ing evidence against her husband upon the charge of having stolen the lumber. The result was, stated briefly by the court, that she fell to the floor and lay there for an indefinite time, unconscious. A physician was called and attended her for some time, during which time she was suffering a great deal from nervous trouble, the result of the fright that she received through the conduct of the detective, the agent, and the other servant of the railroad company in entering the yard at the time of night that they did, etc. It does not appear that any evidence was obtained as to the guilt of Alexander, and it has not been asserted, so far as we are able to see, by the railroad company, that there was really any ground for suspicion. The detective and those who accompanied him had no warrant of authority from any court or officer, nor in any way were they authorized by any lawful process to enter upon the premises for such purposes. Consequently, they were trespassers upon Alexander’s home, in his absence, and under the circumstances stated.
There was a trial in the District Court of Hill County, at which the presiding judge instructed a verdict for the defendant. That judgment was, upon appeal to the' Court of Civil Appeals of the Fifth District, reversed and remanded. At a subsequent trial, Alexander recovered a judgment for $3000, from which the appeal was taken to the Fifth District, as before, and transferred to the Third District, where the judgment of the District Court of Hill County was affirmed, and this writ of error was granted by this court.
There is no controversy about the facts of the case, and the only question of law is, was the evidence sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury as a matter of law. This court, in granting the writ, seemed to take the view of the case that there was not sufficient evidence to show legal liability on the part of the railroad company.
The facts warranted the jury in finding that the servants of the plaintiff in error acted under the instruction of the railroad company, and, without any lawful authority, entered upon the premises of defendant in error, whereby they committed a trespass. That the entry was -made to investigate an unfounded charge of dishonesty against the plaintiff in error, and was made when they knew that Alexander was absent, and at the hour of midnight. Liability for the direct consequences can not be denied, and the only question for this court is, can plaintiff recover for the mental suffering and physical injury that was suffered by the wife, arising from the fright produced by the unlawful acts of the detective and agent of the railroad company. It would be unprofitable for us' to enter upon a discussion of the liability for physical suffering arising from mental condition produced by wilful tort. The decisions of other States are in decided conflict, but this court has fully settled the rule to be, that in case of such injury the wrongdoer is liable for all mental and phvsical injuries which naturally result from such tort. Hill v. Kimball. 76 Texas, 210, 7 L. R. A., 618, 13 S. W., 59; Gulf, C. &
S. F. Ry. Co. v. Hayter, 93 Texas, 239, 77 Am.. St., 856, 47 L. R. A., 325, 54 S. W., 944. The right to recover under such circumstances for physical suffering caused by fright is logically and defi