originated in and arose out of and about the master’s business, and not out of personal matters of either Saxon or Johnson (subdivision 4, art. 5246-82, Vernon’s Ann. Civ.St.Supp.1918); there was not, nor had there been, any personal grudge between them. In our compensation statute (article 5246-1) the expression ‘in the course of his employment’ has reference to the time, place, and circumstances under which the injury occurred. Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152, 13 A.L.R. 524; Lumbermen’s Reciprocal Association v. Behnken (Tex.Civ.App.) 226 S.W. 154. Our statute is more liberal than the compensation statutes of many states. It does not require that the injury shall ‘arise out of the employment.’ ”
On the authorities cited it is our conclusion that the evidence fully supports the verdict of the jury as summarized above on this point.
The court did not err in refusing to submit appellee’s specially requested issue, asking the jury to find whether or not Mills provoked the difficulty, for the reason that, on the undisputed evidence, the difficulty grew out of the performance by Hawthorne and Mills of the duties of their employment; on the facts of this case it was immaterial as to which one of them was the aggressor.
Appellant assigns error on the refusal of the court to submit the following issues:
“Do you find from the evidence that deceased, Abe Mills, was attempting to wrongfully injure or assault Harry Hawthorne at the time deceased Abe Mills suffered his fatal injury? Answer Yes or No.”
“Do you find from the evidence that at the time Harry Hawthorne struck deceased, if he did, that he did so in the necessary protection of his own person from serious bodily harm or death at the hands of the deceased, Abe Mills, at the time in question, when viewed from the standpoint of Harry Hawthorne, in the light of all the surrounding circumstances? Answer Yes or No.”
“Do you find from the evidence that Harry Hawthorne was acting in self defense at the time he struck and killed the •deceased, Abe Mills, if he did? Answer Yes or No.”
These defensive issues were not raised by the evidence. Hawthorne struck Mills some fifteen minutes after Mills had assaulted him in the “bear pit,” and at a time when Mills was not molesting him but was actually engaged in the performance of the duties of his employment, and when Mills was not attempting to harm or injure him, and when it was not necessary for him to strike Mills “in the necessary protection of his own person.” Under all the evidence, Hawthorne was not acting in self-defense when he inflicted the fatal blow upon Mills.
The court did not err in refusing to define the terms “injury” and “accidental personal injury.” The facts on these issues were undisputed; the injury inflicted upon Mills by Hawthorne, as a matter of law, harmed and damaged the physical structure of his body. No definitions of these terms could have aided the jury, in answering the questions submitted by the court’s charge. A definition of legal terms is not required where there is no controversy as to the facts of the injury, and that it harmed and damaged the physical structure of the body, or produced the death or the incapacity in issue. On this point we quote as follows from 41 Tex.Jur. 1158:
“ ‘Reasonable Necessity’ as Test. — Not all legal terms used in submitting issues need be defined in every case. It is only when, under the facts presented, definitions are necessary to enable the jury properly to pass upon the questions and render a verdict upon the issues submitted that they are required (R.S. art. 2189). •
“In the nature of things, the statute has not attempted to declare what ‘legal terms’ shall be explained or defined further than ‘shall be necessary to enable the jury to properly pass upon and render a verdict on such issues.’ Reasonable necessity, considering the term or terms used, then, should be the test. *
“Again, the undisputed testimony may render it unnecessary to define some legal terms. And a term which at times should be defined may, in view of the context of the issue, convey its meaning without explanation. Furthermore, when the evidence clearly discloses the meaning of a .term it need not be defined.”
Speaking for this court in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Branton, 70 S.W.(2d) 780, 783, Mr. Justice O’Quinn said: “It appearing without dispute that plaintiff was injured, it was not necessary to define the word ‘injury,’ or to submit an issue as to