Appellant v. H.D. (Mar. 13, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
A.C. Appellant v. H.D. AND J.C.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania (PA)
Court
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Decided
Mar. 13, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Lazarus (P.J.); Dubow (J.); Sullivan (J.)
A.C. Appellant v. H.D. AND J.C., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 711256Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) and Superior CourtO.P. § 65.37 (Non-Precedential Decisions)NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION -SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37Superior Court of Pennsylvania.A.C. Appellantv.H.D. AND J.C.No. 2364 EDA 2025|FILED MARCH 13, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2025 In the Courtof Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):2024-60246BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.OpinionMEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, P.J.:*1 A.C. (Stepmother1), proceeding pro se, appeals fromthe order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of BucksCounty, sustaining H.D.’s (Mother) preliminary objectionsand denying and dismissing Stepmother's custody petitionwith prejudice. After review, we affirm.This matter was initiated when Stepmother filed a custodypetition seeking shared legal and primary physical custodyof K.D. (DOB 6/12) and A.D. (DOB 10/14) (Children) onFebruary 9, 2024, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2).2Stepmother lived with the Children for a period of at least 3years, from 2019 through 2022.On August 4, 2025, Mother filed preliminary objections toStepmother's complaint in custody and raised the issue ofStepmother's standing. The trial court held a hearing onAugust 8, 2025, at which time the trial court permittedStepmother, proceeding pro se, to speak on the recordregarding her relationship to Children. She stated thefollowing:I have remained a consistent stepparent to [Children],despite being blocked at every avenue. I was present fortheir first days of school. I was there for regular pick[-]upsfrom school, doctors’ visits, IEP evaluations, birthdays,holidays, extracurricular activities, and day-to-day care.I provided emotional support by virtual schooling themduring COVID; emotional care, like writing letters fromthe tooth fairy; taking them to birthday parties and trick-or-treating, sometimes even with [Mother] present. I wasthe one in our household that made Christmas happen forall seven kids[3] each year, and I continue to do so, evenafter the separation of [Father] and I.Over the years, I've received personalized cards from[Children] and ongoing public affirmation of their lovetoward me and towards their siblings.I've been active in their lives since 2016, when their fatherand I first began dating. I've supported their health andeducation. I've made dinners for them. I've had fun withthem. I've kissed booboos, and I've loved them exactly howI love my biological children.I've had love – I've had [Children]’s love, security, andtrust. They call me [“]Mom [A.”] and even asked to call me[“]Mom[”], and often did.N.T. Hearing, 8/8/25, at 35-36.Stepmother marked and identified several exhibits butultimately failed to move to admit them into the record. Id.at 102-03. After the close of testimony,4 on the record, thetrial court found that Stepmother did not stand in loco parentisto the Children, granted Mother's preliminary objections, anddenied and dismissed Stepmother's custody petitions. Id. at103.*2 Stepmother filed a motion for reconsideration on August11, 2025. On August 13, 2025, the trial court issued twoorders. The first reduced to writing the oral order it announcedat the hearing, granted Mother's preliminary objections
A.C. Appellant v. H.D. AND J.C., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2as to Stepmother's standing, and denied and dismissedStepmother's custody petition with prejudice. The otherdenied Stepmother's motion for reconsideration. Stepmotherfiled a timely notice of appeal, and both Stepmother and thetrial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.Stepmother raises the following issues for our review:1. Whether the trial court erred by sustaining preliminaryobjections filed sixteen months after service inviolation of Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(c)’s mandatory waiverprovision, and by entering a written order dismissing[Stepmother]’s petition [“]with prejudice[”] when thatlanguage was never stated in the court's oral ruling?2. Whether the trial court violated [Stepmother]’sconstitutional due-process rights as a self-represented,indigent, domestic- violence survivor by excludingproperly marked and identified exhibits used throughoutthe hearing, thereby preventing full evidentiary reviewof [Stepmother]’s in loco parentis claim, in violation ofWilliams v. Yohe, 131 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super. 2016), andthe fairness principles codified in Kayden's Law (Act 8of 2024; 23 Pa.C.S.