Crawford v. Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC (Apr. 23, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Joann Crawford v. Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Texas (TX)
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 23, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Byrne (Chief Justice); Kelly; Ellis
Joann Crawford, Appellant v. Buffalo Creek Properties,..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1097101Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FORDESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin.Joann Crawford, Appellantv.Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC, AppelleeNO. 03-24-00260-CV|Filed: April 23, 2026FROM THE 335TH DISTRICT COURT OF BASTROPCOUNTYNO. 2031-335, THE HONORABLE REVA TOWSLEE-CORBETT, JUDGE PRESIDINGBefore Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and EllisMEMORANDUM OPINIONDarlene Byrne, Chief Justice*1 Joann Crawford appeals from the trial-court judgmentgranting specific performance of a contract for Crawford tosell real property. Crawford raises several issues that are notsupported by the record. We will affirm the judgment.BACKGROUNDBecause there is no reporter's record before this Court, thisrecital is based on documents in the clerk's record, includingthe judgment.Buffalo Creek Properties, LLC, sued Crawford and VickieMorgan1 seeking specific performance of a written agreementfor Crawford to sell a parcel of real estate. According to aBuy-Sell Agreement (Contract) attached to Buffalo Creek'slive petition, Crawford agreed in writing on August 15, 2021,to sell her parcel to “Trails End Investments, LLC ‘or assigns.’” The trial court found that Trails End assigned its rightsunder the Contract to Buffalo Creek on August 16, 2021. TheContract required Crawford to pay the costs to obtain, deliver,and record releases of any liens required to be released inconnection with the sale. As part of the Contract, Crawfordrepresented “that there will be no liens, assessments, bindingagreements, or other security interests against the propertythat will not be satisfied out of the sales price.” BuffaloCreek alleged that, on December 8, 2021, Crawford informedBuffalo Creek that the “deal was off.”Buffalo Creek sued Crawford and Morgan and asserted thatit filed a notice of lis pendens with the Bastrop County Clerkin February 2022. The court found that Crawford deeded theparcel to Morgan on March 17, 2022, with full knowledgethat the suit had been filed and public knowledge of the lispendens. Crawford did not timely file an answer. Morgananswered, seeking reimbursement for taxes that she said shepaid to stave off a tax foreclosure sale. In March 2023, BuffaloCreek filed a motion to compel Crawford and Morgan toprovide answers to interrogatories and disclosures that weredue in November 2022.All three parties appeared at the February 28, 2024 non-jury trial. Buffalo Creek and Morgan were represented bycounsel. Crawford appeared without an attorney, as she doeson appeal. The trial court awarded judgment to Buffalo Creek,concluding that Morgan had public knowledge of this lawsuitwhen she received the deeds from Crawford and, therefore,was not a bona fide purchaser. The court found that BuffaloCreek was ready, willing, and able to purchase the propertyfrom Crawford and had tendered performance timely.The trial court ordered specific performance of the Contractas modified by the judgment. The trial court ordered BuffaloCreek to pay the agreed-upon sales price of $100,000 lessamounts paid or owed for expenses incurred to effectuate thepurchase, including court costs, attorney's fees, compensationof a life-estate holder not expressly addressed in the Contract,property taxes and late fees, and surveyor's costs. The courtfound that Crawford's mother had a 1/3 life estate in theparcel. The court held that, after offsets, Buffalo Creek owedCrawford $38,197.70 and ordered Buffalo Creek to depositthat amount into the registry of the court. The court held thatMorgan could seek reimbursement for her tax payments fromBuffalo Creek's payment to Crawford under the judgment.The court ordered Crawford and Morgan to execute deedsconveying their interests in the parcel to Buffalo Creek.*2 Crawford appealed on April 22, 2024. Only after BuffaloCreek filed its brief in February 2025 did Crawford request
