State ex rel. Eldridge v. Kilbane, No. 115338 (Oct. 31, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
State ex rel. Soretha Marie Eldridge v. Judge Ashley Kilbane
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Ohio (OH)
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Decided
Oct. 31, 2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Panel
Calabrese (J.)
Opinion
Per curiam
STATE EX REL., SORETHA MARIE ELDRIDGE Relator, v...., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5053 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3102285CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FORREPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF LEGALAUTHORITY.Court of Appeals of Ohio, EighthDistrict, Cuyahoga County.STATE EX REL., SORETHAMARIE ELDRIDGE Relator,v.JUDGE ASHLEY KILBANE, Respondent.No. 115338|DATED: October 31, 2025JUDGMENT: WRITS DISMISSEDWrits of Mandamus and Prohibition Motion No. 587190Order No. 589033Attorneys and Law FirmsAppearances: Soretha Eldridge, pro se.Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County ProsecutingAttorney, and Nora E. Poore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,for respondent.JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINIONMICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE*1{¶ 1} On July 17, 2025, the relator Soretha Eldridgecommenced this mandamus and prohibition action against therespondent, Judge Ashley Kilbane, to dismiss the underlyingaction, William Eldridge, Jr. v. Soretha Eldridge, CuyahogaC.P. No. CV-23-980910, on the priority of jurisdictionprinciple and disqualification of the judge for judicialbias. The relator also sought a stay of the July 8, 2025hearing and relief from appearing before Judge Kilbane.On August 19, 2025, the respondent judge moved todismiss. On September 8, 2025, Eldridge filed her briefin opposition but did not address the judge's arguments.Rather, she stated that she wanted findings of fact andconclusions of law for a preliminary injunction and tovacate the preliminary injunction because the judge didnot accept proper documentary evidence and did notresolve contradictory evidence. Eldridge also claimed thather attorney did not receive proper notice and that shewas prohibited from presenting evidence. In this brief inopposition, Eldridge acknowledged that her writ petitioncontained citation errors and hallucinated cases because she“relied on assistance that proved inadequate” and requestedleave to amend her petition with correct legal authority.1The judge filed a reply brief on September 15, 2025. For thefollowing reasons, this court grants the respondent's motionto dismiss.PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND{¶ 2} As gleaned from the docket and filings of the underlyingcases, William Eldridge is the father of relator SorethaEldridge, and this dispute concerns the home on ManneringRd. in Cleveland. On April 10, 2023, Soretha commenced aforcible entry and detainer action against her father, Eldridgev. Eldridge, Cleveland M.C. No. 2023-CVG003855. Sheaverred that she owns the property pursuant to deeds executedin 2018 and 2019, and that she had terminated the month-to-month lease. By June 2, 2023, she had obtained an evictionorder.{¶ 3} In response, on June 13, 2023, William commencedthe underlying action against Soretha. He averred thata 2018 quitclaim deed that purported to transfer theMannering property from himself to Soretha was a forgedand fraudulent deed. His complaint included claims fornegligence, unjust enrichment, fraud, misrepresentation,conversion, constructive trust, slander of title, declaratoryjudgment to declare the quitclaim deed void, quiet title, andinjunctive relief.{¶ 4} On June 15, Soretha and her father entered into anagreed judgment entry in which the scheduled eviction inthe Cleveland Municipal Court would be stayed until furtherorder of the common pleas court and a preliminary injunctionhearing was scheduled for June 29, 2023. On June 30 after thehearing, the respondent judge granted the father's motion forpreliminary injunction staying the eviction until further orderor final judgment in this matter.{¶ 5} In early May 2024, in the Cleveland Municipal Court,Soretha moved to evict her father, who filed a motion to showcause in the common pleas court case why Soretha should notbe held in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction.After an emergency hearing on the motion on May 20, 2024,
STATE EX REL., SORETHA MARIE ELDRIDGE Relator, v...., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5053 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the respondent judge in a May 22, 2024 journal entry notedthat the preliminary injunction was pursuant to an agreementbetween the parties to stay the eviction and submit to thejurisdiction of the common pleas court. The judge furthernoted that she had granted Soretha multiple continuancesbecause the parties had agreed to stay the eviction.*2{¶ 6} In early January 2025, William and Soretha reacheda settlement: the 2018 and 2019 deeds would be void and titleto the property would vest solely in William, who would notencumber the property during his life and then pass it onto hisgrandchildren upon his death. As part the settlement Sorethaasserted that she had not encumbered the property; the partieswould conduct a title search prior to the final judgment.