Williams v. Honl (Jan. 5, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Carol L. Williams v. Tracy Honl
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Oregon (OR)
Court
Oregon Supreme Court
Decided
Jan. 5, 2026
Majority
Lagesen (Chief Judge), joined by Egan (Presiding Judge), Joyce (Judge)
Carol L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Tracy HONL,..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)348 Or.App. 505 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1348 Or.App. 505Court of Appeals of Oregon.Carol L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellantv.Tracy HONL, Defendant-RespondentA186656|April 22, 2026Umatilla County Circuit Court, 24CV10614;Robert W. Collins, Jr., Judge.On Order Denying Motion to File Amended Brief, StrikingOpening Brief, and Directing Appellant to Show Cause whythe Appeal Should not Be Dismissed and Sanctions Imposed,dated January 5, 2026.Attorney fees in the amount of $8,044.25 awarded torespondent, payable by appellant's attorneys. Appellant'samended opening brief is due within 28 days, andrespondent's amended answering brief is due within 49 daysfollowing the filing of the amended opening brief.Attorneys and Law FirmsAbby Shearer, for appellant.Jill O. Gibson for respondent.Before Egan, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, andJoyce, Judge.OpinionLAGESEN, C. J.*1 This matter is the latest to lengthen a recent series ofcases requiring us to address the submission of fabricated lawto the court. Doiban v. OLCC, 347 Or App 742, ___ P3d___ (2026); Powell v. Employment Dept., 347 Or App 55 ___P3d ___ (2026); Ringo v. Colquhoun Design Studio, LLC,345 Or App 301, 582 P3d 695 (2025). It is, however, thefirst case to present the option of awarding attorney fees asa sanction instead of—or in addition to—sanctions payableto the court.1 For the reasons that follow, we exercise ourauthority under ORAP 1.40 and ORCP 17 to sanction theattorneys for appellant by requiring them to pay the $8,044.25in attorney fees incurred by respondent in responding to thebrief containing the fabricated authority and in respondingto the court's show cause order addressing the fabricatedauthority. Because this sanction compensates respondent forthe harm caused by appellant's lawyer's conduct, becauseit is a significant sanction, and because we are persuadedthe conduct is unlikely to recur, we do not order additionalsanctions payable to the court in this instance. We also declineto order dismissal of the appeal as a sanction and, instead,permit appellant to file an amended opening brief under theconditions specified below.As is usual in an appeal, appellant filed an opening brief andrespondent filed an answering brief. The case then deviatedfrom the usual course. Appellant, having reviewed theanswering brief, moved to file an amended opening brief. Themotion represented that “[t]he Amended Opening Brief doesnot change the assignments of error, issues presented, or reliefsought. It corrects the legal standard and citations in lightof Respondent's answering brief.” The motion representedthat respondent would not be prejudiced by the filing of theamended brief and included a proposed amended brief. Themotion did not provide any further explanation of what hadled to the need for correction, or why the court should permitthe unusual relief of allowing an appellant to file a new briefafter a responsive brief had been filed.On review of the motion, the brief on file, and respondent'sanswering brief, the court, through the Chief Judge,determined that the brief on file “contain[ed] fabricatedquotations and propositions of law falsely attributed toexisting cases.” The court further determined that respondenthad been prejudiced by having to respond to a brief withfabricated authority, and that the proposed amended briefappeared to be substantially rewritten in a way that wouldprejudice respondent by requiring respondent to address anew brief. As a result, the court issued an order that deniedthe motion to file an amended brief, struck the brief on file,and directed the appellant to show cause why the appealshould not be dismissed and sanctions imposed. This opinionincludes an appendix with a chart detailing some (althoughnot necessarily all) of the issues identified with appellant'sbrief, the answering brief's response to those issues, theapproach taken by the proposed amended brief, and thiscourt's assessment of the issues with the opening brief andproposed amended brief.*2 In response to the order to show cause, one of appellant'sattorneys, Shearer, took responsibility for the problematic