Joann Crawford, Appellant v. Buffalo Creek Properties,..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2and pay for a reporter's record. After that record was filed onMarch 27, 2025, Crawford submitted a reply brief that thisCourt's clerk's office received but did not file because it lackeda signature and a certificate of compliance with rules. BuffaloCreek filed a motion to strike the reporter's record as untimelyrequested and filed; it argued that allowing the filing of a year-late-requested record would require rebriefing. Buffalo Creekalso asked that this Court strike or disregard Crawford's replybrief because it contained issues not raised in her originalbrief or relevant to the appeal. This Court requested thatCrawford file a response to the motion to strike or disregardthe reporter's record; she did not file a response.Two weeks after the time for response passed, this Courtgranted the motion to strike the reporter's record. This Courtdismissed as moot Buffalo Creek's motion to strike thereply brief because Crawford never supplied a signatureor certificate of compliance as requested. Crawford filed amotion for rehearing of the order striking the reporter's record,asserting that her inability to pay for the reporter's recordcaused her delay in requesting it, that she had technologicaldifficulties in preparing her brief and staying current onnotices from the court, and that Buffalo Creek exploitedher procedural disadvantage. This Court denied Crawford'smotion to reconsider the order striking the reporter's record.DISCUSSIONCrawford contends that the trial court erred by orderingspecific performance for the following reasons: (1) Crawfordjustifiably disagreed with a proposed amendment to theContract, (2) the court ordered her to reimburse taxes thatwere the life tenant's responsibility, (3) the court did not granther reimbursement from Buffalo Creek for taxes paid, (4) herpro se status affected the fairness of the trial, (5) the trialcourt did not consider the validity of the Contract due to thelack of notarization and Buffalo Creek's name change, and (6)collusion between the life tenant and Buffalo Creek affectedher consent to the contract.Specific performance is a remedy for breach of contract whenmonetary damages would be inadequate. White Knight Dev.,LLC v. Simmons, 718 S.W.3d 203, 209 (Tex. 2025). A partyseeking specific performance must prove that it has compliedwith its obligations under the contract (unless excused by theother party's breach or repudiation) and that it was ready,willing, and able to timely perform its obligations under thecontract. DiGiuseppe v. Lawler, 269 S.W.3d 588, 593-94(Tex. 2008). We review a trial court's award of specificperformance for abuse of discretion. See Edwards v. Mid–Continent Off. Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied); see also Cire v. Cummings, 134S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004) (noting that appellate court willreverse trial court's ruling on claim seeking equitable reliefonly if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unsupported by guidingrules and principles).Where, as here, there is no timely-filed reporter's record, andfindings of fact and conclusions of law are neither requestednor filed, the judgment of the trial court implies all necessaryfindings of fact to sustain the judgment. See Waltenburg v.Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308, 312 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,no pet.). In other words, we must presume that the unfiledreporter's record supports the decisions of the trial court.See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 230 (Tex. 2002).Crawford did not request a reporter's record at or beforethe time for perfecting an appeal as required. See Tex. R.App. P. 34.6(b)(1). She did not request it until after BuffaloCreek filed its brief. While we are not to refuse to file areporter's record because it was not timely requested,2 partiesare required to cite to the record in their brief3 and partiesgenerally waive arguments that are not raised in their initialbrief.4 In her original brief, Crawford did not cite to the as-yet-unrequested reporter's record and did not file an amendedoriginal brief with citations to the reporter's record. She didnot file a reply brief compliant with relevant rules after thereporter's record was filed. Accordingly, we must review theissues presented in her original brief without citations to areporter's record.*3 The trial court ordered specific performance of theContract. The court described the Contract between TrailsEnd and Crawford and noted that Trails End assigned itspurchase rights to Buffalo Creek. The court found that BuffaloCreek was at all times ready, willing, and able to fulfillits obligations under the Contract and tendered performanceby submitting the purchase price. See DiGiuseppe, 269S.W.3d at 593-94. We must presume that the reporter's recordwould have supported those findings as well as the findingsregarding payments made to obtain title clear from the life-estate holder and to pay off tax debts owed. See Bennett, 96S.W.3d at 230. Given those presumptions, we cannot say thatthe trial court erred by finding that Crawford breached thecontract and by ordering specific performance as it did.Crawford's issues on appeal do not show a basis for reversal.
