K.C. v. D.R., No. 02-25-00234-CV (Apr. 30, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Fort Worth. K.C. v. D.R
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Texas (TX)
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 30, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Panel
Kerr (J.); Birdwell (J.); Wallach (J.)
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1190661Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FORDESIGNATION AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.K.C., Appellantv.D.R., AppelleeNo. 02-25-00234-CV|Delivered: April 30, 2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.On Appeal from the 360th District CourtTarrant County, TexasTrial Court No. 360-766223-25Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ.Memorandum Opinion by Justice WallachMEMORANDUM OPINIONMike Wallach Justice*1 Appellant Karen Cane1, pro se, appeals from theprotective order issued against her in favor of AppelleeDebbie Ramos and her son, G.A. In six issues, Cane arguesthat the trial court (1) lacked jurisdiction; (2) erred byapplying Texas Family Code Section 71.0021 when theevidence negated the existence of “dating violence”; (3)erred by refusing to recognize her defense of third persons;(4) violated her due-process rights; (5) abused its discretionby admitting unauthenticated exhibits “after acknowledginguncertainty in the statute and lack of supporting case law”;and (6) issued an unconstitutionally overbroad protectiveorder. We will affirm.Background2Cane is the romantic partner of G.A.'s father, Jerry Amaro.3Ramos filed an application for a protective order againstCane, alleging in the application's attached affidavit that shehad an altercation with Cane on March 23, 2025. Ramosasserted that on that date, Amaro had refused to return G.A.to her care. She alleged that she had waited at the WhiteSettlement Police Station, the police station nearest to Amaro,“to see if [he] would bring [their] son” there. After four hours,she left after messaging Amaro that she was leaving. Hethen approached in his Tahoe, and Cane “also approached[Ramos's car] from another angle[,] stopped her car in themiddle of the road[, got out of the car,] and rushed [Ramos's]car with a baseball bat wearing a ski mask as [Amaro] alsostopped in the middle of the road.” Cane then “got back in hercar and began driving erratically, circling [Ramos's] car withhers, driving the wrong way down the street” until a policevehicle approached, at which point Cane and Amaro both left.Ramos further described other acts, which she characterizedas harassing and threatening, that Cane had committed againsther after the March 23 incident.*2 After a hearing at which Cane represented herself, theassociate judge granted Ramos's protective-order application.See Tex. Fam. Code § 201.005(a) (providing that a presidingjudge may refer to an associate judge an action under FamilyCode Title 4, which governs protective orders). The associatejudge signed the order at the hearing, and the presiding judge(the trial court) subsequently signed it as well. Cane fileda motion for new trial and a voluminous amount of othermotions and documents; her post order filings make up nearly600 pages of the clerk's record. The trial court held threehearings on the motions that had been timely filed. See Tex. R.Civ. P. 329b(c). At the conclusion of the last hearing, the trialcourt orally denied Cane's motions. However, the trial courtdid not sign a written order, so the motions were overruled byoperation of law. See id. Cane now appeals.DiscussionI. Issues with Cane's briefWe start our discussion by noting that Cane's brief contains aconcerning number of errors in its citations. First, Cane citednine cases to support propositions that they do not support:
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. 2020); In re K.A.F.,160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex. 2005); In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d594, 596 (Tex. 2005); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.1967); Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tex. Crim.App. 2016); Wooten v. State, 400 S.W.3d 601, 605 (Tex.Crim. App. 2013); In re E.L.T., 93 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.); Allen v. State,479 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.);and Clements v. Haskovec, 251 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2008, no pet.). Moreover, fromAllen, Cane provided a purported quote that does not exist,and regarding Clements, she represented that the court ofappeals reversed a trial court's protective order, when in fact,the court affirmed it.Second, and equally concerning, is Cane's citing three casesthat do not appear to exist: In re J.B.G., 540 S.W.3d 446, 450(Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2018); Ex parte Hughes,133 S.W.3d 889, 891 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.);and Walker v. State, 261 S.W.3d 356, 363 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, no pet.). Cane's cite to the nonexistentWalker v. State is particularly concerning because, at one ofthe motion-for-new-trial hearings, the trial court told Canethat it was unable to locate a case using that citation, butshe included the same citation in her brief to this court.4Because these citations either do not exist or do not supportthe proposition for which they are cited, any statement inCane's brief for which they are the sole cited authority is astatement that is unsupported by authority. See Tex. R. App. P.38.1(i). In addition to these issues, in multiple sections of herbrief, Cane failed to provide relevant citations to the record.