West v. Lower Duwamish Waterway Group, No. 87289-3-I (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Arthur West v. Lower Duwamish Waterway Group
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Washington (WA)
Court
Washington Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant, v. LOWER DUWAMISH..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1069752Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION,SEE WA R GEN GR 14.1UNPUBLISHED OPINIONCourt of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.ARTHUR WEST, Appellant,v.LOWER DUWAMISH WATERWAY GROUP, asa subagency and/or the functional equivalent of apublic agency subject to the OPMA and/or the PRA,KING COUNTY, CITY OF SEATTLE, PORT OFSEATTLE, BOEING, AND JEFF STERN, Respondents,andSKIP FOX, TOM NEWLON, ELAINEBILD, JOHN AND JANE DOE LDWGBOARD MEMBERS 1-5, Defendants.No. 87289-3-I|04/20/2026OpinionCoburn, J.*1 Respondents King County,1 City of Seattle, Portof Seattle, and The Boeing Company entered intoan administrative consent order with federal and stateauthorities regarding contamination within the LowerDuwamish Waterway. Respondents voluntarily entered intoa Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to coordinatetheir independent responsibilities under the consent order,collectively referring to themselves as the “Lower DuwamishWaterway Group” or “LDWG.” Arthur West sued the LDWGand respondents as its “agency partners,” alleging that theLDWG engaged in clandestine business activities in violationof the Open Public Meetings Act of 1971 (OPMA), chapter42.30 RCW.West now appeals pro se the trial court's order grantingsummary judgment dismissal in favor of the respondents anddenying his cross-motion for partial summary judgment onhis OPMA claims. West argues that the trial court erred indetermining as a matter of law that the LDWG is not a “publicagency” subject to the OPMA under RCW 42.30.020(1). Wedisagree and affirm.FACTSIn 2000 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) and Washington State Department of Ecologyissued an administrative consent order under the federalComprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,and Liability Act (CERCLA)2 and Washington's ModelToxics Control Act (MTCA) regarding contamination of theLower Duwamish Waterway in Seattle.3 The consent orderprovided that the respondents were jointly and severallyresponsible for the preparation of, performance of, andreimbursement of costs incurred by the EPA and theDepartment for a river-wide “Remedial Investigation andFeasibility Study.”Separate from the consent order, the respondents voluntarilyentered into a “Lower Duwamish Waterway GroupMemorandum of Agreement” (MOA) to cooperate “with eachother with respect to certain activities related to sedimentsin the Lower Duwamish Waterway.” Under the MOA,respondents referred to themselves collectively as membersof the “ ‘Lower Duwamish Waterway Group’ or ‘LDWG.’” The MOA stated that it “shall remain in effect untilcompletion of the [consent order] or until [the MOA] isterminated by the LDWG.” The respondents agreed under theMOA to share costs for the feasibility study on an interimor per capita basis. The respondents “agree[d] that paymentsmade under this MOA constitute an interim allocation forparticipation under this MOA and do not represent anallocation of responsibility for investigation or cleanup of theLower Duwamish Waterway.” Instead, “[e]ach member [ofthe LDWG] shall be individually responsible for its activitiesand obligations under this MOA, and no action undertakenby one Member shall create or impose liabilities on any othermember.” The MOA further provides that any member of theLDWG may withdraw from the MOA upon written notice tothe other members.4*2 In 2023 West sued the respondents under the OPMA,alleging that the LDWG deliberated and made decisionsoutside the purview of the public in violation of the Act.5In his complaint, West alleged that “by legislative action andacting pursuant to state and/or federal statues, [respondents]created the [LDWG].” West requested a declaratory judgment
