Ascent Mgmt., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Ascent Management, Inc. et al v. Shell Oil Company et al
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Ohio (OH)
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
CASE_DSCR 2024 CV 03112 CASE_TYPE CV DOCKET_CODE FORMSGEN YES WORDDOC YES IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO CIVIL DIVISION ASCENT MANAGEMENT INC et al, Plaintiff(s), -vs- SHELL OIL COMPANY et al, Defendant(s). CASE NO.: 2024 CV 03112 JUDGE STEVEN K. DANKOF ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ATTORNEY DEEK OF DEFENDANTS SHELL AND TNE This matter is before the Court on the November 19, 2024 Motion for Sanctions against Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel of Defendants Shell Oil Company, Shell Leasing Company, Shell Petroleum Inc. (collectively, “Shell”) and True North Energy, LLC (“TNE”) (“the Motion”). Defendants Petroleum Solutions, Inc. and VeriFone, Inc., have also filed for sanctions against Plaintiffs and/or Plaintiffs’ counsel. In its October 14, 2025 Order, this Court found that each Defendant had asserted an arguable basis under Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 for the sanction requests. On March 13, 2026, the Court held a hearing on Defendants’ motions for sanctions (“the Hearing”) during which Plaintiffs’ counsel Ghassan Jamal Deek (“Attorney Deek”) admitted that artificial intelligence was used to produce every filing he had submitted herein, resulting in numerous citation errors and issues, and that he failed to verify his citations.1 Importantly, and before the Hearing, in his various related filings responsive to Defendants’ sanction motions, Attorney Deek never admitted to using AI, merely arguing the errors were inadvertent, even going so far as to blame somehow a different attorney not licensed in Ohio and his own client.2 So it goes… 1 This Court is hard pressed to think of a more fundamental failing by any attorney in the discharge of their duties as an officer of the court. 2 See Plaintiffs’ December 3, 2024 Response in Opposition to Shell and TNE’s Motion to Strike and for Sanctions and Plaintiffs’ November 29, 2024 Response in Opposition to Verifone’s Motion to Strike and for Sanctions, pg. 2, 5. The other attorney, who signed various filings from Attorney Deek, and the client Marwan Deek appear to be familial relatives of Attorney Deek. Montgomery County Common Pleas Court General Division ELECTRONICALLY FILEDCOURT OF COMMON PLEASThursday, April 30, 2026 12:21:57 PMCASE NUMBER: 2024 CV 03112 Docket ID: 619593548Mike FoleyCLERK OF COURTS MONTGOMERY COUNTY OHIO
2 Specifically as to Defendants Shell and TNE, Plaintiffs’ November 5, 2024 Motion for Sanctions against them was replete with unprofessional character attacks3 and contained a fake citation.4 Plaintiffs’ December 3, 2024 Opposition to Shell and TNE’s Motion to Strike, etc. included more inaccurate citations and unprofessional character attacks on defense counsel,5 even after Attorney Deek had been alerted to these issues.6 Notwithstanding his apology offered to Defense counsel during the Hearing, Attorney Deek has never offered a satisfactory explanation for the character attacks against Shell and TNE’s counsel.7 As such, this Court finds that Attorney Deek’s filings in this regard were made with the purpose to harass counsel and cause unnecessary delay. The Ohio Supreme Court has specifically noted that courts have “inherent power to regulate the practice before it and protect the integrity of its proceedings.”8 A court has inherent authority to impose sanctions against a party or an attorney “where [their] conduct thwarts the administration of justice, disobeys court orders, abuses the judicial process, or when it is otherwise necessary for the administration of justice and protection of judicial powers and processes.”9 In addition to a court’s inherent authority, Ohio law provides courts with two additional and separate mechanisms for an award of sanctions against an attorney for frivolous and/or unprofessional conduct: Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51.10 Both allow for an award of attorney fees and expenses.11 Civ.R. 11 provides the following in relevant part: The signature of an attorney or pro se party constitutes a certificate by the attorney or party that the attorney or party has read the document; that to the best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a document 3 Noted on pages 3-4 of the Court’s October 14, 2025 Order Concerning Motions to Strike and for Sanctions and incorporated herein. 4 Plaintiffs’ November 5, 2024 Motion against the Shell Defendants and TNE, pg. 5 (citation to “Perrico v. Verizon, 2018-Ohio-3994.” A search for this citation produces no such result.) 5 Such as misleading the Court and using an abusive litigation strategy. 6 Plaintiffs’ December 3, 2024 Response in Opposition to Shell and TNE’s Motion- citation to “Kyser v. Summit County Children Services, 2022-Ohio 1207,” a search for this reporter results in State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2022-Ohio-1207, (11th Dist.); citation to “In re Fuel Adjustment Clauses for Columbus S. Power Co. & Ohio Power Co., 41 Ohio St.2d 41,” a search for this reporter results in Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, Bd. of Bldg. Stds. & Bldg. Appeals, 41 Ohio St.2d 41 (1975); and citation to “Baker v. Coast to Coast Manpower, LLC, 2020-Ohio-4533,” a search of this reporter results in State v. Stoutamire, 2020-Ohio-4533, (11th Dist.). 7 As well as apologizing to other Defense counsel. Then again, what satisfactory explanation could there be? 8 Royal Indemn. Co. v. J. C. Penney Co., 27 Ohio St.3d 31, 33 (1986). 9 DiCuccio v. Lindsmith, 2018-Ohio-2320, 30 (10th Dist.), citing Telecom, Ltd. v. Wisehart & Wisehart, Inc., 2012-Ohio-4376, (10th Dist.) and Ceol v. Zion Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 289 (9th Dist.1992). 10 Sigmon v. Southwest Gen. Health Ctr., 2007-Ohio-2117, 14 (8th Dist.). 11 See Stevenson v. Bernard, 2007-Ohio-3192 (11th Dist.) and R.C. 2323.51(B)(3).