“[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensedattorneys and must comply with applicable laws and rulesof procedure.” Amir-Sharif v. Hawkins, 246 S.W.3d 267, 270(Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). “The rules ofappellate procedure require an appellant's brief to contain ‘aclear and concise argument for the contentions made, withappropriate citations to authorities and to the record.’ ” Id.(quoting Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i)). Complying with this ruleis part of an appellant's responsibility to identify and explainhow the trial court erred by, among other things, “present[ing]argument that will enable [the appellate] court to decide thecase.” Cole v. Cole, No. 02-25-00229-CV, 2026 WL 478940,at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 19, 2026, no pet. h.).We have no duty to “perform an independent review of therecord and applicable law to determine whether the errorcomplained of occurred,” Amir-Sharif, 246 S.W.3d at 270,and we cannot abandon our role as a neutral arbiter to developan appellant's legal argument that the appellant has failed toadequately brief, Cole, 2026 WL 478940, at *4. Because ofthe deficiencies of Cane's brief, we will hold below that manyof the arguments under her issues present nothing for review.With these considerations in mind, we turn to Cane's issues.II. Qualifying relationship*3 Cane's first two issues both relate to the kinds ofrelationships that can give rise to a protective order underFamily Code Title 4. Cane argues in her first issue that thetrial court lacked jurisdiction because the evidence showedthat no “qualifying relationship” existed under Texas FamilyCode Sections 71.0021, 71.003, 71.005, or 71.006. See Tex.Fam. Code §§ 71.0021, 71.003, 71.005, 71.006. Under Cane'ssecond issue, she argues that the trial court misapplied Section71.0021(b) by finding “dating violence” between two womenwho had never dated each other, based solely on their separaterelationships with a third party, Amaro. We begin with hersecond issue because our disposition of it also disposes of thefirst issue.A trial court must issue a protective order to an applicantwhen the court finds that family violence has occurred. Seeid. § 81.001. The definition of “family violence” includes anact, other than a defensive measure to protect oneself, thatconstitutes a threat “by a member of a family or householdagainst another member of the family or household” that“reasonably places the member in fear of imminent physicalharm[ or] ... assault.” Id. § 71.004. For purposes of thissection, the Family Code defines “family,” “household,” and“member of a household.” Id. §§ 71.003 (“family”), 71.005(“household”), 71.006 (“member of a household”).Further, relevant to this appeal, the definition of “familyviolence” also includes “dating violence.” Id. § 71.004. Asnoted by Cane, the Family Code's definition of “datingviolence” includes a threat that reasonably places theprotective-order applicant in fear of imminent physical harmor assault when the threat is committed against the applicant“because of the ... applicant's ... dating relationship withan individual with whom the actor is or has been in adating relationship.”5 Id. § 71.0021(a)(1)(B). A “datingrelationship” is “a relationship between individuals who haveor have had a continuing relationship of a romantic orintimate nature.” Id. § 71.0021(b) (emphasis added).Ramos testified that she and Amaro had not been romanticallyinvolved since 2019 and that she and Cane had never dated,
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3were not related, and had never lived together, and Cane relieson this testimony to argue that Ramos failed to establish a“qualifying relationship” on which a family-violence findingmay be based. Cane dismisses the applicability of Section71.0021(a)(1)(B) in two ways.First, she argues that for an act to constitute “datingviolence,” the parties to the protective order—the applicantand respondent—must have a dating relationship. Thisinterpretation ignores Section 71.0021(a)(1)(B)'s plainlanguage. See In re Catherine Goodman, No. 02-26-00061-CV, 2026 WL 547521, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort WorthFeb. 26, 2026, orig. proceeding) (construing unambiguousstatutory language according to its plain meaning). The statuteaddresses a situation in which the applicant has (or previouslyhad) a dating relationship with an individual and that sameindividual has (or previously had) a dating relationship withthe respondent. See Tex. Fam. Code § 71.0021(a)(1)(B),(b). Cane does not dispute that the associate judge waspresented with evidence that Ramos has had a romantic orintimate relationship with Amaro and that Cane is or has beenin a romantic or intimate relationship with him. See id. §71.0021(b).