Torah v. Hendel (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Sharei Torah v. Hendel
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
New York (NY)
Court
New York Court of Appeals
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1872259Unreported DispositionNOTE: THIS OPINION WILL NOT APPEARIN A PRINTED VOLUME. THE DISPOSITIONWILL APPEAR IN THE REPORTER.This opinion is uncorrected and will not bepublished in the printed Official Reports.Supreme Court, Queens CountyCommercial DivisionSHAREI TORAH, Plaintiff,v.Mendel HENDEL, Menachem Shagalow,Congregation Ohr Menachem a/k/aYeshiva Gedola Lubavitch, Defendants.Index No. 701131/2023|Decided on June 1, 2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.Attorneys and Law FirmsFor Plaintiff Sharei Torah: Yifat Vered Schnur, Esq., YifatV. Schnur Esquire LLC, 26 Broadway 19th, New York, NY10004, (347) 268-5347, Yvlslaw@gmail.com.For Defendant Mendel Hendel: None recorded.For Defendant Menachem Shagalow: None Recorded.For Defendant Congregation Ohr Menachem a/k/a YeshivaGedola Lubavitch: None Recorded.OpinionLeonard Livote, J.*1 The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEFdocument number (Motion 009) 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132,133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 were read on this motionto/for RENEW/REARGUE/RESETTLE/RECONSIDER.The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEFdocument number (Motion 010) 135, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145,146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151 OTHER RELIEF.The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEFdocument number (Motion 011) 152, 160, 164, 165 OTHERRELIEFThe following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEFdocument number (Motion 012) 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158,159, 161, 162, 163, 166, 167 were read on this motion to/forOTHER RELIEFUpon the foregoing papers, the motions are determined asfollows.I. Relevant background:The within action is for, inter alia, allegedly unpaid rent,use and occupancy breach of contract, and fraud. PlaintiffSharei Torah (“Plaintiff”) is a non-profit organization thatowns the property at 92-15 69th Avenue, Forest Hills, NY11475 (“Property”).Plaintiff purports to have leased the Property to two rabbis,defendants Mendel Hendel (“Mr. Hendel”) and MenachemMendel Shagalow (“Mr. Shagalow”), for the purposes ofoperating the defendant entity Congregation Ohr Menachema/k/a Yeshiva Gedola Lubavitch (“Yeshiva”).Plaintiff alleges as follows: Messrs Hendel and Shagalowoperate defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch, a New York501 [c][3] organization, out of the Property. On or aboutAugust 2, 2011, the parties entered into a 12-month leaseagreement (“2011 Lease”) by which Plaintiff, owner ofthe Property, leased it to Messrs Hendel and Shagalow“in their personal capacit[ies] (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 6).Defendants allegedly failed to make certain rent and/or useand occupancy payments. At the conclusion of the 2011Lease, Plaintiff agreed to allow Messrs. Hendel and Shagalowto ”continue to occupy the Premises on a month-to-monthbasis, pay the back due rent and continue at a monthly rentof $10,500.00” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 7). For some timethereafter, Defendants continued to occupy the Property as amonth-to-month tenant, although Defendants “occasionally,at times, paid rent, but have gone vast periods of timewithout paying any rent while continuing to occupy” theProperty such that “in total, Defendants owe to [Plaintiff]approximately $600,000 in back rent and accumulated useand occupancy charges (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2further alleges that Defendants “ignored the maintenance andother expenses of operating” the Property which the 2011Lease purportedly required (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 9).On or about June 2013, Plaintiff entered into a letteragreement to sell the Property to non-party Yeshiva SharYisochor Div (“Yeshiva Div”), but Messrs Hendel andShagalow purportedly engaged in “tortious conduct” suchthat Yeshiva Div “felt threatened did not purchase the[Property] at that time” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 13). Onor about March 2016, Plaintiff purportedly again attemptedto sell the Property to Yeshiva Div but Defendants “filed alis pendens and a plenary action in Queens County SupremeCourt (Hon. Robert J. McDonald, Index No. 10193/2016)(“Plenary Action”) claiming that Plaintiff had breachedDefendants' right of first refusal. The court, in that PlenaryAction, held: “[P]laintiffs [Messrs Hendel and Shagalow] didnot renew or extend the lease in accordance with its terms.Rather they entered into oral agreement whereby they weremonth-to-month tenants. Thus, following the expiration of thelease, [Messrs Hendel and Shagalow] no longer maintainedan enforceable right of first refusal” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at14).*2 Plaintiff alleges that since 2016, “in order to prevent[Plaintiff] from selling the [Property] to a third-party,Defendants have repeatedly claimed they were going topurchase the [Property], and worked out deals to do so bywhich [Plaintiff] agreed to forego or reduce the payment ofback rent on the condition Defendants actually purchase the[Property]” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 15).On or about 2018, Plaintiff initiated a holdover evictionproceeding in Queens County Civil Court (Index No.LT-077973/2018-QU) (“LL-T Action”), in which that courtissued a judgment of eviction in or around February 2020.The parties ultimately agreed, pursuant to a stipulation ofsettlement so-ordered by Hon. Sally E. Unger (“StipulatedSettlement”) to stay the eviction until July 2021, and againuntil April 2022. Said Stipulated Settlement purportedlyprovided that Defendants “would either peaceably surrenderthe [Property] or would agree to purchase [it]” (NYSCEFDoc. No. 1 at 16). Plaintiff claims Defendants “repeatedly”claimed to be interested in purchasing the Property but neverdid so and never vacated (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 16). Intrying to consummate the transaction for Defendants to buythe Property, Plaintiff claims to have also dealt with threedifferent Defendants' attorneys (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 17).On or about September 2022, in the LL-T Action, the court(Hon. John C. V. Katsanos) issued an order for the issuanceof a new warrant of eviction with an earliest execution dateof September 26, 2022, and further held that Defendants were“in violation of the so-ordered stipulation of settlement asmodified” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at 17).On or about September 2023, Plaintiff then commencedthe within action for claims sounding in “collection ofunpaid rent in quantum meruit,” “breach of stipulation ofsettlement,” “tortious interference with