
of
the
lease
agreement
in
his
complaint,
omitting
its
key
terms,
including
Bond
requirement,
the
option
to
purchase,
prepaid
rent
for
the
entire
lease
term,
the
right
of
first
refusal,
and
the
ability
to
sublet
or
assign
the
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
5
property
without
prior
consent."
He
further
contends
that
plaintiff
failed
to
allege
any
breach
of
lease
terms
or
failure
to
fulfill
lease
obligations.
Here,
plaintiff
has
established
that
plaintiff
is
the
proper
owner
in
fee
of
the
Property,
pursuant
to
the
1972
Deed,
and
as
the
surviving
spouse
after
Doris
Gafni
passed
away
on
October
15,
2023.
Accordingly,
the
first
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed.
Second
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff's
own
conduct,
or
by
the
conduct
of
its
agents,
representatives,
and
consultants
bar
this
action."
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
failed
to
address
and
remedy
the
second
affirmative
defense
with
any
factual
support.
Where,
as
here,
the
affirmative
defense
is
merely
plead
as
a
conclusion
of
law
without
any
supporting
facts,
such
defense
is
dismissed.
Third
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff
lacks
of
capacity
and
or
standing
to
sue
as
Defendant
exercised
defendant's
option
to
purchase
the
demised
property
from
the
Plaintiff."
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
plaintiff
failed
to
take
any
steps
to
involve
the
estate
of
Doris
Gafni
in
this
lawsuit
as
a
necessary
party.
Here,
as
previously
set
forth,
plaintiff
has
established
that
he
is
the
proper
owner
in
fee
of
the
Property,
having
received
the
fee
interest
in
its
entirety
by
operation
of
law
upon
his
wife
Doris
Gafni's
death.
Accordingly,
as
plaintiff
avers,
the
estate
of
Doris
Gafni
is
not
a
necessary
party.
Further,
RPL
§
329
authorizes
the
owner
to
commence
such
action
as
here
where
the
owner
is
seeking
to
cancel
an
instrument
of
record
(
see
RPL
§
329
;
Silverberg
v
Bank
of
NY
Mellon
,
165
AD3d
1193,
1193
[2d
Dept
2018]
).
Accordingly,
the
third
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed.
Fourth
Affirmative
Defense:
"Waiver
and
estoppel."
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
plaintiff's
failure
to
object
to
the
leases
on
October
1,
2023,
coupled
with
his
acceptance
of
lease
benefits,
constitutes
waiver
and
estoppel.
"A
valid
waiver
requires
no
more
than
the
voluntary
and
intentional
abandonment
of
a
known
right
which,
but
for
the
waiver
would
have
been
enforceable"
(
Golfo
v
Kycia
Assoc.,
Inc.
,
45
AD3d
531,
532
[2d
Dept
2007]
,
quoting
Nassau
Trust
Co.
v
Montrose
Concrete
Prods.
Corp.
,
56
NY2d
175,
184
[1982]
).
A
waiver
"is
not
created
by
negligence,
oversight,
or
thoughtlessness,
and
cannot
be
inferred
from
mere
silence"
there
must
be
proof
that
there
was
a
voluntary
and
intentional
relinquishment
of
a
known
and
otherwise
enforceable
right
(
id.
at
533
,
quoting
Peck
v
Peck
,
232
AD2d
540,
540
[2d
Dept
1996]
).
Where,
as
here,
there
is
no
evidence
that
plaintiff
waived
his
ownership
rights
to
the
Property,
the
fourth
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed
(
see
Bank
of
Am.,
N.A.
v
414
Midland
Ave.
Assoc.,
LLC
,
78
AD3d
746,
750
[2d
Dept
2010]
).
*6
Fifth
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff's
Unclean
Hands."
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
his
father,
Morris
Gafni's,
"attempt
to
mislead
the
court
by
denying
his
knowledge
and
possession
of
lease
documents
constitutes
bad
faith,
barring
him
from
equitable
relief."
Where,
as
here,
the
fifth
affirmative
defense
does
not
apply
under
the
factual
circumstances
of
the
case,
such
defense
is
dismissed
(
see
Seagirt
Realty
Corp.
v
Chazanof
,
13
NY2d
282,
285
[1963]
).
