Boersma v. Davenport (Mar. 4, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Heather Lynn BOERSMA v. Cynthia DAVENPORT
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Oregon (OR)
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Decided
Mar. 4, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Joyce (Judge), joined by Ortega (Presiding Judge), Hellman (Judge)
Boersma v. Davenport, --- P.3d ---- (2026)349 Or.App. 268 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1349 Or.App. 268Court of Appeals of Oregon.Heather Lynn BOERSMA, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Cynthia DAVENPORT, an individual, and Dollar TreeCorporation Stores, Inc., Defendants-Respondents.A186400|Submitted February 19, 2026|On the court's order to show cause filed March 4, 2026|Appellant's response filed March 17, 2026|May 6, 2026Marion County Circuit Court, 23CV44512; Jennifer K.Gardiner, Judge.Attorneys and Law FirmsHeather Boersma filed the brief and response pro se.No appearance for respondents.Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman,Judge.OpinionJOYCE, J.*269 **1 Plaintiff, a self-represented party, appeals fromwhat is labeled as a limited judgment awarding defendants$735.00 pursuant to ORCP 39 H(1) for plaintiff's failure toattend a deposition. Defendants have not appeared. Becausewe conclude that the judgment from which plaintiff appealsis not a valid limited judgment and thus not appealable,we dismiss plaintiff's appeal. Additionally, plaintiff's openingbrief contains several citations to fabricated cases and casesthat are unrelated to the propositions for which she citesthem. In response to our order to show cause on the issueof fabricated authority, plaintiff recognized the possibilitythat there were “citation issues” with her brief, but she didnot explicitly recognize that her brief included fabricatedauthority or take responsibility for their inclusion. She alsoadmitted to having been made aware, prior to this case beingsubmitted to the court, of the potential for her legal researchand writing process to produce fabricated authority. Weconclude that sanctions are warranted and order a monetarysanction of $500, payable to the Appellate Court ServicesDivision of the Oregon Judicial Department.FABRICATED AUTHORITYWe begin with the issue of plaintiff's reliance on fabricatedauthority in her opening brief. When examining plaintiff'sbrief, we found several citations to completely fabricatedcases and numerous instances in which plaintiff cites casesthat are unrelated to the propositions for which she cites them.We issued an order to show cause “(1) why plaintiff's openingbrief should not be stricken in part or in whole and (2) whythis court should not, on its own motion, impose monetarysanctions for submitting briefing to this court that containednonexistent case law.” In plaintiff's response to the order toshow cause, she claimed that she conducted her researchin good faith despite limited access to legal research tools,did not intend to submit fabricated authority, and had been“subjected to heightened scrutiny for minor or correctablecitation issues” while defendants relied on questionable legalauthority without consequences in the trial court. She alsopointed us toward her “prior experience regarding citationerrors” as evidence that she has a history *270 of acting ingood faith and being willing to correct errors once they areidentified. Specifically, she pointed us toward her actions ina separate appeal before this court.According to plaintiff, in that separate appeal, opposingcounsel informed her that several citations in plaintiff'sopening brief for that case were “either misquoted ormischaracterized.” Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file anamended opening brief in that case, explaining the citationissues. However, she filed no such motion in this case, whichwas being briefed around the same time as the separate appeal.Plaintiff apparently took no steps to ensure that her openingbrief in this case did not contain the same issues to which shehad been alerted in the separate appeal.**2 ORCP 17 C(1), which applies to the appellate courtsthrough ORAP 1.40(4), provides that a party who signs adocument filed with the court “makes the certifications tothe court identified in subsections (2) to (5) of this section,and further certifies that the certifications are based onthe person's reasonable knowledge, information and belief,formed after the making of such inquiry as is reasonableunder the circumstances.” Further, self-represented parties