contract,” “fraudulentinducement,” “damage to property” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1at 18-23). At the time of commencement, Plaintiff claimedit was “still waiting [for] the Queens County Clerk's officeto upload a signed possessory judgment to hand over tothe Sheriff's office for execution” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1 at17). Defendants interposed an answer on February 28, 2023(NYSCEF Doc. No. 12) and later an amended answer onMarch 10, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16), in which they, interalia, pled denials and various affirmative defenses.On March 22, 2023, this Court issued a PreliminaryConference Order (“PC Order”) directing certain discovery.By order dated July 25, 2023, this Court granted the motion(Mot. Seq. 001) of Zelenitz, Shapiro and D'Agostino, P.C.to withdraw as counsel for Defendants (NYSCEF Doc. No.41). On August 15, 2023, Defendants retained Jacobs PC(NYSCEF Doc. No. 46).On August 18, 2023, defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch filedfor bankruptcy, as debtor, under Chapter 11 of the UnitedStates Bankruptcy Code (EDNY Case No. 23-42923-jmm),but this case was ultimately dismissed on December 26, 2023(NYSCEF Doc. No. 51).By order dated March 11, 2025, this Court denied, onprocedural grounds, Jacobs PC's motion (Mot. Seq. 004) towithdraw as counsel.By order dated September 30, 2025, this Court granted thesecond branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 005) seekingpreclusion “to the extent that Defendants are precluded fromoffering any affirmative evidence in support of their claimsand defenses at the time of trial on the issue of liability butmay defend at trial on the issue of damages” (NYSCEF Doc.No. 89). In that same order, this Court found Defendants'conduct to be willful and contumacious. In that same order,this Court also granted Jacobs PC's motion (Mot. Seq. 006)seeking to withdraw as Defendants' counsel and directed
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3parties to appear for a virtual conference on December 1, 2025such that “any parties' failure to appear either by new counselor pro se may result in striking pleadings, default, dismissal,and/or contempt” (id.)*3 On December 1, 2025, defendant Mr. Hendel filed to theNYSCEF record a “Notice of Removal” document addressedto “The Clerk of the United States District Court for theSouthern District of New York” apparently requesting to saidclerk that, because an involuntary petition under Chapter 7of Title 11 of the United States Code had been purportedlyfiled against Mr. Hendel in the United States BankruptcyCourt for the Southern District of New York (“SDNY”),the within action before this Court should be removed tothe SDNY (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92). Mr. Hendel, in thatsubmission, referenced a “Standing Order of Reference datedFebruary 1, 2012 entered by the United States District Courtfor the Southern District of New York (12 Misc. 00032)” thatpurportedly serves as a basis for Mr. Hendel's claim that thewithin action was “automatically referred to the BankruptcyJudges of this Court.” No such “Standing Order“ or order ofany court was included in Mr. Hendel's NYSCEF Doc. No. 92submission. Mr. Hendel also referenced that ”On November28, 2025, an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 303, was filed against“him. No such petition document was included in Mr. Hendel'sNYSCEF Doc. No. 92 submission.On December 1, 2025, Mr. Hendel appeared at the court-ordered virtual conference in his personal capacity. Plaintiffappeared by counsel. Defendant Mr. Shagalow did not appear.The defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch did not appear withcounsel.On December, 4, 2025, this Court issued an order to showcause regarding Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 007) directingDefendants to show cause as to why an order should notbe issued, inter alia, “entering default judgment against alldefendants,” “setting this matter down for an inquest ondamages or directing written submission,” “rejecting [Mr.Hendel's] purported 'Notice of Removal' (NYSCEF Doc. No.92) and confirming that no stay is in effect and that thisCourt retains jurisdiction,” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 102). ThisCourt directed Plaintiff to serve said order to show cause onDefendants “via personal service“ (NYSCEF Doc. No. 102).On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of motion(Mot. Seq. 008) seeking an order pursuant to CPLR § 308[5] for, inter alia, “authorizing alternate service of the Orderto Show Cause and all supporting papers upon DefendantMendel Hendel” regarding the order to show cause issued forMot. Seq. 007 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 112).By order dated April 2, 2026, this Court addressed Mot.Seqs. 007 and 008. This Court, having reviewed the NYSCEFrecord, held that “Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence007)...was administratively marked 'closed' with leave torefile” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126). This Court further held that“Plaintiff's motion (Motion Sequence 008) is denied as mootwith leave to refile” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126).Thereafter, the parties filed the various motions discussedherein. Based on the Court's review of the record, it appearsthe conduct between Plaintiff's counsel and unrepresentedDefendants has devolved into name-calling, disparagement,and personal attacks. In one communication from Plaintiff'scounsel, Ms. Yifat Schnur (“Ms. Schnur”) to Mr. Hendelon April 19, 2026, Ms. Schnur appears to write: “1. You[Mr. Hendel] are a vermin that is an embarrassment tothe Jewish people; 2. You are a thief and a conartist[sic]; 3. You are a horrible human being That [sic] shouldnot be allowed near children — and definitely not ina school Setting [sic]...” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 145). Inanother email to Mr. Hendel on April 17, 2026, Ms. Schnurwrites: “I am embarrassed that you claim you are religious— it is because of people like you that October 7thhappened...” (id.). In an April 19, 2026 email to Ms. Schnurfrom Mr. Hendel, Mr. Hendel threatened to bring Ms. Schnur'scommunications to the “subject of a grievance to be filed withthe Attorney Grievance Committee of the Second JudicialDepartment...” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 145).II. Plaintiff's motion for relief (Mot. Seq. 009):Plaintiff now moves via order to show cause (Mot. Seq. 009)to, inter alia, reargue. The above-numbered papers were readon this motion by Plaintiff seeking:“1. Granting leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221(d) theCourt's Decision and Order dated April 2, 2026 and enteredApril 3, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126).*4 2. Upon reargument, vacating so much of the Order asdenied Motion Sequence 008.3. Determining that no stay or removal has been establishedon the present record.
