Hunter-Bey v. City of Cleveland Law Dep't, No. 115696 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Isaiah Hunter-Bey v. City of Cleveland Law Department
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Ohio (OH)
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Mary J. Boyle (J.) (unanimous Court)
ISAIAH HUNTER-BEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF..., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1869 WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1434161CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FORREPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF LEGALAUTHORITY.Court of Appeals of Ohio, EighthDistrict, Cuyahoga County.ISAIAH HUNTER-BEY, Petitioner-Appellant,v.CITY OF CLEVELAND LAWDEPARTMENT, Respondent-Appellee.No. 115696|RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 21, 2026JUDGMENT: AFFIRMEDCivil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of CommonPleas Case No. CV-25-122420Attorneys and Law FirmsAppearances: Isaiah Hunter-Bey, pro se.Mark D. Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, James R.Russell, Jr., Chief Assistant Director of Law, and Michael A.Arnold, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINIONMARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE*1 {¶ 1} Petitioner-appellant Isaiah Hunter-Bey (“Hunter-Bey”), pro se, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga CountyCourt of Common Pleas granting respondent-appellee City ofCleveland Law Department's (“the City”) motion to dismisspursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). After careful review of therecord, we affirm.I. Facts and Procedural History{¶ 2} On August 8, 2025, Hunter-Bey filed a pro se petitionfor writ of mandamus in the court of common pleas allegingthat the City failed to comply with a public-records requestsubmitted by Hunter-Bey in violation of R.C. 149.43(B)(1), Ohio's Public Records Act. Hunter-Bey asserted that hesubmitted the request on June 18, 2025, seeking “emergencycommunication records related to a series of 911 calls madebetween June 7 and June 15, 2025.” (Petition, p. 1.) Hespecifically requested:All computer-aided dispatch (CAD) logs includingtimestamps, priority, caller information, dispatcher ID, unitassignments, status changes, and final disposition.All audio recordings of 911 calls, dispatchercommunications, radio traffic, phone reroutes, and any callmetadata.Narrative and freeform logs, transfer notes, incidentnumbers, and paper/electronic call logs stored byCECOMS.(Petition, p. 1.) Hunter-Bey further asserted that he hand-delivered the public-records request; however, he averredthat he could not locate “the stamped paper copy that wasreturned after submission.” (Petition, p.1.) Additionally, heasserted that he made “a recorded call and left a voicemailreinforcing the original request” and that “50 days had elapsedwithout response, acknowledgment, or production of therequested records, exceeding the ‘reasonable period of time’required under R.C. 149.43(B)(1).” (Petition, p. 2.) Hunter-Bey requested that the trial court order the City to complywithout delay and award statutory damages, court costs,reasonable attorney fees, and any further relief the courtdeemed proper. (Petition, p. 2.){¶ 3} Thereafter, Hunter-Bey filed an affidavit of indigency towaive filing fees and court costs (Aug. 8, 2025), a motion forstatutory damages and costs (Aug. 14, 2025), a supplementto correct dates (Aug. 18, 2025), and a motion for reasonableaccommodations under the ADA (Aug. 19, 2025). Within themotion for statutory damages, Hunter-Bey acknowledged thatthe City was served with Hunter-Bey's petition on August 11,2025, and produced the requested records on August 13, 2025.{¶ 4} On September 5, 2025, the City filed a filed a motionto dismiss Hunter-Bey's petition pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The City argued that the petition was (1) moot becausethe records were provided; (2) Hunter-Bey failed to complywith R.C. 149.43(C) when he filed his petition without firstnotifying the City and allowing an opportunity to cure thenoncompliance; and (3) Hunter-Bey failed to comply with therequirements necessary to seek an extraordinary writ. Hunter-Bey filed a brief in opposition on September 9, 2025. TheCity filed a reply brief September 16, 2025. Hunter-Bey fileda surreply brief.