{¶ 7} However, by July 2025, the title search found liensthat ran afoul of the January 2025 settlement order. Therespondent judge ordered the parties to produce documentsevidencing the liens and when they were incurred. Sorethathen commenced this writ action.LEGAL ANALYSIS{¶ 8} The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1)the relator must have a clear legal right to the requested relief,(2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty to perform therequested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate remedy atlaw. Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compela court to exercise judgment or to discharge a function, itmay not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion isgrossly abused. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118(1987). Furthermore, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal.State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d141 (1967), paragraph three of the syllabus. Thus, mandamusdoes not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities inthe course of a case. State ex rel. Wilmore v. Hayes, 2013-Ohio-4716, 6 (8th Dist.). Furthermore, if the relator had anadequate remedy, regardless of whether it was used, relief inmandamus is precluded. State ex rel. Tran v. McGrath, 1997-Ohio-245. Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary remedythat is to be exercised with caution and only when the right isclear. It should not issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel. Taylorv. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165 (1977); State ex rel. Connole v.Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio App.3d 43 (8th Dist. 1993).{¶ 9} Although mandamus should be used with caution, thecourt has discretion in issuing it. In State ex rel. Pressley v.Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967), paragraphseven of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruledthat “in considering the allowance or denial of the writ ofmandamus on the merits, [the court] will exercise sound,legal and judicial discretion based upon all the facts andcircumstances in the individual case and the justice to bedone.” The Court elaborated that in exercising that discretionthe court should considerthe exigency which calls for the exercise of such discretion,the nature and extent of the wrong or injury which wouldfollow a refusal of the writ, and other facts which have abearing on the particular case....Among the facts and circumstances which the court willconsider are the applicant's rights, the interests of thirdpersons, the importance or unimportance of the case, theapplicant's conduct, the equity and justice of the relator'scase, public policy and the public's interest, whether theperformance of the act by the respondent would give therelator any effective relief, and whether such act would beimpossible, illegal, or useless.Id. at 161-162. State ex rel. Bennett v. Lime, 55 Ohio St.2d62 (1978).{¶ 10} Similarly, the principles governing prohibition arewell established. Its requisites are (1) the respondent againstwhom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2)the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3)there is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Largent v.Fisher, 43 Ohio St.3d 160 (1989). Furthermore, if a petitionerhad an adequate remedy, relief in prohibition is precluded,even if the remedy was not used. State ex rel. Lesher v.Kainrad, 65 Ohio St.2d 68 (1981). Prohibition will not lieunless it clearly appears that the court has no jurisdiction ofthe cause that it is attempting to adjudicate or the court isabout to exceed its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Ellis v. McCabe,138 Ohio St. 417 (1941), paragraph three of the syllabus.“The writ will not issue to prevent an erroneous judgment,or to serve the purpose of appeal, or to correct mistakes ofthe lower court in deciding questions within its jurisdiction.”State ex rel. Sparto v. Juvenile Court of Darke Cty., 153Ohio St. 64, 65 (1950). Furthermore, it should be used withgreat caution and not issue in a doubtful case. State ex rel.Merion v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 137Ohio St. 273 (1940). Nevertheless, when a court is patentlyand unambiguously without jurisdiction to act whatsoever,the availability or adequacy of a remedy is immaterial to
STATE EX REL., SORETHA MARIE ELDRIDGE Relator, v...., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5053 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3the issuance of a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Tilford v.Crush, 39 Ohio St.3d 174 (1988); and State ex rel. Csankv. Jaffe, 107 Ohio App.3d 387 (8th Dist. 1995). However,absent such a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, acourt having general jurisdiction of the subject matter of anaction has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A partychallenging the court's jurisdiction has an adequate remedyat law via an appeal from the court's holding that it hasjurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. ofEdn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 78 Ohio St.3d489 (1997). Moreover, this court has discretion in issuing thewrit of prohibition. State ex rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott, 36 OhioSt.2d 127 (1973).