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.44. Directing Defendant Mendel Hendel, within five (5)days of service of the Order deciding this motion, to filea sworn affidavit together with competent documentaryproof of any alleged bankruptcy petition, including thecourt, case number, petition, and any order imposing a stayor effectuating removal.5. Providing that failure to produce such proof shall resultin a determination that no stay exists, that this actionshall proceed without delay, and that Defendant shall beprecluded from asserting any bankruptcy-related stay orremoval.6. Upon Defendant's failure to comply with the abovedirective, or upon a finding that no stay exists, grantingPlaintiff's prior motion (Motion Sequence 007) fordefault judgment on liability, striking Defendant Hendel'spleadings, and setting the matter down for an inquest ondamages.7. Awarding sanctions against Defendant Mendel Hendelpursuant to 22 NYC RR § 130-1.1 (authorizing sanctionsfor frivolous conduct), including monetary sanctions andattorneys' fees.8. Imposing protective conditions barring unsupportedassertions of bankruptcy or removal and limitingadjournments.9. Directing that all service in this matter bemade upon [Defendant] Mendel Hendel via email tommhendel@gmail.com; and10. Granting such other and further relief as the Courtdeems just and proper.” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133)a. Plaintiff's first and second branches of its motion:The first two (2) branches of relief sought by Plaintiff relateto this Court's April 2, 2026 order (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126)(“April 2026 Order”).Under CPLR § 2221 [d]:“A motion for leave to reargue: 1. shall be identifiedspecifically as such; 2. shall be based upon matters offact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by thecourt in determining the prior motion, but shall not includeany matters of fact not offered on the prior motion; and 3.shall be made within thirty days after service of a copy ofthe order determining the prior motion and written noticeof its entry.” (CPLR § 2221 [d]).A motion for leave to reargue “may be granted upon ashowing that the court overlooked or misapprehended thefacts or law or for some reason mistakenly arrived at its earlierdecision” (Carrillo v PM Realty Group, 16 AD3d 611, 611[2d Dept 2005]; see Coke-Holmes v Holsey Holdings, LLC,189 AD3d 1162, 1164 [2d Dept 2020]).In its April 2026 Order, this Court stated: “the Court is notable to adequately ascertain from the record whether anybankruptcy petition or court order either removed or stayedthe within action” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126). In the instantmotion, Plaintiff argues that “[T]he proper course was not todeny relief because the Court lacked enough certainty. Theproper course was to direct Hendel to produce competentproof immediately, and absent such proof, to decline torecognize any purported stay” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 129).Plaintiff's argument in this regard is based on amisunderstanding of the law and court procedure. In issuingits April 2026 Order, the Court did not “overlook” or“misapprehend” a fact or law under Carrillo v PM RealtyGroup, 16 AD3d 611 [2d Dept 2005]. Plaintiff's motion (Mot.Seq. 007) seeking default against Defendants was erroneouslymarked administratively “closed” by a clerk within the courtsystem and without this Court's directive to that clerk todo so. There is an indication on the NYSCEF record onDecember 1, 2025 at 9:28 am by a clerk as follows: “CASECLOSED -- REMOVED TO EASTERN DISTRICT AS PERDOC #92,” referring to Mr. Hendel's purported “Notice ofRemoval.” There is another, later, comment by a differentclerk on December 1, 2025 at 9:54 am as follows: “Closedon error.”*5 As Plaintiff appears to be unaware, the Court cannot entera decision on the merits of a motion that has been marked“closed.” The Court also cannot direct a “closed” motion tobe reopened for a decision. The action by the clerk to mark thewithin action and Plaintiff's Mot. Seq. 007 “closed” renderedthis Court unable to enter any decision on Mot. Seq. 007. Assuch, this Court denied as moot Plaintiff's subsequent motion(Mot. Seq. 008) which sought alternative service of the orderto show cause that was a part of Plaintiff's closed Mot. Seq.007. Thus, the first and second branches of Plaintiff's instantmotion (Mot. Seq. 009) seeking to reargue and vacate so muchof the Court's April 2026 Order on the basis of the Courtpurportedly having overlooked or misapprehended the factsor the law are denied.