ISAIAH HUNTER-BEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF..., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1869 WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 {¶ 5} On September 24, 2025, the trial court dismissed thepetition finding that Hunter-Bey failed to follow the statutoryrequirements set forth in R.C. 149.43(C)(1), which requiredthat Hunter-Bey serve a copy of the complaint upon the Cityand allow three days for the City to cure the noncompliancebefore filing a mandamus action with a court. (Opinion andOrder, Sept. 24, 2025.){¶ 6} It is from this order Hunter-Bey now appeals. He raisesthe following assignments of error for review:Assignment of Error I: [Hunter-Bey] contends: The trialcourt erred by dismissing the action without first rulingon [Hunter-Bey]’s pending motion for [Americans withDisabilities Act] ADA and Section 504 accommodations.According to [Hunter-Bey], this failure denied meaningfulaccess to the court and violated Title II of the ADA, Section504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Due Process Clause, and28 C.F.R. § 35.160.Assignment of Error II: [Hunter-Bey] asserts: The trialcourt erred as a matter of law by entering final judgmentwhile multiple motions allegedly remained pending, incontravention of established Ohio precedent.Assignment of Error III: [Hunter-Bey] contends:The trial court abused its discretion by dismissingthe mandamus petition despite what [Hunter-Bey]characterizes as undisputed statutory noncompliance andan incomplete procedural record.II. Law and Analysis{¶ 7} In Hunter-Bey's first and second assignments of error,he contends that the trial court erred by not ruling on allhis pending motions, particularly his motion for reasonableaccommodations and motion to correct clerical errors, beforegranting the City's motion to dismiss. We find his argumentsunpersuasive.{¶ 8} Initially, we note that our review of thesetwo assignments of error is hindered by Hunter-Bey'sfailure to follow the requirements of the Ohio AppellateRules. Specifically, his brief exhibits all the hallmarks ofbeing generated by artificial intelligence (“AI”) includingnonexistent cases, miscited cases, and cases that exist butstand for different legal propositions than what is represented.See Smith v. Gamble, 2025-Ohio-2381, 26 (12th Dist.);Gonzalez v. Tex. Taxpayers & Research Assoc., 2025 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 16801 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2025). App.R.16(7) requires that an appellant set forth “[a]n argumentcontaining the contentions of the appellant with respect toeach assignment of error presented for review and the reasonsin support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities,statutes, and parts of the record on which the appellant relies.”Hunter-Bey's status as a pro se litigant does not relieve himof his obligations to comply with the appellate rules becauseit is well established that “ ‘pro se litigants are held to thesame standard as all other litigants [and] they must accept theconsequences of their own mistakes.’ ” Manning v. CuyahogaMetro. Hous. Auth., 2025-Ohio-4751, 17 (8th Dist.), quotingBikkani v. Lee, 2008-Ohio-3130, 29 (8th Dist.), citing Kilroyv. B.H. Lakeshore Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363 (8th Dist.1996). Furthermore, App.R. 12(A)(2) permits this court todisregard any assignment of error on these grounds alone.Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, we will addressHunter-Bey's first and second assignments of error to theextent that we are able.{¶ 9} Hunter-Bey contends that the trial court was requiredto rule on his motion for reasonable accommodations andmotion for clerical correction, seemingly arguing that he wasprejudiced by the trial court's failure. Hunter-Bey cites Stateex rel. Henry v. Britt, 67 Ohio St.2d 71 (1981), in support ofhis argument that the trial court must rule on all his pendingmotions prior to deciding the City's motion to dismiss. Hisreliance on this case, however, is misguided. Although thecase exists, it does not stand for the stated proposition.Similarly, Hunter-Bey cites to “McQueen” without a cite orexplanation as to how “McQueen” might apply, and we areunable to decipher which case he is relying upon.*3 {¶ 10} Nevertheless, Hunter-Bay's assertions aremistaken, because “there is no rule of law requiring that atrial court expressly rule on every pretrial motion before it.”N. Star Med. Research, L.L.C. v. Kozlovich, 2025-Ohio-5410, 26 (8th Dist.). “In general, if a trial court fails to mentionor rule on a pending motion, the appellate court presumesthat the motion was implicitly overruled.” Siemientkowskiv. State Farm Ins. Co., 2005-Ohio-4295, 39 (8th Dist.),citing Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Owca, 1999 Ohio App.LEXIS 5405, *4 (9th Dist. Nov. 17, 1999). Further, the trialcourt's failure to rule on a pending motion does not necessarilyconstitute an abuse of discretion. Id., citing Fed. Home LoanMtge. Corp. at *4; Carrington Mtge. Servs. v. Princess ADAIsrael, 2026-Ohio-839, 24 (8th Dist.).