*4 Second, Cane argues that the evidence below negated theapplicability of Section 71.0021(a)(1)(B) because Ramos'stestimony established that the events giving rise to theprotective order were not “because of” a dating relationship.She relies on Ramos's testimony that “[t]his” was “not abouta dating relationship, but about child custody.”6 But Canepresents this testimony out of context, and it does not supporther argument.Immediately before Ramos made the statement on whichCane relies, Cane argued with her about whether she had beenharassing Cane to testify in a custody proceeding.7 Cane thenasked, “So was this custody, or because you think that it hadsomething to do with a dating relationship?” It was in thatcontext that Ramos said that “this” was “due to custody” andher “trying to get [her] son back safe.” It is unclear whetherby “this,” Ramos meant her actions related to the custodyproceeding, her filing the protective-order application, or herown actions on March 23, 2025. But nothing in her wordsor their context suggests that she was referring to anythingother than her own actions to “get [G.A.] back.” That is, hertestimony was not opining on why Cane acted as she didon March 23 and whether it was related to Ramos's priorromantic relationship with Amaro. Cane does not direct us toany other testimony or evidence in the record to support herargument.Aside from this argument, Cane does not otherwise challengethe sufficiency of the evidence to establish dating violenceunder Section 71.0021(a)(1)(B), and she does not discuss thetestimony and evidence that Ramos presented at the trial tosupport the protective order. We overrule Cane's second issue.As for Cane's first issue, even if we accept that Title 4'sdefinitions are jurisdictional,8 because we have rejected herargument that Ramos's testimony negated the existence of a“qualifying relationship,” we also reject her argument that theabsence of a qualifying relationship negated the trial court'sjurisdiction.III. Cane's alleged defenses*5 In Cane's third issue, she argues that the trial court erredby refusing to recognize her statutory defense of third personsunder Texas Penal Code Section 9.33 and Texas FamilyCode Section 71.004 when she acted to protect childrenfrom imminent harm. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.33 (providingcircumstances under which a person is justified in using forceagainst another to protect a third person); Tex. Fam. Code§§ 71.004(1) (providing that “family violence” as definedin that subsection does not include a defensive measure toprotect oneself), 71.0021 (excluding from “dating violence”definition “a defensive measure to protect oneself”). Canedoes not tell us where she raised these defenses below. SeeTex. R. App. P. 33.1. Moreover, the only two cases thatCane cites in this part of her brief are Ex parte Hughesand Walker v. State, which, as noted above, do not exist.See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Further, Cane does not explainhow Section 9.33 applies in the protective-order context. Sheargues in one sentence that “[t]he Family Code incorporatesthe Penal Code's justification defenses into its definition of‘family violence,’ ” but she cites only Section 71.004(3)'sincorporation of “dating violence,” the definition of whichdoes not mention defense of others. See Tex. Fam. Code §§71.004(3), 71.0021.Moreover, even accepting her interpretation of Section71.004, she has not shown how it applies here. Cane contendsthat when Ramos followed Amaro on March 23, G.A. andCane's two children were with Amaro in his Tahoe; thatRamos's vehicle “and additional cars in her family's convoynearly flipped [the] Tahoe while attempting to force it tostop”; and that (unidentified) witnesses reported “that one
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4occupant of [Ramos's] party brandished a firearm, causing[Amaro] to brake suddenly and exit onto Camp BowieBoulevard to avoid the conflict or a collision to protect”G.A. and Cane's children. The only record references that sheprovides do not support these assertions. That is, she providesno references to any testimony or other evidence to supporther assertion that the children were in danger and that sheacted to protect them. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g). We haveno obligation to scour the record9 to find support for Cane'sappellate arguments.Cane also cites Texas Penal Code Section 9.31, whichprovides that “a person is justified in using force againstanother when and to the degree the actor reasonably believesthe force is immediately necessary to protect the actor againstthe other's use or attempted use of unlawful force,” andFamily Code Section 71.004(3)'s exclusion of a defensivemeasure to protect oneself from the definition of “datingviolence.” See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31; Tex. Fam. Code §71.004 (incorporating definition in Section 71.0021). Canedoes not explain why her actions were defensive measures toprotect herself or immediately necessary, and she cites no partof the record to support such an argument. See Tex. R. App.P. 38.1(i).Because Cane's arguments are unpreserved, inadequatelybriefed, or unsupported by the record, we overrule this issue.See Cole, 2026 WL 478940, at *4; Amir-Sharif, 246 S.W.3dat 270.IV. Exclusion of evidence and denying discoveryIn Cane's fourth issue, she states that the trial court violatedher due-process rights by excluding evidence, denyingdiscovery,10 and refusing to consider testimony at themotion-for-new-trial stage.11 Under this issue, Cane makesseveral sub-arguments, which we address in turn.A. Notice*6 First, Cane argues that she received insufficient notice ofthe protective-order trial setting, “learning of the proceedingonly days before it occurred,” which “deprived her of ameaningful opportunity to secure witnesses or prepare adefense.” She asserts that “[t]he record shows no proof ofproper service beyond conclusory statements from [Ramos's]counsel,” but “[t]he court proceeded despite these defects.”Cane does not tell us where in the record she raised lack ofservice, if she did so.Moreover, the clerk's record contains an affidavit of serviceshowing that Cane was served with the protective-orderapplication on May 3, 