In re T.F., No. 25CA704 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Ohio (OH)
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3458316CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FORREPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF LEGALAUTHORITY.Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Vinton County.In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children.Case No. 25CA704|RELEASED 11/25/2025Attorneys and Law FirmsAPPEARANCES: Corey Mason, Logan, Ohio, pro seappellant.William L. Archer, Jr., Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney,and Amanda K. Miller, Assistant Vinton County ProsecutingAttorney, McArthur, Ohio, for appellee South Central OhioJob and Family Services.Jorden M. Meadows, Logan, Ohio, for appellee mother.John K. Clark, Jr., Jackson, Ohio, for appellee children.DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRYMichael D. Hess, Judge*1 {¶1} Corey Mason appeals from a April 10, 2025judgment of the Vinton County Court of Common Pleas,Juvenile Division, dismissing various motions he filed in acase involving his ex-girlfriend's three minor children. Masonpresents five assignments of error asserting that the trial courterred by: (1) denying his motion for contempt; (2) denying hismotion for sanctions; (3) denying his motion for a hearing on ano-contact order and dismissing his filings on the ground thathe lacked standing; (4) dismissing his filings after October 11,2024 for lack of standing; and (5) failing to issue findings offact and conclusions of law in violation of Civ.R. 52. For thereasons which follow, we overrule the assignments of errorand affirm the trial court's judgment.I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORYA. Initial Proceedings{¶2} In March 2018, South Central Ohio Job and FamilyServices (“SCOJFS”) filed complaints in three cases allegingT.F., P.F., and S.S., were neglected and dependent children.The complaints alleged the children had the same mother,that J.F. was the father of T.F. and P.F., and that S.S.’s fatherwas unknown. The court adjudicated the children dependentand issued a dispositional order of temporary custody of S.S.and P.F. to SCOJFS and of T.F. to an aunt, with protectivesupervision by SCOJFS. Later, the court granted Masontemporary custody of the children with protective supervisionby SCOJFS.{¶3} In May 2021, the court ordered Mason and motherto “exercise shared parenting” as set forth in its entry andterminated protective supervision. Later, mother asked thecourt to find Mason in contempt for withholding the childrenfrom her, and Mason and mother moved the court to terminateshared parenting. In August 2023, the court ordered Masonand mother to enter into a shared parenting plan as set forth inits entry, found Mason in contempt, and imposed a suspendedsentence. In December 2023, the court ordered protectiveservices. In April 2024, mother moved the court to terminateshared parenting. On July 26, 2024, the court issued an entrystating the matter came on for a hearing the day before.Among other things, the court awarded legal custody of thechildren to mother with continued protective supervision bySCOJFS. The entry makes no mention of Mason havingcompanionship time, but it states that “[a] more detailedEntry/Order will be forthcoming in these cases.”{¶4} On August 8, 2024, the trial court verbally grantedemergency temporary custody to SCOJFS. The same day,Mason moved the court to order placement of the childrenwith him pending a shelter care hearing and to grant himtemporary custody after the hearing. On August 9, 2024,SCOJFS filed a motion for an ex parte temporary custodyorder. The motion alleged sheriff's deputies found P.F. zip-tied to a bed, the children said mother did this, and thedeputies reported that the home conditions were disgusting.The motion indicated there were questions about Mason'sinvolvement and the truthfulness of the children's statements.The day SCOJFS filed the motion, the court issued an entryconfirming its verbal order.*2 {¶5} On August 16, 2024, SCOJFS filed a complaintalleging that the children were dependent. The same day, the
