Holmes Family Trust v. Assessor (July 30, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Holmes Family Trust v. Multnomah County Assessor
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Oregon (OR)
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Decided
July 30, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Holmes Family Trust v. Multnomah County Assessor, 2025 WL 3641430 (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3641430 (Or.Tax Magistrate Div.)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.Oregon Tax Court, Magistrate Division,Property Tax.HOLMES FAMILY TRUST, Plaintiff,v.MULTNOMAH COUNTY ASSESSOR, Defendant.TC-MD 250247N|December 16, 2025ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'SMOTION TO DISMISS IN PART*1 This matter came before the court on Defendant's Motionto Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Motion), filedJuly 30, 2025. Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant'sMotion on October 1, 2025, and Defendant filed its Reply onOctober 16, 2025. This matter is now ready for the court'sdetermination.A. Original and Amended ComplaintsPlaintiff filed an original Complaint on April 25, 2025,seeking farm use special assessment for the “1999-2024” taxyears.1 (Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff attached Defendant's letterdated January 29, 2025, denying Plaintiff's “application forrequalification of Non-EFU Farm Special Assessment” forproperty identified as Account R324841 (subject property).(Id. at 3.) The letter states: “Use of the land does not meet thecriteria of ORS 308A.056, therefore requirements under ORS308A.068 and ORS 308A.071 are not met.” (Id.) Defendantmoved to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal of the 1999 to 2023 taxyears, arguing Plaintiff was not aggrieved for those years andthe appeal was untimely. (Def.’s Mot to Dismiss and Ans at1-2, May 27, 2025.)Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on June 26, 2025,challenging the “2019-2024” tax years. (Am Compl. at 1.)Plaintiff attached a portion of Defendant's letter disqualifyingthe subject property from farm use special assessment inaddition to Defendant's letter denying the requalificationapplication. (Id. at 5-7.) The disqualification letter dated July24, 2024, states that 67.67 acres are disqualified from non-EFU special assessment because the “land is no longer in aqualifying use and has been disqualified for failure to meetthe income requirements under ORS 308A.071, as specifiedin ORS 308A.116(1)(c).” (Id. at 5.) Other relevant provisionsof the letter include:• “To date you have not provided sufficient information tothe Assessor's office to meet the income requirementsof ORS 308A.071. If you believe your land did meetthe requirements to receive farm use special assessment,ORS 308A.089 allows you to submit an application forrequalification on or before December 15 * * *. The newapplication must meet all use and income requirementsof an application the same as anyone applying for farmuse special assessment for the first time.” (Id.)• “If you do not submit a qualifying application underORS 308A.089, the potential additional taxes will bedeferred under ORS 308A.706(1)(e) provided the landcontinues to maintain limited farm use. For each yearlimited farm use continues the oldest deferred year willbe abated (eliminated) until no potential additional taxyears remain as specified under ORS 308A.119.” (Id.(emphasis in original).)• “If you wish to appeal this action, it is recommendedyou contact the Oregon Tax Court, Magistrate Division,within 90 days of the date of this notice in accordancewith ORS 305.275 and ORS 305.280 in the mannerprovided in ORS 305.404 to ORS 305.560.” (Def.’s Mot,App 1 at 4.)*2 Shortly after receiving the disqualification letter in2024, “Plaintiff reached out to the County for remedy” and“the County directed the Plaintiff toward the requalificationprocess which they followed, and not tax court.” (Am Compl.at 2.) Plaintiff maintains that the subject property qualifies forfarm use special assessment based on horse stabling, whichproduced qualifying farm income “for all tax years from 2019to 2024.” (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff requests that the subject property“be requalified for farm status from 2019 through 2024 andcurrent, and that the annual property taxes be assessed foryears 2019 through 2024 and current at the farm rate, not atthe market rate.” (Id.)B. Motion to Dismiss, Response, and ReplyDefendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal of “all claimsbeyond those arising from the January 29, 2025, letter(including for all tax years before the 2024-2025 taxyear).” (Def.’s Mot at 1.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff