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant, v. LOWER DUWAMISH..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2regarding whether the LDWG must comply with the OPMAand requested other related relief, including an injunction andconstitutional and statutory writs of mandamus.On August 9, 2024, Boeing moved for summary judgment.That same day King County, City of Seattle, and Portof Seattle jointly moved for summary judgment. In theirmotions, respondents argued that the LDWG is not a publicagency subject to the OPMA because it was not createdpursuant to statute but instead originated from the MOA thatthe respondents voluntarily entered into in 2000. In support,both Boeing and King County, jointly with City of Seattle andPort of Seattle, submitted the MOA as an exhibit.West filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgmenton his OPMA claims and opposed respondents’ summaryjudgment motions. In both his summary judgment motionand opposition, West generally asserted that the LDWGwas created pursuant to “law” and that it is the functionalequivalent of an agency under the OPMA.The trial court granted respondents’ motions for summaryjudgment dismissal and denied West's motion forpartial summary judgment.6 West filed a motion forreconsideration, which the trial court denied. West appeals.DISCUSSIONThe purpose of summary judgment is to avoid a uselesstrial. Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wn.2d 345,349, 588 P.2d 1346 (1979). We review a trial court's ordergranting summary judgment de novo. Ranger Ins. Co. v.Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008).Our review is limited to the record and issues before the trialcourt. Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 19 Wn.App. 2d 210, 221, 494 P.3d 450 (2021) (citing RAP 9.12).Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuineissue of material fact and the moving party is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). “The party movingfor summary judgment bears the initial burden of showingthat there is no disputed issue of material fact. The burdenthen shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that anissue of material fact remains.” Haley v. Amazon.com Servs.,LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 216, 522 P.3d 80 (2022) (citationomitted). The nonmoving party avoids summary judgmentwhen it sets forth specific facts which sufficiently rebut themoving party's contentions and disclose the existence of agenuine issue as to a material fact. Ranger Ins. Co., 164 Wn.2dat 552. “There is a genuine issue of material fact if reasonableminds could disagree on the conclusion of a factual issue.”Mihaila v. Troth, 21 Wn. App. 2d 227, 231, 505 P.3d 163(2022). If there are no genuine disputes as to the materialfacts, then summary judgment can be determined as a matterof law. See Smith v. Safeco Ins. Co., 150 Wn.2d 478, 485, 78P.3d 1274 (2003).We consider all facts and reasonable inferences in the lightmost favorable to the nonmoving party. Mountain ParkHomeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wn.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d1383 (1994). However, a nonmoving party “may not rely onspeculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factualissues remain, or on affidavits considered at face value.”Meyer v. Univ. of Wash., 105 Wn.2d 847, 852, 719 P.2d98 (1986). Affidavits comprised of conclusory statementswithout sufficient factual support cannot defeat a summaryjudgment motion. CR 56(e); Guile v. Ballard Cmty. Hosp., 70Wn. App. 18, 25, 851 P.2d 689 (1993). We may affirm the trialcourt's grant of summary judgment on any basis supported bythe record. Johnson v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd., 197 Wn.2d605, 611, 486 P.3d 125 (2021).*3 The OPMA is “Washington's comprehensivetransparency statute.” Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port ofVancouver USA, 188 Wn.2d 421, 434, 395 P.3d 1031 (2017).Our legislature enacted the OPMA as part of a nationwideeffort to make government activities more accessible andtransparent. West v. Wash. Ass'n of County Officials, 162Wn. App. 120, 131, 252 P.3d 406 (2011) (citing LAWS OF1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 250). The OPMA “seeks ‘to ensurepublic bodies make decisions openly’ ” and its purpose “ ‘isto allow the public to view the decision[-]making processat all stages.’ ” Beauregard v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 197Wn.2d 67, 73, 480 P.3d 410 (2021) (internal quotation marksomitted) (quoting Miller v. City of Tacoma, 138 Wn.2d 318,324, 979 P.2d 429 (1999); Cathcart v. Andersen, 85 Wn.2d102, 107, 530 P.2d 313 (1975)). It is the intent of the Actthat the actions of “all public commissions, boards, councils,committees, subcommittees, departments, divisions, offices,and all other public agencies of this state and subdivisionsthereof” “be taken openly and that their deliberations beconducted openly.” RCW 42.30.010.Under the OPMA, except as otherwise provided, “[a]llmeetings of the governing body of a public agency shall beopen and public and all persons shall be permitted to attendany meeting of the governing body of a public agency.” RCW