Carol L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Tracy HONL,..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)348 Or.App. 505 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2brief and acknowledged that “generative artificial intelligencewas used as a research and drafting aid, and quotations andlegal propositions were not independently verified against thecited cases before filing. That failure resulted in inaccurateattributions of law.” Appellant's attorney represented that“[s]teps have been taken to ensure that similar errors do notrecur,” and that “generative artificial intelligence will not beused for legal research, citation, quotation, or paraphrasingin court submissions.” Appellant's attorney requested that theharm caused by the attorney's conduct be addressed by meansother than dismissal.Respondent, in turn, urged that the appeal be dismissed or,if not, that the court award the attorney fees incurred byrespondent in preparing the respondent's brief and addressingthe court's order regarding the fabricated law. With respectto the fees for the brief, respondent noted that the “amountis more than it would have been if fabricated quotes andincorrect propositions of law had not been included inAppellant's opening brief” because the inclusion of thosethings “result in billable time devoted to searching for thenonexistent quotations, re-reading and re-evaluating casessearching for the incorrectly stated propositions of law, andadditional research to confirm Respondent's understanding ofthe relevant law.” Respondent “acknowledged that this wouldbe a difficult result for Appellant, but given the options beforethe Court, an option that does not prejudice the Respondentshould be chosen.”On receipt of the parties’ responses, the court, through theChief Judge, referred the matter to the Motions Departmentfor resolution by way of precedential opinion issued by athree-judge panel because of the important and concerninglyrecurrent nature of the issue.As an initial matter, the professional choice for appellant'sattorney to have made upon receiving the respondent's briefwould have been to disclose to the court immediately thatthe opening brief contained fabricated law resulting from theuse of generative artificial intelligence, and to have requestedleave to file a rewritten brief. The motion that appellant'sattorney filed lacked the candor that we expect from lawyers.See RPC 3.3 (discussing a lawyer's duty of candor towarda tribunal). Beyond that, as noted in the court's show causeorder, the proposed amended brief itself was also problematic,so the proposed fix risked exacerbating the problem, hadthe court not rejected it. We nevertheless appreciate theexplicit, if belated, acknowledgment by appellant's attorneyin response to the court's order that her use of generativeartificial intelligence led to this predicament. The trendof submitting briefs containing fabricated law is a recentone, and lawyers’ willingness to identify the causal roleof generative artificial intelligence is critical as we assesshow the use of that technology squares with our obligationto maintain the rule of law. As we have previously noted,the situation is grave: “The injection of false precedent intothe practice of law shakes the foundation of our judicialsystem.” Ringo, 345 Or App at 305. Documenting the rolethat generative artificial intelligence plays in the fabrication oflaw better equips us, as a profession, to evaluate whether thebenefits of using a technology that fabricates legal authoritysubstantially outweigh the significant risks.2*3 We also decline to dismiss the appeal. There is noindication that appellant herself played a role in encouragingthe use of the fabricated authority and we are not persuadedthat appellant herself should bear the consequences of herattorney's reliance on generative artificial intelligence lackingadequate safeguards. Because we have stricken the openingbrief, we permit appellant to file an amended opening briefwithin 28 days of the date of this opinion. If the brief issubmitted by the same attorney responsible for the strickenbrief, it must contain a certification that (1) counsel draftedthe brief and did not use generative artificial intelligenceto draft the brief; (2) counsel has read each case and eachother source of law cited in the brief; and (3) counsel hasverified that every source of law cited, quoted, or paraphrasedexists. This certification required does not preclude counselfrom using services such as Westlaw and Lexis to conductlegal research, or from using standard spelling and grammarfunctions of any word processing program. See Ringo, 345Or App at 306-07 (requiring same certification from attorneywho filed brief containing fabricated law). Because the newopening brief filed by appellant will require respondent to filea new answering brief, in accordance with ORAP 5.80(2),respondent may file that amended answering brief within 49days of the date that appellant files the amended opening brief.Finally, we turn to monetary sanctions. As noted, respondenthas requested that we award the attorney fees incurred for thework of respondent's counsel in responding to the strickenopening brief and the court's show cause order. We agree thatan award of attorney fees to respondent payable by appellant'sattorneys is an appropriate sanction.As we previously have held, ORAP 1.40 and ORCP 17authorize us to impose sanctions for the submission of briefscontaining fabricated law. Ringo, 345 Or App at 303. That