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5This Court, however, can enter a decision on a motion thatis open and which seeks the same relief sought in a “closed”motion. Plaintiff's remaining branches of its instant motion(Mot. Seq. 009) are addressed below.b. Plaintiff's third branch of its motion:Plaintiff's third branch of its motion seeks a determination“that no stay or removal has been established on the presentrecord” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133).Where a case has been removed, the court is “withoutjurisdiction to entertain” motions (Fin. Freedom Acquisition,LLC v Braunsberg, 201 AD3d 788, 792 [2d Dept 2022]).At no point in the Court's April 2026 Order did this Courtdeclare that the within action had been stayed or removed to adifferent court on account of Mr. Hendel's purported “Noticeof Removal” filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92). If this Courthad found as such, then the Court would have been “withoutjurisdiction to entertain” Plaintiff's then-pending motion (Fin.Freedom Acquisition, LLC, 201 AD3d at 792 [2d Dept 2022].As apparent from the NYSCEF record, this Court did in factrender a decision on Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 008), whichit could not have done had the case been removed.For the avoidance of doubt, the Court states here, as it alreadyestablished by the mere issuance of its April 2026 Order, thatthe within action is not stayed and has not been removed toany other court, and that Mr. Hendel's purported “Notice ofRemoval” filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92) did not remove thewithin action. Thus, the Plaintiff's third branch of its motion(Mot. Seq. 009) is granted.c. Plaintiff's fourth and fifth branches of its motion:The fourth and fifth branches of Plaintiff's instant motion seekto compel Mr. Hendel to produce certain documents or proofevidencing a purported removal of the within action, and topreclude him from asserting any bankruptcy-related stay orremoval. Such branches of relief are denied as redundant onthe grounds that this Court, as described above, did not findthe within action in its April 2026 Order to have been stayedor removed.d. Plaintiff's sixth and seventh branches of its motion:Plaintiff's sixth branch of its motion seeks: “Upon Defendant'sfailure to comply with the above directive, or upon a findingthat no stay exists, granting Plaintiff's prior motion (MotionSequence 007) for default judgment on liability, strikingDefendant Hendel's pleadings, and setting the matter downfor an inquest on damages” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133).Plaintiff's seventh branch of its motion seeks an order“awarding sanctions against Defendant Hendel Mendelpursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (authorizing sanctionsfor frivolous conduct), including monetary sanctions andattorneys' fees” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 133).i. Relief sought as to defendants Mr. Shagalow and entityYeshiva Lubavitch:CPLR § 3215 [a] authorizes a party to make an application fora default judgment “[w]hen a defendant has failed to appear,plead or proceed to trial of an action reached and calledfor trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any otherneglect to proceed.” A corporate defendant is in default whenit appears in this action without representation by a licensedattorney and fails to give a reasonable excuse for its default(Lohmann v Castleton Gallery, Inc., 252 AD2d 482, 482-83[2d Dept 1998]) (internal citations omitted).*6 Here, defendant entity Yeshiva Lubavitch did not appearat the December 1, 2025 conference with counsel. Individualdefendant Mr. Shagalow also did not appear. As such, theCourt finds these defendants in default under CPLR § 3215[a] and Lohmann v Castleton Gallery, Inc., 252 AD2d 482 [2dDept 1998].ii. Relief sought as to defendant Mr. Hendel:1. Whether Mr. Hendel engaged in fraudulent conduct:The Court of Appeals has held that “a finding of fraud onthe court may warrant termination of the proceedings in thenonoffending party's favor...for 'when a party lies to the courtand [its] adversary intentionally, repeatedly, and about issuescentral to the truth-finding process, it can fairly be said that[the party] has forfeited [the] right to have [the] claim decidedon the merits'” (CDR Creances S.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d307, 321 [2014]) (internal citations omitted). Therefore,once a court concludes that clear and convincing evidenceestablishes fraud on the court, it may strike a pleading andenter a default judgment (id.).Plaintiff claims that at the December 1, 2025 conference, Mr.Hendel feigned an inability to understand English but, when
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6his former counsel was brought on to the call at the directionof the clerk, Mr. Hendel conversed with him in fluent English(NYSCEF Doc. No. 98). Mr. Hendel does not address thisclaim in his opposition to the instant motion.At the December 1, 2025 conference, Mr. Hendel representedto the Court that the within action had been removed as perhis purported “Notice of Removal” filing (NYSCEF Doc. No.92). As already discussed in this Court's April 2026 Order, Mr.Hendel's “Notice of Removal” filing referenced a “StandingOrder of Reference dated February 1, 2012 entered by theUnited States District Court for the Southern District of NewYork (12 Misc. 00032)” that purportedly served as a basis forMr. Hendel's claim that the within action was “automaticallyreferred to the Bankruptcy Judges of this Court.” No such“Standing Order” or order of any court was included with Mr.Hendel's filing.Mr. Hendel also referenced in his purported “Notice ofRemoval” filing (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92) that “On November28, 2025, an involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 303, was filed against”him. No such petition document was included in Mr. Hendel'spurported ”Notice of Removal” submission. Mr. Hendel's“Notice of Removal” filing did not indicate an index numberof the relevant bankruptcy action underpinning his filing.Mr. Hendel also did not produce same in his oppositionto the within action. Furthermore, Mr. Hendel's “Noticeof Removal” filing stated that a petitioning creditor filedan involuntary petition for relief under Chapter 7 of theBankruptcy Code, but Mr. Hendel does not identify inany papers before the Court the identity of the purportedpetitioning creditor.Contrary to Mr. Hendel's claim, 11 USC § 362 provide foran automatic stay of all acts and proceedings against a debtorand its property only upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,not a purported “notice of removal” document filed to thestate court. Mr. Hendel has not provided, either now in hisopposition to the instant motion or earlier at the time of hispurported “Notice of Removal” filing in December 1, 2025,proof of any such bankruptcy petition filed to the federal courtto which he claims the within action was removed.