Sixth
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff
failed
to
comply
with
his
own
obligations."
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends,
pursuant
to
the
terms
of
the
lease
executed
by
Doris
Gafni
and
Yoram
Gafni,
that
plaintiff
failed
to
post
a
bond
in
the
sum
of
the
market
value
of
the
premises.
Where,
as
here,
the
instant
action
seeks
to
cancel
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
between
defendants
Rapid
Foreclosure
and
Yoram
Gafni
pursuant
to
RPL
§
329
,
this
defense
is
inapplicable.
Accordingly,
the
sixth
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed.
Seventh
Affirmative
Defense:
"Claims
are
barred
in
whole
or
in
part
by
the
existence
of
a
lease
dated
October
1,
2023
in
which
plaintiff
is
a
party,
agreed
to
same,
and
has
a
copy
of
said
lease."
As
argued
in
his
sixth
affirmative
defense,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
plaintiff
"willingly
executed,
via
the
Power
of
attorney
he
freely
gave
Doris
Gafni,
his
wife,
the
lease
agreement,
which
includes
clear
provisions
that
contradict
his
claims."
However,
at
issue
in
this
action
is
the
cancellation
of
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
between
defendants
Rapid
Foreclosure
and
Yoram
Gafni,
wherein
it
was
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
6
disputed
whether
Rapid
Foreclosure
was
the
landlord
with
any
ownership
interest
in
the
Property
at
the
time
it
was
signed
and
recorded.
Accordingly,
the
seventh
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed,
as
it
is
inapplicable.
Eighth
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff
has
failed
to
name
an
indispensable
party
to
the
lawsuit."
As
explained
above
in
dismissing
the
third
affirmative
defense,
the
estate
of
Doris
Gafni
is
not
a
necessary
party.
Accordingly,
the
eighth
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed.
Ninth
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff
does
not
have
standing
to
bring
this
complaint
in
that
he
is
not
the
current
full
Legal
and
Equitable
owner
of
the
property."
As
explained
above
in
dismissing
the
first
affirmative
defense,
plaintiff
has
established
that
plaintiff
is
the
proper
owner
in
fee
of
the
Property,
pursuant
to
the
1972
Deed,
and
as
the
surviving
spouse
of
Doris
Gafni.
Accordingly,
the
ninth
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed.
Tenth
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff
has
failed
to
meet
all
conditions
precedent
to
bringing
this
action.
By
failing
to
attach
a
document
upon
which
it
relies."
No
factual
support
has
been
presented
regarding
this
purported
affirmative
defense.
Where,
as
here,
the
affirmative
defense
is
merely
plead
as
a
conclusion
of
law
without
any
supporting
facts,
such
defense
is
dismissed.
Eleventh
Affirmative
Defense:
"Plaintiff
failed
to
notify
the
Defendant,
Yoram
Gafni,
prior
to
his
attempt
to
sell
the
property
as
required."
*7
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni
contends
that
plaintiff's
actions
in
publicly
listing
the
property
for
sale
violated
his
contractual
right
of
first
refusal
as
well
as
constituted
a
material
breach
of
the
lease
executed
by
Doris
Gafni
and
Yoram
Gafni.
Where,
as
here,
the
instant
action
is
to
cancel
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
between
defendants
Rapid
Foreclosure
and
Yoram
Gafni,
this
defense
is
inapplicable.
Accordingly,
the
eleventh
affirmative
defense
is
dismissed.
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
Counterclaims
Plaintiff
also
moves
to
dismiss
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
counterclaims
sounding
in
defamation
for:
i)
"damages,
special
damages,
actual
damages
and
punitive
damages
totaling
One
Million
($1,000,000)
Dollars"
for
plaintiff's
false
written
statement
to
family
members
and
home
health
aides
on
June
18,
2024,
that
Yoram
Gafni
"falsified
documents
and
committed
a
big
fraud";
and
ii)
"damages,
special
damages,
actual
damages
and
punitive
damages
totaling
One
Million
($1,000,000)
Dollars"
for
plaintiff's
false
written
statement
to
family
members
and
home
health
aides
that
Yoram
Gafni
"hit
him
twice
and
he
has
witnesses."