Holmes Family Trust v. Multnomah County Assessor, 2025 WL 3641430 (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2is not aggrieved under ORS 305.275(1) for any yearsbefore the 2024-25 tax year because no act, omission, ordetermination was taken by Defendant prior to the July 24,2024, disqualification, so there is nothing to appeal for prioryears. (Id. at 3.) Defendant notes that the subject property wasin special assessment until the July 24, 2024, disqualificationand was disqualified because Plaintiff failed to providesufficient information to meet income requirements. (Id. at1-2.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is time-barred fromappealing the 2024 disqualification notice. (Id. at 3.) UnderORS 305.280(1), Plaintiff had 90 days to appeal from actualknowledge of the disqualification. (Id.)Plaintiff responds that it is aggrieved by additional deferredtaxes under ORS 308A.703. (Ptf.’s Resp at 1.) Those taxesbecome due upon any sale of the subject property, creatinga financial burden. (Id.) Transfer of the subject property islikely because the owner is 94 years old, and it would takea minimum of five years “to completely cure the deferredtaxes.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant should beestopped from raising the statute of limitation because itdirected Plaintiff to reapply rather than appeal and Plaintiffrelied on that direction. (Id.) Defendant “suggested” theapplication would be approved “based on similar incomeevidence” submitted in past years, but Defendant denied theapplication. (Id. at 3.)In Reply, Defendant requests dismissal of the entire action as asanction for Plaintiff citing “a case that plainly does not exist:‘See Dept. of Rev. v. Sec'y of State, 16 OTR 350, 359 (2003)(estoppel where representations induce reliance).’ ” (Def.’sReply at 2.) Plaintiff also cites an incorrect authority—ORS305.280(4)—which “has nothing to do with estoppel.” (Id. at1.)C. AnalysisThe issues are (1) whether Plaintiff is aggrieved for anytax years before the 2024-25 tax year; (2) whether Plaintiffis time-barred from appealing the disqualification notice;(3) if so, whether Defendant is estopped from invoking thestatute of limitation because it misled Plaintiff to file a newapplication rather than appeal to this court; and (4) whetherthis entire action should be dismissed as a sanction for citingto nonexistent law.1. Aggrievement; tax years at issueDefendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal of all tax yearsbefore the 2024-25 tax year because Defendant made no act,omission, order, or determination from which Plaintiff mayappeal under ORS 305.275(1)(a).2 Plaintiff argues that it isnevertheless aggrieved for the 2019-20 through 2023-24 taxyears by the potential additional taxes imposed but deferredas a result of the disqualification. (Ptf.’s Resp at 1.) Defendantresponds that the additional taxes “are a statutory requirementarising out of disqualification. * * * Applying the statuteto calculate them and inform the taxpayer of them is not aseparate act of the assessor that is subject to challenge * **.” (Def.’s Reply at 3, citing ORS 308A.703.)*3 The court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff hasnot identified any appealable act, omission, order, ordetermination by Defendant for the 2019-20 through 2023-24tax years. The potential additional taxes were imposed dueto disqualification, which occurred for the 2024-25 tax year.That said, dismissing Plaintiff's appeal of the 2019-20 through2023-24 tax years does not mean that evidence from thoseyears is irrelevant or inadmissible at trial. For example,non-EFU special assessment requires a certain amount ofgross income “in three out of the five full calendar yearsimmediately preceding the assessment date * * *.” ORS308A.071(2)(a). To the extent Defendant maintains thatthe subject property failed to meet income requirements,evidence pertaining to earlier years may be relevant toqualification for special assessment.With that caveat in mind, the court dismisses Plaintiff's appealof the 2019-20 through 2023-24 tax years because Plaintiff isnot aggrieved under ORS 305.275(1)(a) for those years.2. Whether Plaintiff's appeal of disqualification is timelyDefendant argues that Plaintiff's appeal from thedisqualification notice is untimely under ORS 305.280(1),which requires an appeal to be taken “within 90 days afterthe act, omission, order or determination becomes actuallyknown to the person, but in no event later than one year afterthe act or omission has occurred, or the order or determinationhas been made.” Plaintiff has not argued that it did not timelyreceive the disqualification letter dated July 24, 2024. Evenallowing for Plaintiff's Amended Complaint to relate back tothe original Complaint filed April 25, 2025, Plaintiff's appealfrom the 2024 disqualification was filed more than 90 daysfrom when the determination was known to Plaintiff.3 Theappeal is untimely under ORS 305.280(1).Once again, the court's conclusion that Plaintiff's appealof the disqualification notice is untimely comes with some