3 is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may proceed as though the document had not been served. For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party or upon the court's own motion, may be subjected to appropriate action, including an award to the opposing party of expenses and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing any motion under this rule…. Thus, the rule provides that where an attorney’s violation of Rule 11 is willful, they may be subjected to appropriate action which may include expenses and reasonable attorney’s fees. The purpose of Civ.R. 11 is to ensure that a motion or other filing is filed in good faith and with adequate supporting grounds12 and to curb abuses of the judicial system resulting from baseless filings.13 “When a party files a motion for sanctions under Civ.R. 11, the trial court must determine whether the attorney who signed the document: ‘(1) has read the pleading, (2) harbors good grounds to support it to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief, and (3) did not file it for the purposes of delay.’”14 If the Court finds that one of these requirements is not satisfied, the Court will then decide of the violation was willful or merely negligent.15 “‘Civ.R. 11 employs a subjective bad-faith standard to invoke sanctions by requiring that any violation must be willful.’”16 The Ohio Supreme Court has “described bad faith as ‘a general and somewhat indefinite term. It has no constricted meaning. It cannot be defined with exactness. It is not simply bad judgment. It is not merely negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity. It implies conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. * * * It means with actual intent to mislead or deceive another.’”17 The Sixth District has said that the term “willful” means “‘voluntarily, knowingly, deliberate * * * intentional, purposeful, not accidental or involuntary.’”18 At the very least, Civ.R. 11 requires the attorney who signs a filing to read the cases cited and 12 State ex rel. Bristow v. Baxter, 2018-Ohio-1973, 25 (6th Dist.). 13 Sickle v. Yeager, 2016-Ohio-4740, 6 (11th Dist.), citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). 14 Walters v. Carter, 2020-Ohio-807, 16 (8th Dist.), quoting Ceol v. Zion Indus., Inc., 81 Ohio App.3d 286, 290 (9th Dist.1992). 15 Id., citing Ceol at 290. 16 State ex rel. Bardwell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2010-Ohio-5073, 8, quoting State ex rel. Dreamer v. Mason, 115 Ohio St.3d 190, 2007-Ohio-4789, 19, emphasis added. 17 Id., quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 151 (1962), overruled on other grounds in Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St.3d 552 (1994), internal quotations omitted. 18 Gallagher v. AMVETS Post 17, 2009-Ohio-6348, 33 (6th Dist.), quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 1103 (6 Ed.1991).