[A]. §§ 5328 and 5329.1)?3. Whether the trial court's opinion relied on factualmischaracterizations unsupported by the record—including fabricated references to the children's alleged“dislike” of [Stepmother] and improper reliance on post-separation conduct—in contravention of C.G. v. J.H.,193 A.3d 891 (Pa. 2018)?4. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law bydenying in loco parentis standing despite unrebuttedevidence of six years of cohabitation, daily caregiving,and parental acquiescence, contrary to T.B. v. L.R.M.,786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001)?5. Whether the cumulative effect of proceduraland substantive errors—including acceptance ofwaived objections, exclusion of [Stepmother]’sexhibits, misapplication of standing law, judicialbias toward a pro se litigant, and failure toapply Kayden's Law's trauma-informed protections—constituted custody gamesmanship and a systemicbreakdown of due process, requiring reversal andremand for recognition of standing and a full custodyhearing on the merits in compliance with state andfederal constitutional safeguards?6. Whether the trial court's conduct—including dismissivetreatment of Stepmother's claims, exclusion of markedexhibits, refusal to apply trauma-informed custodyprocedures, and failure to ensure an impartial forum—violated [Stepmother]’s due process rights and requiresreassignment to a neutral judge on remand?7. Whether the trial court erred by engaging in a best-interest analysis and issuing findings about the children'sneeds after denying Stepmother standing, contrary toPennsylvania law requiring standing to be decided first?Appellant's Brief, at 6-8 (reordered for ease of disposition;footnote omitted).Stepmother's first issue consists of two arguments: (1) that thetrial court erred by sustaining Mother's preliminary objectionssixteen months after Stepmother filed her custody petition;and (2) that the trial court erred by dismissing Stepmother'spetition with prejudice after not stating on the record thatdismissal would be with prejudice.Stepmother avers that Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure1915.5(a) requires a challenge to standing or jurisdiction ina custody action be brought within 20 days of service of thecomplaint. According to Stepmother, because Mother filedher preliminary objections more than 20 days after the filingof her custody petition, these claims are “waived forever.”Appellant's Brief, at 20. However, Stepmother has waivedthis argument by failing to raise it with the trial court andby failing to raise it in her Rule 1925(b) statement. SeePa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court arewaived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”);see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in theStatement and/or raised in accordance with the provisions ofthis paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). Therefore, Stepmother'sargument regarding the untimeliness of Mother's preliminaryobjections is waived.5*3 Turning to the second argument contained inStepmother's first issue, Stepmother claims that the trial courterred when it entered its order dismissing her petition withprejudice because, in doing so, it materially departed fromits oral ruling, wherein it did not specify whether dismissalwould be with or without prejudice. See Appellant's Brief,at 22-23. Further, Stepmother claims that dismissals forlack of standing are not adjudications on the merits and,therefore, must be without prejudice. See id. at 23 (citingCommonwealth v. Parker, 152 A.3d 309 (Pa. Super. 2016)).
A.C. Appellant v. H.D. AND J.C., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Stepmother has likewise failed to preserve this issue byraising it with the trial court prior to her appeal. See Pa.R.A.P.302; see also id. at 1925(b)(4)(vii). Stepmother did not raisethis argument in her motion for reconsideration or in her Rule1925(b) statement. Therefore, the claim is waived on appeal.In her second issue, Stepmother argues that the trial courterred in excluding the exhibits she marked and identifiedthroughout the custody hearing. Stepmother avers that,because Mother's exhibits were admitted while hers were notwhere she “believed that marking constituted admission[,]”she was “deprived of justice through procedural confusion.”Appellant's Brief, at 35-36.Stepmother has, however, waived this issue for failure toproperly develop it. See Pa.R.A.P 2119(a) (argument sectionof brief must contain “discussion and citation of authoritiesas are deemed pertinent”). Stepmother cites only two casesin support of her argument: Williams v. Yohe, 131 A.3d 1036(Pa. Super. 2016) and In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207 (Pa.Super. 2010). We have determined that Williams v. Yohe, 131A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super. 