2025, and the citation informed herthat the matter had been set for a hearing on May 13. SeeTex. Fam. Code § 82.041 (providing that notice of applicationfor protective order must include the date, time, and placeof hearing). Cane does not explain how this notice failed tocomply with the requirements of the Family Code. See id.;see also id. § 84.001(a) (providing that “[o]n the filing of anapplication for a protective order, the court shall set a dateand time for the hearing unless a later date is requested bythe applicant” and that other than an exception not applicablehere, “the court may not set a date later than the 14th dayafter the date the application is filed”); id. § 82.043 (providingthat notice of protective-order application “must be servedin the same manner as citation under the Texas Rules ofCivil Procedure, except that service by publication is notauthorized”); Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a. Cane does not cite anyauthority to support an argument that she was entitled to morenotice than she received or that the protective order must bereversed on this basis. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).Moreover, if she had received less than forty-eight hours'notice of the hearing, she could have asked the trial court toreschedule it. See Tex. Fam. Code § 84.004. Cane does not citeto any part of the record reflecting that she informed the trialcourt that she had not received enough notice or requesteda reset. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Additionally, Cane does nottell us what evidence or witnesses she was prevented frompresenting due to insufficient notice or how or if she madea record of that evidence below. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1,44.1. Because this argument is not preserved, is inadequatelybriefed, or is not supported by the record, we overrule thispart of Cane's fourth issue.B. Witness swearing in and testimonySecond, Cane argues that she was never sworn in to testifyat the protective-order trial. Her entire argument under thissection is as follows:Appellant was never placed under oath at the May 13hearing and therefore had no official opportunity to presentevidence or testimony.An argument by a self-represented litigant is not evidence.Tex. R. Civ. P. 266; In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 928 (Tex.2005).
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Despite this, the court relied on Appellee's narrativetestimony—often unsworn hearsay—to issue the order.[Italics added.]Regarding her argument that she was never placed underoath, Cane cites no record references in this part of her brief.See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g). Nevertheless, we reviewed thebeginning of the trial transcript and discovered that, as isoften the case, the associate judge swore in all witnesses atthat time. Specifically, at the start of trial, the associate judgeordered, “Will everybody that's going to testify please standand raise your right hand.” The judge then swore in thosewitnesses. If the record contains any indication that Canewas not or could not have been sworn at that time,12 shedoes not tell us where in the record to find it. Moreover,she does not tell us if she informed the associate judge thatshe wished to testify. Additionally, she does not tell us whattestimony she would have presented had she testified at thehearing or where she made a record of that testimony. SeeTex. R. App. P. 33.1, 38.1(g); Dutton v. Dutton, 18 S.W.3d849, 853 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied) (noting thatappellant “should have made the trial court aware, at somepoint, of the complaint he now presents on appeal”). To theextent that she complains that the trial court excluded otherevidence at trial, she does not tell us what that evidence was,where in the record she offered it or the trial court excludedit, why the trial court abused its discretion by excluding it,or how she was harmed by its exclusion. See Tex. R. App. P.33.1, 38.1(g) & (i), 44.1.13*7 Regarding the second part of the argument, Cane does nottell us what part of Ramos's testimony was hearsay,14 doesnot tell us where in the record she objected to the testimonyand obtained a ruling, does not explain why the testimonyconstituted hearsay, and does not cite any authority to supporther argument that it was hearsay. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1,38.1(g). Thus, she has not preserved this argument or hasinadequately briefed it.C. No trial transcriptThird, Cane argues that although she ordered and paid forthe trial transcript, “multiple delays occurred.” She says that“[t]he court reporter admitted on record that payments weremishandled and certain audio files required ‘re[-]creation’”15 and that this “deprived [her] of timely access to theevidence necessary to prepare her post-trial motions.” Weinterpret this argument as asserting that she did not receivethe trial transcript in a timely manner and that the trial courttherefore abused its discretion by denying her motion for newtrial. However, the only authority she cites in this section isJ.B.G., a case that does not exist. Moreover, she does nottell us what argument she would have made in her new-trialmotions but was prevented from raising because she did nothave the transcript. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). We concludethat her inadequate briefing presents nothing for review, andwe overrule this part of her fourth issue.D. Production of exhibitsNext, Cane argues that at the second new-trial hearing,the trial court refused to review her exhibits and instead“compelled [her] to hand over her binder of exhibits—including personal notes, photographs, and other materials—to opposing counsel” and that “[t]his forced disclosure”violated Texas Rule of Evidence 40316 and Texas Ruleof Civil Procedure 192.5.17 She further contends that“[s]uch compelled production of evidence outside discoveryprocedures chills the right to prepare a defense.”*8 Generally, a party should give the opposing party theopportunity to review an exhibit before its admission. See,e.g, Walp v. Williams, 330 S.W.3d 404, 411 (Tex. App.—FortWorth 2010, no pet.) (Dauphinot, J., concurring) (noting that“generally, a party wishing to place a document into evidenceshould produce the document and in some way signify that heis offering it into evidence, allow the opposing party to inspectthe evidence and make any objections to its admission, havethe evidence marked as an exhibit by the court reporter, andhand it to the trial judge”). Moreover, the record referencethat Cane provides to support her argument actually refutesit. The trial court informed the parties that it was continuingthe hearing and asked if they would be available on a date thenext month. The court then had this exchange with Cane aboutproviding her proposed exhibits to opposing counsel beforethat date:[THE COURT] And I do -- I am going to order you toturn over copies of whatever you want to present at trial to[Ramos's attorney] by –[CANE]: Does she want my binder now?THE COURT: Yeah. Is that an extra copy?[CANE]: I have extra copies of everything. I cameprepared, fully, to –
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6THE COURT: Okay.[CANE]: -- the Court today.THE COURT: Will you hand that to [Ramos's attorney]now –[CANE]: Yes, ma'am.This exchange shows that Cane had the option of providingcopies to Ramos's attorney after the hearing, but shevolunteered to provide her exhibit binder at that time. See Tex.R. App. P. 33.1. We overrule this part of Cane's fourth issue.E. “Silencing” CaneNext, in a section titled, “Unequal Treatment and Silencing ofthe Appellant,” Cane argues as follows:Throughout the hearings, the court repeatedly curtailedAppellant's ability to speak, threatening contempt for evenminimal clarification.By contrast, Appellee was allowed to narrate at lengthwithout restraint.When Appellant attempted to question the legal basisfor standing and conclusions of law, [the trial court]rescheduled the hearing. (RR July 23, p. 23 ln. 12–19).This one-sided treatment deprived Appellant of the fairbalance required by Tex. R. Evid. 611(a).Other than Texas Rule of Evidence 611, Cane cites noauthority. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Further, she cites nopart of the record to support her argument that the trialcourt “curtailed [her] ability to speak,” and the only recordcite she provides to support her argument that the trialcourt rescheduled the hearing when Appellant “attemptedto question the legal basis for standing and conclusions oflaw” does not support her arguments. That part of the recordreflects that after some discussion about why Cane did notyet have a trial transcript from the court reporter, the trialcourt announced that it was continuing the hearing, proposeda hearing date for the next month, and asked Cane if she wouldbe available on that date.[CANE]: I need to look at my calendar.THE COURT: All right. Please look at your calendar.[CANE]: I really just want to ask you, like, the findings --like, the facts and conclusion of law. What is the qualifyingrelationship?THE COURT: Ma'am –[CANE]: What have I done wrong?THE COURT: Ma'am, I need you to let me know if you canbe here on [the proposed date]. That's the question beforeyou.And, now, if you want to have the hearing right nowwithout the transcripts, we can have a hearing right nowwithout the transcripts. If you want to stop the hearing andhave time to have the transcripts, we will have the hearing[on the proposed date].Cane then confirmed that she wanted to obtain the trialtranscript and that she was available on the proposed date.This exchange shows only that Cane had attempted to requestoral findings of fact and conclusions of law before the trialcourt had ruled on her postjudgment motions and while thetrial court was attempting to schedule a date to continue thehearing to give her the opportunity to obtain the transcriptto support her motions. It does not show that Cane sufferedunequal treatment or that the trial court “silenced” her.Moreover, Cane does not explain how under Rule 611, whichgoverns “the mode and order of examining witnesses andpresenting evidence,” the trial court was required to grantan oral request for findings and conclusions in the middleof a hearing. See Tex. R. Evid. 611. As noted, she does notcite anywhere else in the record where she contends the trialcourt violated Rule 611. Because this part of her issue isnot supported by the record and is inadequately briefed, weoverrule it.F. “Refusal to [c]onsider [e]vidence or [p]rovide[f]indings”*9 Cane next argues that the trial court denied herpostjudgment motions but failed “to make findings of fact andconclusions of law,” which “frustrates appellate review anditself constitutes error under Tex. R. Civ. P. 296–297.” Canefails to provide appropriate citations to the record and makesno attempt to explain how she satisfied the requirements forobtaining findings and conclusions. First, Cane does not tellus where in her postjudgment filings she requested in writingthat the trial court make findings and conclusions. See Tex. R.