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2court issued a more detailed judgment entry regarding theJuly 25, 2024 hearing. Among other things, the entry statesthat Mason “shall have companionship the first, second, andfourth weekends of every month, Friday after school (or 6p.m. if there is no school) to Sunday at 6 p.m. during theschool year and week-on/week off in the summer.”{¶6} On August 27, 2024, Mason filed a “motion forsupervised parenting time” during SCOJFS's investigation.Attached to the motion was a purported letter from apsychiatric services center stating that Mason had no issueswhich would affect his ability to care for the children. OnAugust 28, 2024, SCOJFS moved the court to remove Masonas a party. The next day, Mason's counsel requested, andthe court granted, counsel leave to withdraw. On September9, 2024, Mason, acting pro se, filed a motion for custody.On September 24, 2024, he filed a “motion to remove fromshelter care.”{¶7} On September 26, 2024, SCOJFS filed a motion foran emergency ex parte no-contact order prohibiting Masonfrom contacting the children. SCOJFS alleged that he hadengaged in a pattern of deceit to find and contact the children,and SCOJFS believed he intended to kidnap them. That sameday, the court issued an entry prohibiting Mason from havingor attempting contact with the children until further orderof the court. Also that day, Mason's former counsel filed anaffidavit stating that claims had arisen that the letter from thepsychiatric services center was forged and that counsel got itfrom Mason and could not verify its authenticity.B. Mason's Motion to Dismiss and Subsequent Motions{¶8} The court set a hearing on the ex parte no-contact orderfor October 25, 2024. But on October 11, 2024, Mason fileda “motion to dismiss” asking the court to dismiss him asa party. The motion stated that Mason believed this was inthe best interest of all parties, particularly the children. Thesame day, the court issued an entry granting Mason's motionand dismissing him as a party. The entry stated that becauseMason “is no longer a party at his request, the stay away orderhearing set for October 25, 2024 is hereby vacated. However,the stay away order remains in full force and effect ... untilfurther order of this Court.” In November 2024, the courtadjudicated the children dependent and issued a dispositionalorder of temporary custody to SCOJFS.{¶9} On December 11, 2024, Mason filed a “motion torescind no contact order,” but he withdrew it two days later.On December 26 2024, he filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion forrelief from “the judgment entered on July 25, 2024,” alongwith a request for “expedited hearing and instanter ruling”on the motion. On February 5, 2025, he filed a request toappear at a semi-annual review hearing, which the courtdenied. On February 19, 2025, he filed an “ex parte motionfor immediate visitation reinstatement and no-contact orderinvalidity.” On March 13, 2025, Mason filed a motion forsanctions for litigation misconduct. Mason claimed that hewas improperly denied court-ordered companionship rights,that criminal proceedings (a falsification charge regarding theletter from the psychiatric services center) were improperlyused to influence the juvenile proceeding, and that he wasdenied due process through procedural manipulation. OnMarch 17, 2025, Mason filed an “emergency ex parte motionfor temporary orders based on newly discovered evidence ofcourt order violation.” On March 20, 2025, he filed a motionasking the court to find mother in contempt for keepingthe children August 5-8, 2024, during his court-orderedcompanionship time set forth in a “July 25, 2024 JudgmentEntry.” He also filed a “motion for expedited hearing oncontempt.” On March 24, 2025, the court issued an entrydenying Mason's Civ.R. 60(B) motion. The court questionedwhether he had standing to file the motion because he wasno longer a party at his request, but the court addressed thesubstance of his motion. On April 4, 2025, Mason filed a“motion for hearing on no-contact order” and a “motion forexpedited ruling on motions for sanctions and contempt.”C. April 10, 2025 Entry*3 {¶10} On April 10, 2025, the court issued an entryresolving Mason's pending motions. Regarding the motion forhearing on no-contact order, the court found that Mason “isnot a party in this case,” “is not a parent,” and “has no standingto file this Motion or any Motion in this case.” The court alsofound that it previously set a hearing on the no-contact order,but before the hearing, the court granted Mason's motion tobe dismissed as a party, and for that reason, there was nohearing. Thus, the court dismissed the motion for hearing onno-contact order.{¶11} With respect to Mason's contempt motion, the courtfound mother could not be in contempt for refusing to permitMason's visitation with the children from August 5-8, 2024,because the court did not grant Mason visitation until August