2016) does not exist; there is no caseat that reporter citation, and our search of the parties’ namesonly uncovered a case by the name of Danielle Marie Yohev. Michael Craig Williams from the Tenth Judicial District inFlorida. While In re Ullman does exist, Stepmother cites it fora proposition for which it does not stand. Stepmother cites itin support of the proposition that “[w]hen a misunderstanding—not neglect—causes a procedural omission, courts must actto prevent prejudice.” Appellant's Brief, at 36. In re Ullman,however, contains no discussion of a procedural mistakebeing overlooked when caused by a misunderstanding asopposed to neglect. See generally, id.6 Therefore, giventhe lack of proper discussion and citation of authority, thisargument, too, is waived.Stepmother's third and fourth issues, which we analyzetogether for ease of disposition, both challenge the trial court'sstanding determination. Stepmother argues, inter alia, that thetrial court erred when it ignored or gave insufficient weightto her testimony showing she assumed a parental role towardthe Children and discharged paren tal duties, improperlyrelied on post-separation conduct, and applied the wrong legalstandard. See Appellant's Brief, at 27-34, 36-38, 44-49.*4 Our standard of review is as follows:Issues of standing generally raisepure questions of law for which weemploy de novo review of a trialcourt's decision. [A] challenge toasserted in loco parentis status in aparticular context typically involvesa fact-intensive inquiry[ ] and mayimplicate mixed questions of lawand fact. Where factual findings andcredibility determinations are at issue,we will accept them insofar as they aresupported by the record.See Int. of K.N.L., 284 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2022) (internalcitations omitted).At a basic level, “[s]tanding relates to the capacity of anindividual to pursue a particular legal action, and requires thepetitioning litigant to be adversely affected, or aggrieved, insome way.” Id. at 136. Traditionally, this requirement is met“where an individual demonstrates [that she] has a substantialinterest in the subject matter of the litigation that [is] directand immediate, rather than remote, and which distinguishes[her] interest from the common interest of other citizens.” Id.(internal quotations omitted).Pennsylvania statute confers standing to seek custody uponindividuals who stand in loco parentis to a child. SeeHale v. Hale, 345 A.3d 1234, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2025); seealso 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2). The phrase in loco parentisspecifically “refers to a person who puts [herself] in thesituation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligationsincident to the parental relationship without going through theformality of a legal adoption.” Int. of K.N.L., 284 A.3d at144. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court further explained that“[t]he foundational elements of in loco parentis status, uponwhich all other considerations may rise or fall, include theassumption of a parental role, and the discharge of parentalduties.” Id. (citing C.G. v. J.H., 193 A.3d at 907–08). Theassumption of the parental role, however, must originatewith a legal parent's assent, be it through encouragementor acquiescence. Int. of K.N.L., 284 A.3d at 144. The timeframe relevant to an in loco parentis analysis is “when theparty developed the relationship with the child with theacquiescence of encouragement of the natural parent.” Id.at 145. While the test is “stringent” to “prevent intrusion
A.C. Appellant v. H.D. AND J.C., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4into fundamental parental rights” by “those who are merelystrangers,” our Supreme Court has cautioned it must not beinterpreted “so rigidly or absolutely as to deny one actingin loco parentis an opportunity to be heard[.]” Id. at 138–39. With those principles in mind, we turn to the merits ofStepmother's position.Applying the foregoing analysis here, we conclude thetrial court did not err in its standing determination.The trial court considered the evidence put forward byStepmother insufficient, explaining that Stepmother “failedto provide clear or specific examples[,] such as managingthe Children's daily routines or participating in significantdecision-making[,]” that Stepmother's statements “lack[ed]the necessary specificity and do not reflect the level ofparental responsibility required[,]” and that Stepmother hadnot “offered insights into how she co-parented with Father orwhat specific role she played alongside him in the [Children's]upbringing.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/30/25, at 10.*5 Based upon a comprehensive review of the record, andmindful of the appropriate standard and scope of review, weconclude that the trial court correctly determined Stepmotherdid not stand in loco parentis to the Children. WhileStepmother's testimony indicates she played a significantrole in the Children's lives during her time with them, it isinsufficient to show that she assumed the role of a parent. SeeHale, 345 A.3d at 1240 (finding in loco parentis status wherepetitioner “undertook numerous shared parental obligations”such as providing “independent input regarding [child's]medical providers, education, and general welfare”); see alsoA.C. v. E.K., 331 A.3d 939, 947 (Pa. Super. 