4 ensure that they support the proposition they are representing.19 It goes without saying that submitting fake or materially misleading citations means that the attorney failed to read and verify the cases. R.C. 2323.51(A)(2) defines “frivolous conduct” as: Conduct of … other party to a civil action… that satisfies any of the following: (i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of litigation. (ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law. (iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. (iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.20 The statute uses an objective standard for determining if sanctions may be imposed for frivolous conduct.21 “[A] finding of frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 is determined without reference to what the individual knew or believed.”22 “Frivolous conduct is considered based on the reasonable attorney standard, an objective consideration of what a reasonable lawyer would have done.”23 “[S]anctions are proper for egregious conduct and not for mere error.”24 In recent years, various courts have issued sanctions against attorneys for the use of inaccurate citations, including citations to entirely fake cases.25 As noted by a federal court, “A fake opinion is not ‘existing law’ and citation to a fake opinion does not provide a non-frivolous ground for extending, modifying, 19 See Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779 F. Supp. 3d 341, 347 (E.D.N.Y.2025) and Versant Funding Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Ents., Ltd. Liab. Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98418, * 13 (S.D.Fla. May 20, 2025). 20 Emphasis the Court’s. 21 State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 2011-Ohio-5350, 21, citing Stafford v. Columbus Bonding Ctr., 177 Ohio App. 3d 799, 2008-Ohio-3948, 8, emphasis added. 22 Smith v. Anderson, 2023-Ohio-108, 16 (6th Dist.), citing City of Wauseon v. Plassman, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5168, (6th Dist. Nov. 22, 1996), emphasis added. 23 State ex rel. Right to Life Action Coa. of Ohio v. Capital Care of Toledo, LLC, 2022-Ohio-3266, 43 (6th Dist.). 24 Id. at 44. 25 See Smith v. Gamble, 2025-Ohio-2381 (12th Dist.); Gonzalez v. Texas Taxpayers & Rsch. Ass’n, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16801 (W.D.Tex. Jan. 29, 2025); Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443 (S.D.N.Y.2023); Benjamin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 779 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y.2025); and Versant Funding Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Ents., Ltd. Liab. Co., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98418 (S.D.Fla. May 20, 2025).
5 or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law. An attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary by relying on fake opinions is an abuse of the adversary system.”26 The Court finds that Defendants Shell and TNE are entitled to an award for sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel Ghassan Jamal Deek pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority, Civ.R. 11, and, R.C. 2323.51. The Court determines that Attorney Deek’s conduct abused the judicial process, was willful under Civ.R. 11, and was frivolous under R.C. 2323.51(A)(2).27 Defendants Shell and TNE request a total of $5,273.00 in expenses and attorney’s fees (“Defendants’ Request”) for Attorney Deek’s conduct, which request is supported by an affidavit and an itemized bill. The Court finds that the hourly rates and hours expended were reasonable given Attorney Deek’s repeated misconduct and the extent of such conduct. The Court notes that it also considered the Defendants’ Request through the lens of the time it took for the Court’s staff attorney to conduct the research necessary to deal with the issues herein. And the Court flatly rejects Plaintiffs’ baseless argument that any hours over twenty are either redundant or unnecessary.28 Finally, the Court rejects Plaintiffs’ request to postpone payment of these sanctions until final resolution of the claims herein.29 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants Shell and TNE’s Motion for Sanctions and AWARDS Defendants Shell and TNE $5,273.00 in expenses and attorneys’ fees as sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel Ghassan Jamal Deek. Attorney Deek is ORDERED to make full payment of this sum NLT 5:00 p.m., Friday, May 29, 2026. SO ORDERED: JUDGE STEVEN K. DANKOF This document is electronically filed by using the Clerk of Courts e-Filing system. The system will post a record of the filing to the e-Filing account "Notifications" tab of the following case participants: 26 Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, 461 (S.D.N.Y.2023), citing Salovaara v. Eckert, 222 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.2000), emphasis added. 27 The Court declines to sanction Plaintiffs, Attorney Deek’s clients, as no evidence suggests that the clients were actually involved in the sanctionable conduct herein. 28 There being no legitimate support for this notion. 29 Which is essentially a request for an indefinite delay….
6 GHASSAN JAMAL DEEK (937) 270-1294 Attorney for Plaintiff, Ascent Management Inc Attorney for Plaintiff, Marwan Deek DEREK L MUNCY (937) 223-3277 Attorney for Plaintiff, Ascent Management Inc Attorney for Plaintiff, Marwan Deek JULIE A DOUGLAS (419) 861-4595 Attorney for Defendant, Shell Oil Company Attorney for Defendant, Shell Leasing Company Attorney for Defendant, Shell Petroleum Inc. Attorney for Defendant, True North Energy Inc RYAN RUBIN (216) 344-9422 Attorney for Defendant, Petroleum Solutions Inc NATHAN P WOODWARD (216) 912-3803 Attorney for Defendant, Petroleum Solutions Inc SCOTT J PULLAR (216) 298-2200 Attorney for Defendant, Petroleum Solutions Inc ALAN H. ABES (513) 977-8200 Attorney for Defendant, Verifone ROSS WILSON Attorney for Defendant, Verifone ELIZABETH HALL, Bailiff (937) 225-4151 ELIZABETH.HALL@montcourt.oh.gov
Electronically signed by SDankof on 04/30/2026 12:22:03 PM Page 7 of 7General DivisonMontgomery County Common Pleas Court41 N. Perry Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422Case Number:Case Title:2024 CV 03112ASCENT MANAGEMENT INC vs SHELL OIL COMPANY Type:Order:So Ordered,
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