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.316, 2024. The court also stated that even if mother had beenin contempt, “that issue would now be moot” because sheno longer had custody of the children. SCOJFS did, and“SCOJFS determines the said children's visitation.” The courtalso again found Mason was no longer a party in the case.Thus, the court dismissed his motion for contempt.{¶12} With respect to the motion for sanctions, the courtobserved that Mason did not explain who he wantedsanctioned. Regarding the allegation of improper denialof court-ordered companionship rights, the court foundit had already addressed the issue, it was “based on amisunderstanding by Corey Mason of the Court's orders,” andit was “without merit.” Regarding the allegation of improperuse of criminal proceedings, the court found that “whether ornot a falsification charge was filed in another court againstCorey Mason is not a matter for this Court to take up.”Regarding the allegation of denial of due process throughprocedural manipulation, the court stated that Mason's efforts“appear to be designed to appeal this Court's decision and thedecision of SCOJFS to protect the said children and to do whatis in the best interest of the children.” The court again foundMason was not a parent or party. Thus, the court dismissed thesanctions motion. The court also dismissed the other motionsMason filed after his dismissal as a party on October 11, 2024,except the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, for lack of standing, becausehe was not a parent or party.II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR{¶13} Mason presents five assignments of error:Assignment of Error No. 1: The trial court erred andabused its discretion by denying Appellant's Motion forContempt based on an erroneous finding regarding the dateand effect of the visitation order, and by declaring the issuemoot.Assignment of Error No. 2: The trial court erred bysummarily denying Appellant's Motion for Sanctionswithout conducting a hearing on specific allegations oflitigation misconduct and abuse of prosecutorial power.Assignment of Error No. 3: The trial court erred andviolated due process by denying Appellant's Motion for aHearing on the No-Contact Order, and by dismissing hisfilings on the ground that he lacked standing despite beingthe subject of ongoing court orders.Assignment of Error No. 4: The trial court erred andviolated due process by dismissing all filings after October11, 2024 for lack of standing, on the ground that Appellantwas “not a party and not a parent,” even though he remainedthe subject of ongoing court orders and retained unresolvedcompanionship rights.Assignment of Error No. 5: The trial court abusedits discretion and violated Civ.R. 52 by failing to issuefindings of fact and conclusions of law following timelyand repeated requests by Appellant.1III. LAW AND ANALYSISA. Motions to Dismiss*4 {¶14} In their appellate briefs, mother and the childrenmove us to dismiss Mason's appellate brief for failure ofservice. They claim Mason certified that he served all partiesbut did not in fact do so and that they acquired copies of hisbrief via other means. Mother and the children do not supporttheir motions with any legal authority. We deny them andproceed to address the assignments of error.B. First Assignment of Error{¶15} In the first assignment of error, Mason contends thetrial court erred and abused its discretion by denying hismotion for contempt based on an erroneous finding regardingthe date and effect of a visitation order and by declaring theissue moot. Mason suggests the court erred when it foundmother could not be in contempt because he did not havecourt-ordered visitation from August 5-8, 2024. He claimsa “July 25, 2024 Judgment Entry ... expressly reaffirmed[his] companionship rights and set a schedule for summerparenting time.” Mason also claims a party can be held incontempt for violating a court order in effect at the time of theconduct even if circumstances later change. He asserts thatthe court violated his due process and equal protection rights.{¶16} “Contempt is defined in general terms as disobedienceof a court order.” State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d551, 554 (2001) (“Russo”). “Generally, a trial court possessesbroad discretion when it considers a contempt motion.” Jonesv. Jones, 2021-Ohio-1498, 28 (4th Dist.). Ordinarily, wewill uphold a trial court's contempt decision absent an abuse