2025) (petitionerseeking in loco parentis status failed to establish that he andchild's biological mother lived as a “family unit” and co-parented). Therefore, we find Stepmother's third and fourthissues to be without merit.Stepmother's fifth and sixth issues both claim that the trialcourt took various actions that, when taken together, violatedher right to due process. See Appellant's Brief, at 17, 20,24-25, 41, 49, 53-61. These issues are waived, however,due to Stepmother's failure to cite controlling authority. SeePa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, again, Stepmother cites numerouscases which do not support the proposition she cites them for.For example, Stepmother cites Commonwealth v. Roney, 79A.3d 595 (Pa. 2013) and Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d431 (Pa. 2011) in support of the position that the cumulativeeffect of a trial court's errors can constitute a violation ofdue process, yet neither Roney nor Paddy provide support,even implicitly, for such a position. See Appellant's Brief at17, 20, 25, 41, and 61. Further, Stepmother again cites toWilliams v. Yohe, a case which does not exist. See Appellant'sBrief, at 41 (“As this [C]ourt reaffirmed in Williams v. Yohe,131 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super 2016), ‘[p]rocedural equality isthe cornerstone of due process.’ ”). In addition to Yohe,Stepmother points to Commonwealth v. Lyons, 574 Pa. 373(2003), which also does not exist.7 Therefore, Stepmother'sarguments regarding the trial court's alleged cumulative errorsare waived.Stepmother's final argument is that the trial court erredby making a best-interest determination after finding thatStepmother did not have standing. See Appellant's Brief,at 50-53. While the trial court did briefly opine onwhether awarding Stepmother a form of custody wouldbe in the Children's best interests, because it had alreadydetermined that Stepmother lacked standing, and because ofour affirmance of that determination, the trial court's best-interest analysis is superfluous and, at most, mere dicta. SeeTrial Court Opinion, 8/8/25, at 14. This issue, therefore, isalso without merit.Accordingly, as all of Stepmother's issues are either waivedor without merit, we affirm.Order affirmed.Judgment Entered.Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. ProthonotaryAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 711256 (Table)Footnotes
A.C. Appellant v. H.D. AND J.C., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.51While Stepmother and J.C. (Father) separated in 2022, Stepmother testified at the August 8, 2025 hearingthat they remained married. See N.T. Hearing, 8/8/25, at 7.223 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(2) provides that an individual “who stands in loco parentis to the child” may file an actionfor physical or legal custody.3Stepmother has four children of her own, two of whom are half-siblings to Children and two of whom arestep-siblings to Children.4Father was not present to the testify at the hearing. The testimony indicates that the Children have not been inFather's care since November of 2022, and that Father resides in Texas. See N.T. Hearing, supra, at 21, 93.5Stepmother's argument, if not waived, is meritless. Stepmother claims Rule 1915.5 contains language that itdoes not. Compare Appellant's Brief at 18-19 (“Rule 1915.5(c) is mandatory and absolute: ‘Unless preliminaryobjections are filed within the time provided by subdivision (a), they shall be deemed to be waived’ ”), withPa.R.C.P. 1915.5(c) (“There shall be no discovery unless authorized by special order of court.”). Further,the cases Stepmother cites in support of a 20-day deadline were decided prior to the 2020 amendment toRule 1915.5(c). See Appellant's Brief, at 19 (citing M.G. v. L.D., 155 A.3d 1083, 1087 (Pa. Super. 2017)and M.O. v. J.T.R., 85 A.3d 1058, 1062 (Pa. Super. 2014)). Prior to 2020, Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5 included a 20-day deadline; the current version, effective since October 1, 2020, does not. Compare Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a)(current version), with Pa.R.C.P. 1915.5(a) (prior version effective until Sept. 30, 2020).6Based upon our review of Stepmother's brief and the cases cited therein, we suspect she used generativeartificial intelligence in drafting it. See Saber v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 2026 WL 194332, at *3 n.4 (Pa.Super. Jan. 14, 2026) (discussing generative artificial intelligence “hallucinations,” wherein program makesup cases that do not exist). While we may liberally construe materials filed by pro se litigants, they are stillsubject to the same rules as represented litigants. See Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa2014). Therefore, all litigants using generative artificial intelligence must ensure that the citations in their briefsare to real cases, or they risk waiving them for failure to cite to “pertinent” authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).7While we found three Pennsylvania cases decided in 2003 with the caption Commonwealth v. Lyons, nonestand for the proposition Stepmother cites it for or appear at the reporter citation she provides.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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