Joann Crawford, Appellant v. Buffalo Creek Properties,..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3(1) Crawford claims that the trial court erred by grantingspecific performance despite her “justified” refusal to agree toa proposed amendment to the Contract. She does not specifyin her brief what amendment she refused to accept. Shecites cases that she purports support the proposition that anyamendments to the Contract had to be in writing. However,Crawford's cited cases are either “hallucinated” cases or donot support the proposition that the mere proposal of anamendment nullified the Contract.5Regardless of what amendment Crawford disputes, BuffaloCreek sought specific performance of the original Contract,and the court awarded that relief. There is no showing thatthe court ordered specific performance of any amendmentBuffalo Creek proposed. The Contract called for any liens orbinding agreements to be “satisfied out of the sales price.”The court “reformed” the Contract to adjust Buffalo Creek'spayment due for the expenses of effectuating the Contractsuch as courts costs, attorney's fees, property-tax payments,and payment to the life-estate holder. Even if Crawford'srefusal to agree to any proposed amendments was valid, thatdoes not require reversal of the judgment.(2) Crawford asserts that the court erred by ordering her toreimburse Buffalo Creek for paying back taxes that were alife tenant's responsibility. We must presume that the recordsupports a finding that—regardless of the life tenant's rolein paying property taxes—Crawford had the responsibilityunder the Contract to obtain a release of liens and satisfy anyliens, assessments, binding agreements or other security outof the sales price.*4 Specific performance can be accompanied by monetarycompensation when needed to put the parties in the sameposition as if the contract had been performed. See WhiteKnight, 718 S.W.3d at 208-10. The ordered reimbursement ofthe back taxes paid is consistent with satisfying Crawford'sresponsibility to satisfy any liens, assessments, bindingagreements, or other security out of the sales price.(3) Crawford contends that the court erred by orderingCrawford to reimburse Buffalo Creek for the cost of acquiringthe life-estate interest. We presume that the record supports afinding that the life-estate owner's interest would be satisfiedout of the sales price in order to effectuate the sale.Crawford also asserts that an LLC cannot have a life-estateinterest. But the unification of the ownership of the lifeestate and the reversionary estate leads to a merger of theinterests in Buffalo Creek, extinguishing the life estate. SeeSteger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 S.W.3d 359, 376 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (stating test for mergerof estates). Crawford has not shown that the trial court'sjudgment is erroneous.(4) Crawford claims that her pro se status affected the fairnessof the trial. We must presume that the record supports afinding that her self-representation did not affect the fairnessof the trial. Crawford cites a case and a study that she assertsshow that courts have mistreated pro se litigants but theseauthorities are not properly cited.6 She does not, however,show when or how her pro se status caused the trial court inthis case to treat her improperly in a way that probably causedthe rendition of an improper judgment or probably preventedher from properly presenting the case to this Court. See Tex.R. App. P. 33.1 (describing how to preserve error), 44.2(describing standard for reversible error). We presume thatproceedings in the trial court are regular and correct unless therecord shows otherwise. See Diamond Offshore Servs. Ltd. v.Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 545 (Tex. 2018). We construe prose filings liberally and with patience “so as to obtain a just,fair and equitable adjudication of the parties' rights.” Veigelv. Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., 549 S.W.3d 193,195 n.1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, no pet.). However, pro selitigants must comply with the same rules and standards asmust litigants represented by attorneys. Mathis v. Lockwood,166 S.W.3d 743, 745 (Tex. 2005).Crawford also asserts that the “aggressive actions” of BuffaloCreek contributed to an unfair trial process. While it isunclear whether Crawford presented this argument to thetrial court, we must presume that the record supports anegative finding on this assertion. The clerk's record showsthat Buffalo Creek filed suit on February 15, 2022; BuffaloCreek sent discovery requests in October 2022, to whichresponses were due in November 2022 and did not seek tocompel responses until March 2023; and trial was held inFebruary 2024. Neither the pleadings nor the pace of thelawsuit demonstrate undue aggression. The record before usdoes not support a conclusion that Buffalo Creek conducteditself with aggression that caused reversible error as definedin Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1.*5 (5) Crawford contends that the court erred by notconsidering the validity of the Contract due to the lackof notarization and because the LLC changed its name.However, land-sale contracts are not required to be notarized.See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 26.01 (requiring real-estate
