MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
TROUTMAN, District Judge.
Summary judgment may be granted where no genuine issue of material fact exists1 and the moving party is entitled thereto as a matter of law.2 Deposition testimony may be used to support or refute the motion.3 The opposing party may not rely solely upon the allegations of the complaint4 but must adduce issues of material fact, defined as one which affects the outcome of the litigation.5 In the case at bar, plaintiff, who is blind, fell and suffered injuries when his seeing eye dog, supplied to him by defendant, reacted to the presence of another dog in the vicinity. Defendant impleaded the third-party defendant on the basis that the plaintiff’s accident occurred on property owned by the third-party defendant and resulted from his negligent maintenance of the sidewalk. The third-party defendant, now moving for summary judgment, contends not only that depositions of plaintiff and another eyewitness establish that the fall occurred in the street adjacent to the sidewalk but also that the dog’s improper behavior comprised the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
Plaintiff testified during depositions that he fell in the street and that the dog dragged him onto the sidewalk. An eyewitness, Margaret Becher, who supposedly viewed the accident from her house across the street, apparently6 testified during depositions that plaintiff was on the sidewalk when she saw him fall. However, where plaintiff fell will be relevant only if defendant can show a genuine issue of material fact establishing the condition of the sidewalk as the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall. In Dubois v. Wilkes-Barre7 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the entry of a compulsory nonsuit where the plaintiff’s testimony failed to establish what caused her fall. To prevail, plaintiff needed to prove “what actually caused the accident, not what might possibly have caused it”.8 A jury could not be allowed to surmise or conjecture that the fall resulted from the existence of melted ice cream and grease on the sidewalk. In the case at bar, defendant suggests through Mrs. Becher’s deposition testimony that the third-party defendant’s sidewalk contained uneven bricks uprooted by a tree. Defendant, failing to demonstrate any evidence linking the uneven bricks to plaintiff’s fall, has not
2
Tose v. First National Bank, 492 F.Supp. 246 (3d Cir. 1981), Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 515 F.Supp. 472 (E.D.Pa. 1981). See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
3
See, for example, Meuller v. Jeffrey Mfg. Co., 494 F.Supp. 275 (E.D.Pa. 1980), aff'd, (3d Cir. 1981). The parties may also rely upon admissions, Grabey v. Ford Motor Co., 89 F.R.D. 575, (E.D.Pa.1981), interrogatories, Hollinger v. Wagner Mining Equipment Co., 505 F.Supp. 894 (E.D.Pa.1981), affidavits, Pangrazzi v. United States, 511 F.Supp. 648, (E.D.Pa.1981), Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F.Supp. 923 (E.D.Pa. 1981), along with the pleadings. Cisione v. Ford Motor Co., 504 F.Supp. 328 (E.D.Pa.1980). See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
4
Martinez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 496 F.Supp. 1002 (E.D.Pa.1979), aff’d, 633 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1980), Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
5
Goodman v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1978), Hollinger v. Wagner Mining Equipment Co., supra.
6
Regrettably, the deposition testimony to which defendant adverted has not been docketed and made part of the file.
7
410 Pa. 155, 189 A.2d 166 (1963).
8
Id. at 156, 189 A.2d 166.