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant, v. LOWER DUWAMISH..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.342.30.030(1). “The OPMA's purpose is to permit the public toobserve the steps employed to reach a governmental decision.The intended result is to ensure government accountabilityto the public by demonstrating that publicly funded agenciesare functioning as intended.” West, 162 Wn. App. at 131(citations omitted). Courts must liberally construe the OPMA“to ensure that its purpose is accomplished.” West v. WallaWalla City Council, 34 Wn. App. 2d 195, 203, 567 P.3d 634(2025) (citing Eugster v. City of Spokane, 110 Wn. App. 212,222, 39 P.3d 380 (2002); RCW 42.30.910).To ascertain the meaning of the OPMA, we look first to itslanguage and give effect to the language's plain meaning if itis not ambiguous. West, 162 Wn. App. at 130 (citing Cerrillov. Esparza, 158 Wn.2d 194, 201, 142 P.3d 155 (2006)). “Wheninterpreting a statutory provision, courts ‘must give meaningto every word in a statute.’ ” Smith v. Wash. State Dep'tof Lab. & Indus., 22 Wn. App. 2d 500, 511, 512 P.3d 566(2022) (quoting Bennett v. Seattle Mental Health, 166 Wn.App. 477, 483, 269 P.3d 1079 (2012)). If a statute's languageis ambiguous, we resort to tools of statutory construction toascertain its meaning. West, 162 Wn. App. at 130 (citingCerrillo, 158 Wn.2d at 201). A statute is ambiguous if itis susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.Vashon Island Comm. for Self-Gov't v. Wash. State BoundaryReview Bd. for King County, 127 Wn.2d 759, 771, 903 P.2d953 (1995). This court “cannot rewrite or modify the languageof the statute under the guise of statutory interpretation orconstruction. Rather, we must give full effect to the plainlanguage of the statute, ‘even when the results may seemunduly harsh.’ ” Graham Thrift Grp., Inc. v. Pierce County,75 Wn. App. 263, 267-68, 877 P.2d 228 (1994) (citationsomitted) (quoting Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wn.2d 833,841, 854 P.2d 1061 (1993)).The OPMA defines a “public agency” as:(a) Any state board, commission, committee, department,educational institution, or other state agency which iscreated by or pursuant to statute, other than courts andthe legislature. This does not include a comprehensivecancer center participating in a collaborative arrangementas defined in RCW 28B.10.930 that is operated inconformance with RCW 28B.10.930;(b) Any county, city, school district, special purposedistrict, or other municipal corporation or politicalsubdivision of the state of Washington; (c) Any subagencyof a public agency which is created by or pursuant tostatute, ordinance, or other legislative act, including but notlimited to planning commissions, library or park boards,commissions, and agencies;*4 (d) Any policy group whose membership includesrepresentatives of publicly owned utilities formed by orpursuant to the laws of this state when meeting togetheras or on behalf of participants who have contracted for theoutput of generating plants being planned or built by anoperating agency.RCW 42.30.020(1)(a) (emphasis added). A “governing body”is defined under the OPMA as “the multimember board,commission, committee, council, or other policy or rule-making body of a public agency, or any committee thereofwhen the committee acts on behalf of the governing body,conducts hearings, or takes testimony or public comment.”RCW 42.30.020(2) (emphasis added).West contends that the LDWG is a coordinating agencycreated “pursuant to” statutory mandates under the CERCLA,the MTCA, and the Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA),chapter 90.48 RCW. He cites West, wherein this courtconsidered whether the Washington Association of CountyOfficials (WACO) was a public agency subject to the OPMA.162 Wn. App. at 125, 127-28, 130-35. West argues that “[l]ikethe WACO entity in [West], LDWG exists because federal andstate statutes (CERCLA, [the WPCA], and MTCA) requiredthe creation of the LDWG to coordinate action across multiplejurisdictions to remediate contaminated waters of statewidesignificance.”In West, this court determined that because WACO wasnot a state board, commission, committee, department oreducational institution, it “must qualify as an other stateagency which is created by or pursuant to statute” to meetthe statutory definition under RCW 42.30.020(1)(a).7 Id. at131 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court observedthat “state agency” was not expressly defined by the OPMAand held that a “ ‘state agency’ may be an association ororganization created by or pursuant to statute which servesa statewide public function.” Id. at 131-32. Referring to ourstate Supreme Court's decision in Cathcart v. Andersen, thecourt stated that an entity is created “pursuant to statute” underRCW 42.30.020(1)(a) “ ‘if it is created in conformity with orin the course of carrying out [a statute], implying that whatis done is in accordance with an instruction or direction.’ ”Id. at 132 (alteration in original) (quoting Cathcart, 85 Wn.2dat 104). Therefore, RCW 42.30.020(1)(a) “requires that anenabling statute exist prior to or be enacted simultaneously
