Bruce v. United States, No. 3:25-cv-4020-SAL (Feb. 9, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Nelson L. Bruce v. The United States
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
South Carolina (SC)
Court
South Carolina Supreme Court
Decided
Feb. 9, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Sherri A. Lydon (J.) (unanimous Court)
Nelson L. Bruce, Plaintiff, v. The United States, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 353523Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. South Carolina.Nelson L. Bruce, Plaintiff,v.The United States, Defendant.Case No. 3:25-cv-4020-SAL|Filed 02/09/2026ORDERSherri A. Lydon United States District Judge*1 Nelson L. Bruce, proceeding pro se, brings this civilaction pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680, 1346(b). Bruce contends that a deputyclerk of court in the United States District Court's CharlestonDivision negligently failed to docket his notice of appeal ina previous civil case.1 He claims this failure deprived himof appellate review of the district judge's decision. Beforethe court is the United States’ motion to dismiss. [ECFNo. 23.] United States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett,under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(4)(D.S.C.), issued a Report and Recommendation (“Report”),recommending that the motion be granted. [ECF No. 51.]Bruce timely objected.2 [ECF No. 56.]STANDARD OF REVIEW*2 The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation tothis court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight,and the responsibility to make a final determination remainswith this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). In response to a recommendation, any party mayserve and file written objections. See Elijah v. Dunbar, 66F.4th 454, 459 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)). The district court then makesa de novo determination of those portions of the Report towhich an objection is made. Id. To trigger de novo review,an objecting party must object with sufficient specificity toreasonably alert the district court of the true ground for theobjection. Id. (quoting United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007)). If a litigant objects only generally,the court need not explain adopting the Report and must “onlysatisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the recordin order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. ColonialLife & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citingFed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).An objection is specific so long as it alerts the districtcourt that the litigant believes the magistrate judge erred inrecommending dismissal of that claim. Elijah, 66 F.4th at460. Objections need not be novel to be sufficiently specific.Id. Without specific objections, this court need not giveany explanation for adopting the recommendation. Field v.McMaster, 663 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451–52 (D.S.C. 2009). Thatsaid, the Fourth Circuit has instructed district courts that prose filings, “however unskillfully pleaded, must be liberallyconstrued.” Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 1994).DISCUSSIONThe magistrate judge found that Bruce's claim fails becauseclerks of court are generally entitled to quasi-judicialimmunity. See ECF No. 51. Bruce opposes dismissal andgenerally objects to the entire Report. [ECF No. 56.] For thereasons below, the court agrees that quasi-judicial immunityapplies and that Bruce's claim must be dismissed.The FTCA provides only a limited waiver of the UnitedStates’ sovereign immunity. See Welch v. United States, 409F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2005). The Act expressly preservesdefenses based on judicial immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674(permitting the United States “to assert any defense basedupon judicial ... immunity which otherwise would have beenavailable to the employee of the United States whose act oromission gave rise to the claim”). Courts have recognized inmany contexts that “a court clerk is generally entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.” See, e.g., Ross v. Baron, 493 F. App'x405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012). Quasi-judicial immunity protectsquasi-judicial actors such as deputy clerks of court for tasksundertaken as part of the judicial process. See Al-Mujahadinv. McBride, C/A No. 9:13-2671-BHH, 2015 WL 402918, at*4 (D.S.C. Jan. 28, 2015).Here, Bruce asserts a single claim for negligence, allegingthat a docketing clerk failed to properly docket his noticeof appeal.3 That said, clerks of court are generally entitledto quasi-judicial immunity for negligent acts, though suchimmunity would not extend to intentional acts. ComparePink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
Nelson L. Bruce, Plaintiff, v. The United States, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2causes of action against clerks of court for negligent conductimpeding access to the courts cannot survive) with Myer v.Stoney, 752 F. App'x 157, 158 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that adistrict court “may have erred” in concluding that a plaintiff'sclaim against a clerk of court for intentional refusal to filedocuments was barred by quasi-judicial immunity); see alsoWymore v. Green, 245 F. App'x 780, 783 (10th Cir. 2007)(considering a § 1983 claim based on a deputy clerk of court'srefusal to file the plaintiff's court documents and extendingabsolute quasi-judicial immunity because the deputy clerk'sactions were “judicial act[s], ... having an integral relationshipwith the judicial process” (quoting Coleman v. Farnsworth,90 F. App'x 313, 317 (10th Cir. 2004))); Meyers v. UnitedStates, No. 7:23CV00347, 2024 WL 1893607, at *3 (W.D.Va. Apr. 30, 2024) (“[P]ast and current Clerks of Court areentitled to quasi-judicial immunity for tasks they undertookas part of the judicial process.”). Because Bruce alleges onlynegligence, his claim falls squarely within the scope of quasi-judicial immunity and is therefore subject to dismissal.