tion by virtue of § 9 of the act of 1890, supra. That jurisdiction was brought into exercise by the filing of the petition, regardless of whether the petition complied with-the statute, and regardless of . any errors or irregularities in the proceedings of the council.
“The power to hear and determine a case is jurisdiction; it is ‘coram judice,’ whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action.” United States v. Arredondo, 6. Pet. 691.
In Morrow v. Weed, 4 Iowa, 77 (66 Am. Dec. 122), it was held :
“ If there be a petition, or the proper matter of that nature, to call into action the power or jurisdiction of the court, its sufficiency cannot be called in question in a collateral proceeding.”
To the same effect is the very well considered case of City of Terre Haute v. Beach, 96 Ind. 143.
The objections urged against the proceedings of the council of the respondent city do not go to any question of jurisdiction, but constitute mainly irregularities and informalities not affecting jurisdiction, and afford no ground for collateral attack.
The appellant’s participation in the annexation proceedings, his subsequent recognition of the jurisdiction of the city authorities, his acquiescence in the result reached and declared by them, and his gross laches in the assertion of his rights, constitute an equitable bar to the cause of action which he, after the lapse of nearly three years, first attempted to assert; and it would be immaterial to the result were we to determine that his conduct amounted to a ratification or an election, or requires the application of the doctrine of estoppel. Strosser v. City of Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443; Hayward v. National Bank, 96 U. S. 611; Graham v. City of Greenville, supra.