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant, v. LOWER DUWAMISH..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4with the creation of an entity carrying out a statewide publicfunction.” Id.Because the legislature formally created WACO as astatewide coordinating agency or “recognized public agency”in 1959, the court held that WACO was “created ‘pursuantto’ statute as required under the OPMA” and “satisfie[d]the statutory definition of ‘public agency’ [under RCW42.30.020(1)(a)] outright.” Id. at 132-33 (citing LAWS OF1959, ch. 130, § 1 (“The necessity and the desirabilityof coordinating the administrative programs of all of thecounties in this state is recognized by this act.”)). The courtfurther explained that it was WACO's own efforts for statutoryrecognition and authorization to receive public funds as astatewide coordinating agency that caused its creation underthe statute and “[t]he fact that WACO initially conducted itselfas a purely professional association among the state's countyofficials does not abrogate its decision to become a recognizedpublic agency in 1959.” Id.*5 Comparatively, the Supreme Court held in Beauregardv. Washington State Bar Ass'n that because the state barassociation existed as a voluntary association before the statebar act of 1933, it was not created “pursuant to statute” underRCW 42.30.020(1)(a) to constitute a public agency under theOPMA. 197 Wn.2d at 74, 76 (citing Cathcart, 85 Wn.2d at104). The court held that though the state bar act of 1933made WSBA membership mandatory to practice law andlisted additional powers and responsibilities for the WSBA,“the state bar act did not create the WSBA.” Id. at 75-76.In the instant case, the record supports that the LDWG'sorigin derives from the respondents’ MOA that they enteredinto solely of their own accord to coordinate their efforts,including sharing costs, in fulfilling their independentobligations under the consent order. West points to noprovision under the CERCLA, the MTCA, or the WPCAto show that the LDWG, like WACO, was created pursuantto an enabling statute. In his briefing, West's argument onlyprovides general references to these acts.8 His argumentalso does not include precise citation to the record, broadlyciting to page ranges that refer to various filings withoutspecifying the information we are to glean from them.West's broad citation to the record, for example, includescounterarguments in Boeing's motion for summary judgmentas well as references to the CERCLA, the MTCA, and theWPCA in irrelevant contexts.We hold West as a pro se litigant to the same standardas an attorney. In re Est. of Little, 9 Wn. App. 2d 262,274 n.4, 444 P.3d 23 (2019); West, 162 Wn. App. at 137n.13. As such, his arguments must comply with RAP 10.3,which provides parties with briefing instructions necessaryfor this court's review. State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App.442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999); see West, 162 Wn. App.at 137 n.14. The rule requires an appellant to support theirarguments with citation to legal authority and references tothe relevant portions of the record. RAP 10.3(a)(6). A party'scitations to legal authority in support of their position onappeal should relate to the issues presented for review andsupport the proposition for which that authority is cited. LithoColor, Inc. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co., 98 Wn. App. 286,305, 991 P.2d 638 (1999). We need not consider argumentsunsupported by meaningful analysis or authority. CowicheCanyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828P.2d 549 (1992). We conclude that West fails to show thatthe LDWG was created pursuant to a statute under RCW42.30.020(1)(a).West contends that this court should, for the first time, extendthe functional equivalent test under Telford v. ThurstonCounty Board of Commissioners to determine whether theLDWG is a “public agency” subject to the OPMA. See95 Wn. App. 149, 161-66, 974 P.2d 886 (1999). TheTelford court held that the “hybrid” WACO and WashingtonState