Carol L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Tracy HONL,..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)348 Or.App. 505 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3is because an attorney who signs a brief certifies that it issupported by existing law, a certification that is false when thebrief contains nonexistent law that has been fabricated. Oneappropriate sanction is an award of attorney fees “sufficientto reimburse the moving party for attorney fees and otherexpenses incurred by reason of the false certification[.]”ORCP 17 D(4).Here, respondent has requested that we award all attorneyfees incurred in responding to appellant's problematic briefand the related show cause order. Having declined to dismissthe appeal, we agree with that proposed sanction. The brieffiled by appellant did not contain merely a few problematiccitations among mostly valid ones, such that the problemcan be fixed by striking a few sentences or citations andproceeding on a revised opening brief and the respondent'sexisting brief. The problems permeated the brief. Six of thenine cases cited in the opening brief were cited either fornonexistent quotations or propositions of law not plausiblyattributable to them. Redressing the problem will requireappellant to submit a substantially rewritten brief. That, inturn, will require respondent to submit a new brief.Although the time taken from respondent is irretrievable,it is compensable. Under these circumstances, it wouldbe in equitable for respondent to bear both the expenseof responding to the arguments raised in the problematicbrief and the expense of responding to a replacement brief.See Shahid v. Esaam, 376 Ga App 145, 147, 918 SE2d198 (2025) (The attorney's “use of fictitious cases andcitations has deprived the opposing party of the opportunityto appropriately respond to [the] arguments.”); Mattox v.Prod. Innovations Research, LLC, 807 F Supp 3d 1341,1352-53 (ED Okla 2025) (after striking offending filings fromthe record, awarding attorney fees to compensate opposingcounsel for the “burden unjustly borne by opposing counselin responding to pleadings that no longer exist” in additionto monetary sanctions totaling $6,000 payable to the court);Ferris v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 778 F Supp 3d 879,880-81 (ND Miss 2025) (“While one party can create afake legal brief at the click of a button, the opposing partyand court must parse through the case names, citations,and points of law to determine which parts, if any, aretrue. As AI continues to proliferate, this creation-responseimbalance places significant strain on the judicial system.”).Therefore, it is appropriate to require appellant's attorneys topay respondent's reasonable attorney fees in responding to thestricken opening brief and the show cause order.*4 In this case, respondent has requested attorney fees inthe amount of $8,044.25 for approximately 23 hours of workby respondent's attorney and her assistant.3 The request issupported by a detailed billing statement. The hours billedinclude the hours respondent spent drafting the answeringbrief, which is the majority of the time; only about 3.5hours were spent responding to the show cause order andappellant's request to file an amended opening brief. Thework of 23 hours is reasonable, as are the respective hourlyrates. Appellant's attorney has not responded in oppositionto respondent's request for attorney fees; as noted previously,appellant's sole argument in addressing the show cause order,which had proposed attorney fees as a potential sanction, isthat the court not dismiss the appeal.The remaining question is whether to impose additionalsanctions to redress the harm to the court. As we observedin Ringo, the submission of fabricated authority “strains ourlimited judicial resources. Every hour spent addressing falsecitations and statements of law is an hour diverted from thosematters in which attorneys have supported their argumentswith precedent that exists.” Ringo, 345 Or App at 304. Anattorney's decision to rely on generative artificial intelligencewithout adequate safeguards thus impedes the administrationof justice in a concrete way. It delays the resolution of anindividual case and eats time that could be applied to theresolution of other people's cases. Despite that harm, wedecline to award additional sanctions here. The award ofattorney fees is a significant one, and appellant's attorney'sresponse to the court's order gives the court confidence thatthe conduct will not recur.Finally, so that the clear does not become cloudy, we state theobvious: Using generative artificial intelligence to generatelegal briefs and then simply cite-checking them bears noresemblance to the competent practice of law. See Mattox,807 F Supp 3d at 1353 (“When lawyers trade reflectionfor automation, they surrender the very quality that makestheir words worthy of belief.”). Although cite checking is,of course, an important part of producing reliable, competentbriefs, it is not the type of work that requires a law degree.Law is a profession:“a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often longand intensive preparation including instruction in skills andmethods as well as in the scientific, historical, or scholarlyprinciples underlying such skills and methods, maintainingby force of organization or concerted opinion highstandards of achievement and conduct, and committing its