"A
cause
of
action
contained
in
a
counterclaim
shall
be
treated,
as
far
as
practicable,
as
if
it
were
contained
in
a
complaint"
(
Banschick
v
Johnson
,
222
AD3d
608,
611
[2d
Dept
2023]
).
"On
a
motion
to
dismiss
a
counterclaim
a
court
must
accept
as
true
the
facts
as
alleged
in
the
pleading,
accord
the
pleader
the
benefit
of
every
possible
favorable
inference,
and
determine
only
whether
the
facts
as
alleged
fit
within
any
cognizable
legal
theory"
(
Shah
v
Mitra
,
171
AD3d
971,
973
[2d
Dept
2019]
,
quoting
Wand,
Powers
&
Goody,
LLP
v
Yuliano
,
144
AD3d
1017,
1018
[2016]
).
"At
the
same
time,
however,
allegations
consisting
of
bare
legal
conclusions
as
well
as
factual
claims
flatly
contradicted
by
documentary
evidence
are
not
entitled
to
any
such
consideration"
(
Simkin
v
Blank
,
19
NY3d
46,
52
[2012]
,
quoting
Maas
v
Cornell
Univ.
,
94
NY2d
87,
91
[1999]
[internal
quotation
marks
omitted]).
"The
elements
of
a
cause
of
action
for
defamation
are
(a)
a
false
statement
that
tends
to
expose
a
person
to
public
contempt,
hatred,
ridicule,
aversion,
or
disgrace,
(b)
published
without
privilege
or
authorization
to
a
third
party,
(c)
amounting
to
fault
as
judged
by,
at
a
minimum,
a
negligence
standard,
and
(d)
either
causing
special
harm
or
constituting
defamation
per
se"
(
Banschick
,
222
AD3d
at
610-611
).
"Further,
the
complaint
in
a
defamation
action
must
set
forth
the
particular
words
allegedly
constituting
defamation,
and
it
must
also
allege
the
time
when,
place
where,
and
manner
in
which
the
false
statement
was
made,
and
specify
to
whom
it
was
made"
(
Sternberg
v
Wiederman
,
225
AD3d
820,
821
[2d
Dept
2024]
,
quoting
Kimso
Apts.,
LLC
v
Rivera
,
180
AD3d
1033,
1034
[2d
Dept
2020]
).
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
7
Here,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
fails
to
allege
the
particular
defamatory
words,
the
time
when,
place
where,
and
manner
in
which
such
purported
false
statements
were
made.
Accordingly,
the
first
and
second
counterclaims
are
dismissed
(
see
Sternberg
,
225
AD3d
at
821
).
Default
Judgment
Against
Defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
and
Yoram
Gafni
It
is
well
settled
that
a
limited
liability
company
(LLC)
may
only
appear
by
an
attorney
(
see
CPLR
321
[a]
;
Michael
Reilly
Design,
Inc.
v
Houraney
,
40
AD3d
592,
593-94
[2d
Dept
2007]
["the
LLC
may
only
be
represented
by
an
attorney
and
not
by
one
of
its
members"]).
The
failure
of
a
corporate
defendant
to
comply
with
CPLR
321
(a)
warrants
default
judgment
(
see
Pisciotta
v
Lifestyle
Designs,
Inc.
,
62
AD3d
850,
853
[2d
Dept
2009]
;
Jimenez
v
Brenillee
Corp.,
48
AD3d
351
[1st
Dept
2008]
;
Mail
Boxes
Etc.
USA,
Inc.
v
Higgins
,
281
AD2d
176
[1st
Dept
2001]
).
"On
a
motion
for
leave
to
enter
a
default
judgment
pursuant
to
CPLR
3215
,
the
movant
is
required
to
submit
proof
of
service
of
the
summons
and
complaint,
proof
of
the
facts
constituting
its
claim,
and
proof
of
the
defaulting
party's
default
in
answering
or
appearing"
(
Atlantic
Cas.
Ins.
Co.
v
RJNJ
Servs.,
Inc.
,
89
AD3d
649,
651
[2d
Dept
2011]
;
see
CPLR
3215
[f]
;
Peak
Prop.