Association of Counties (WSAC), which had someattributes of local agencies and some attributes of privateones, constituted agencies subject to the Public Records Act(PRA), chapter 42.56.9 Id. The PRA, another governmenttransparency law, defines “agency” in relevant part asencompassing “all local agencies,” which consists of “everycounty, city, town, municipal corporation, quasi-municipalcorporation, or special purpose district, or any office,department, division, bureau, board, commission, or agencythereof, or other local public agency.” RCW 42.56.010(1)(emphasis added).10 The Telford court determined that thestatute was ambiguous as applied to WACO and WSACbecause they would have to “qualify as ‘other local publicagenc[ies]’ ” to be subject to the PRA, which was undefined.95 Wn. App. at 156-58 (alteration in original) (quotingRCW 42.56.010(1)). The court adopted a balancing testderived from case law interpreting the federal Freedom ofInformation Act (FOIA)11 to determine whether the PRAapplies to a certain private or quasi-private entity, setting forthfour factors: (1) the entity's performance of a governmentalfunction, (2) the level of the entity's government funding,(3) the extent of government control over the entity, and (4)
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant, v. LOWER DUWAMISH..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5whether the entity was created by the government. Id. at161-66.*6 Telford is not helpful to the question of whether theLDWG is a public agency under RCW 42.30.020(1) because,as the court observed in West, “[t]he Telford court did notdiscuss the OPMA.” 162 Wn. App. at 129. Here, West doesnot present evidence that the LDWG was created by orpursuant to a statute as required under the plain language ofRCW 42.30.020(1)(a). Because an application of the Telfordfactors to the LDWG would require us to turn a blind eye tothis express requirement under the OPMA, we decline West'sinvitation to do so.12 See Five Corners Fam. Farmers v. State,173 Wn.2d 296, 312, 268 P.3d 892 (2011) (“To be reasonable,an interpretation must, at a minimum, account for all thewords in a statute.”).In his reply brief, West cites the Supreme Court's recentdecision in Horvath v. DBIA Services, which appliedthe Telford four-factor balancing test in its determinationthat private nonprofit corporation DBIA Services was thefunctional equivalent of a government agency subject to thePRA. No. 103339-7, slip op. at 12-17 (Wash. Dec. 18, 2025),https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/1033397.pdf. LikeTelford, however, Horvath does not discuss the OPMA.Horvath thus does not control our application of the plainlanguage under RCW 42.30.020(1)(a). Likewise, additionalcases that West cites that endorsed or applied the Telfordfactors in analyses specific to the PRA with no mention of theOPMA are neither controlling nor persuasive to the presentmatter. See generally Worthington v. WestNET, 182 Wn.2d500, 341 P.3d 995 (2015); Fortgang v. Woodland Park Zoo,187 Wn.2d 509, 387 P.3d 690 (2017).West otherwise provides no authority to contradict ourinterpretation.13 See DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60Wn.2d 122, 126, 372, P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authoritiesare cited in support of a proposition, the court is not requiredto search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, afterdiligent search, has found none.”).CONCLUSIONWest fails to show that the LDWG is subject to the OPMA asa state agency created by or pursuant to statute under RCW42.30.020(1)(a). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court didnot err by granting summary judgment dismissal in favor ofthe respondents.14*7 We affirm.15WE CONCUR:All CitationsNot Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2026 WL 1069752Footnotes1Below and on appeal King County represents Jeff Stern, who West named as an individual defendant in hislawsuit in the context of his claims against King County and other respondents.242 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75.3The MTCA has been recodified since the issuance of the consent order from chapter 70.105D RCW to chapter70A.305 RCW. See LAWS OF 2020, ch. 20, §§ 101-103, 2030.4The record also includes a sixth amendment to the MOA, which “applies MOA contracting, invoicing andgrant procedures that reflect current LDWG practices.” The amendment states that “[a]ll terms and provisionsin the MOA remain in effect, except as expressly supplemented and modified herein.”5West also raised claims under the Public Records Act (PRA), chapter 42.56, which are not at issue on appeal.