Boersma v. Davenport, --- P.3d ---- (2026)349 Or.App. 268 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2“must inform [themselves] of and comply with court rulesas any other litigant.” State v. Palmer, 35 Or App 125, 128,580 P2d 592 (1978). When a party is found to have made afalse certification under ORCP 17 C, the court may imposesanctions against them. ORCP 17 D(1).Here, plaintiff was on notice of the potential for her researchand writing process to produce fabricated authority. She wasalso aware of a potential mechanism for alerting this courtto the fact that her brief might contain fabricated authority,having filed a motion to amend a brief in a separate case dueto “misquoted or mischaracterized” legal authorities thereinwhile this case was still being briefed. However, plaintiff didnot investigate the authority she relied on in this case and didnot inform this court of the possible citations issues to whichshe had been alerted. Further, plaintiff's reliance on fabricatedauthority wasted the resources of this court. Therefore, weconclude that sanctions are warranted. A monetary sanctionin the amount of *271 $500 is in order. See Powell v.Employment Dept., 347 Or App 55, 60, ––– P3d –––– (2026)(imposing a $500 sanction on a pro se party where (1) thatparty was on notice of the potential for his research andwriting process to produce fabricated authority but did notinform the court and (2) that reliance on fabricated authoritywasted judicial resources).LIMITED JUDGMENTWe turn to the question of whether the judgment from whichplaintiff appeals is a valid limited judgment. The trial courtordered plaintiff to pay defendants’ “videographer and courtreporter costs” as a sanction for plaintiff having failed toattend her deposition. See ORCP 39 H(1) (permitting a trialcourt to order a party who failed to attend a depositionto pay the other party the reasonable expenses the otherparty incurred in attending). The trial court then issued adocument titled “Limited Judgment and Money Award,”which was prepared by defendants’ counsel and is the limitedjudgment from which plaintiff now appeals. Although it isunderstandable that, based on that title, plaintiff believed thedocument to be a valid limited judgment, that document isnot a valid limited judgment. See Trail v. Haney, 288 Or App626, 628, 406 P3d 188 (2017) (holding that a document titled“Limited Judgment and Money Award” that awarded ORCP17 sanctions against the defendant was not a valid limitedjudgment, though recognizing that it was “not surprising that[the] defendant understood it to be a limited judgment andappealed from it”).ORS 18.005(13) sets out what qualifies as a “limitedjudgment”:“(a) A judgment entered under ORCP 67 B or 67 G;“(b) A judgment entered before the conclusion of an actionin a circuit court for the partition of real property, definingthe rights of the parties to the action and directing sale orpartition;“(c) An interlocutory judgment foreclosing an interest inreal property; and“(d) A judgment rendered before entryof a general judgment in an action thatdisposes of at least one but *272fewer than all requests for relief in theaction and that is rendered pursuantto a legal authority that specificallyauthorizes that disposition by limitedjudgment.”**3 The document at issue here does not fall with in anyof those categories. It is not a limited judgment under ORS18.005(13)(a). It is not a judgment entered under ORCP 67 Gbecause it did not resolve a “portion of any claim that exceedsa counterclaim.” Trail, 288 Or App at 629 (quoting ORCP 67G). It is also not a judgment under ORCP 67 B. See id. at629-30 (holding that a purported limited judgment awardingsanctions does not resolve a “claim” for purposes of ORCP67 and is consequently not a valid ORCP 67 B judgment);see also Shah v. Aerotek Affiliated Services, Inc., 343 Or App554, 558, 578 P3d 1284 (2025), rev. den., 375 Or 67 (2026)(holding that ORCP 67 B is not applicable to a documentawarding sanctions under ORS 20.105(1)). The document isalso not a limited judgment under ORS 18.005(13)(b) or (c)“because it does not resolve the sort of real property disputesidentified in those provisions.” See Trail, 288 Or App at 629.Finally, the purported limited judgment is also not a limitedjudgment under ORS 18.005(13)(d) because no source oflegal authority authorizes a court to award ORCP 39 H(1)sanctions by limited judgment. See id. (so holding in thecontext of ORCP 17 sanctions). As we noted for the appellantsin Trail and Shah, plaintiff must wait until the trial courthas entered a judgment that satisfies the requirements forappealability before she can challenge the trial court's award
Boersma v. Davenport, --- P.3d ---- (2026)349 Or.App. 268 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3of sanctions. See Trail, 288 Or App at 630 n 2; Shah, 343 OrApp at 558.Appeal dismissed; additionally, plaintiff is directed to pay$500 to the Appellate Court Services Division of the OregonJudicial Department.All Citations--- P.3d ----, 349 Or.App. 268, 2026 WL 1243999End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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