Powell v. Employment Dep't (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Keith POWELL v. EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT and First Congregational Church of Portland
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Oregon (OR)
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Reversed
Majority
Joyce (Judge), joined by Ortega (Presiding Judge), Hellman (Judge)
Keith POWELL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT and..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)347 Or.App. 55 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1347 Or.App. 55Court of Appeals of Oregon.Keith POWELL, Petitioner,v.EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT and FirstCongregational Church of Portland, Respondents.A185894|Argued and submitted November 17, 2025|February 11, 2026Employment Appeals Board, 2024EAB0655;Affirmed; additionally, claimant is directed to pay $500 tothe Appellate Court Services Division of the Oregon JudicialDepartment.Attorneys and Law FirmsKeith E. Powell argued the cause and filed the briefs pro se.Joy Ellis argued the cause for respondent First CongregationalUnited Church of Christ. Also on the brief was Foster GarveyPC.Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, waivedappearance for respondent Employment Department.Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman,Judge.OpinionJOYCE, J.*1 Claimant seeks review of an Employment AppealsBoard (EAB or board) order that reversed the decisionof the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and denied himunemployment insurance benefits on the grounds that hevoluntarily left work without good cause. We affirm.Additionally, at oral argument, employer's attorney alerted usto fabricated legal citations and quotations in claimant's briefsand asked for sanctions. In response to our order to showcause, claimant acknowledged that some of the authoritiescited in his briefs were “inaccurate” and resulted from the useof online search engines and artificial intelligence (AI). Weconclude that sanctions are warranted and order a monetarysanction of $500, payable to the Appellate Court ServicesDivision of the Oregon Judicial Department.FABRICATED AUTHORITYWe begin with the issue of claimant's reliance on fabricatedauthority because it necessarily informs what authoritywe can consider when ruling on the merits of claimant'sarguments. At oral argument, employer's counsel asked, forthe first time, that the court sanction claimant on the groundsthat claimant's briefs contained citations to fabricated casesand quoted material that could not be found in the citedauthority. Counsel did not point the court to any particularfabricated case or quote but referenced page numbers inthe claimant's briefs. Employer's counsel further informedthe court that petitioner had engaged in similar conductin separate civil suits that proceeded simultaneous to thisappeal and that, when confronted in those cases, petitionerhad acknowledged using AI to draft the pleadings withoutexercising reasonable diligence to ensure his citations andlegal arguments were correct and supported by Oregonlaw. Employer's counsel asked that we impose sanctionson petitioner by affirming the board's decision below andawarding fees to respondent. Claimant did not addressthe allegations of fabricated cases and quotes during oralargument.We re-examined petitioner's briefs and found several citationsto completely fabricated cases, multiple purported quotationsthat we could not find anywhere in Oregon case law, and manyinstances in which claimant cites cases that are unrelated tothe proposition for which he cites them. We issued an order toshow cause (1) why petitioner's case should not be dismissedand (2) why we should not, on our own motion, imposemonetary sanctions for submitting briefs with nonexistentcase law and quotations. In response to the order to showcause, claimant acknowledged that his briefs containedcitations and quotations that were “inaccurate.” He explainedthat those errors were “inadvertent and stemmed frommisunderstanding the reliability of the sources used, includingonline search engines and AI[-]assisted legal research sites.”Claimant stated that he accepted full responsibility for theerrors and emphasized that he did not fabricate any authorityintentionally.He also objected to the idea that his inclusion of fabricatedauthorities in briefs for this case was part of a pattern ofrelying on fabricated authority. To support that contention,
Keith POWELL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT and..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)347 Or.App. 55 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2claimant clarified that, after the time for briefing hadconcluded in this case, he filed separate civil cases againstemployer. According to claimant, in those separate cases, hebecame aware of citation issues when employer's counselbrought attention to them. He explained that the trial courtissued a “verbal admonition” and ordered him to correct thebriefing, which he did. In employer's response to the orderto show cause, it noted that, in the separate civil cases, a“Notice of Acknowledgment” was filed, in which claimantacknowledged his reliance on research tools that led him tocite authority that was “incorrect, inaccurately referenced,and inaccurately applied.” According to employer, that noticewas filed on August 27, 2025—nearly 12 weeks before oralargument in this case.