ARTHUR WEST, Appellant, v. LOWER DUWAMISH..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.66The trial court's order, along with West's OPMA and declaratory judgment claims, dismissed West's claimsunder the PRA.7RCW 42.30.020 has been amended since this court's decision in Wash. Ass'n of County Officials, but becausethe language relevant to this opinion's analysis has remained the same, we refer to the current version. SeeLAWS OF 2022, ch. 71, § 11.8In the table of authorities to his opening brief, West cites RCW 90.48.030 of the WPCA, which grants theDepartment “jurisdiction to control and prevent the pollution of streams, lakes, rivers, ponds, inland waters,salt waters, water courses, and other surface and underground waters of the state of Washington.”9In 2005 the legislature recodified and renamed the Public Disclosure Act (PDA), former chapter 42.17 RCW(1973), as the PRA, chapter 42.56 RCW. See LAWS OF 2005, ch. 274, § 103. For clarity, we refer to thestatute by its current name.10RCW 42.56.010 has been amended since the Telford decision, but the relevant language undersubsection .010(1) remains the same.115 U.S.C. § 552.12For this reason, we also decline West's argument that the State Attorney General Opinion No. 5 (1991)supports the application of the Telford factors to the issue of whether the LDWG is a public agency under theOPMA. In addition to not being binding on this court, we observe that the AGO noted in its analysis regardingwhether the nonprofit corporation Small Business Export Finance Assistance Center (EAC) was an agencysubject to the OPMA or the PRA that the EAC was “authorized to be formed under chapter 24.03 RCW.”1991 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 5, at 2, https://www.atg.wa.gov/ago-opinions/public-records-open-public-meetings-act-corporations-small-business-export-finance; see City of Pasco v. Dep't of Ret. Sys., 110 Wn. App. 582,592 n.11, 42 P.3d 992 (2002) (“Attorney General Opinions are not binding on the court and we may disregardthem.”); see also Telford, 95 Wn. App. at 162 & n.17 (discussing 1991 Att'y Gen. Op. No. 5). This is notpersuasive to the instant record.13At certain points in his briefing, West provides fictitious quotations from existent cases. We rebuke such lack ofcandor as detrimental and offensive to the legal process and not worthy of judicial review. Everyone, includingpro se litigants, are responsible to confirm their pleadings, motions, briefs, and other filings are accurate anddo not contain any citations that are invented or hallucinated by generative artificial intelligence (AI) or anyother source. See RAP 10.3(a)(6); West v. Thurston County, 168 Wn. App. 162, 187, 275 P.3d 1200 (2012).14We similarly decide that the trial court properly denied West's motion for reconsideration.15We also deny West's motion to supplement the appellate record under RAP 9.11. Though respondents didnot oppose the motion, a movant must satisfy six elements to prove that additional evidence is necessary toresolve the case under RAP 9.11(a). Because West submits the additional evidence only in furtherance ofhis argument that the LDWG is the functional equivalent of a government agency under Telford and Horvath,he fails to show under RAP 9.11(a) that the “additional proof of facts is needed to fairly resolve the issueson review” and that “the additional evidence would probably change the decision being reviewed.” Even ifWest could meet the six criteria under RAP 9.11(a), which he has not, the additional evidence would notchange our analysis.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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