*3 In his objections, Bruce argues that the filing of anotice of appeal is “an event of jurisdictional significance,”that the magistrate judge improperly relied on unpublishedcases from the Fourth Circuit as if they were binding, andthat the magistrate judge improperly applied the doctrine ofquasi-judicial immunity. See generally ECF No. 56 at 6–18.However, the court finds that the magistrate judge's analysis isconsistent with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Pink that courtclerks are immune from actions alleging negligent conductconcerning access to courts. See 52 F.3d at 78; Hamiltonv. Murray, 648 F. App'x 344, 345 (4th Cir. 2016). Brucefurther contends that the act of filing a document is ministerialand thus immunity would not apply. [ECF No. 56 at 3, 8–9, 10–17.] That said, even assuming the clerk of court'sactions were ministerial, the court finds that because Brucealleged negligence, the immunity analysis remains the same.Accordingly, even upon de novo review, the court furtherfinds that the magistrate judge correctly applied the lawgoverning Bruce's allegations and correctly recommendeddismissal.After a thorough review of the Report, the applicablelaw, and the record of this case, the court ADOPTS theReport and Recommendation, ECF No. 51, and overrulesBruce's objections. As a result, the United States’ motion todismiss, ECF No. 23, is GRANTED. Bruce fails to state aplausible claim for relief, and his claim is therefore dismissedWITHOUT PREJUDICE.IT IS SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 353523Footnotes1See Bruce v. Bank of America, 2:19-2854-BHH. According to Bruce, he hand-delivered the notice of appealto the court on September 2, 2022, and received a stamped copy at that time but the notice of appeal wasnever filed on the docket. The record does not reflect that Bruce sought relief in that case by asking for anextension of time to appeal under the appellate rules. The docket reflects a judgment was entered on August4, 2022, with no docket entries after that date. See Bruce v. Bank of America, ECF Nos. 69, 70. Rather thanpursuing relief in that action, Bruce initiated proceedings under the FTCA on July 2, 2024. ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-7.It is unclear when Bruce realized that his notice of appeal had not been filed or why he waited more than ayear and a half to file an FTCA claim raising the same issues.2The court observes that Bruce's filings in this case bear characteristics the court has increasingly observedin briefs generated by artificial intelligence (“AI”) programs. See ECF Nos. 1, 56. Perhaps as the result ofusing AI, sometimes there are errors in Bruce's citations or statements of law. For example, Bruce claimsLocal Rule 83.I.08 “obligates the Clerk to accept all filings, regardless of form, and to note deficiencies ratherthan reject them.” [ECF No. 1 at 5.] In fact, Local Rule 83.I.08 relates to rules of disciplinary enforcement.“It is no secret that generative AI programs are known to ‘hallucinate’ nonexistent cases, and with the adventof AI, courts have seen a rash of cases in which both counsel and pro se litigants have cited such fake,
Nelson L. Bruce, Plaintiff, v. The United States, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3hallucinated cases in their briefs.” Sanders v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 163, 169 (2025). Although the courtdoes not impose sanctions at this time, it cautions Bruce that the submission of nonexistent or inaccuratelegal authority is improper and wastes judicial resources. The court concludes a warning is appropriate here.See id. at 170. (“[G]iven the relative novelty of AI, the Court recognizes that Plaintiff may not have been awareof the risk that AI programs can generate fake case citations and other legal misstatements. For this reason,many judges opt to warn—rather than sanction—pro se litigants who have improperly used AI ....”). Bruceis now on notice that he could be subjected to sanctions, including the striking of filings, the imposition offiling restrictions, monetary penalties, or the dismissal of his action, should he cite fake, AI-generated legalauthority to the court.3The sole cause of action in Bruce's complaint is for negligence. See ECF No. 1 at 4–5. As a result, themagistrate judge entered an order construing Bruce's action as one for negligence and offered him theopportunity to object to this construction. See ECF No. 18 at 1; ECF No. 27 (“[I]f any party disagrees withthe court's construction of the Plaintiff's claims, he or she may file an appropriate motion with the court withinseven (7) days from the date of this order.”). Bruce did not timely object, nor did he seek to amend hiscomplaint. While Bruce argues in his objections that the magistrate judge “incorrectly redefines [his] claimas negligence ‘in maintaining the court's official docket,’ ” and that he instead alleges a claim for “failure toperform the act that creates appellate jurisdiction,” he makes clear that his claim “is soundly grounded innegligence, not a constitutional tort.” [ECF No. 56 at 6; ECF No. 32 at 5.] Accordingly, Bruce's claim, asarticulated in the complaint and as construed by the magistrate judge, sounds in negligence and thus failsdue to quasi-judicial immunity.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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