*7 On December 1, 2025, after Mr. Hendel'spurported “Notice of Removal” filing, Plaintiff's counsel acorrespondence to the Court responding to Mr. Hendel's filingby arguing that, inter alia, Mr. Hendel's filing was improper.In this letter (NYSCEF Doc. No 93), Plaintiff's counsel, whohad enumerated her arguments using numbered paragraphs,wrote as follows:“5. Plaintiff Will Move to Remand if Necessary Should thefederal court open a civil docket, Plaintiff will promptly filea motion to remand.” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 93).In response to this December 1, 2025 letter, Mr. Hendelsubmitted his own correspondence on January 15, 2026 tothe Court in which he characterized the above statement inPlaintiff's letter as follows:“Third, counsel admitted in her own letter that Plaintiff'will promptly file a motion to remand' in federal court—thereby acknowledging that the proper forum to challengeremoval is federal court, not this Court. Yet she [Plaintiff'scounsel] simultaneously asked this Court to proceedanyway” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 117).The Court finds Mr. Hendel's selective truncation of Plaintiff'soriginal statement from “Should the federal court open acivil docket, Plaintiff will promptly file a motion to remand”to “Plaintiff 'will promptly file a motion to remand'” wasdeceptive on the grounds that the full quotation included aclear condition precedent—the federal court opening a civildocket—whereas Mr. Hendel's truncated quotation did not(NYSCEF Doc. No. 93). The original statement by Plaintiffdid not admit that any federal court had already opened a civildocket, yet Mr. Hendel's correspondence to the Court made itseem as if Plaintiff had made such an admission.In opposition to the instant motion, Mr. Hendel submittedan affirmation (NYSCEF Doc. No. 136). In it, he arguesthat he did not have adequate time to oppose the instantmotion, which was returnable April 21, 2026, because of hisobservance of the Shabbat holiday between the evening ofFriday, April 17, 2026 and the evening of Saturday, April18, 2026. In furtherance of this contention, Mr. Hendelargues: “Due process requires that notice be given 'at ameaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Mullane v.Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314(1950).” Mr. Hendel's quotation is nowhere to be found in theMullane court's opinion. Thus, Mr. Hendel attributed a non-existent holding to a case in his submission to the Court.Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition that “Pro selitigants are entitled to greater latitude and their submissionsare held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadingsdrafted by lawyers.' Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.1983).” Mr. Hendel's quotation is nowhere to be found in the
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Traguth court's opinion. Thus, Mr. Hendel again attributed anon-existent holding to a case in his submission to the Court.In fact, the Appellate Division has held the opposite of whatMr. Hendel posits, to wit: “Although courts will routinelyafford pro se litigants...some latitude, a litigant's decision toproceed without counsel does not confer any greater rightsthan those afforded to other litigants, nor may a pro seappearance serve to deprive parties in opposition of their rightto a fair trial” (Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d 816,819 [2d Dept 2024]). Thus, Mr. Hendel's argument that heshould be entitled to greater latitude is not only based on anon-existent holding but also runs counter to an establishedholding by the Appellate Division.*8 Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition that “Courtsroutinely grant pro se litigants additional time to prepareresponsive papers, particularly where the opposing party isrepresented by counsel and the relief sought is significant.See Ennis v. Lessing, 84 AD3d 1508, 1509 (3d Dep't 2011).”There is no such case titled Ennis v Lessing having the citationprovided by Mr. Hendel. The citation of “84 AD3d 1508”belongs to People v Parker, a Third Department AppellateDivision opinion regarding the affirmation of a criminalconviction and discussing issues that are not relevant to thosein the instant motion. The Court could not find any casehaving the caption “Ennis v Lessing.” Thus, Mr. Hendel hascited to a non-existent case in his submission to the Court.Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition: “The UnitedStates Supreme Court has held that any proceedingsconducted by a state court after removal are void, regardlessof whether the removal was proper. Waco v. U.S. Fidelity &Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 143 (1934).” The actual holding atthe pin cite he offered is: “We are of opinion that the petitionerwas entitled to have the Circuit Court of Appeals determinewhether the dismissal of its cross-action against the FidelityCompany was proper. If the District Court erred on this point,which we do not decide, its action should be reversed” (City ofWaco, Tex. v U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 US 140 [1934]). TheWaco court does not ever categorize state court proceedingsas “void.” Thus, Mr. Hendel offered a non-existent pin citeand overstated the Waco court's holding in its submission tothe Court.Mr. Hendel further argues in his opposition, regarding hispurported “Notice of Removal” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92),that: “Even if my removal is procedurally defective, onlythe federal court may make that determination. ThingsRemembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 128 (1995)[emphasis added by Mr. Hendel].” The pin cite offered byMr. Hendel does not contain any holding by the ThingsRemembered court that, as Mr. Hendel suggests, “only thefederal court may make” a determination of whether removalwas procedurally defective. The holding at the offered pin citeis instead that 28 U.S.C. 1447 [d] “precludes appellate reviewof any order 'remanding a case to the State court from which itwas removed.'” (Things Remembered, Inc. v Petrarca, 516 US124, 128, 116 SCt 494, 497, 133 LEd 2d 461 [1995]). Thus,Mr. Hendel offered a non-existent pin cite and overstated theThings Remembered court's holding in its submission to theCourt.The aforementioned inconsistences appear to be exemplaryof the result of using artificial intelligence-based tools todraft legal documents. To the extent Mr. Hendel's submissionsto the Court were drafted or otherwise prepared with theassistance of artificial intelligence-based tools, which Mr.Hendel denies, this Court reminds all parties that submissionsto this Court, even if made by an unrepresented litigant, mustnot be frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.Mr. Hendel's repeated false and misleading submissionsto this Court, by way of his misleading and unsupported“Notice of Removal” filing, multiple submissions to the Courtcontaining inaccurate citations to case law, overstated andmisleading holdings, fictitious cases, non-existent pin cites,and selective quotation of Plaintiff's statements, amount tocommitting fraud before this Court under CDR CreancesS.A.S. v Cohen, 23 NY3d 307 [2014]. As such, this Courtstrikes Mr. Hendel's amended answer dated March 10, 2023(NYSCEF Doc. No. 16) and finds Mr. Hendel to be in default.2. Whether Mr. Hendel engaged in frivolous conduct:22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] provides:*9 “[C]onduct is frivolous if:(1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot besupported by a reasonable argument for an extension,modification or reversal of existing law;(2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong theresolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciouslyinjure another; or