Holmes Family Trust v. Multnomah County Assessor, 2025 WL 3641430 (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3caveats, including issues that may require further briefing.Defendant maintains that disqualification and requalificationare “two separate acts” controlled by different statutes.(Def.’s Reply at 4, citing ORS 308A.116 (disqualification),and ORS 308A.086 and 308A.089 (requalification).) Thecourt agrees that the two acts are separately appealable.However, Defendant's reasons for disqualification providedin the notice, including its determination of the deferral ofpotential additional taxes, may be relevant to Defendant'sdenial of Plaintiff's application for requalification.Defendant's disqualification notice states that it deferredpotential additional taxes under ORS 308A.119 and ORS308A.706(1)(e). The abatement under ORS 308A.119 appliesonly when non-EFU farmland becomes disqualified forfailure to meet gross income or other requirements under ORS308A.071.4 See ORS 308A.119(1). If Defendant disqualifiedthe subject property for a lack of qualifying farm use, ORS308A.706(1)(a)(A) would apply.5*4 It appears Defendant originally disqualified the subjectproperty for failure to meet income requirements. (See, e.g.,Def.’s Mot at 2 (stating that Defendant disqualified thesubject property because Plaintiff “had not provided sufficientinformation to the Assessor's office to meet the incomerequirements of ORS 308A.071”)).6 However, in its denial ofPlaintiff's application for requalification, it is unclear whetherDefendant determined the subject property was no longerin a qualifying farm use or whether it failed to meet theincome requirements. (See Am Comp. at 7 (the denial letterstates: “[u]se of the land does not meet the criteria of ORS308A.056.”)) Defendant's reason for the disqualification maybe relevant in evaluating not only the requalification denialbut also the deferral of the potential additional taxes.Defendant suggests that Plaintiff's appeal of the additionaltaxes resulting from disqualification is time-barred becausePlaintiff did not timely appeal the disqualification. (See,e.g., Def.’s Reply at 3) (“Applying the statute to calculatethem and inform the taxpayer of them is not a separateact of the assessor that is subject to challenge – it isrequired as part of the disqualification decision, whichis time-barred * * *”). The court is not persuaded. Asdiscussed above, the opportunity for requalification is linkedto the disqualification, and the deferral under ORS 308A.119applies only when the disqualification results from failure tomeet gross income or related requirements in ORS 308A.071.The parties should be prepared to address at trial or in post-trial briefing the impact on additional taxes in the followingscenarios:• Rather than a failure to meet the income requirements,the subject property does not qualify for farm use specialassessment because it was “not being used as farmland”under ORS 308A.706(1)(a)(A).• The subject property requalifies for farm use specialassessment.Because Plaintiff's appeal of the disqualification notice wasuntimely, the next question is whether Defendant is estoppedfrom asserting a timeliness defense because it misled Plaintiff.3. Whether Defendant is estopped from assertingtimeliness defensePlaintiff argues that the disqualification notice itself wasmisleading by presenting a requalification application asan alternative to appeal, without explaining that “failureto appeal within 90 days would forfeit rights.” (Ptf.’sResp at 5.) Plaintiff argues that the option to reapply wasmisleading in the context of Plaintiff's past applications thathad been approved based on the same set of facts. (See id.at 6.) Plaintiff relied on Defendant's option to submit anapplication to Plaintiff's detriment because Plaintiff missedthe 90-day appeal period. (Id.) Defendant disagrees that itmisled Plaintiff, pointing out that the disqualification noticecontained accurate information about Plaintiff's appeal rights.(Def.’s Mot at 3-4.)To make a successful estoppel claim, a taxpayer must provethree elements: “(1) misleading conduct on the part of the[county]; (2) taxpayer's good faith, reasonable reliance onthat conduct; and (3) injury to taxpayer.” Webb v. Dept.of Rev., 18 OTR 381, 383 (2005). To establish misleadingconduct requires “proof positive that the [county] hasmisinformed the individual taxpayer.” Johnson v. State TaxComm'n, 248 Or 460, 463, 435 P2d 302 (1967). “Whenwritten materials are given to taxpayers containing accurateinformation and advice, taxpayers may not continue to rely onan understanding based on oral representations or discussionswhich are contrary to the written information.” Smith v. Dept.of Rev., 13 OTR 206, 210 (1994).*5 A notice disqualifying property from farm use specialassessment must notify taxpayer of “appeal rights.” OregonAdministrative Rule (OAR) 150-308-1530(2)(e) (2025);see also White v. Dept. of Rev., 19 OTR 119, 121-22