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Civ. P. 296. With no help from Cane, however, we reviewedthe clerk's record index and found that she did file a request.However, assuming the request was filed timely, see Tex. R.Civ. P. 296, the index does not reveal that she filed a noticeof past-due findings and conclusions, and Cane has not toldus where any such notice may be found.18 See Tex. R. Civ.P. 297; Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g). Moreover, Cane has notexplained how the trial court's failure to issue findings andconclusions prevented her from presenting her case to thiscourt. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1; In re J.R., No. 02-23-00071-CV, 2024 WL 191211, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 18,2024, pet. denied). Accordingly, Cane has not preserved thiscomplaint or has failed to adequately brief it on appeal. SeeTex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i); Guillory v. Boykins, 442 S.W.3d682, 694 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).Cane also states that she “filed multiple sworn motions—including motions to vacate and for a new trial—raisingjurisdictional and evidentiary defects. Yet, without any furtherbriefing or findings, the court denied relief.” She provides nofurther elaboration of this argument. To the extent that sheargues that the trial court refused to consider her evidence, orif she means that her evidence negated Ramos's entitlementto a protective order or established that the trial court abusedits discretion by denying her postjudgment motions, she doesnot tell us what evidence she means, when she presented itto the trial court, or why it should have produced a differentoutcome in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g), (i).To the extent she refers to the jurisdictional argument raisedunder her first issue, we have already rejected that argument.We overrule this part of her issue.G. “Cumulative Effect”Finally, Cane argues that “[b]ecause the record demonstratespervasive procedural unfairness, this [c]ourt should reverseand vacate the protective order as constitutionally invalid.”Having overruled Cane's other arguments under this issue,we cannot say that she has shown a “cumulative effect”of “pervasive procedural unfairness” requiring reversal. SeeAnderson v. G & S Auto of Fort Worth VI, LLC, No.02-25-00063-CV, 2025 WL 3039141, at *8 (Tex. App.—FortWorth Oct. 30, 2025, pet. denied); Haskett v. Butts, 83 S.W.3d213, 221 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied). We overrulethe remainder of Cane's fourth issue.V. Admission of Ramos's evidenceIn Cane's fifth issue, she contends that the trial court “abusedits discretion by admitting unauthenticated exhibits19 andproceeding after acknowledging uncertainty in the statuteand lack of supporting case law.” She makes multiple sub-arguments.First, she argues that the trial court abused its discretionby acknowledging uncertainty regarding its jurisdiction butnevertheless proceeding. She refers us to a moment in thefirst new-trial hearing at which the trial court asked Ramos'sattorney to supply authority for issuing a protective orderagainst a respondent with whom the applicant has not had adating relationship. Ramos's attorney told the trial court thatCane and Amaro were in a dating relationship and that Canehad judicially admitted that fact.20 That response appearedto address the trial court's concern.*10 Citing Clements v. Haskovec, Cane argues, “When acourt admits doubt regarding its power yet continues to act, itnecessarily abuses its discretion.” Clements does not supportthat proposition, either at the pinpoint page Cane providesor elsewhere in the opinion. See, e.g., 251 S.W.3d at 83(discussing, on pinpoint page relied on by Cane, evidence andobjections raised at hearing and addressing whether appealwas moot). Cane cites no authority that supports her argumentthat if a trial court asks a party to provide the legal basison which the party seeks relief, the trial court abuses itsdiscretion by proceeding with the hearing. See Tex. R. App.P. 38.1(i). She has therefore waived this issue by inadequatelybriefing it.Next, Cane re-urges some of the same arguments that wehave addressed regarding the application of Section 71.0021.We do not re-address them here. Then, Cane argues thatthe trial court “expanded state power beyond the statute'stext.” The only authority she cites for her argument is Exparte Hughes, a non-existent case. Because this argument isinadequately briefed, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i), and appearsto be a reassertion of arguments we have already rejected, weoverrule this part of her issue.Finally, she argues that the record shows that the trialcourt made arbitrary decisions when it “[a]cknowledgeduncertainty about statutory standing,” “[r]equested authoritythat was never produced,” “[r]efused to hear sworn testimonyfrom [her],” “[r]elied on unverified allegations,” and“[e]ntered a final order despite admitted doubt.” She contendsthat “[t]hese acts demonstrate arbitrary decision-makingoutside of legal principles.” To the extent these assertions are