ISAIAH HUNTER-BEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF..., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1869 WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3{¶ 11} In Hunter-Bey's motion for reasonableaccommodations, he set forth ten specific requests, nineof which pertained to accommodations demanded for courthearings. One accommodation requested simplified and plainlanguage communications by the court and the City. We notethat the Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas has an ADAcoordinator to help facilitate individuals with physical ormental disabilities; however, it is unclear from the recordwhether Hunter-Bey utilized the ADA coordinator.1{¶ 12} Again, Hunter-Bey cites no caselaw or statutes thatrequire the trial court to rule on a motion for accommodations.Moreover, a review of the record reveals that no hearings wereheld and Hunter-Bey promptly and articulately respondedto the City's motion to dismiss with accurate caselaw andsound arguments. Furthermore, the trial court used plainlanguage when ruling against Hunter-Bey on the motion todismiss. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuseits discretion by failing to specifically rule on Hunter-Bey'smotion for reasonable accommodations.{¶ 13} Hunter-Bey also contends that the trial court wasrequired to rule on his motion to correct a clerical error. Again,there is no requirement that the trial court rule on all pretrialmotions. Furthermore, it was unnecessary for the trial court torule on this motion because it was clear from the record thatHunter-Bey mistakenly referred to 2024 when he meant 2025.The City and the trial court referenced the correct year, andHunter-Bey was not prejudiced by his typographical error.{¶ 14} After careful review, we cannot say that the trial courterred by failing to rule on Hunter-Bey's motions filed prior togranting the City's motion to dismiss. Furthermore, we findno caselaw to suggest that the trial court is required to rule onthese motions.{¶ 15} Accordingly, Hunter-Bey's first and secondassignments of error are overruled.{¶ 16} In his third assignment of error, Hunter-Bey arguesthat the trial court erred in dismissing his petition whenhis petition set forth clear violations of R.C. 149.43(B)(1).The City maintains that Hunter-Bey's petition was properlydismissed because he failed to comply with the dictatesof R.C. 149.43(C)(1), which now requires an allegedlyaggrieved party to complete additional steps prior to filinga mandamus action.2 Specifically, the statute requires that apetitioner serve the public office with a complaint and to allowthree days to pass before filing an action with the court.*4 {¶ 17} We review a trial court's decision to dismiss acomplaint or petition pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) de novo.Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford, 2004-Ohio-4362, 5. “Under ade novo analysis, we must accept all factual allegations of thecomplaint [or petition] as true and all reasonable inferencesmust be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.” NorthPointProperties v. Petticord, 2008-Ohio-5996, 11 (8th Dist.).{¶ 18} A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure tostate a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint or petition.Smith v. Gall, 2023-Ohio-2692, 29 (8th Dist.), citing Antoonv. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2015-Ohio-421, 7 (8th Dist.).In resolving a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the court's reviewis limited to the allegations contained in the complaint orpetition, along with any documents properly attached to orincorporated within the complaint. Id. citing Glazer v. ChaseHome Fin. L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-5589, 38 (8th Dist.).{¶ 19} In order for a court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R.12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint orpetition that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling theplaintiff to relief after all factual allegations of the complaintor petition are presumed true and all reasonable inferencesare made in the nonmoving party's favor. Id. at 30, citingWindsor Realty & Mgt., Inc. v. N.E. Ohio Regional SewerDist., 2016-Ohio-4865, 23 (8th Dist.), citing O'Brien v.Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242(1975), syllabus. If there is a set of facts consistent with theplaintiff's complaint or petition that would allow the plaintiffto recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion todismiss. Id., citing York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 OhioSt.3d 143, 145 (1991). A court may not dismiss a complaintunder Civ.R. 12(B)(6) merely because it doubts the plaintiffwill prevail. Id., citing Bono v. McCutcheon, 2005-Ohio-299, 8 (2d Dist.).{¶ 20} Here, the trial court granted the City's motion todismiss based on Hunter-Bey's failure to comply with R.C.149.43(C)(1), which provides:If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of apublic office or the person responsible for public records topromptly prepare a public record and to make it availableto the person for inspection in accordance with division (B)of this section ... the person allegedly aggrieved may servepursuant to Rule 4 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure acomplaint, on a form prescribed by the clerk of the courtof claims, to the public office or person responsible forpublic records allegedly responsible for the alleged failure.