*2 Claimant further claimed that he acted in good faiththroughout the appeal and that his inaccurate citations had notprejudiced employer. Because we find that neither of thosepoints are accurate, sanctions are appropriate.ORCP 17 C(1), which applies to the appellate courtsthrough ORAP 1.40(4), provides that a party who signs adocument filed with the court “makes the certifications tothe court identified in subsections (2) to (5) of this section,and further certifies that the certifications are based onthe person's reasonable knowledge, information and belief,formed after the making of such inquiry as is reasonableunder the circumstances.” Further, self-represented parties“must inform [themselves] of and comply with court rulesas any other litigant.” State v. Palmer, 35 Or App 125, 128,580 P2d 592 (1978). When a party is found to have made afalse certification under ORCP 17 C, the court may imposesanctions against them. ORCP 17 D(1).Here, claimant was on notice that the process he used—AI-assisted or otherwise—in drafting the briefs submitted to thiscourt could produce fabricated authority. In his response tothe order to show cause, claimant stated that, after the timefor briefing in this case had concluded, he became awareof fabricated citations in his briefs for separate civil cases.According to claimant, the judge in that matter gave hima verbal admonition and ordered him to correct the briefs.Claimant emphasized that that activity occurred after the timefor briefing in this appeal had concluded. What claimant failsto acknowledge, however, is that while the time for briefinghad ended, oral argument in this case had not yet occurred.Despite having been alerted to issues in his legal researchand writing processes several months before oral argumentwas heard in this case, claimant did not contact this courtto attempt to amend his briefs. He also made no mention ofpotential issues with his briefs in his opening argument anddid not address employer's allegations of fabricated authoritywhen it was his turn for rebuttal.Claimant also fails to grapple with how his relianceon fabricated authority prejudiced employer. Claimant,concluding that employer was not prejudiced, explainedthat employer “did not rely upon, analyze, or respondto [claimant's] nonexistent citations.” That is incorrect.Employer was the one who brought the issue to the court'sattention; employer's counsel directed the court to severalpages in claimant's briefs and asserted that those pagescontained references to nonexistent case law and quotations.To bring the issue to the court's attention, employer's counselhad to first analyze the authority herself.Finally, claimant ignores how his reliance on fabricatedauthority wasted limited judicial resources. The time takento address claimant's reliance on fabricated authority wouldhave been far better utilized addressing other matters. SeeRingo v. Colquhoun Design Studio, LLC, 345 Or App 301,304, ___ P3d ___ (2025) (“Every hour spent addressing falsecitations and statements of law is an hour diverted from thosematters in which attorneys have supported their argumentswith precedent that exists.”).Given that claimant was on notice of the potential for hisresearch and writing process to produce fabricated authoritybut did not inform the court and that claimant's reliance onfabricated authority wasted the resources of employer and thiscourt, we conclude that sanctions are warranted. Specifically,we conclude that a monetary sanction in the amount of $500is in order.REVIEW OF BOARD DECISION*3 We turn to the merits of claimant's arguments on appeal.We do not consider the portions of claimant's briefs thatrelied on fabricated authority and do not consider claimant'sreplacement briefs, filed in response to the court's order toshow cause, as he did not have leave to file them.Claimant assigns error to the board's reversal of the ALJ'sdecision to award benefits to claimant. He raises fourarguments: (1) the board exceeded its authority by reversingthe ALJ's order without identifying legal error; (2) the boardmisapplied OAR 471-030-0038 and Oregon case law in
Keith POWELL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT and..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)347 Or.App. 55 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3determining that he did not have good cause to quit; (3)the board incorrectly concluded that he resigned to avoiddischarge for misconduct; and (4) the board made impropercredibility determinations. Each argument fails.The substantive facts are uncontested and drawn fromthe board's findings of fact. Employer employed claimantas a business manager from May 2022 to March 2024.Claimant suffered from “extreme anxiety and childhood post-traumatic stress [disorder]” (PTSD). During his employment,claimant had a supervisor with whom he had a strainedrelationship; claimant believed that supervisor did notsufficiently accommodate his mental health needs and wouldunreasonably deny his requests to use accrued leave. InJanuary 2024, that supervisor retired. Claimant was put onpaid leave on February 27, 2024, as employer investigatedseveral allegations of misconduct that had purportedlyoccurred throughout the month of February.1 One of theallegations related to an incident in which, as claimantdescribed it, claimant “lost [his] temper in front of [the officemanager],” “raised [his] voice in frustration * * * used acouple of expletives,” and “picked up a side table adjacent to[the office manager's] desk and * * * pounded it on the floora couple times.”Another allegation that employer was investigating was thatclaimant had failed to timely report the office manager'sresignation—which was in response to the above-describedoutburst—to employer. The office manager initially sent anemail to claimant, explaining she was resigning due to “theevents that have transpired”—referring to claimant's outburst.Claimant asked her to send a revised letter. She sent a revisedletter, which was shorter and omitted, among other things,any mention of “events that have transpired.” Claimant didnot immediately forward that letter to employer. After a fewdays passed without word of her resignation being conveyedto employer, the office manager notified a member of thepersonnel committee of her resignation and the reasons forit. At that point, employer met with claimant about theallegations and put him on paid administrative leave whileit investigated. Claimant turned