South Central Ohio Job v. Mason, No. 25CA706 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
South Central Ohio Job and Family Services v. Corey Mason
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Ohio (OH)
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Missy Robson On Behalf Of: South Central Ohio Job and Family..., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5385 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3458466CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FORREPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF LEGALAUTHORITY.Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Vinton County.Missy Robson On Behalf Of: South Central OhioJob and Family Services, Petitioner-Appellee,v.Corey Mason, Respondent-Appellant.Case No. 25CA706|RELEASED 11/25/2025APPEARANCES: Corey Mason, Logan, Ohio, pro seappellant.Attorneys and Law FirmsWilliam L. Archer, Jr., Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney,and Amanda K. Miller, Assistant Vinton County ProsecutingAttorney, McArthur, Ohio, for appellee South Central OhioJob and Family Services.DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRYMichael D. Hess, Judge*1 {¶1} Corey Mason appeals from a judgment of theVinton County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion tovacate civil protection order. Mason presents two assignmentsof error asserting that the trial court erred and abused itsdiscretion by: (1) issuing a civil protection order withoutsufficient factual findings or evidence of present danger,thereby denying him due process; and (2) denying his motionto vacate the civil protection order when his “purportedwaiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent,” andthe order “was improperly obtained as a condition of acriminal plea.” For the reasons which follow, we overrule theassignments of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY{¶2} On May 14, 2025, Missy Robson1, on behalf of SouthCentral Ohio Job and Family Services (“SCOJFS”), fileda petition for a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”)pursuant to R.C. 2903.214. The petition named Mason as therespondent and sought the protection of three minor childrenwho were in the custody of SCOJFS. The trial court issuedan ex parte CSPO and set the matter for a full hearing. Onthe day of the hearing, May 20, 2025, the trial court issued aCSPO, effective until May 20, 2028. The order indicates that,among other people, Mason and his counsel appeared at thehearing. The order states that the “Respondent was providedwith reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard within thetime required by Ohio law.” The order further states:The Court hereby makes the following findings of fact:The parties agreed to a three yearprotection order, with the conditionthat the children may send Respondentletters through the agency if theychoose to do so. Any contact initiatedby the children does not change theobligations of Respondent to complywith the terms of this protectionorder and does not remove, waive,or otherwise change the terms ofthe order. Respondent is still bond[sic] by the order and prevented fromcontacting the minor children in anyway.[Id.] In addition, the order includes a signed waiver, whichstates:I, Corey Mason (Respondent) understand that I have theright to a full hearing on the Petition for Civil StalkingProtection Order ... and acknowledge each of the following:1. I waive the right to have a full hearing on this ProtectionOrder.2. I waive the right to cross-examine witnesses and reviewevidence submitted in support of this Protection Order.3. I waive the right to present witnesses and evidence onmy own behalf.4. I waive the right to file objections and recognize this maylimit my right to appeal the issuance of this ProtectionOrder.
Missy Robson On Behalf Of: South Central Ohio Job and Family..., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5385 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2I understand that based on the waivers listed above, aProtection Order will be entered against me.{¶3} On June 3, 2025, Mason filed a “motion to vacatecivil protection order.” Mason maintained that the May 20,2025 CSPO had to be vacated because it “fails to meet therequirements of Ohio law and fundamental due process.”Mason asserted that R.C. 3113.31 “requires that a protectionorder be supported by findings of present or imminent danger,based on evidence presented on the record.” He claimed thatthere was no present or ongoing threat at the time of the CSPOhearing and that no evidence was presented at the hearing tosupport the CSPO. He asserted that the CSPO “was issuedas part of a negotiated criminal plea” and “not on the basisof any factual need for protection” or “to remedy any currentdanger.” He relied on “Huntington Natl. Bank v. Williams,2008-Ohio-1675 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist.)” to support hisposition that “[p]rotection orders cannot lawfully be usedas bargaining chips or procedural tools in criminal casesabsent an independent legal basis.” In addition, he assertedthat the trial court “made no findings of fact or reference toany evidence” in the CSPO and that “due process requiresadequate findings in the record and a meaningful opportunityto be heard before any liberty interest is restricted.”