*3{¶ 11} Soretha's first argument is that pursuant to priorityof jurisdiction principles, Cleveland Municipal Court hasjurisdiction over the matter, rather than the common pleascourt, and the underlying case should be dismissed for lackof jurisdiction.{¶ 12} The principles of the jurisdictional priority rule arewell established. This rule provides that “[a]s between [state]courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose poweris firsts invoked by the institution of proper proceedingsacquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all tribunals, toadjudicate upon the whole issue and to settle the rights of theparties.” State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 Ohio St.3d391, 393 (1997); quoting State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v.Morgan, 17 Ohio St.3d 54, 56 (1985); and State ex rel. Phillipsv. Polcar, 50 Ohio St.2d 279 (1977), syllabus. Furthermore,“it is a condition of the operation of the state jurisdictionalpriority rule that the claims or cases of action be the same inboth cases, and ‘[i]f the second case is not for the same causeof action, nor between the same parties, the former suit willnot prevent the latter.’ ” Crawford at 393, quoting State ex rel.Sellers v. Gerken, 1995-Ohio-247, and State ex rel. Judson v.Spahr, 33 Ohio St.3d 111, 113 (1987). Nonetheless, the rulemay apply even if the causes of action and requested reliefare not identical. Sellers and State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson,2011-Ohio-4082. That is, if the claims in both cases are suchthat each of the actions comprise part of the “whole issue” thatis within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court whose poweris legally first invoked, the priority of jurisdiction principlesmay be applicable.{¶ 13} However, in the present matter, the causes of actionare different, and priority of jurisdiction rule does not apply.Although municipal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicateforcible entry and detainer actions, they cannot hear quiettitle matters. Disher v. Bannick, 2021-Ohio-1331 (2d Dist.);and Brown v. Arnolt, 2016-Ohio-5741 (5th Dist.). Ohio courtshave repeatedly declined to apply the rule when one case isa forcible entry and detainer case and the other case involvessuch claims as breach of contract, promissory estoppel,tortious interference with business relations, declaratoryjudgment, quiet title, ejectment, and fraud. State ex rel. TriEagle Fuels, L.L.C. v. Dawson, 2019-Ohio-2011; State exrel. Brady v. Pianka, 2005-Ohio-4105; State ex rel. Weissv. Hoover, 84 Ohio St.3d 530 (1999); Haas v. Gerski, 175Ohio St. 327 (1963); CS/RW Westlake Indoor Storage, L.L.C.v. Russo, 2016-Ohio-2845 (8th Dist.); and State ex rel. ThePortaro Group, Inc. v. Parma Mun. Court, 2023-Ohio-937(8th Dist.).{¶ 14} Eldridge's next argument is that the respondent judgeengaged in unprofessional behavior, such as screaming atEldridge, which deprives her of jurisdiction and shouldabsolve Eldridge from appearing in court. However,“improper, biased, prejudiced, discourteous, undignified,impatient, and belligerent conduct does not relate to a patentand unambiguous lack of jurisdiction warranting a writ ofprohibition.” Woodard v. Colaluca, 2014-Ohio-3824, 9 (8thDist.); and Jacobs v. Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas,2025-Ohio-2076 (8th Dist.). Furthermore, Eldridge providedno authority for the proposition that such behavior establishesa clear legal right to not appear before a court. Thus, shehas not carried her burden for this court to issue a writ ofmandamus.*4{¶ 15} To the extent that she seeks a stay of the July 8,2o25 hearing, that issue became moot before she filed thiswrit action on July 17, 2025.{¶ 16} The court declines Eldridge's suggestion that thiscourt allow her to amend her petition with correct legalauthority. She did not proffer a proper motion to amend, andthe court doubts the efficacy of such efforts. State ex rel. TriEagle Fuels, L.L.C. v. Dawson, 2018-Ohio-3054 (8th Dist.).Similarly, the court declines to address the new claims sheargues in her brief in opposition, such as that the preliminaryinjunction is void because the judge did not issue findingsof fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 65, thatmandamus should issue for proper notice because she claimsher attorney did not get notice of the hearing two years ago,and that the trial judge made multiple evidentiary errors.These were not proffered in a motion to amend but in a briefin opposition.
STATE EX REL., SORETHA MARIE ELDRIDGE Relator, v...., Slip Copy (2025)2025-Ohio-5053 © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4{¶ 17} Accordingly, this court grants the respondent's motionto dismiss this writ action. Relator to pay costs. This courtdirects the clerk of courts to serve all parties notice of thejudgment and its date of entry upon the journal as required byCiv.R. 58(B).{¶ 18} Writs dismissed.EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and DEENA R.CALABRESE, J., CONCURAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3102285, 2025-Ohio-5053Footnotes1A “hallucinated case” is a made-up, fictitious case generated by “artificial intelligence, AI.”End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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