Baker v. Baker (Jan. 7, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Jessica Baker v. Ryan Joseph Baker
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania (PA)
Court
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Decided
Jan. 7, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
JESSICA BAKER v. RYAN JOSEPH BAKER Appellant, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 45197Unpublished DispositionOnly the Westlaw citation is currently available.NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION -SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37Superior Court of Pennsylvania.JESSICA BAKERv.RYAN JOSEPH BAKER AppellantNo. 1130 EDA 2025|FILED JANUARY 7, 2026Appeal from the Order Entered May 22, 2025 In the Courtof Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):2019-60902BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS,P.J.E.*MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:*1 Appellant, Ryan Joseph Baker (“Father”), appeals pro sefrom the May 22, 2025 order1 entered in the Bucks CountyCourt of Common Pleas that, inter alia, found Father incontempt and confirmed the parties stipulated custody order.In this appeal, Father raises challenges to both the April 16,2025 order holding him in contempt as well as a stipulatedcustody order entered the next day, April 17, 2025, thatmodified not only custody but also his contempt sanctions.Upon review, we conclude that the April 17, 2025 stipulatedcustody order superseded the April 16, 2025 contempt orderand, therefore, all challenges to the April 16, 2025 contemptorder are moot. Moreover, because the parties agreed to theApril 17, 2025 order, it is unappealable. Accordingly, weaffirm.The following factual and procedural history is relevant tothis appeal. Father and Appellee, Jessica Baker (“Mother”),are parents to nine-year-old L.B. and eight-year-old C.B.(collectively, “Children”). They separated on May 15, 2019,while living in Arizona, after almost five years of marriage.During that time, Father struggled with alcoholism, wasverbally and sexually abusive to Mother, was verbally andphysically abusive to Children, and was unable to superviseChildren properly. Mother obtained an order of protectionin Maricopa County, Arizona, against Father and moved toBucks County, Pennsylvania, to live with her parents. On July3, 2019, Mother filed an Emergency Petition for Custody inBucks County seeking joint legal and sole physical custodyof Children. On September 23, 2019, the Superior Courtof Arizona in Maricopa County entered a temporary orderawarding Mother sole legal custody and primary physicalcustody and Father supervised partial physical custody ofChildren. On December 2, 2019, the Superior Court ofArizona granted Mother's motion to transfer venue to BucksCounty, Pennsylvania. Father subsequently moved to BucksCounty, Pennsylvania. On July 20, 2024, Father marriedJessie Bisceglie-Baker.In this highly contentious case, both parties have filednumerous petitions for contempt, petitions for emergencyrelief, and petitions to modify custody. On January 22, 2024,the parties reached a custody agreement for Mother to haveprimary physical custody of Children and Father to havepartial physical custody of Children on weekends until Aprilof 2024 when Mother and Father would begin to sharephysical custody of Children. On June 17, 2024, Motherfiled an Emergency Petition for Special Relief requestingthat the court order Father to submit to a hair folliclealcohol screening test due to concerning behavior that Motherwitnessed, including appearing at Children's school smellingof alcohol. Emergency Pet., 6/17/23, at 5-8. On June 20,2024, Father filed a pro se “Counterclaim for EmergencyPFSR” requesting that the court hold Mother in contempt andaward him legal custody. On October 11, 2024, after a hearingand upon consideration of the 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328 custodyfactors, the court denied Father's request for legal custodyand awarded Mother sole legal custody of Children, deniedFather's petition for contempt, ordered Father to pay Mother'sattorney's fees, and ordered Father to submit to hair follicletesting for alcohol.*2 On October 31, 2024, Mother filed a contempt petitionaverring that Father failed to comply with hair follicle testingfor alcohol. In response, Father filed a contempt petitionagainst Mother prompting both parties to file numerousresponses. On February 12, 2025, Mother filed a motion fora hearing date on her contempt petition. Father filed a motionto dismiss Mother's contempt petition, a motion for judicialreassignment, and various other motions. On April 16, 2025,the trial court held a hearing and found Father in contemptof the October 11, 2024 order compelling him to submit toa hair follicle test for alcohol use after hearing testimonythat, in October 2024, Father “shaved all the hair on hisbody, despite knowing that he was required to submit to a