Joann Crawford, Appellant v. Buffalo Creek Properties,..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4sales contract to be in writing and signed by party to becharged with promise; no notarization requirement). Further,we must presume that the record supports a finding that norelevant entity changed its name improperly and the trialcourt's express finding that the contracting entity (Trails End)assigned its right to purchase the parcel to a different entity(Buffalo Creek) the day after Crawford signed the contractwith Trails End.(6) Crawford contends that her consent to the Contract wasaffected by collusion between the life tenant and BuffaloCreek. We must presume that the record does not supporta finding of collusion that affected Crawford's consent ina legally significant way. She asserts that Buffalo Creekcontacted her through another person's texting account andused it to send “[e]ndless, harassing text messages attemptingto entice appellant with dollar symbols and offers of personal‘help’ with financial burdens that could be holding back theclosing of business. Offering storage space funding, helppaying taxes as well as transportation [etc.] (text messagedocumentation is available).” Crawford argues that theseassertions show fraud, but does not assert that any of therepresentations or enticements were false as is required toshow fraud. See Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001) (defining elements offraud). Further, the time for introducing documentation is attrial, and the record before us lacks the asserted text-messagedocumentation.We note further that Crawford's issues would show no erroreven if we considered the reporter's record. In an abundance ofcaution, we have reviewed the reporter's record and exhibitsthat we struck. Viewed under the proper standard of review,the record supports the trial court's judgment.7 When facedwith conflicting or disputed evidence, the trial court was bestpositioned to assess credibility and weight of the evidence.8The record did not show the trial court acting with biasagainst Crawford because she represented herself and did notshow Buffalo Creek acting with impermissible aggression.Crawford did not provide the necessary evidence of collusionbetween Buffalo Creek and the life tenant or get the allegedlyfraudulent text messages admitted into evidence.CONCLUSION*6 Finding no reversible error presented, we affirm thejudgment.AffirmedAll CitationsNot Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2026 WL 1097101Footnotes1Morgan is not a party to this appeal.2See Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(b)(3).3See id. 38.1(g), (i) (requiring briefs to cite to record).4See Howell v. Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 143 S.W.3d 416, 439 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied).5For example, she lists In re Estate of Denman as being found at 462 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, no pet.).However, that page citation is partway through a criminal case from Arkansas, Isom v. State, 462 S.W.3d 638 (Ark. 2015).She describes Denman as involving a dispute over the validity of a land-sale-contract amendment. The most recentTexas case with the style In re Denman has a different cite and is a non-substantive grant of a motion to dismiss. SeeNo. 04-14-00111-CV, 2014 WL 4627603 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, no pet.). Another case with that name concernedthe statute of limitations for declaratory judgment actions. 362 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet). Stillanother concerned the independent co-executor's standing to appeal and how to apply a generation-skipping tax. See270 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet. denied).One case that she cites discusses a subdivision covenant that required lease agreements to be in writing and discussedrestrictions on the modifications of covenants, but did not pertain to a requirement that amendments to a land-sale contract
Joann Crawford, Appellant v. Buffalo Creek Properties,..., Not Reported in S.W.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5be in writing. See Angelwylde HOA, Inc. v. Fournier, No. 03-21-00269-CV, 2023 WL 2542339, at *1 (Tex. App.—AustinMar. 17, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).6Crawford refers to “Hercenberger v. Proctor” without reporter citation for the proposition that the right to a tribunal free frombias or prejudice is required by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. She refers to a study titled “Underestimatingthe Unrepresented: Cognitive Biases Disadvantage Pro Se Litigants in Family Law Cases.” We find no binding authorityby that name, and Crawford does not identify where the study was published.7Under the legal-sufficiency standard, when the appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on whichshe did not have the burden of proof, she must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adversefinding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011). Under the factual-sufficiency standard,when the appellant attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on which she did not have the burden of proof, weconsider and weigh all the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding to determine if the credible evidence supportingthe finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside.Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016).8Under legal-and factual-sufficiency standards, the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weightto be given to their testimony. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005) (describing legal-sufficiencyreview); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (describing factual-sufficiency review).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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