Carol L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Tracy HONL,..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)348 Or.App. 505 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4members to continued study and to a kind of work whichhas for its prime purpose the rendering of a public service—see learned profession.”Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1811 (unabridged ed2002) (defining “profession”). As veteran Oregon lawyershave advised new lawyers for years, an Oregon lawyerdevelops and maintains the specialized knowledge requiredof the profession by reading the cases relevant to the lawyer'spractice in the Advance Sheets (in print or on the appellatecourts’ website) and discussing them with colleagues. Aperson who uses generative artificial intelligence in lieuof reading, writing, and talking about the law—the veryprocesses by which a lawyer acquires and retains thespecialized knowledge and skills required of the profession—risks losing claim to the title of lawyer.Respondent is awarded $8,044.25 in attorney fees, payable byappellant's attorneys. ORCP 17 D(1) (“A law firm is jointlyliable for any sanction imposed against a partner, associateor employee of the firm, unless the court determines thatjoint liability would be unjust under the circumstances.”).Appellant's amended opening brief is due within 28 days ofthe date of this opinion. If the brief is filed by the attorney whoprepared the previous brief, it shall contain the certificationdiscussed above. Respondent's amended brief is due 49 daysafter the filing of appellant's amended opening brief.APPENDIX*5 Stricken Answering Proposed, Court's opening briefbrief amended January 6 opening brief orderNeumann v.“Neumann does Different cite: Liles, 358 Or not state thatNeumann v. Liles, 706, 720, 369 the review is 261 Or App567, P3d 1117 (2016): de novo. In fact, 572-73, 323 P3ddetermination Neumann does 521 (2014) of whether not evenaddress Changed brief: It claim arises out standards of “is aquestion of of public issue review”; correct law reviewed forprotected by standard of legal error.” special motion reviewis for to strike under legal error. anti-SLAPP is reviewed denovo Staten v. Steel, “Staten does not Changed brief: Order:That is 222 Or App 17, say this. In fact, Removes quote;“not a plausible 32, 191 P3d 778 Staten does not reframes asbroad reading of (2008): Quote even involve public/privateStaten, which that “private, workplace or distinction. focusedon employment-employment the issue of related disputes”matters[.]” reviewability are not matters * * *.” of publicinterest, even though the employer was a public body Tubrav. Cooke, n/a Omitted Order: Quote 233 Or App does not339, 225 P3d exist; case did 862 (2010): not involve Quoteabout anti-SLAPP “information received from others” andemployer's claim surviving anti-SLAPP motion Handy v.Lane n/a Omitted Order: “That is County, 360 Or not aplausible 605, 385 P3d reading of 1016 (2016): Handy, whichEmphasized that contained no the statements such emphasis.”there involved transparency and accountability in governmentStricken Answering Proposed, Court's opening brief briefamended January 6 opening brief orderDavoodian v. n/a OmittedRivera, 327 Or App 197, 200-01, 535 P3d 309(2023) Brown v. Gatti, n/a Omitted 341 Or 452, 458, 145P3d 130 (2006): Accusations of dishonesty or misconduct inone's professional or political capacity are defamatory per seMullen v. Meredith “Mullen has Changed brief: Corp., 271Or App nothing to do Reframes as 698, 704, 353 with apersonnel public discussion P3d 598 (2015): dispute.” versustargeted Private, personnel individual. disputes versus mattersof public interestAll Citations--- P.3d ----, 348 Or.App. 505, 2026 WL 1091610Footnotes1In the previous cases involving the submission of fabricated law, we have not considered attorney fees as a sanctioneither because of the self-represented status of the party burdened by the opposing party's use of fabricated law (a self-represented party is not eligible to recover attorney fees), or because the opposing party did not request attorney fees.2Appellant's attorney did not identify what generative artificial intelligence product she used. So that Oregon lawyers are notmisled into thinking that generative artificial intelligence products by established legal providers are necessarily incapableof creating the types of problems with the opening brief and the proposed amended brief, we note that, whatever theirsource in this case, they resemble those addressed in a recent opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for theSixth Circuit, United States v. Farris, ___ F4th ___, 2026 WL 915082, *3 (6th Cir 2026) (“That Howe's briefs cited reallegal authorities—as opposed to ‘hallucinations’ featuring fictitious cases—does not absolve him. gHowe's failure to verifythe artificial-intelligence output still resulted in the submission of false quotations and misleading legal arguments to this
Carol L. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Tracy HONL,..., --- P.3d ---- (2026)348 Or.App. 505 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Court.” (citation omitted)). In Farris, the attorney explained that the fabricated law resulted from the use of Westlaw'sCoCounsel program. Id. at *2. This caused the court to note the importance a lawyer understanding how generativeartificial intelligence programs operate before using them “even when new tools are sponsored by trusted legal technologyproviders.” Id. We agree with the Sixth Circuit's caution and restate it for that reason. Regardless of provider, a generativeartificial intelligence program is not, itself, a lawyer. It is important to keep that in mind if using one to do a lawyer's work.3The request was for a slightly higher amount that we have adjusted to exclude the first appearance fee which wasincorrectly included in an entry for billed time and also to account for what appears to be an arithmetical error.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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