Holmes Family Trust v. Multnomah County Assessor, 2025 WL 3641430 (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4(2006) (finding county's notice including appeal rights wassufficient; county was not required to also send appropriateappeal forms). Here, Defendant's notice alerted Plaintiff to“Appeal Rights” and made an accurate statement of thoserights, mirroring the text of ORS 308A.718(4): taxpayer mayappeal to “the Oregon Tax Court * * * in the manner providedin ORS 305.404 to 305.560.”7 Defendant's statement thatPlaintiff could apply for requalification by December 15was also accurate information. See ORS 308A.089(2); seealso Basho v. Clackamas County Assessor, TC-MD 010035E,2001 WL 36203892 (Or Tax M Div, Feb. 27, 2001)(referencing two options for property disqualified from farmuse special assessment: appeal to this court or apply forrequalification to the county). The court finds that Defendant'sdisqualification notice gave Plaintiff accurate information anddid not mislead Plaintiff about the right to appeal.4. Sanction for citing to nonexistent lawFinally, Defendant asks the court to dismiss Plaintiff's appealas a sanction for citing nonexistent law. (Def.’s Reply at1-2.) The court has reviewed the “case” cited by Plaintiffin its Response and agrees with Defendant that it does notexist. Plaintiff's citation to nonexistent law is likely the resultof using generative artificial intelligence (AI) to prepare itsresponse. See Ringo v. Colquhoun Design Studio, LLC, 345Or App 301 (2025) (describing the negative impact of AIon the court system and the rule of law).8 This court hasthe authority to impose sanctions, including dismissal, whena party fails or refuses to comply with a “decision, order,judgment, or other statement directing the party to performa specific act * * *.” Tax Court Rule-Magistrate Division(TCR-MD) 21 A. Here, the court has not previously given anydirection to Plaintiff concerning the use of AI. As a result, thecourt declines to impose a sanction at this time and insteadadmonishes Plaintiff to use resources like the State of OregonLaw Library or the Tax Court's Decisions, Opinions, andOrders webpage to verify case law prior to submitting it to thecourt. Should Plaintiff again cite nonexistent law, the courtwill reconsider sanctions.D. ConclusionUpon careful consideration, the court grants Defendant'sMotion in part. Plaintiff's appeal of the 2019-20 to 2023-24tax years is dismissed because Plaintiff is not aggrievedunder ORS 305.275(1)(a) for those years. However, thecourt will consider evidence from those tax years to theextent relevant to determine if the subject property satisfiedincome requirements in ORS 308A.071. Plaintiff's appeal ofDefendant's 2024-25 disqualification notice is time-barred.However, the court may consider the disqualification to theextent it constrains the Defendant's requalification denialand determination of additional taxes. Defendant did notmislead Plaintiff concerning Plaintiff's right to appeal thedisqualification, so Defendant is not estopped from invokingthe statute of limitation. Finally, the court declines to sanctionPlaintiff at this time for citing to nonexistent law, but the courtwill reconsider sanctions should Plaintiff cite to nonexistentlaw in any future briefing. Now, therefore,*6 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to DismissPlaintiff's Amended Complaint is granted in part. Plaintiff'sappeal of the 2019-20 to 2023-24 tax years and Plaintiff'sappeal of Defendant's 2024-25 disqualification notice aredismissed.All Citations2025 WL 3641430Footnotes1That is the FedEx “ship date”; the Complaint was received by the court on April 28, 2025.2The court's references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2023.3“Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction,or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back tothe date of the original pleading.” Tax Court Rule (TCR) 23 C; see also Tax Court Rule-Magistrate Division(TCR-MD) 2 C (referencing TCR 23 A-D).
Holmes Family Trust v. Multnomah County Assessor, 2025 WL 3641430 (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.54Other requirements under ORS 308A.071 include, for example, complying with the county's request to providecopies of returns showing gross income. ORS 308A.071(4).5ORS 308A.706(1)(a)(A) states that the additional taxes following disqualification “may not be imposed andshall remain a potential tax liability if, as of the date the disqualification is taken into account on the assessmentand tax roll, the land is * * * [d]isqualified * * * nonexclusive zone farmland that [i]s not being used asfarmland[.]”6Defendant's notice uses broader language and may encompass disqualification for a lack of qualifyingfarm use. It states the “land is no longer in a qualifying use and has been disqualified for failure to meetthe income requirements under ORS 308A.071.” (Def.’s Mot, App 1 at 1 (emphasis added).) That said,Defendant's application of ORS 308A.119 indicates the reason for disqualification was failure to meet incomerequirements.7The appeal rights stated in Defendant's disqualification letter appear to be based on sample letters providedin the Department of Revenue's Farm Use Manual, Appendix F: Disqualification, available at: https://www.oregon.gov/DOR/forms/FormsPubs/farm-use-manual_303-422.pdf.8In Ringo, an attorney filed a brief citing to nonexistent law. The court imposed a fine of $2,000 against theattorney and struck the brief containing false authority but permitted the respondent to file a new brief. Thecourt imposed additional certification requirements upon the attorney for future briefing in that case.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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