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8(3) it asserts material factual statements that are false.Frivolous conduct shall include the making of a frivolousmotion for costs or sanctions under this section. Indetermining whether the conduct undertaken was frivolous,the court shall consider, among other issues the (1)circumstances under which the conduct took place,including the time available for investigating the legal orfactual basis of the conduct; and (2) whether or not theconduct was continued when its lack of legal or factualbasis was apparent, should have been apparent, or wasbrought to the attention of counsel or the party” (22NYCRR 130-1.1 [c]).Here, the record establishes Mr. Hendel submitted in hisfilings, as described above, inaccurate citations to caselaw, overstated and misleading holdings, fictitious cases,non-existent pin cites, and selective quotation of Plaintiff'sstatements. Such actions, in addition to Mr. Hendel'ssubmission of a purported “Notice of Removal” (NYSCEFDoc. No. 92) without including the bankruptcy petitionreferenced by Mr. Hendel in said filing itself, amount tofrivolous conduct.Mr. Hendel's claim that he did not have enough time toadequately prepare his opposition papers due to the Shabbatholiday between the evening of Friday, April 17, 2026 tothe evening of Saturday, April 18, 202, is unavailing. Evenconsidering the “the time available for investigating thelegal or factual basis of the conduct” under 22 NYCRR130-1.1 [c], this Court finds Mr. Hendel had ample time andopportunity between December 1, 2025 when he initiallyfiled the purported “Notice of Removal” and the filing of theinstant motion on April 16, 2026, to provide the petition ofthe purported petitioning creditor who he claims initiated theinvoluntary bankruptcy proceeding against him.Mr. Hendel's attempt to stay or remove this case by wayof filing a bare “Notice of Removal” without a petition,and to mislead this Court with inaccurate citations to caselaw, overstated and misleading holdings, fictitious cases,non-existent pin cites, and selective quotation of Plaintiff'sstatements are all “material” acts done “without merit” to“prolong the resolution” of the within action under 22NYCRR 130-1.1 [c].Thus, the Court finds Mr. Hendel's conduct as frivolousand, therefore, sanctionable under Rules of the ChiefAdministrator of the Courts, 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 (see,e.g.: Will of Samuel, 82 Misc 3d 616 [Sur Ct 2024] (strikingpleading that contained fictional and/or erroneous citations);see also Deutsche Bank Natl. Tr. Co. v LeTennier, 250 NYS3d260 [3d Dept 2026] (defendant submitted 23 fabricated legalauthorities across five filings and misrepresented the holdingsof several real cases); and Ader v Ader, 87 Misc 3d 1213(A)[NY Sup 2025] (sanctions ordered to compensate adversaryfor reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in addressingnonexistent case citations)).*10 Under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [d], “an award of costs orthe imposition of sanctions may be made either upon motionin compliance with CPLR § 2214 or § 2215 or upon thecourt's own initiative, after a reasonable opportunity to beheard. The form of the hearing shall depend upon the nature ofthe conduct and the circumstances of the case” (22 NYCRR130-1.1 [d]). Having found Mr. Hendel's frivolous conductsanctionable, Mr. Hendel shall reimburse Plaintiff for thelegal fees incurred in preparing and filing Plaintiff's variousletters and exhibits to the Court in response to Mr. Hendel'spurported “Notice of Removal,” specifically, NYSCEF Docs.No. 93, 94, 95 and 96. Plaintiff shall submit to NYSCEFan affirmation of services, attorney biographies, and invoicesregarding the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff in preparingand filing NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 93, 94, 95 and 96 withinten (10) days of the date of this decision, and Mr. Hendelmay submit an opposition within seven (7) days of Plaintiff'ssubmissions or otherwise waives opposition.e. Plaintiff's eighth branch of its motion:Plaintiff's eighth branch of its motion (Mot. Seq. 009)seeks an order “imposing protective conditions barringunsupported assertions of bankruptcy or removal and limitingadjournments.” This branch is denied as it was presentedwithout any support in Plaintiff's memo of law.f. Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion:Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion seeks an order “directingthat all service in this matter be made upon DefendantMendel Hendel via email to mmhendel@gmail.com.” TheCourt notes Mr. Hendel has indicated his email to be“mmhendel@gmail.com” on various documents he has filedto NYSCEF, including NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 136, 158, and166. The record thus establishes that Mr. Hendel utilizesthis email address as a means of communication. Sistercourts have found that “if any methods of communicationcan be reasonably calculated to provide a defendant withreal notice, surely those communication channels utilized andpreferred by the defendant himself must be included among
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9them” (Hollow v Hollow, 193 Misc 2d 691, 696 [Sup Ct2002]). Thus, Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion is granted.g. Plaintiff's purported reply papers:Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-d “absent advance permissionof the court, reply papers shall not be submitted on ordersto show cause.” Here, the Court's Order to Show Cause(NYSCEF Doc. No. 133) for the instant motion did not permitreply submissions. As such, the Court declines to considerPlaintiff's purported reply papers here (NYSCEF Docs. Nos.137, 138, 139, and 140).III. Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 010)The above-numbered papers were read on this motion (Mot.Seq. 010) by defendant Mr. Mendel seeking an order:“1. DISMISSING the Complaint in its entirety,with prejudice, as against Defendant Mendel Hendelindividually, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(7), on the ground that Plaintiff Sharei Torah is not a partyto the August 2, 2011 lease annexed to the Complaint asExhibit A (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2), the lease identifies RabbiAvraham Yehuda Rosenberg as the sole landlord, expresslyrecites that Rosenberg is the legal owner of the premises,and does not identify Sharei Torah as a party, owner,principal, assignee, or beneficiary, and after three years oflitigation Plaintiff has produced no deed, no assignment, noagency agreement, and no other documentary instrumentestablishing any enforceable interest of Sharei Torah in thelease;2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, DISMISSING the Complaintpursuant to CPRL 3211(a)(3) for lack of legal capacityto sue, on the ground that Plaintiff has not produced anydocumented action by the Board of Trustees of ShareiTorah authorizing the commencement or continuation ofthis action as required by Religious Corporations Law §§2-b and 5 and Not-for-Profit Corporation Law §§ 202,701, and 708, and the self-authenticating Affirmation andRatification Resolution of Isaac M. Neuberger (NYSCEFDoc. Nos. 122, 123), each executed by Neuberger alone,and each deriving its purported authority from the other, donot satisfy those statutory requirements;*11 3. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, STAYING allproceedings in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d),on the ground that Defendant Hendel filed a Notice ofRenewal (NYSCEF Doc. No. 92), the statutory effect ofwhich is to divest this Court of jurisdiction until a certifiedorder of remand is entered by the United States DistrictCourt and filed with the clerk of this Court; and directingthat Plaintiff, if it contends the action has been remanded,produce a certified copy of any remand order;4. GRANTING leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR 2221(d)the Court's Decision and Order dated April 2, 2026 andentered April 3, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 126), on theground that the Court overlooked or misapprehended(a) the dispositive threshold defect that Plaintiff is not aparty to the subject lease, squarely raised in Defendant'sReply Affirmation at Point III, paragraphs 23-31 (NYSCEFDoc. No. 125), which Plaintiff's counsel did not address inher responsive papers (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 121, 122, 123),and(b) the legal effect of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), which effectsremoval by operation of statute upon filing regardless ofwhether any federal order is produced;5. DIRECTING Plaintiff, within then (10) days of serviceof the Order deciding this motion, to produce and file onNYSCEF competent documentary proof of each of thefollowing:(a) any instrument by which Sharei Torah acquired rightsunder the August 2, 2011 lease, including but not limitedto any deed, assignment, agency agreement, or successor-in-interest documentation;(b) minutes of a duly noticed meeting of the Board ofTrustees of Sharei Torah authorizing the commencementand continuation of this action, with evidence of noticeto all trustees, presence of a quorum, and adoption of theauthorizing resolution;(c) the certificate of incorporation of Sharei Torah and itscurrent bylaws;(d) a certificate of the corporate secretary of Sharei Torahauthenticating the foregoing documents and identifyingthe current trustees of the corporation; and (e) if Plaintiffcontends this action has been remanded from federal court,a certified copy of the order of remand;6. PROVIDING that failure to produce the documentsspecified in paragraph 5 within the time prescribed shallresult in dismissal of this action with prejudice pursuant toCPLR 3211(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(7);
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.107. STRIKING the Affirmation of Isaac M. Neuberger(NYSCEF Doc. No. 122) and the Ratification Resolution(NYSCEF Doc. No. 123) as procedurally deficient andinsufficient as a matter of law to establish corporateauthorization under the Religious Corporations Law andthe Not-for-Profit Corporations law;8. AWARDING sanctions against Plaintiff and its counselpursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 for(a) prosecuting an action on behalf of an entity that is astranger to the subject matter;(b) failing to address a dispositive threshold defense whensquarely raised, and(c) affirmatively mischaracterizing a Notice of Removal asa “bankruptcy” matter in Plaintiff's Order to Show Causedated April 14, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 128), includingan award of Defendant's costs and expenses incurred inresponding; and9. GRANTING such other and further relief as to this Courtmay seem just and proper” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 146).This Court's order to show cause dated April 22, 2026(NYSCEF Doc. No. 146), upon which Mr. Hendel bringsthe instant motion (Mot. Seq. 010) did not issue a temporaryrestraining order (“TRO”).The above-numbered papers were read on this cross-motion(Mot. Seq. 010) filed by Plaintiff seeking “sanctions and entryof default judgment” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 142).*12 Upon the foregoing the papers, the motion and cross-motion are determined as follows.a. Mr. Hendel's motion for relief:A defendant seeking to vacate an order awarding a defaultmust demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default andthe existence of a meritorious defense (Orwell Bldg. Corp. vBessaha, 5 AD3d 573, 574 [2d Dept 2004]; see CPLR 5015[a] [1]).Here, Mr. Hendel has been precluded by this Court viaits September 30, 2025 Order (“September 2025 Order”)“from offering any affirmative evidence in support of theirclaims and defenses at the time of trial on the issue ofliability” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 89). That order remains ineffect as it has not been vacated or overturned.Mr. Hendel alleges in the instant motion that, inter alia,the named Plaintiff “Sharei Torah” was never a party tothe underlying 2011 Lease and that the Plaintiff's complaintshould be dismissed. Mr. Hendel also alleges here thatthe entity “Sharei Torah” was recently taken over by non-party Zalman Zvulonov (“Mr. Zvulonov”), who purportedlystated to Mr. Hendel that “We have no connection to thislawsuit” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 117). In response, Plaintiff, interalia, references an affirmation submitted by Mr. Zvulonov inwhich he stated that he does “not object to the continuationof this action. Sharei Torah continues to authorize theprosecution of this Action.” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 119).Mr. Hendel argues that although he has been precludedfrom presenting affirmative defenses, his claim that Plaintiff“Sharei Torah” is not named in the 2011 Lease is notan affirmative defense because it references Plaintiff's ownsubmission, to wit, the complaint and the 2011 Lease, at theoutset of the within action (NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 1-2). Sucha claim that Plaintiff “Sharei Torah” was never a party tothe 2011 Lease underpinning the within action, if true, couldserve as an affirmative defense in dismissing the case forlack of Plaintiff's standing, although it would present deeplytroubling questions as to why such a claim was not presentedby Mr. Hendel in the prior Plenary Action or the LL-T Action.Because the Court's September 2025 Order remains in effect,Mr. Hendel is precluded from offering such an argument orevidence herein.On these grounds, Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 010) isdenied in its entirety.b. Plaintiff's cross-motion for relief:Plaintiff's cross-motion (Mot. Seq. 010) seeking sanctions anddefault are denied as redundant based on this Court's holdingsin Mot. Seq. 009 (see decretals below).IV. Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011):The above-numbered papers were read on this motion (Mot.Seq. 011) by defendant Mr. Mendel seeking an order:“1. STRIKING Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law (NYSCEFDoc. No. 141) and the Affirmation of Yifat V. Schnur(NYSCEF Doc. No. 149) in their entirety, on the groundthat they contain material misrepresentations of fact,including the sworn characterization of Plaintiff's own