ISAIAH HUNTER-BEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CITY OF..., Slip Copy (2026)2026-Ohio-1869 WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Upon receipt of the complaint of the person allegedlyaggrieved, the public office or person responsible forpublic records has three business days to cure or otherwiseaddress the failure alleged in the complaint. The personallegedly aggrieved shall not file a complaint with a courtor commence a mandamus action under this section withinthe three-day period. If the person fails to file an affirmationpursuant to this division, the suit shall be dismissed.{¶ 21} In a similar case, State ex rel. Ames v. Geauga LocalSchool Dist. Bd. Of Edn., 2025-Ohio-5179 (11th Dist.), theEleventh District Court of Appeals dismissed an originalaction for a writ of mandamus that requested a judgmentrequiring the school district to comply with petitioner'spublic-records request. The Ames Court reasoned that theexhibits attached to the petition established that the schooldistrict was served with a complaint in accordance with R.C.149.43(C)(1); however, the petitioner filed the mandamusaction before the expiration of the three-day waiting period.Consequently, the court concluded that the statute requireddismissal of the petition.*5 {¶ 22} According to R.C. 149.43(C)(1), Hunter-Bey mustfirst file a complaint “on the form prescribed by the clerk ofthe court of claims” with the City and then allow the Citythree days to cure the failure before filing a mandamus action.In addition, the statute requires that Hunter-Bey affirm in hispetition that he filed a complaint with the public office, in thiscase the City, at least three days before filing a mandamusaction with the court. Although Hunter-Bey averred in hispetition that he had made several phone calls in an effort toobtain his public-records request, he did not file a complaintwith the City, and he did not wait three days to file suit as isrequired by R.C. 149.43(C)(1). Therefore, the trial court wasrequired to dismiss the petition according to the statute.{¶ 23} In conclusion, after accepting all factual allegations inthe petition as true and drawing all reasonable inferences infavor of Hunter-Bey, we find that it is apparent from the fourcorners of the petition that he did not follow the procedureset forth in R.C. 149.43(C)(1). Consequently, it was not errorwhen the trial court dismissed Hunter-Bey's petition.{¶ 24} Accordingly, Hunter-Bey's third assignment of error isoverruled.{¶ 25} Judgment affirmed.It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs hereintaxed.The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court tocarry this judgment into execution.A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandatepursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and SEAN C.GALLAGHER, J., CONCURAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1434161, 2026-Ohio-1869Footnotes1Common Pleas Court General Division Cuyahoga County, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accommodations,https://cp.cuyahogacounty.gov/court-information/americans-with-disability-act/ (accessed Apr. 29, 2026) [https://perma.cc/9NX7-8J6V].2The new legislation outlined in 2024 Ohio H.B. No. 265 became effective April 9, 2025.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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