Saber v. Navy Fed. Credit Union (Aug. 12, 2024)

Case details
Full caption
Saber v. Navy Federal Credit Union
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Pennsylvania (PA)
Court
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
Decided
Aug. 12, 2024
Disposition
Affirmed
IDRIS ABDUS SABER Appellant v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, --- A.3d ---- (2026)2026 PA Super 7 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 194332Superior Court of Pennsylvania.IDRIS ABDUS SABER Appellantv.NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNIONNo. 2449 EDA 2024|January 14, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2024 In the Courtof Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division atNo(s): 230900635BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.OpinionOPINION BY NICHOLS, J.:*1 Appellant Idris Abdus Saber appeals from the orderdenying his motion for title of vehicle against Appellee NavyFederal Credit Union. Appellant claims that he is the holderin due course of a promissory note for a vehicle loan with acorresponding right to title to the vehicle prior to repaymentof the loan. We affirm.The trial court summarized the facts and procedural historyof this appeal as follows:On or about April 26, 2023, Appellant [ ] applied for andwas preapproved for a loan in the amount of $42,399.00by [Appellee] to purchase a vehicle. The pre-approvalletter, promissory note, security agreement, and disclosureincluded salient terms and conditions of the loan, includingthe required methods of repayment by [Appellant] as theborrower, as well as [Appellee's] approval condition in theform of a security interest and/or lien on the purchasedvehicle as collateral.Following execution of all loan documents and theloan draft which reiterated the security lien condition,[Appellant] successfully purchased and took physicalpossession of [a] 2020 Jeep Grand Cherokee [(Vehicle)]on or about May 1[9], 2023, from Reedman TollChrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Jenkintown [(dealership)].[Vehicle] was purchased with the loan funds that hadbeen conditionally supplied to [Appellant] by [Appellee].[Appellee] paid $30,454.40 [directly] to [the] dealershipand the total amount financed was $42,375.76. [Appellee]duly supplied its lien and title information report[on Vehicle] to the Commonwealth of PennsylvaniaDepartment of Transportation [(PA DOT)] on or about May19, 202[3].The resulting loan draft which had been issued by[Appellee] and executed by both parties expresslyidentified [Appellee's] security interest and/or lien in[Vehicle].... [T]he promissory note required [Appellant]to make payments towards his loan balance. On or aboutJune 19, 2023, ... approximately seven [ ] weeks after[Appellant] had purchased [Vehicle], [Appellee] received aletter from [Appellant] claiming that his debt was invalid.[Appellee] responded to [Appellant's] correspondence inwriting informing [Appellant] that his debt was valid andthat any failure to make payments could result in negativecredit action and breach of the loan agreement. Shortlythereafter, [Appellant] requested verification of his debt,which he received from [Appellee], including consumerloan bills and a copy of the promissory note and allpaperwork related to his purchase of [Vehicle].On or about September 8, 2023, [Appellant] commencedthe instant civil action by [filing] a motion for title ofvehicle ... averring that [Appellant] is the “last endorser”of the promissory note and is, therefore, entitled to the fullunencumbered title [to Vehicle] issued by [PA DOT].On September 26, 2023, [Appellee] filed an answer[,]arguing in pertinent part, that [Appellant] applied for andreceived a loan from [Appellee] to purchase [Vehicle]; that[Appellee] has a valid security interest and has asserteda lien on [Vehicle] as collateral; that the lien is validand legally enforceable, and that [Appellant] still owesa balance on his loan to [Appellee]. [Appellee] furtherresponded that when [Appellant] pays off his vehicle loan,he will be eligible to receive the title to [Vehicle].