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11Exhibit A (NYSCEF Doc. No. 2) as a “purported Hebrewversion of the lease, which is not part of the record,” whenthe NYSCEF Confirmation Notice identifies the FilingUser of that document as counsel herself;*13 2. IMPOSING sanctions against Plaintiff's counselpursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [3] for assertingmaterial factual statements that are false;3. DENYING Plaintiff's cross-motion for sanctions anddefault judgment; and4. GRANTING such other and further relief as this Courtdeems just and proper” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 160).Upon the foregoing papers, the motion is determined asfollows.Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011), brought via order toshow cause, consists only of the statements presented in theOrder to Show Cause (NYSCEF Doc. No. 160) and nothingelse as support.As such, Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq. 011) is denied in itsentirety.V. Plaintiff's Motion (Mot. Seq. 012):The above-numbered papers were read on this motion (Mot.Seq. 012) by Plaintiff seeking an order:“1. Issuing a protective order directing that allcommunications between Defendant Hendel and Plaintiff'scounsel be limited to written correspondence confinedstrictly to matters directly relevant to this litigation;2. Directing Defendant Hendel, as part of such protectiveorder, to refrain from issuing extrajudicial demands,threats, or deadlines directed to counsel, including but notlimited to demands for 'retractions' and threats of sanctionsor disciplinary complaints outside proper motion practice;3. Directing Defendant Hendel to cease efforts to obtainruling from other tribunals or forums intended to interferewith or halt this action, and confirming that this action shallproceed exclusively before this Court; and4. Granting such other and further relief as the Court deemsjust and proper.” (NYSCEF Doc. No. 162).Based on the foregoing papers, the motion is determined asfollows.Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Mr. Hendel accuses Plaintiff'scounsel of “lying to the Court” and “misconduct” (NYSCEFDoc. No. 154). Plaintiff alleges Mr. Hendel has threatenedto file “a grievance with the Attorney Grievance Committee”and to prepare “a RICO complaint” (id.). Plaintiff argues,without legal support, that “New York courts possess inherentauthority to regulate the conduct of parties appearing beforethem and to prevent abuse of the judicial process” (id.).CPLR 3103 [a], regarding protective orders, provides asfollows:“Prevention of abuse. The court may at any time on its owninitiative, or on motion of any party or of any person fromwhom or about whom discovery is sought, make a protectiveorder denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the useof any disclosure device. Such order shall be designed toprevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment,disadvantage, or other prejudice to any person or thecourts” (CPLR 3103 [a]).The language of the statute prescribes that protective ordersregulate disclosure (see, e.g.: Balsamello v Structure Tone,Inc., 226 AD3d 580, 582 [1st Dept 2024] (“a court's powerto limit otherwise proper use of a disclosure device shouldbe exercised only for the purpose of avoiding 'unreasonableannoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or otherprejudice'”). Here, none of the Plaintiff's branches of itsmotion seek the issuance of a protective order as to discovery.*14 As such, the Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 012) is deniedin its entirety.VI. DecretalsAccordingly, it isORDERED that NYSCEF Doc. No. 92, having beenerroneously processed by the clerk, is deemed to be of noforce and effect and shall be disregarded by the Court anddeemed void by the County Clerk, and the County Clerk isdirected to mark the record in NYSCEF as to that documentwith an indication to such effect and to see the within order.The County Clerk shall, in accordance with this order, markNYSCEF Doc. No. 92 as “void” and should cite the withinorder thereat. The County Clerk shall mark the case to berestored to this Court's active Commercial Division Part Atrial calendar;
Sharei Torah v. Hendel, Slip Copy (2026)2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50994(U) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12ORDERED that the first and second branches of Plaintiff'smotion (Mot. Seq. 009) are denied; and it is furtherORDERED that the third branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot.Seq. 009) is granted to the extent that this Court holds that nostay or removal of the within action has been established onthe present record; and it is furtherORDERED that the fourth and fifth branches of Plaintiff'smotion (Mot. Seq. 009) are denied as moot; and it is furtherORDERED that the sixth branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot.Seq. 009) is granted to the extent that all named defendantsare deemed to be in default, that Mr. Hendel's amendedanswer dated March 10, 2023 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 16) is tobe stricken, and that upon Plaintiff's filing note of issue thewithin action shall be placed on the Commercial DivisionPart A calendar for an inquest on damages (Teams link to becirculated upon Plaintiff's filing of note of issue); and it isfurtherORDERED that the seventh branch of Plaintiff's motion (Mot.Seq. 009) is granted in so far that Mr. Hendel shall reimbursePlaintiff for the legal fees incurred in preparing and filingPlaintiff's filings on NYSCEF Docs. No. 93, 94, 95 and 96, foran amount to be determined by the Court upon the Plaintiff'ssubmission to NYSCEF of an affirmation of services, attorneybiographies, and invoices regarding the attorney fees incurredby Plaintiff in preparing and filing NYSCEF Docs. Nos. 93,94, 95 and 96 within ten (10) days of the date of this decision(Mr. Hendel may submit an opposition within seven (7) daysof Plaintiff's submissions or otherwise waives opposition);and it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's eighth branch of its motion (Mot.Seq. 009) is denied; and it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's ninth branch of its motion (Mot.Seq. 009) seeking an order “directing that all service in thismatter be made upon Defendant Mendel Hendel via email tommhendel@gmail.com” is granted; and it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq.010) is denied in its entirety; and it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-motion (Mot. Seq. 010) isdenied in its entirety; and it is furtherORDERED that Defendant Mr. Hendel's motion (Mot. Seq.011) is denied in its entirety; and it is furtherORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Mot. Seq. 012) is deniedin its entirety.Any such other relief not described herein is denied. Thisconstitutes the Order of the Court.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1872259 (Table), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op.50994(U)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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