JESSICA BAKER v. RYAN JOSEPH BAKER Appellant, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2hair follicle test, and knowing such testing could utilize otherbody hair.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/22/25, at 5. The court found,“[i]n his testimony, Appellant essentially acknowledged thathe was aware since October 2024, at least, that he needed arequisite length of hair, from anywhere on his body, to obtainthe hair follicle testing, yet he continued to shave all hair onhis body and continued to cut his head hair extraordinarilyshort. This [c]ourt is of the belief that [Father] did this in aneffort to avoid the testing.” Id. at 22. The court ordered Fatherto immediately go to ArcPoint Labs and complete his hairfollicle test before 4:00 PM that same day, or the court wouldimpose a suspended sentence of 30 days incarceration, whichwould be purged upon Father submitting to the testing. Uponrequest from Father, the court suspended his incarcerationsanction until noon on April 17, 2025, to allow Father andMother the opportunity to come to a custody agreement.On April 17, 2025, at the request of the parties, the courtentered a stipulated custody order. In that stipulated custodyorder, the parties agreed that Mother would have sole legaland physical custody of Children until further notice. Theparties also agreed that Father would register for Soberlink,submit to a complete and accurate Ethyl Glucuronide (“EtG”)hair follicle test with a look-back period of six months, andthat Father shall only be able to file a petition for custodyupon the production of an EtG hair follicle test showing zeroalcohol intake.Father timely appealed. Both Father and the trial courtcomplied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.Father raises the following issues for our review:1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion andcommitted an error of law by enforcing a stipulated custodyagreement where Appellant's consent was not voluntary,knowing, or intelligent, and where the court failed toconduct an on-the-record colloquy to safeguard Appellant'sdue process rights.2. Whether the trial court violated Appellant's due processrights by approving and enforcing a custody agreemententered under coercion, duress, and undue pressure,without a meaningful opportunity to consult independentcounsel or understand the consequences.3. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to hold anevidentiary hearing and failing to consider the statutorybest-interest factors under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a) beforeentering and enforcing the stipulated custody order.4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and violatedAppellant's constitutional rights by ordering an EtG hairfollicle test purporting to detect alcohol use dating back toJuly 1, 2024, a scientifically unsupported and physicallyimpossible condition and by threatening incarceration fornoncompliance.5. Whether the trial court improperly bypassed theappellate process and exerted undue pressure on Appellantby asserting it could not modify custody due to a pendingappeal yet could hold Appellant in contempt to compelabandonment or alteration of the appeal.6. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by materiallymodifying custody and finding Appellant in contemptbased on unsubstantiated accusations without competentevidence, relying solely on Appellee's claim of smellingalcohol more than a year earlier.7. Whether the trial court demonstrated bias and theappearance of bias by retaliating against Appellant forexercising appellate rights, thereby depriving Appellant ofa fundamentally fair proceeding in violation of due process.8. Whether the cumulative effect of the trial court'serrors, bias, and potential conflicts of interest requiresvacatur of the orders entered and reassignment of the caseto a different judge to ensure impartiality and the fairadministration of justice.Father's Br. at 10-12.This Court reviews a custody determination “for an abuseof discretion, and our scope of review is broad.” S.W.D. v.S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014). This Court willnot find an abuse of discretion “merely because a reviewingcourt would have reached a different conclusion.” In reK.D., 144 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Super. 2016). This Courtmust accept the findings of the trial court that the evidencesupports. S.W.D., 96 A.3d at 400. Importantly, “[o]n issues ofcredibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to the findingsof the trial judge who has had the opportunity to observe theproceedings and demeanor of the witnesses.” K.T. v. L.S.,118 A.3d 1136, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).We can interfere only where the “custody order is manifestlyunreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.” Saintzv. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citationomitted).