*2 {¶4} On June 4, 2025, the trial court issued an entrydenying Mason's motion. Initially, the court noted that only2 of the 10 case cites in the motion “actually refer to thecases cited by Mr. Mason.” The court also noted that Masonserved his motion directly on the petitioner and not on thepetitioner's counsel as required by the Civil Rules. The courtthen rejected Mason's assertion that the CSPO failed to meetthe requirements of Ohio law and fundamental due process.The court explained that the matter had been set for a fullhearing, that Mason received notice of the hearing, and thathe appeared. The court explained that it “was available withplentiful time designated to conduct an evidentiary hearing.”However, the parties, with the aid and advice of counsel,“negotiated a resolution to this matter involving Respondent'sconsent to a Civil Stalking Protection Order for a period ofthree (3) years, and if Respondent's assertions in his motionare to be taken at face value, also resolving his criminal matterin County Court.” The court also found that Mason signeda waiver of rights. The court explained that “[f]undamentaldue process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard,both of which were afforded to Respondent.” The court foundthat Mason waived his opportunity to be heard, in writing,and with the advice of counsel. Citing three cases, the courtfound that “[v]arious courts of appeals have confirmed thatconsent orders are authorized in the context of civil protectionorders issued pursuant to [R.C.] 2903.214.” The court statedthat it would not address Mason's argument that a globalresolution of this case and his criminal matter was contrary tolaw because the argument was “based on one of the inaccuratecitations contained in his motion.”{¶5} On June 13, 2025, Mason filed a notice of appeal fromthe entry denying his motion to vacate.2II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR{¶6} Mason presents two assignments of error:The trial court erred and abused its discretion by issuing aCivil Protection Order without sufficient factual findingsor evidence of present danger, thereby denying Appellantdue process.The trial court erred and abused its discretion by denyingAppellant's Motion to Vacate the Civil Protection Order,where Appellant's purported waiver was not knowing,voluntary, or intelligent, and the CPO was improperlyobtained as a condition of a criminal plea.III. LAW AND ANALYSISA. First Assignment of Error{¶7} In the first assignment of error, Mason contends thetrial court erred and abused its discretion by issuing acivil protection order without sufficient factual findings orevidence of present danger, thereby denying him due process.Mason asserts that “Ohio law requires that a [civil protectionorder] under R.C. 2903.214 be supported by competent,credible evidence of a present danger, with specific findingson the record.” He asserts that the record contains no evidenceof any conduct by him “to justify a finding of present orimminent danger at the May 20, 2025 hearing.” He assertsthat due process requires individualized factual findings tosupport a civil protection order and that Civ.R. 52 requiresseparate findings of fact and conclusions of law upon a properrequest. He claims “the trial court issued only boilerplatestatutory language and made no specific findings of fact,despite the importance of the interests at stake and therecord's lack of any evidence of present danger.” He assertsthat without separate findings of fact and conclusions of
Missy Robson On Behalf Of: South Central Ohio Job and Family..., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5385 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3law, he and this court cannot discern the basis for the trialcourt's decision. Therefore, “[t]he trial court's failure to issuefindings of fact as required by Civ.R. 52 constitutes reversibleerror.”{¶8} The first assignment of error is not well-taken. Itchallenges the issuance of the May 20, 2025 CSPO, whichwas a final, appealable order. R.C. 2903.214(G)(1) (“An orderissued under this section, other than an ex parte order, thatgrants a protection order, or that refuses to grant a protectionorder, is a final, appealable order”). However, Mason did nottimely file an appeal from that order. See App.R. 4(A)(1)(generally “a party who wishes to appeal from an order that isfinal upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal required byApp.R. 3 within 30 days of that entry”). His notice of appealonly designated the entry denying the motion to vacate as thejudgment being appealed. See App.R. 3(D) (“The notice ofappeal ... shall designate the judgment, order or part thereofappealed from ...”).{¶9} The motion to vacate did raise arguments regardingthe lack of evidentiary support for and factual findings inthe CSPO, but even if we construed the first assignmentof error as a challenge to the entry denying the motion tovacate, it would be meritless. Initially, we observe that Masonhas not identified any legal authority which authorizes amotion to vacate a R.C. 2903.214 CSPO. R.C. 2903.214(J)addresses, among other things, the assessment of costsfor the modification or dismissal of a protection order.However, “R.C. 2903.214 does not expressly provide for themodification or termination of a CSPO.” C.K.R.M. v. K.O.H.,2025-Ohio-3001, 12 (2d Dist.). “Nevertheless, some Ohioappellate districts have held that an order made pursuant toR.C. 2903.214 is subject to modification or termination ‘“if the movant shows that the original circumstances havematerially changed and it is no longer equitable for theorder to continue.” ’ ” Id. at 12, quoting Jones v. Hunter,2009-Ohio-917, 12 (11th Dist.), quoting Prostejovsky v.Prostejovsky, 2007-Ohio-5743, 26 (5th Dist.). In addition,some districts have suggested that a court can grant relieffrom a CSPO under Civ.R. 60(B). See generally Copas v.Luikart, 2025-Ohio-1694, 11, 13, 15, 47 (12th Dist.) (trialcourt denied motion it construed as a Civ.R. 60(B) motionfor relief from judgment granting a CSPO on merits, andappellate court affirmed); T.D. v. C.N., 2018-Ohio-1840, 25,44 (8th Dist.) (trial court did not abuse discretion in denyingCiv.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment granting aCSPO because there were no allegations of operative facts toshow relief was warranted).