between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”
416 U.S. at 244-45, 94 S.Ct. at 1690-91.
Although Pierson v. Ray and Scheuer v. Rhodes were civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is clear that the immunity recognized in those cases was not peculiar to § 1983 actions. In Pierson v. Ray the court said:
“[T]he defense of good faith and probable cause, which the Court of Appeals found available to the officers in the common-law action for false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983.”
386 U.S. at 557, 87 S.Ct. at 1219.
Thus, the immunity generally available at common law was applied to § 1983 actions, it was not created for that sole purpose.
Citing an earlier non-§ 1983 case, the Scheuer court said:
“To be sure, the occasions upon which the acts of the head of an executive department will be protected by the privilege are doubtless far broader than in the case of an officer with less sweeping functions. But that is because the higher the post, the broader the range of responsibilities and duties, and the wider the scope of discretion, it entails. It is not the title of his office but the duties with which the particular officer sought to be made to respond in damages is entrusted — the relation of the act complained of to ‘matters committed by law to his control or supervision,’ Spalding v. Vilas, supra, 161 U.S. [483], at 498, 16 S.Ct. [631], at 637 [40 L.Ed. 780]—which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official acts of the executive officer with immunity from civil defamation suits.” [Barr v. Matteo], 360 U.S. [564], at 573-574, 79 S.Ct. [1335], at 1340-1341 [3 L.Ed.2d 1434].
416 U.S. at 247, 94 S.Ct. at 1692.
In summing up the extent of the common law immunity the court in Scheuer v. Rhodes said:
These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.
Id. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1692.
Surprisingly, few cases have dealt specifically with the immunity of law enforcement officers in directing traffic. In Abo El Ela v. State, 468 N.W.2d 580 (Minn.App.1991), a police officer was alleged to have been negligent in using hand signaling to stop a motorist during an air-ground speed enforcement. The court held that only safety considerations were left to the officer in deciding whether to use hand signaling, and decisions based on safety alone were not protected. Id. at 582.
In Simon v. Heald, 359 A.2d 666 (Del.Super.1976), a police officer motioned with his hand to a motorist in an effort to get the motorist, whose vehicle was disabled, to cross the highway to a nearby garage. The signal was misinterpreted and resulted in an accident. While recognizing the existence of immunity for discretionary acts, the court held that the officer had been performing a routine function for which he would be personally liable for any negligence. Id. at 669. The court reasoned:
[A] police officer’s duties and his methods of carrying out these duties are routine procedures. * The acts of aiding a stranded motorist and signaling to passing traffic are not such executive level decisions that an officer is entitled to be protected from personal liability if he acts negligently.
Id. at 668-69. Moreover, the court noted that it was the state’s responsibility to pro