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8ones that we have already considered, we reject them. To theextent Cane was attempting to raise different complaints, theypresent nothing for review because they are unsupported byrecord references, relevant authority, or even enough detailfor us to guess what she means. Accordingly, she has waivedthem by inadequate briefing. We overrule the remainder ofCane's fifth issue.VI. Protective order breadthIn Cane's sixth and final issue, she argues that the protectiveorder is unconstitutionally overbroad and restricts her libertyand right to travel. She does not tell us where in the recordshe raised this objection below.21 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1;Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. 1993) (“As arule, a claim, including a constitutional claim, must have beenasserted in the trial court in order to be raised on appeal.”).Furthermore, she does not cite any part of the record tosupport her factual allegations under this issue, including, forexample, that the order prevents her from “public corridorsthat [she] must use to reach her university and employment.”See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g). For these reasons, we overruleCane's sixth issue.22Conclusion*11 Having overruled Cane's six issues, we affirm the trialcourt's order.All CitationsNot Reported in S.W. Rptr., 2026 WL 1190661Footnotes1To protect the identity of the minor child involved in this case, we use initials for the child and use pseudonymsfor the appellant, the appellee, and the child's father.2Other than the parties' relationship to each other, the facts giving rise to the protective order are largelyirrelevant to the issues on appeal, and we therefore do not discuss the trial evidence except as necessarybelow to address Cane's issues.3We received a document, ostensibly an amicus brief, from Amaro, in which he repeats some of Cane'sarguments and additionally argues that the protective order affects his possession of G.A. This document isnot an amicus brief because it is not filed by “[a]n amicus curiae [who] is a ‘bystander’ [and] whose missionis to aid the court, to act only for the benefit of the court.” Rahman v. Discover Bank, No. 02-19-00182-CV,2020 WL 2202450, at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 7, 2020, no pet.) (quoting Johnson v. Conner,No. 07-11-00055-CV, 2011 WL 3587425, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 16, 2011, no pet.) (brackets andalterations added in Rahman)). “Instead, the proposed brief would function as advocacy on [Cane]'s behalfand would be the equivalent of an appellant's brief. The amicus process cannot be used to circumvent theprohibition of a layperson acting as counsel for a party to an appeal.” Id. There is good cause to refuse toconsider the brief, and we have declined to consider it. See id. (citing Tex. R. App. P. 11 and stating thatthere was no good cause to permit filing of purported amicus brief in that case).4Cane filed a motion to supplement her brief to raise new issues. This court denied the motion, but we notethat the supplemental brief also included a citation for a case that does not appear to exist. Additionally, thebrief includes cites to several cases—for example, In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282 (Tex. 2019), Statev. $435,000.00, 842 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1992), Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990);and In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)—to support propositionsthat they do not support. Moreover, for some of her issues, as with her original appellant's brief, she does nottell us where she raised the complaints below, does not tell us what parts of the record support her complaints,or does not cite authority to support her argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 38.1(g), (i).