in a letter of resignationto employer. Employer stopped its investigation into theallegations when it received claimant's resignation letter; ithad not decided whether to discharge claimant. Claimantceased working for employer on March 5, 2024.Claimant then filed for unemployment benefits. TheEmployment Department (department) denied his claim,concluding that claimant quit work without good cause.Claimant appealed, and the ALJ reversed the department'sdecision, concluding that claimant quit work for good causeand was therefore not disqualified from receiving benefits.Specifically, the ALJ found that claimant had not engagedin any disqualifying misconduct. The ALJ further concludedthat claimant had left work in response to a grave situationand that a reasonable and prudent person with claimant'sconditions would have left work and had no reasonablealternative but to do so. Employer filed for review with theEAB. The board reversed the ALJ, concluding that claimanthad voluntarily quit work without good cause because he quitto avoid what would otherwise be a potential discharge formisconduct.*4 Under ORS 657.176(2)(c), a claimant is disqualifiedfrom receiving unemployment benefits if the claimant “[v]oluntarily left work without good cause.” In the context ofORS 657.176(2)(c), “[f]or an individual with a permanentor long-term ‘physical or mental impairment’ * * * goodcause for voluntarily leaving work is such that a reasonableand prudent person with the characteristics and qualities ofsuch individual, would leave work.” OAR 471-030-0038(4).Except for in circumstances not applicable here, the reasonfor the claimant's leaving “must be of such gravity that theindividual has no reasonable alternative but to leave work.”Id. However, leaving work without good cause includes“[r]esignation to avoid what would otherwise be a dischargefor misconduct or potential discharge for misconduct.” OAR471-030-0038(5)(b)(F). Misconduct is “a willful or wantonlynegligent violation of the standards of behavior which anemployer has the right to expect of an employee.” OAR471-030-0038(3)(a).The EAB concluded that claimant did not have good causeto quit work because he voluntarily quit work to avoid whatwould otherwise be a potential discharge for misconduct.When reviewing the board's decision on whether a claimanthad good cause to leave work, we apply a substantial evidencestandard to any findings of fact. ORS 183.482(8) (c); see alsoLane County v. Employment Dept., 299 Or App 373, 377, 449P3d 524 (2019). We review the board's determination of goodcause to determine whether, given the board's factual findings,“the standard set out in the department's rule has been satisfiedas a matter of law.” Id. at 377.Claimant first argues that, under ORS 183.482(7) and (8),the board was required to cite substantial new evidence tooverturn the findings of the ALJ. That argument is basedon a misunderstanding of the board's standard of review, as
Keith POWELL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT and..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)347 Or.App. 55 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4claimant admits in his reply brief. ORS 183.482 governs thejurisdiction and procedure of review of the Oregon Court ofAppeals, not those of the board.His second argument is that the board misapplied OAR471-030-0038 and related precedent in determining thatclaimant did not have good cause to quit. In making thatargument, we understand claimant's main contention to bethat the board should have accounted for his individualcharacteristics when evaluating whether he had good causeto leave work. However, the board explicitly found thatclaimant suffered from extreme anxiety and childhood PTSDand identified the correct legal standard, as described above,for assessing the circumstances of a claimant with sucha permanent or long-term mental impairment. While theboard was ultimately unpersuaded by claimant's claim thathe left work due to the detrimental effect of a hostile workenvironment on his mental health, that is not the same asmisapplying the proper standard and precedent.In his next two arguments, claimant argues that the boardincorrectly concluded that he resigned to avoid discharge formisconduct and improperly reversed credibility findings thatthe ALJ made. We disagree on both points.“When there is evidence in the record both to make moreprobable and less probable the existence of any basic factor inference, the board need not explain its decision tobelieve or rely on such evidence unless the [ALJ] has madean explicit credibility determination regarding the source ofsuch facts or evidence.” ORS 657.275(2). To the extent anyexplicit credibility determinations were made by the ALJ, theboard explained any contrary weight it gave the evidence.Additionally, when evaluating the accounts of the officemanager and claimant regarding editing the office manager'sresignation letter, the ALJ concluded that the conflictingtestimony of claimant and the office manager “is seen inbalance.” That was not an explicit credibility finding inclaimant's favor, and the board was free to find differently.*5 And to the extent that claimant argues that the board'sconclusion that claimant resigned to avoid discharge formisconduct is not supported by substantial evidence, we havereviewed the record and the board's conclusions and rejectclaimant's argument without further discussion.Affirmed; additionally, claimant is directed to pay $500 tothe Appellate Court Services Division of the Oregon JudicialDepartment.All Citations--- P.3d ----, 347 Or.App. 55, 2026 WL 383038Footnotes1Employer investigated four allegations. However, the board concluded that two of the allegations didnot constitute misconduct. Claimant does not challenge those conclusions, so we describe only the twoallegations relevant to the board's conclusion.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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