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State v. Dixon
(2026)
Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Oregon (OR)
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Panel
Ortega (Presiding Judge); Joyce (Judge); Hellman (Judge)
Opinion
Per curiam
No.
686
July
15,
2026
603
This
is
a
nonprecedential
memorandum
opinion
pursuant
to
ORAP
10.30
and
may
not
be
cited
except
as
provided
in
ORAP
10.30(1).
IN
THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
OF
THE
STATE
OF
OREGON
STATE
OF
OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHRISTINA
GALE
DIXON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Clackamas
County
Circuit
Court
19CR42686;
A184062
Michael
C.
Wetzel,
Judge.
Submitted
June
2,
2026.
Christine
Gale
Dixon
filed
the
briefs
for
appellant
pro
se
.
Dan
Rayfield,
Attorney
General,
Benjamin
Gutman,
Interim
Deputy
Attorney
General
and
Jon
Zunkel-
deCoursey,
Assistant
Attorney
General,
filed
the
brief
for
respondent.
Before
Ortega,
Presiding
Judge,
Joyce,
Judge,
and
Hellman,
Judge.
PER
CURIAM
Affirmed.
604
State
v.
Dixon
PER
CURIAM
Defendant
appeals
from
a
judgment
of
conviction
for
one
count
of
first-degree
custodial
interference
and
two
counts
of
first-degree
criminal
mistreatment.
On
appeal,
she
contends
that
Oregon
lacked
territorial
jurisdiction,
that
Clackamas
County
was
not
the
proper
venue
for
the
proceedings,
and
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
relying
on
a
dependency
jurisdictional
judgment
that
was
later
set
aside.
Having
considered
the
briefing
and
the
pertinent
parts
of
the
record
identified
by
the
parties,
we
are
unper
-
suaded
that
the
trial
court
committed
reversible
error.
In
reaching
that
conclusion,
we
note
that
we
have
limited
our
review
to
claims
of
error
that
are
properly
presented
in
the
opening
brief.
It
is
defendant’s
duty
to
identify
the
specific
ruling(s)
challenged
on
appeal,
show
us
that
the
claims
of
error
were
adequately
preserved
in
the
trial
court,
and
provide
a
cogent
argument
that
conforms
to
the
applicable
standard
of
review
and
is
supported
by
legal
authority
and
citations
to
the
appellate
record.
1
Although
we
recognize
the
challenges
inherent
in
representing
oneself
pro
se
in
an
appellate
court
and
may
disregard
technical
deficiencies
up
to
a
point,
we
cannot
step
out
of
our
role
as
neutral
arbiter
to
“make
or
develop
a
party’s
argument.”
Beall
Transport
Equipment
Co.
v.
Southern
Pacific
,
186
Or
App
696,
700
n
2,
64
P3d
1193,
adh’d
to
as
clarified
on
recons
,
187
Or
App
472,
68
P3d
259
(2003);
see
also
Briggs
v.
Lamvik
,
242
Or
App
132,
142
n
9,
255
P3d
518
(2011)
(stating
similar).
With
that
limitation
in
mind,
we
have
considered
each
of
defendant’s
arguments,
and
we
are
unpersuaded
that
the
trial
court
erred
in
the
ways
claimed.
2
Oregon
had
1
See,
e.g.
,
ORAP
5.45(3)
(“Each
assignment
of
error
must
identify
precisely
the
legal,
procedural,
factual,
or
other
ruling
that
is
being
challenged.”);
ORAP
5.45(4)(a)
(“The
court
may
decline
to
consider
any
assignment
of
error
that
requires
the
court
to
search
the
record
to
find
the
error
or
to
determine
if
the
error
properly
was
raised
and
preserved.”);
ORAP
5.45(5)
(standard-of-review
requirements).
2
We
have
disregarded
the
citations
that
defendant
relies
on
that
appear
to
be
to
nonexistent
cases
and
the
citations
that,
although
to
existing
cases,
do
not
stand
for
the
propositions
upon
which
defendant
relies.
In
response
to
an
order
to
show
cause
from
this
court,
defendant
stated
that
she
did
not
intentionally
include
any
fabricated
authority
and
that
she
was
not
aware
that
her
drafting
process
could
produce
fabricated
authority.
We
denied
her
motion
to
file
a
cor
-
rected
brief,
struck
the
citations
that
were
fabricated,
and
imposed
a
$100
fine.
Nonprecedential
Memo
Op:
351
Or
App
603
(2026)
605
territorial
jurisdiction
over
defendant
because
the
evidence
showed
that
defendant
interfered
with
the
state’s
custody
of
her
daughter
when
she
disobeyed
an
Oregon
court
order
and
prevented
her
daughter
from
receiving
surgery
in
Oregon.
ORS
131.215(1)
(“[A]
person
is
subject
to
prosecution
under
the
laws
of
this
state
for
an
offense
that
the
person
com
-
mits
by
the
conduct
of
the
person
or
the
conduct
of
another
for
which
the
person
is
criminally
liable”
where
“[e]ither
the
conduct
that
is
an
element
of
the
offense
or
the
result
that
is
an
element
occurs
within
this
state.”).
Defendant
did
not
challenge
venue
below
and
has
not
assigned
error
to
any
trial
court
ruling
with
respect
to
venue.
In
her
final
claim
of
error,
defendant
appears
to
contend
that
the
trial
court
improperly
relied
on
a
vacated
dependency
judgment.
We
disagree.
At
the
time
that
defendant
committed
the
acts
for
which
she
was
found
guilty,
a
valid
dependency
judgment
existed.
Affirmed.
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