*3 {¶10} Mason's motion to vacate did not argue that theoriginal circumstances materially changed, and even if weconstrued the motion as a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Mason hasnot shown the trial court erred in denying it. Initially, weobserve that the trial court could have rejected the argumentMason made in his motion regarding the lack of evidentiarysupport for and factual findings in the CSPO based on thedoctrine of res judicata because Mason could have raisedthem in a direct appeal from the CSPO. See State v. Stamper,2018-Ohio-5376, 11 (4th Dist.), citing In re B.C.S., 2008-Ohio-5771, 14 (4th Dist.) (“The doctrine of res judicata barsclaims that the defendant raised or could have raised on directappeal”); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, 16 (“It is well established that a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannotbe used as a substitute for an appeal and that the doctrineof res judicata applies to such a motion”). But even if thedoctrine did not apply, the argument in support of the firstassignment of error fails to address the fact that Mason waivedhis right to a full hearing, the fact that Mason consented tothe CSPO, and the case law the trial court relied upon toconclude that consent orders are authorized in the context ofcivil protection orders issued pursuant to R.C. 2903.214. Andwhile the second assignment of error challenges the validityof the waiver, as we explain below, it lacks merit.{¶11} Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.B. Second Assignment of Error{¶12} In the second assignment of error, Mason contendsthe trial court erred and abused its discretion by denyinghis motion to vacate because his “purported waiver wasnot knowing, voluntary, or intelligent,” and the CSPO “wasimproperly obtained as a condition of a criminal plea.”Citing “Nolan v. Nolan, 2016-Ohio-2987, 12,” Masonasserts that “[a] valid waiver must be knowing, voluntary,and intelligent.” Mason claims his “attorney pressured himfinancially, withheld meaningful assistance, and participatedin a process tainted by irregularities and coercion.” He claims“[t]he May 20, 2025 hearing occurred simultaneously witha scheduled criminal case hearing,” and he “was physicallyrushed between courtrooms while a clearly annoyed judgedemonstrated impatience throughout.” He asserts that whenhis attorney arrived, his attorney stated for the first time thathe should not be fighting for the children, that he could besued, and that if he wanted to contest the CSPO, he hadto pay “over $1,000 immediately for further representation.”
Missy Robson On Behalf Of: South Central Ohio Job and Family..., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5385 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Mason claims his attorney effectively admitted that his abilityto challenge the CSPO “had become an afterthought in abroader, calculated effort to block his participation entirely,”and Mason was “shocked and confused by these disclosures,which contributed to his inability to meaningfully engagewith the process.” Mason claims his “blood sugar wassignificantly elevated at the time of the hearing, causingsevere brain fog and impairing his ability to read orprocess the waiver documents or to fully understand thelegal implications of his actions.” In addition, he assertsthat “informal courtroom remarks reflected prejudgment andcynicism, including a comment that [SCOJFS's counsel] wasso confident Appellant would not appear that she joked aboutbuying Appellant's attorney Starbucks.”{¶13} Mason has not shown the trial court erred by denyinghis motion to vacate because his purported waiver was notknowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Contrary to what Masonasserts, his motion to vacate did not argue that his waiverwas not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. “It is well-settledthat a party may not raise new issues or legal theories for thefirst time on appeal.” In re B.S., 2024-Ohio-5183, 74 (4thDist.), citing Stores Realty Co. v. Cleveland, 41 Ohio St.2d41, 43 (1975). “Thus, a litigant who fails to raise an argumentbefore the trial court forfeits the right to raise that issue onappeal.” Id., citing Independence v. Office of the CuyahogaCty. Executive, 2014-Ohio-4650, 30. Even if Mason hadnot forfeited his waiver argument, it lacks merit. The onlylegal authority Mason cites in support of his argument isnon-existent. The case citation 2016-Ohio-2987 is assignedto State v. Hari, not Nolan v. Nolan, and State v. Hari doesnot address the subject of waiver. Moreover, none of the factsMason relies on to support his waiver argument are in therecord on appeal.*4 {¶14} Mason has also not shown that the trial courterred by denying his motion to vacate because the CSPOwas improperly obtained as a condition of a criminal plea.The trial court did not address this contention because it wasbased on an inaccurate citation. And on appeal, Mason citesno legal authority to support the contention that the CSPOwas improperly obtained as a condition of a criminal plea. SeeApp.R. 16(A) (appellant's brief shall include “[a]n argumentcontaining the contentions of the appellant with respect toeach assignment of error presented for review and the reasonsin support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities,statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies”).Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.C. Conclusion{¶15} Having overruled the assignments of error, we affirmthe trial court's judgment.JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.JUDGMENT ENTRYIt is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and thatappellant shall pay the costs.The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Courtdirecting the VINTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMONPLEAS to carry this judgment into execution.Any stay previously granted by this Court is herebyterminated as of the date of this entryA certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandatepursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.For the CourtBY:NOTICE TO COUNSELPursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutesa final judgment entry and the time period for furtherappeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and OpinionAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3458466, 2025-Ohio-5385
Missy Robson On Behalf Of: South Central Ohio Job and Family..., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5385 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Footnotes1It appears Ms. Robson's first name may be spelled “Missi,” but for purposes of this opinion we have usedthe spelling in the entry being appealed.2The notice of appeal incorrectly states that the entry was filed on June 6, 2025.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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