&
Cas.
Ins.
Corp.
v
Rodriguez
,
230
AD3d
512,
514
[2d
Dept
2024]
;
Lugo
v
Corso
,
215
AD3d
944,
945
[2d
Dept
2023]
)
.
*8
Here,
it
is
undisputed
that
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure,
a
LLC,
has
not
appeared
by
counsel.
Plaintiff
further
submits
an
affidavit
of
service
dated
March
8,
2024,
demonstrating
proper
service
on
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure.
1
Upon
review
of
the
submissions,
plaintiff
has
also
established
proof
of
the
facts
constituting
his
claim.
Accordingly,
the
branch
of
plaintiff's
motion
for
default
judgment
is
granted
as
against
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure.
To
the
extent
that
plaintiff
seeks
a
default
judgment
against
defendant
Yoram
Gafni,
in
his
individual
capacity,
it
is
denied
as
he
has
appeared
and
answered
in
this
action.
For
all
the
reasons
stated,
plaintiff's
motion
is
granted
to
the
extent
that
summary
judgment
is
granted
in
plaintiff's
favor
as
against
defendant
Yoram
Gafni
on
the
first
cause
of
action,
the
first
to
eleventh
affirmative
defenses
are
dismissed,
the
first
and
second
counterclaims
are
dismissed,
and
default
judgment
is
granted
as
against
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure
only.
Defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
Cross-Motion
In
light
of
the
foregoing
determination,
the
only
remaining
branch
from
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
cross-
motion
pertains
to
sanctioning
plaintiff
and
plaintiff's
counsel
for
frivolous
litigation
tactics,
pursuant
to
22
NYCRR
§
130-1.1
.
A
court,
may,
in
its
discretion,
impose
sanctions
for
frivolous
conduct
(
see
22
NYCRR
130-1.1
[b],
[d];
Santaliz
v
OR
FM
Assoc
,
2024
NY
Slip
Op
50794(U)
,
*6
[2d
Dept
2024];
M&T
Bank
v
Friedmann
,
217
AD3d
934,
936
[2d
Dept
2023]
).
"[C]onduct
is
frivolous
if:
(1)
it
is
completely
without
merit
in
law
and
cannot
be
supported
by
a
reasonable
argument
for
an
extension,
modification
or
reversal
of
existing
law;
(2)
it
is
undertaken
primarily
to
delay
or
prolong
the
resolution
of
the
litigation,
or
to
harass
or
maliciously
injure
another;
or
(3)
it
asserts
material
factual
statements
that
are
false"
(
Santaliz
,
2024
NY
Slip
Op
50794(U)
at
*7,
quoting
22
NYCRR
130-1.1
[c]).
Here,
plaintiff
has
presented
a
non-frivolous
claim
that
does
not
present
as
rising
to
the
level
of
sanctionable
conduct.
Accordingly,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
cross-
motion
is
denied
in
its
entirety.
Papers
Submitted
Under
the
Rules
of
the
Chief
Administrative
Judge,
attorneys
and
parties
are
required
to
ensure
that
papers
they
prepare
and
sign
are
reviewed
for
accuracy,
certifying
by
signing
that
the
paper
does
not
contain
any
false
or
frivolous
authority
or
argument
(
see
22
NYCRR
§§
130-1.1
,
130-1.1a
).
Parties
appearing
pro
se
are
required
to
comply
with
the
same
rules,
are
afforded
no
greater
rights
than
other
litigants,
and
are
expected
to
present
legally
competent
evidence
(
see
Matter
of
Martinez
v
Gaddy
,
223
AD3d
816,
819
[2d
Dept
2024]
;
Benedetto
v
Tannenbaum
,
186
AD3d
1596,
1598
[2d
Dept
2020]
;
Duffen
v
State
,
245
AD2d
653,
653
[3d
Dept
1997]
).
Courts
utilize
and
expend
significant
time
and
resources
in
carefully
reviewing
all
of
the
parties'
submissions.