IDRIS ABDUS SABER Appellant v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, --- A.3d ---- (2026)2026 PA Super 7 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2*2 Upon consideration of all submitted evidence andpleadings, [the trial] court entered an order on October2, 2023, which was [ ] docketed on October 3, 2023,denying Appellant[’s motion].[1] On November 1,202[3], Appellant filed a notice of appeal ... docketed under2841 EDA 2023[,] challenging th[e] October [3], 2023order. Per order dated November 3, 2023, [the trial court]directed Appellant to file a concise statement of matterscomplained of on appeal by November 24, 2023. Appellantfailed to file any statement. On January 18, 2024, [thetrial] court submitted a 1925(a) opinion seeking dismissalof [Appellant's] appeal because all issues had been waiveddue to Appellant's failure to timely time a statement ofmatters complained of on appeal.On January 26, 2024, Appellant filed a motion to file nuncpro tunc arguing that he never received [the trial] court'sNovember 3, 202[3] order directing him to file a statementof errors[.] Subsequent review of the civil docket [by thetrial court] reflected no docketing of [the trial] court's orderdirecting the statement filing that had been filed and sent tothe parties. Appellee [ ] had no opposition to [ ] Appellant'smotion to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. On April29, 2024, [this Court] quashed Appellant's appeal, docketedunder 2841 EDA 2023, granting Appellant ten days tofile post-trial motions pursuant to Jenkins v. Robertson,227 A.3d 1196 (Pa. Super. 2022).[2] [On May 9, 2024,Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief.]To provide [Appellant] a full opportunity to revisit themerits of his motions, [the trial court] directed that a rulehearing be scheduled ... for August 12, 2024[.]Trial Ct. Op., 3/3/25, at 1-4 (some formatting altered and somecitations omitted).At the August 12, 2024 hearing, Appellant argued thathe had a right to title of Vehicle because his “borrower'ssignature on the borrower's line” of the promissory note wasan “endorsement signed by the endorser ... which transfersliability of the security instrument to the new payee[,]”or, in other words, that “an endorsement ... removes theendorser from liability.” N.T., 8/12/24, at 8, 13. Appellantattached a copy of the promissory note to his post-trialmotion. See Appellant's Post-Trial Mot., 5/9/24, Ex. D(copy of promissory note). The promissory note is datedMay 19, 2023 and states the terms of the loan, includingthe amount borrowed, the interest rate and repaymentschedule, and identifies Vehicle as the security interest onthe loan. Id. Appellant signed the note both on the signaturelines for “Borrower” and for “Owner of Collateral (Otherthan Borrower).” Id. Below the signature lines Appellant'ssignature appears a third time, within what appears to be anink stamp stating “WITHOUT RECOURSE PAY TO THEORDER OF IDRIS ABDUS SABER.” Id.Appellee responded that Appellant is not an endorser withregard to the loan but rather “the original maker” of thepromissory note. N.T., 8/12/24, at 11-12. Appellee alsoargued that “[Appellant's] stamping ‘without recourse’ onthe promissory note has literally no legal effect.” Id. at 12.Appellee concluded by noting that Appellant “has taken outa loan that he hasn't repaid[ ]” and, therefore, “[h]e is notentitled to the title of the vehicle[.]” Id. at 13. After hearingthese arguments, the trial court concluded that Appellant“can't get the title of [Vehicle] as long as there's a lien onit. When you pay the loan back, you can get the title of[Vehicle].” Id. On August 13, 2024, the trial court dismissedas moot Appellant's motion to file [a Rule 1925(b) statement]nunc pro tunc and denied Appellant's motion for post-trialrelief. See Trial Ct. Orders, 8/13/24.*3 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and bothAppellant and the trial court timely complied with Pa.R.A.P.1925.On appeal, Appellant raises the following claims:1. Whether the trial court misapplied [PennsylvaniaUniform Commercial Code (PUCC)] principles and thelaw by rejecting the legal effect of a signed specialindorsement appearing on the original promissory noteand thus erred regarding title or possession of the vehicledespite uncontroverted evidence of an indorsementtransferring said note “without recourse” to Appellant,as a Holder in Due Course under 13 Pa.C.S. § 3302.2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error byfailing to recognize Appellant's status as a Holder inDue Course under 13 Pa.C.S. §§[ ] 3104(d), 3301,and 3302, and thus the trial court's judgment conflictswith established precedent, including D'Happart v. FirstCommonwealth Bank, 110 A.3d 167 (Pa. Super. 2015)and 291 A.3d 1026 (Pa. Super. 2023) which confirmsthat a Holder in Due Course is entitled to enforce anegotiable instrument free from competing claims.Appellant's Brief at 7-8.