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion is “an unreasonable,arbitrary, or unconscionable use of discretion, or ... a view oraction that no conscientious judge could honestly have taken.”State v. Brady, 2008-Ohio-4493, 23.{¶17} The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denyingthe motion for contempt. Mother could not be in contemptfor violating a July 25, 2024 judgment entry because the trialcourt did not issue an entry that day. The court conducted ahearing that day, but even if the court orally granted Masoncompanionship time at the hearing, “[i]t is axiomatic that acourt speaks only through its journal entries.” State ex rel.Collier v. Farley, 2005-Ohio-4204, 18 (4th Dist.), citingIn re Adoption of Gibson, 23 Ohio St.3d 170, 173, fn. 3(1986). The court did not issue an entry granting Masoncompanionship time in connection with the July 25, 2024hearing until August 16, 2024, i.e., after the time periodduring which Mason claims mother wrongfully withheldthe children from him. Accordingly, we overrule the firstassignment of error.C. Second Assignment of Error{¶18} In the second assignment of error, Mason contendsthe trial court erred by summarily denying his motion forsanctions without a hearing. Citing “Sain v. Roo, 2018-Ohio-2878, 19,” Russo at 555, and R.C. 2323.51(B)(2),Mason asserts that “[w]here a party presents substantiatedallegations of attorney misconduct, the court must, atminimum, conduct a hearing and issue findings as to thoseclaims.” He claims he presented substantiated allegations ofattorney misconduct, but the trial court summarily denied hismotion for sanctions “without hearing or findings,” which “isreversible error.”{¶19} Mason has not shown the court erred by denying hismotion for sanctions without a hearing. “Sain v. Roo, 2018-Ohio-2878, 19” is fictitious; no case is assigned to 2018-Ohio-2878. Russo exists, but it does not contain the quoteMason attributes to it or hold that a court must conduct ahearing on a motion for sanctions when a party presentssubstantiated allegations of attorney misconduct. Moreover,Mason was not entitled to a hearing under R.C. 2323.51(B)(2). R.C. 2323.51(B) states in pertinent part:*5 (B)(1) Subject to divisions (B)(2) and (3), (C), and (D)of this section and except as otherwise provided in division(E)(2)(b) of section 101.15 or division (I)(2)(b) of section121.22 of the Revised Code, at any time not more thanthirty days after the entry of final judgment in a civil actionor appeal, any party adversely affected by frivolous conductmay file a motion for an award of court costs, reasonableattorney's fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred inconnection with the civil action or appeal. The court mayassess and make an award to any party to the civil action orappeal who was adversely affected by frivolous conduct, asprovided in division (B)(4) of this section.(2) An award may be made pursuant to division (B)(1) ofthis section upon the motion of a party to a civil action oran appeal of the type described in that division or on thecourt's own initiative, but only after the court does all ofthe following:(a) Sets a date for a hearing to be conducted in accordancewith division (B)(2)(c) of this section ... ;...(c) Conducts the hearing described in division (B)(2)(a) ofthis section in accordance with this division ....(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2323.51(B)(2) does not apply tomotions made by a non-party, such as Mason, and even if itdid, it only requires a hearing before a court makes an awardto the movant. R.C. 2323.51(B)(2) does not address whethera hearing is required before a court denies an award. AndMason did not cite any other legal authority to support hisposition that he was entitled to a hearing. He cites other legalauthority under his second assignment of error, but only tosupport his claim of misconduct and claim that courts haveinherent authority to sanction bad-faith conduct.{¶20} App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an appellant's briefinclude “[a]n argument containing the contentions of theappellant with respect to each assignment of error presentedfor review and the reasons in support of the contentions, withcitations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the recordon which appellant relies.” If legal authority exists to supportMason's second assignment of error, “ ‘it is not our duty toroot it out.’ ” In re A.B., 2024-Ohio-2952, 51 (4th Dist.),quoting State v. Alexander, 2022-Ohio-1812, 34 (4th Dist.).Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error. Tothe extent Mason claims the court erred by denying his motionfor sanctions without “findings,” his argument is beyond thescope of the second assignment of error, so we need notaddress it. State v. Webb, 2023-Ohio-4050, 26 (4th Dist.).