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.95The full definition provides,(a) “Dating violence” means an act, other than a defensive measure to protect oneself, by an actor that:(1) is committed against a victim or applicant for a protective order:(A) with whom the actor has or has had a dating relationship; or(B) because of the victim's or applicant's marriage to or dating relationship with an individual with whom theactor is or has been in a dating relationship or marriage; and(2) is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault or that is a threat thatreasonably places the victim or applicant in fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexualassault.Tex. Fam. Code § 71.0021.6Cane's brief summarizes Ramos's testimony but incorrectly presents the summary as a direct quote. Ramostestified, “This was actually because of my son. This was due to custody.... This was for my—it was for myson, trying to get my son back safe.”7Immediately before this testimony, Ramos and Cane argued about whether Cane was still in a romanticrelationship with Amaro.8We can determine whether a lower court had jurisdiction even in the absence of adequate briefing. S.C.v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 449 (Tex. 2022) (“Courts always have the duty to ensure that subject-matterjurisdiction—their own and that of the lower courts—is secure.”). Nevertheless, we note that Cane does notdiscuss why she believes the Title 4 definitions are jurisdictional, and she cites no authority that supportsher argument that they are. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). She cites E.L.T., but that case does not discussprotective orders. 93 S.W.3d at 374–77 (addressing, in appeal from termination of mother's parental rights,whether trial court erred by denying mother's motion for continuance, whether trial court could terminateher parental rights without determining her competency, and whether she received ineffective assistance).Additionally, she does not discuss the factors that courts generally consider when determining whether astatute is jurisdictional. See Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass'n v. Pruski, 689 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. 2024).9Nevertheless, in addition to reviewing the record pages referenced by Cane, we also reviewed the pages ofthe record immediately before and after those pages, and we searched those record volumes for the words“Tahoe,” “firearm,” “gun,” and “weapon.” We found no testimony to support Cane's allegations.10At no point in her brief does Cane tell us what discovery she believes she was entitled to, nor does shetell us how her not having access to it resulted in reversible error. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i), 44.1. In herstatement of facts, she does provide a page of a reporter's record volume where, she claims, she “raisedongoing procedural irregularities, including denial of discovery” to the trial court. That volume contains thetranscript for the second new-trial hearing, but that page (and the pages immediately before and after) donot show that she raised any complaint about being denied discovery. We searched that volume for the word“discovery” and did not find any part of the record where she raised this issue. For these reasons, we overrulethe part of her issue asserting that she was denied discovery. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 38.1(g), (i).11The index for the reporter's record volume for the third new-trial hearing indicates that Cane called Ramosto testify at that hearing. Cane does not tell us what other testimony she wanted to present at the new-trialhearings or where in the record the trial court prevented her from calling additional witnesses.
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1012The record merely states, “(The witnesses are sworn.)” without identifying the witnesses by name.13Moreover, Cane does not explain how her cited authority supports her arguments, and it is not apparentto this court that it does. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) . Rule 266 provides that the plaintiff has the right toopen and close except in certain circumstances and does not address a party's swearing in as a witness,and K.A.F. involved the timeliness of a notice of appeal filed in an accelerated appeal. Tex. R. Civ. P. 266;K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d at 924–28.14Although Cane says that part of the testimony was “unsworn,” she does not address the associate judge'sswearing of witnesses at the start of the hearing.15The single reporter's record page that Cane cites in this part of her brief does not support her assertionthat “payments were mishandled” and that audio files had to be created again. Instead, it reflects that at thesecond new-trial hearing, the trial court and Cane had an exchange in which the trial court informed Canethat she had submitted her payment for the trial transcript to the wrong place (the clerk's office) and told herwho she should pay instead (the court reporter who was present at trial or, alternatively, the court coordinator,who would pass it to the court reporter). Nothing about the exchange indicates that Cane's payment wasmishandled by anyone involved in producing the transcript or that audio files needed to be recreated.16Rule 403 provides that a trial court may exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence “issubstantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, unduedelay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403. Cane does not explain how thisrule relates to her showing her exhibits to opposing counsel. Further, as we explain, she did not preservethis objection.17Cane did not object at the hearing that her binder contained work product. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.5(governing work product); Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.18As noted, Cane's trial court filings were voluminous. Although we have no duty to search the record on Cane'sbehalf, we searched the clerk's record for the word “findings” and did not find anything that we could construeas a notice of past-due findings and conclusions.19Her arguments under this issue do not tell us what unauthenticated exhibits were admitted below, do not tellus where she objected to them, and do not explain how she was harmed by their admission. See Tex. R.App. P. 33.1, 38.1(g), 38.1(i), 44.1.20It was during this discussion that Cane provided the trial court with the cite for Walker v. State, and the trialcourt informed her that the cite was not correct.21We nevertheless searched the 92-pages of Cane's timely postjudgment filings for the words “overbroad,”“travel,” “liberty,” and “constitution,” and we did not find any instance of Cane's raising this complaint in thosefilings.22Nothing in this opinion prevents Cane from filing a motion to modify the protective order, see Tex. Fam.Code § 87.001; J.A.T. v. C.S.T., 641 S.W.3d 596, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied)(providing that even after resolution of an appeal from a protective order, a trial court has jurisdiction underSection 87.001 to modify a protective order while the order remains in effect), or from asking the trial courtto review whether there is a continuing need for the order, see Tex. Fam. Code § 85.025(b) (providing that,not earlier than the first anniversary of the date on which a protective order was rendered, the person whois the subject of the order may file a motion asking that the court review the order and determine whetherthere is a continuing need for it).
K.C., Appellant v. D.R., Appellee, Not Reported in S.W. Rptr. (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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