IDRIS ABDUS SABER Appellant v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, --- A.3d ---- (2026)2026 PA Super 7 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Preliminarily, we address whether Appellant has waivedhis claims. “[W]here an appellant fails to properly raiseor develop his issues on appeal, or where his brief iswholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, [thisCourt] will not consider the merits of the claims raisedon appeal.” Lynch v. Zwecharowski, 1041 EDA 2021,2022 WL 1836263, at *3 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublishedmem.)3 (citation omitted); see also Butler v. Illes, 747A.2d 943, 945 (Pa. Super. 2000) (finding waiver where theappellant “failed to cogently explain ... why the trial courtabused its discretion or made an error of law”). “Appellatearguments which fail to adhere to the[ ] rules [of appellateprocedure] may be considered waived, and arguments whichare not appropriately developed are waived. Arguments notappropriately developed include those where the party hasfailed to cite any authority in support of a contention.”Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006)(citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(c).Here, in his first issue on appeal and in his argument,Appellant cites to “D'Happart v. First Commonwealth Bank,110 A.3d 167 (Pa. Super. 2015) and 291 A.3d 1026 (Pa.Super. 2023).” Appellant's Brief at 8, 12. No such case existsat either of these citations and the single authority with thesame caption does not support Appellant's contention. Cf.d'Happart v. First Commonwealth Bank, 282 A.3d 704 (Pa.Super. 2022). Appellant proffers voluminous argument aboutthe rights of a holder in due course under the PUCC but,absent the purported authority in the non-existent D'Happartcases, fails to state an argument that he has the rights of aholder in due course as enumerated in the PUCC. Appellant'sBrief at 11-22.4*4 While Appellant's brief also includes citations to actualauthority, such as provisions of the PUCC, he fails to“reference the place in the record where the matter referredto appears[,]” that is, to relate the cited authority to the“questions to be argued[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (c). Appellantalso fails to discuss how these PUCC provisions apply tothe facts, as required by Rule 2119(a). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)(requiring argument to include “discussion and citation ofauthorities as are deemed pertinent”).Because Appellant has failed to develop cognizablearguments with discussion and citation to relevant authorityor where in the record the matter appears, we concludethat he has waived his claims on appeal. See Lynch, 2022WL 1836263, at *3; see also Butler, 747 A.2d at 945;Lackner, 892 A.2d at 29-30; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a),(c).Accordingly, we affirm the order below.Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.All Citations--- A.3d ----, 2026 WL 194332, 2026 PA Super 7Footnotes1We note that on September 11, 2023, the trial court issued a rule to show cause order wherein it directedthe parties to appear before it on October 2, 2023 “prepared to present evidence and/or testimony as to theissues raised in the petition and any response thereto.” Trial Ct. Order, 9/11/23 (Rule Returnable). On thesame date, September 11, 2023, the trial court also scheduled a “motion hearing” for October 2, 2023. TrialCt. Docket at 4.2On April 29, 2024, under the impression that the trial could had held “the equivalent of a trial,” this Courtentered an order quashing Appellant's prior appeal on the basis that the trial court had not provided Appellantwith his post-trial motion rights pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c) and granted Appellant ten days “to file anypost-trial motions with the trial court.” Saber v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 2841 EDA 2023, Order, 4/29/24.3We may cite to non-published decisions of this Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive valuepursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
IDRIS ABDUS SABER Appellant v. NAVY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, --- A.3d ---- (2026)2026 PA Super 7 © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.44In addition to Appellant's nonsensical citations to and characterization of the D'Happart cases, Appellant'sbrief fails to relate the PUCC provisions cited to relevant portions of the record. By way of illustration, Appellantargues:To qualify as a Holder in Due Course, the PUCC requires only that the party a) take the instrument forvalue, b) in good faith, and c) without notice of any claim or defense at the time of negotiation. See 13Pa.C.S. § 3302(a).The record demonstrates all of these elements. Appellant testified to having taken the instrument in abona fide transaction, gave value, and was not aware of any competing claims or defenses at the timeof acquisition.Appellant's Brief at 12 (emphasis in original). Here, among other things, Appellant's contention that he “gavevalue” is wholly unmoored from the record. Further, as Appellee points out, in addition to the D'Happartcitations, Appellant's brief contains citations to several other cases which “do not exist” and suggests this isdue to Appellant's use of generative artificial intelligence (“generative AI” or “GAI”) to draft his brief. Appellee'sBrief at 17-18.The Colorado Court of Appeals has explained that “[c]ase names and citations that a GAI tool makes upare known as ‘hallucinations.’ ” Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 564 P.3d 1117, 1119 (Colo. App.2024) (citations omitted); see also Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed.Cl. 163, 169 (Fed. Cl. 2025) (statingthat “[i]t is no secret that generative AI programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases, and withthe advent of AI, courts have seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants have citedsuch fake, hallucinated cases in their briefs” (citation omitted)). The Al-Hamim Court further stated that “GAItools are trained using [large language models] that, through a form of machine learning known as deeplearning, teach the program how characters, words, and sentences function together.” Al-Hamim, 564 P.3dat 1123 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a] GAI system can generate citations to totallyfabricated court decisions bearing seemingly real party names, with seemingly real reporter, volume, andpage references, and seemingly real dates of decision.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted); see alsoCommonwealth v. Shie, 2971 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 6878610, at *7 n.7 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 18, 2023)(unpublished mem.) (noting that “not a single one of [the] citations [in the brief] is legitimate. This Court is leftto guess whether this counterfeit authority is the product of [GAI], or if there is a more nefarious explanationfor the misinformation”).Litigants must cite to authority that is “pertinent” to the issues on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). The useof GAI to draft legal filings (including by pro se litigants), without verification of the accuracy of the contentso produced, may lead to misstatements and/or misrepresentations of legal authority. Such GAI-generatedmisstatements and/or misrepresentations are not ‘pertinent’ authority. Additionally, such misstatements and/or misrepresentations, if further disseminated, would undermine the sense of accuracy and reliability of thelaw they purport to reference.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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