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5D. Third Assignment of Error{¶21} In the third assignment of error, Mason contends thetrial court erred and violated due process by denying hismotion for a hearing on the no-contact order and dismissinghis filings on the ground that he lacked standing despitebeing the subject of ongoing court orders. Mason assertsthat his withdrawal as a party was “coerced under duressfrom counsel and amid threats from opposing parties.” Masonalso claims the trial court never issued an order revokinghis companionship rights, so he “continues to be a legallyinterested party with a direct, enforceable right to participatein proceedings affecting the children.” In addition, Masonasserts that he is still “the named and restrained subjectof the no-contact order and other adverse rulings.” Masonclaims “[d]ue process under both the Ohio Constitution andthe Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutionrequires that an individual subject to restrictive, stigmatizing,or liberty-limiting orders—such as a no-contact order—mustbe given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”He claims “Ohio courts have repeatedly held that denyingan evidentiary hearing where substantial rights are at stakeis reversible error.” He asserts that “party status cannot bemanipulated to shield a court order from challenge whenthe order continues to directly restrain the individual seekingrelief.” He claims using his party status “as a proceduralbarrier” when he is “the direct object of ongoing court orders,constitutes a denial of due process and an abuse of discretion.”*6 {¶22} Mason has not shown that the trial court erred andviolated due process by denying his motion for a hearing onthe no-contact order and dismissing his filings on the groundthat he lacked standing. Again, App.R. 16(A)(7) requiresthat an appellant's brief include “citations to the authorities,statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.”Mason does not support his claim that his dismissal as aparty was “coerced under duress from counsel and amidthreats from opposing parties” with citation to the record. Andcontrary to what Mason asserts, it is evident from the recordthat the trial court implicitly terminated his companionshiptime prior to his dismissal as a party. We observe that in hisreply brief, Mason purports to quote Braatz v. Braatz, 85 OhioSt.3d 40 (1999) for the proposition that “ ‘[c]ompanionshiprights cannot be revoked without a formal motion, hearing,and best-interest finding,’ ” but Braatz contains no suchquotation. He also cites “In re Whitaker, 36 Ohio App.3d213 (1987)” for the position that an “order remains in forceuntil expressly terminated by the court,” but this citationis fictitious. 36 Ohio App.3d 213 is assigned to State v.Arvanitis, a criminal case which has nothing to do withcompanionship rights. Mason also states that “Ohio law doesnot permit the implicit or silent termination of fundamentalrights. See In re M.M., 2015-Ohio-2571, ¶21 (‘Termination ofrights must be by clear, affirmative act of the court; no impliedor silent termination is allowed.’)” But this citation is alsofictitious. 2015-Ohio-2571 is assigned to Ginter v. AuglaizeCty. Bd. of Revision, which contains no such quotation.{¶23} Moreover, Mason's contention that he had standingto file the motions at issue because he was the “named andrestrained subject of the no-contact order and other adverserulings” is not well-taken. The trial court scheduled a hearingon the no-contact order but cancelled it after Mason requested,and the court granted his request, to be dismissed a party.Mason does not direct our attention to any real and relevantlegal authority to support the position that, following hisdismissal, he had standing to file his motion for a hearing onthe no-contact order or the other motions at issue. Most of thelegal authority Mason cites to support his third assignmentof error is fictitious. He cites “In re K.W., 2016-Ohio-5272, 16,” for the position that “Ohio courts have repeatedlyheld that denying an evidentiary hearing where substantialrights are at stake is reversible error.” But 2016-Ohio-5272 isassigned to In re L.T. and does not support the position Masonclaims it does. He cites “State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-1234, 17” and “In re G.C., 2020-Ohio-4092, 20” to support theposition that party status cannot be used to shield a courtorder from challenge by someone who is directly restrainedby it. But 2022-Ohio-1234 is assigned to In re Z.L., 2020-Ohio-4092 is assigned to Oregon v. Gaughan, and these casesdo not support the position Mason claims they do. Mason alsopurports to quote “In re J.J., 2017-Ohio-5467, 29,” but nocase is assigned to 2017-Ohio-5467.{¶24} Mason also cites Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333 (1976), and State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v.Floyd, 2006-Ohio-4437, 45. Mathews at 333 states:This Court consistently has held that some form of hearingis required before an individual is finally deprived of aproperty interest. The “right to be heard before beingcondemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, eventhough it may not involve the stigma and hardships of acriminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.”Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168,71 S.Ct. 624, 646, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring). The fundamental requirement of due processis the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).Eldridge agrees that the review procedures available toa claimant before the initial determination of ineligibilitybecomes final would be adequate if disability benefits werenot terminated until after the evidentiary hearing stage ofthe administrative process. The dispute centers upon whatprocess is due prior to the initial termination of benefits,pending review.In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasionto consider the extent to which due process requires anevidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some typeof property interest even if such a hearing is providedthereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, ... hasthe Court held that a hearing closely approximating ajudicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring sometype of pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutionalright the Court has spoken sparingly about the requisiteprocedures.*7 (Citations omitted.) Floyd at 45 states:The right to procedural due process is required by theFourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitutionand Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. State v.Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 N.E.2d502, 6. “[A]t its core, procedural due process under boththe Ohio and United States Constitutions requires, at aminimum, an opportunity to be heard when the state seeksto infringe a protected liberty or property right. Boddiev. Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780,28 L.Ed.2d 113. Further, the opportunity to be heard mustoccur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814N.E.2d 846, 8.The cited provisions do not support the position that Masonhad standing to file the motions at issue after the trial court,at his request, dismissed him as a party.{¶25} Finally, we observe that in his reply brief, Masonstates that by hearing and ruling on his motions, “the trialcourt conferred party-in-interest status, as recognized in Inre Guardianship of Hollins, 114 Ohio St.3d 434 (2007) (‘Aperson may have standing to appeal if directly affected by thejudgment and who participated in the proceedings.’).” In reGuardianship of Hollins contains no such quotation.{¶26} “An appellant must support an assignment of error‘with arguments and supporting law.’ ” In re A.B., 2024-Ohio-2952, 51 (4th Dist.), quoting McCann v Webb, 2022-Ohio-2318, 7 (4th Dist.). If legal authority exists to supportMason's third assignment of error, “ ‘it is not our duty to rootit out.’ ” Id., quoting Alexander, 2022-Ohio-1812, at 34 (4thDist.). Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error.E. Fourth Assignment of Error{¶27} The fourth assignment of error is similar to the thirdassignment of error. Mason contends the trial court erred andviolated due process by dismissing all filings after October11, 2024, for lack of standing because he was not a partyor parent even though he remained the subject of ongoingcourt orders and retained unresolved companionship rights.He asserts that he has ongoing companionship rights whichgive him standing. He claims “[w]ithdrawal as a party,particularly under coercion, cannot extinguish substantiverights granted by court order,” and “Ohio courts have longrecognized that only a specific, subsequent order can revokeor modify such rights.” He also asserts that because he isthe restrained subject of the no-contact order, he is still aparty for all purposes related to that order. He claims “[i]tis a basic principle of law and due process that courts mustafford the right to be heard to individuals directly affectedby their orders—especially those who are the named subjectof ongoing restraints or no-contact orders.” He asserts thatparty status cannot be manipulated to shield ongoing courtorders from scrutiny. Citing In re Bonfield, 2002-Ohio-6660,he claims that “apart from formal party status, Ohio lawrecognizes de facto and psychological parent protections.”And he contends that “[w]here, as here, a non-biological ornon-legal parent has established a parental relationship andserved as the children's primary caregiver for years, the bestinterests of the children and basic fairness require that thisindividual be afforded due process and a full opportunity tobe heard.” He claims “[t]he rights and interests of a de factoor psychological parent cannot be extinguished through mereprocedural technicalities or forced withdrawal.”*8 {¶28} Mason has not demonstrated that the trial courterred and violated due process by dismissing all filings afterOctober 11, 2024, for lack of standing. Again, App.R. 16(A)(7) requires that an appellant's brief include “citations tothe authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on whichappellant relies.” Mason again does not support his suggestionthat he was coerced into withdrawing as a party with citation