Upon
review
of
the
papers
submitted
in
the
instant
motion
and
cross-motion,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni,
a
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
8
former
attorney,
2
submitted
a
combined
total
of
87
pages
(Memorandum
of
Law
1
of
2,
Memorandum
of
Law
2
of
2,
Affidavit
of
Yoram
Gafni
1
of
2,
and
Affidavit
of
Yoram
Gafni
2
of
2
[NYSCEF
Doc
Nos.
85-88]),
which
contain
fictitious
or
fabricated
citations
to
authority
(commonly
known
as
hallucinations),
citations
to
cases
which
do
not
exist,
as
well
as
cases
which
do
not
stand
for
the
proposition
cited
or
are
wholly
unrelated
to
the
issues
in
this
matter.
Notwithstanding
these
fatal
flaws,
the
Court
nevertheless
proceeded
to
consider
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
arguments
on
their
merits.
The
Court,
however,
issues
a
strong
admonition
against
the
further
submission
of
papers
containing
fictitious
or
fabricated
material:
such
conduct
is
wholly
unacceptable
and
may
result
in
the
imposition
of
sanctions
or
other
appropriate
measures,
including
the
refusal
to
consider
any
such
filings.
*9
Conclusion
Accordingly,
it
is
hereby
ORDERED
that
the
branch
of
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni's
motion
for
summary
judgment
on
the
first
cause
of
action
is
granted;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that,
pursuant
to
RPL
§
329
,
the
Memorandum
of
Lease
dated
November
16,
2023,
and
recorded
on
November
29,
2023,
in
the
City
Register
of
the
City
of
New
York,
Queens
County,
under
CRFN
2023000313206,
for
the
subject
property
located
at
147-12
75th
Avenue,
Flushing,
New
York
11367
(Block:
6683,
Lot:
5),
is
canceled
of
record;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
the
Office
of
the
City
Register
of
the
City
of
New
York
is
directed
to
mark
as
discharged
of
record
said
Memorandum
of
Lease,
upon
service
of
a
copy
of
this
Order
with
Notice
of
Entry
and
upon
the
payment
of
any
applicable
costs;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
the
branch
of
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni's
motion
for
summary
judgment
on
the
second
cause
of
action
is
denied;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
the
branch
of
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni's
motion
for
summary
judgment
on
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
affirmative
defenses
is
granted,
and
the
first,
second,
third,
fourth,
fifth,
sixth,
seventh,
eighth,
ninth,
tenth,
and
eleventh
affirmative
defenses
are
dismissed;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
the
branch
of
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni's
motion
for
summary
judgment
to
dismiss
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
counterclaims
is
granted,
and
the
first
and
second
counterclaims
are
dismissed;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
the
branch
of
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni's
motion
for
default
judgment
is
granted
only
as
against
defendant
Rapid
Foreclosure;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
cross-
motion
is
denied
in
its
entirety;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
any
requested
relief
and/or
remaining
contentions
not
expressly
addressed
herein
have
nonetheless
been
considered
and
are
hereby
expressly
rejected;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
plaintiff
Morris
Gafni
shall
serve
a
copy
of
this
Decision
and
Order
with
Notice
of
Entry
upon
defendants
within
twenty
(20)
days
from
the
date
of
entry;
and
it
is
further
ORDERED
that
the
Clerk
is
directed
to
enter
judgment
accordingly.
This
constitutes
the
Decision
and
Order
of
the
Court.
Dated:
November
21,
2025
Long
Island
City,
New
York
Hon.
Karen
Lin
Justice
of
the
Supreme
Court
All
Citations
Slip
Copy,
2025
WL
3292291
(Table),
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
Footnotes
Morris
Gafni,
Plaintiff,
v.
Rapid
Foreclosure
Refunds
LLC,
YORAM...,
Slip
Copy
(2025)
2025
N.Y.
Slip
Op.
51864(U)
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
9
1
By
stipulation
dated
August
15,
2024,
defendants
accepted
service
of
the
summons
and
complaint
on
said
date,
stipulated
to
"appear
or/and
more
within
20
days
of
service,"
and
waived
claims
to
personal
jurisdiction.
2
Upon
review
of
public
attorney
registration
records,
defendant
Yoram
Gafni's
attorney
registration
indicates
the
following
status,
"Resigned
from
bar
—
disciplinary
reason."
End
of
Document
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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