JESSICA BAKER v. RYAN JOSEPH BAKER Appellant, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3*3 Likewise, we review a contempt order for a “clear abuseof discretion.” Chrysczanavicz v. Chrysczanavicz, 796 A.2d366, 368 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). We give greatdeference to the trial court's discretion. Id. Our review is,thus, “confined to a determination of whether the facts supportthe trial court's decision.” Id. at 368-69 (citation omitted).Moreover, we likewise review a trial court's award of counselfees for an abuse of discretion. A.L.-S. v. B.S., 117 A.3d 352,361 (Pa. Super. 2015).* * *Father raises challenges to both the April 16, 2025 orderfinding him in contempt as well as the April 17, 2025 orderentered by agreement. Upon review, we conclude that theApril 17, 2025 order supersedes the April 16, 2025 orderfinding Father in contempt and ordering him to comply orserve jail time. The April 17, 2025 order discharges thepossibility that Father will serve jail time and, instead, grantsMother full legal and physical custody of Children untilFather complies with the hair follicle test. See Order, 4/17/25;Order, 5/22/25. Accordingly, any of Father's challengesregarding the court's April 16, 2025 finding of contempt,including issues four, five, and six, are moot and we declineto address them.* * *Moreover, we conclude that the April 17, 2025 stipulatedcustody order is not appealable. It is well settled that “[a] partywho has acquiesced in an order or judgment will not laterbe heard to challenge it.” R. Miller v. R.S. Miller, 744 A.2d778, 783 (Pa. Super. 1999) (quoting Karkaria v. Karkaria,592 A.2d 64, 71 (Pa. Super. 1991)). In other words, becauseFather agreed to the April 17, 2025 stipulated custody order,he cannot now challenge it on appeal.Notably, “[b]ecause children are not mere chattel, agreementsregarding custody and visitation are always subject to courtreview and adjustment in the best interests of the child.” Hussv. Weaver, 134 A.3d 449, 455 (Pa. Super. 2016). Parents arefree to enter into agreements regarding custody and visitation.L.J. Miller v. R.E Miller, 620 A.2d 1161, 1165-66 (Pa. Super.1993); see also Pa.R.Civ.P 1915.7. However, a trial court isnot bound by, and may set aside, such agreements if they donot serve the child's best interest. Id.Here, Father fails to raise any challenge that the April 17,2025 stipulated custody order was not in Children's bestinterests.2 Instead, he asserts that he entered the agreementunder fraud or duress and argues that the trial court abusedits discretion in entering the stipulated custody order. Father'sBr. at 10-12. Father contends that it is an abuse of discretionfor a court to uphold a custody agreement that is made underduress or coercion, but he fails to support this argument withany relevant and valid legal authority. We observe that Fatherreferences case law to bolster his arguments, but the citationsappear to be fabricated and do not correspond to actual casesthat support his position. See Father's Br. at 20, 30, 31, 33, 40.*4 In sum, the April 17, 2025 stipulated custody ordersuperseded the court's April 16, 2025 contempt dispositionand, therefore, all challenges to the contempt order are moot.Moreover, because Father agreed to the April 17, 2025stipulated custody order—and failed to raise a challengethat the order was not in Children's best interests—it isunappealable, and we, thus, affirm the order.Order affirmed.Judgment Entered.Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. ProthonotaryAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 45197 (Table)Footnotes*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.1Father filed a timely notice of appeal challenging an April 16, 2025 contempt “order” as well as an April 17,2025 stipulated custody order. Upon review, this Court observed that on April 16, 2025, after conducting acontempt hearing, the trial court docketed a Family Court Sheet rather than an order finding Appellant in
JESSICA BAKER v. RYAN JOSEPH BAKER Appellant, Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4contempt. On May 14, 2025, this Court issued an order directing the trial court to correct its ministerial errorwith respect to its April 16, 2025 contempt disposition. On May 22, 2025, the trial court complied.2We note that Father asserts generally that the trial court failed to hold a hearing and consider the Section5328 custody factors prior to entering the stipulated custody order, but he fails to raise a challenge thatthe stipulated custody order is not in Children's best interest. Father's Br. at 41. While a court can rejecta stipulated custody order if it is not in a child's best interest, it is not necessary for a court to conduct anevidentiary hearing and consider the Section 5328 factors, when presented with a stipulated custody orderthat the parties agreed to. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.7 (regarding consent orders); see also S.P. v. B.S., 2019WL 210411, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2019) (nonprecedential memorandum) (explaining that a court does not have toconsider the Section 5328 custody factors and conduct a hearing if the parties agree to a stipulated custodyorder).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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