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7to the record. And as we previously explained, it is evidentfrom the record that the trial court implicitly terminatedMason's companionship time prior to his dismissal as a party.Mason now relies on “In re G.C., 2020-Ohio-4092” for theposition that the court had to issue a “specific” order torevoke or modify his companionship rights, but again, 2020-Ohio-4092 is assigned to Oregon v. Gaughan, and it does notsupport the position for which Mason cites it.{¶29} Mason again fails to direct our attention to any realand relevant legal authority to support the position that,following his dismissal as a party, he had standing to file themotions at issue. He again relies on “State v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-1234” and “In re G.C., 2020-Ohio-4092,” for support.But again, 2022-Ohio-1234 is assigned to In re Z.L., 2020-Ohio-4092 is assigned to Oregon v. Gaughan, and these casesdo not support the position Mason claims they do. Masonagain purports to quote “In re J.J., 2017-Ohio-5467, 29,”but no case is assigned to 2017-Ohio-5467. He again relieson Mathews at 333, but as we previously explained, thecited provision does not support the position that Mason hadstanding to file the motions at issue after the trial court, athis request, dismissed him as a party. The only other legalauthority Mason cites is In re Bonfield, which has nothing todo with standing to file motions after dismissal as a party.It held that a mother's cohabiting same-sex partner did notqualify as a parent pursuant to R.C. 3109.04 but that pursuantto R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), a juvenile court could determinewhether a shared custody agreement between the mother andher partner was in the best interest of the children. In reBonfield, 2002-Ohio-6660, 4, 36, 50.{¶30} Again, “[a]n appellant must support an assignmentof error ‘with arguments and supporting law.’ ” In re A.B.,2024-Ohio-2952, 51 (4th Dist.), quoting McCann, 2022-Ohio-2318, at 7 (4th Dist.). If legal authority exists tosupport Mason's fourth assignment of error, “ ‘it is not ourduty to root it out.’ ” Id., quoting Alexander, 2022-Ohio-1812,at 34 (4th Dist.). Accordingly, we overrule the fourthassignment of error.F. Fifth Assignment of Error{¶31} In the fifth assignment of error, Mason contends thetrial court abused its discretion and violated Civ.R. 52 byfailing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of lawfollowing timely and repeated requests by him. Mason claimsthat on April 28, 2025, he “promptly filed a written requestfor findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R.52,” and on May 23, 2025, and May 30, 2025, he renewedhis request. He asserts that the trial court failed to complywith Civ.R. 52, so its judgment must be reversed, and thematter must be remanded with instructions for the court toissue findings of fact and conclusions of law.{¶32} Civ.R. 52 states in pertinent part:When questions of fact are tried bythe court without a jury, judgment maybe general for the prevailing partyunless one of the parties in writingrequests otherwise before the entry ofjudgment pursuant to Civ.R. 58, or notlater than seven days after the partyfiling the request has been given noticeof the court's announcement of itsdecision, whichever is later, in whichcase, the court shall state in writing thefindings of fact found separately fromthe conclusions of law.{¶33} Even if Mason had the right to make a request underCiv.R. 52, the record on appeal does not reflect that he did soas he contends. The record shows that on April 25, 2025, hefiled a “motion for specific findings of fact and conclusionsof law” “pursuant to Ohio Juvenile Rule 40(D)(3)(a)(iv),”which does not exist,2 and R.C. 2151.35(B)(1), which makesno mention of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Themotion makes no mention of Civ.R. 52. The record does notinclude any renewed requests by Mason on May 23, 2025, andMay 30, 2025, but even if he requested findings of facts andconclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 52 in filings he claimsto have made on those days, those requests would be untimelyunder Civ.R. 52.*9 {¶34} Accordingly, we overrule the fifth assignment oferror.G. Conclusion{¶35} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirmthe trial court's judgment.
In re T.F., P.F., and S.S. Minor Children., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5384 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.JUDGMENT ENTRYIt is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and thatappellant shall pay the costs.The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Courtdirecting the Vinton County Court of Common Pleas, JuvenileDivision, to carry this judgment into execution.Any stay previously granted by this Court is herebyterminated as of the date of this entryA certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandatepursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.For the CourtBY:Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3458316, 2025-Ohio-5384Footnotes1The assignments of error are taken from pages iii-iv of the Mason's appellate brief. The second assignmentof error is stated somewhat differently on page 4 of the brief.2Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii) does address findings of fact and conclusions of law but only applies to magistrate'sdecisions.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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