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Cady v. O'Malley
(2026)
Case details
Full caption
Ann K. Cady, Beth L. Corning, and Caron G. Roesler v. Matthew C. O'Malley
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Wisconsin (WI)
Court
Wisconsin Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Wendy J.n. Klicko, joined by Graham (P.J.), Kloppenburg (J.), Taylor (J.)
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2026
WL
184862
Only
the
Westlaw
citation
is
currently
available.
NOTICE:
FINAL
PUBLICATION
DECISION
PENDING.
SEE
W.S.A.
809.23.
Court
of
Appeals
of
Wisconsin.
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
Matthew
C.
O'Malley,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal
No.
2025AP944
|
January
23,
2026
Cir.
Ct.
No.
2022CV155
APPEAL
from
an
order
of
the
circuit
court
for
Sauk
County:
WENDY
J.N.
KLICKO,
Judge.
Affirmed
.
Before
Graham
,
P.J.,
Kloppenburg
,
and
Taylor
,
JJ.
Opinion
PER
CURIAM.
*1
¶1
Matthew
O'Malley
appeals
a
circuit
court
order
that
enforced
a
settlement
agreement
he
made
with
his
sisters
regarding
the
disposition
of
real
estate
and
a
family-owned
corporation,
and
that
dismissed
this
litigation
with
prejudice
pursuant
to
that
agreement.
We
reject
O'Malley’s
arguments
and
affirm
the
order
of
dismissal.
BACKGROUND
¶2
The
plaintiffs,
Ann
Cady,
Beth
Corning,
and
Caron
Roesler,
and
the
defendant,
Matthew
O'Malley,
are
siblings
who
shared
ownership
of
real
estate
and
a
family-owned
corporation
called
Johnson-O'Malley,
Inc.
We
refer
to
Cady,
Corning,
and
Roesler
collectively
as
the
“sisters”;
to
the
three
sisters
and
O'Malley
collectively
as
the
“siblings”;
and
to
Johnson-O'Malley,
which
is
not
a
party
in
this
litigation,
as
the
“corporation.”
¶3
When
this
lawsuit
was
initiated,
each
of
the
siblings
owned
an
undivided
one-fourth
interest
in
a
parcel
of
residential
real
estate
in
the
Village
of
Lake
Delton.
Each
of
the
siblings
also
owned
one
fourth
of
the
shares
of
the
family
corporation,
meaning
that
the
siblings
were
its
sole
shareholders.
For
its
part,
the
corporation
owned
a
parcel
of
commercial
real
estate
that
was
adjacent
to
the
residential
parcel.
¶4
In
or
around
2021,
some
or
all
of
the
siblings
decided
that
the
residential
and
commercial
parcels
should
be
sold,
ideally
to
a
single
buyer.
At
some
point
as
they
prepared
for
a
sale,
the
communication
between
the
siblings
broke
down
and
O'Malley,
who
had
been
living
in
a
house
on
the
residential
property,
refused
to
allow
his
sisters
access
to
that
property.
The
Pleadings
¶5
In
April
2022,
the
sisters
initiated
this
lawsuit
and
O'Malley
counterclaimed.
As
we
discuss
in
more
detail
below,
both
sides
generally
agreed
that
the
real
estate
should
be
sold,
and
both
sides
asked
for
a
judicially
ordered
sale
of
one
or
both
parcels
pursuant
to
WIS
.
STAT
.
§
842.02(2)
(2023-24).
1
However,
the
sisters
and
O'Malley
disagreed
about
how
the
proceeds
of
the
sale
should
be
split
between
the
siblings.
¶6
In
their
complaint,
the
sisters
sought
an
injunction
against
O'Malley
that
would
grant
the
sisters
access
to
the
residential
property
and
require
O'Malley
to
move
out.
They
also
sought
an
order
for
the
judicial
sale
of
the
residential
property,
which
would
be
followed
by
a
court-ordered
equitable
division
of
the
proceeds.
According
to
the
sisters’
request
for
relief,
the
distribution
of
sale
proceeds
to
O'Malley
should
be
reduced
based
on
“contributions”
that
the
sisters
made
to
the
residential
real
estate
and
reductions
in
the
value
of
the
real
estate
that
the
sisters
attributed
to
O'Malley,
and
also
based
on
the
theory
of
unjust
enrichment
because
O'Malley
had
been
“living
rent
free”
in
the
house
on
the
residential
property.
¶7
In
his
answer,
O'Malley
denied
that
he
owed
any
rent
for
the
residential
property.
He
affirmatively
alleged
that
any
reduction
in
its
value
was
due
to
mismanagement
by
his
sisters.
¶8
O'Malley
also
filed
two
counterclaims:
one
for
unjust
enrichment
and
a
second
for
a
judicial
sale.
As
for
unjust
enrichment,
O'Malley
alleged
that
the
sisters
had
been
unjustly
enriched
by
the
efforts
he
had
undertaken
to
manage
the
residential
property
and
the
business
on
the
commercial
property,
and
he
sought
the
value
of
the
services
that
he
had
provided
for
both
properties.
As
for
the
request
for
a
judicial
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
sale,
O'Malley
sought
the
sale
of
not
only
the
residential
property
but
also
the
commercial
property,
and
he
took
the
position
that
the
net
proceeds
should
be
divided
equally
among
the
parties.
*2
¶9
In
their
response
to
the
counterclaims,
the
sisters
denied
that
O'Malley
was
entitled
to
any
compensation.
They
affirmatively
alleged
that
he
had
taken
insurance
money
for
the
residential
property
for
his
own
personal
use
and
operated
his
own
business
out
of
the
commercial
property.
¶10
In
February
2023,
O'Malley’s
first
set
of
attorneys
moved
to
withdraw
as
counsel,
citing
a
substantial
breakdown
in
communication
on
the
substantive
issues
relating
to
the
case.
The
circuit
court
did
not
enter
an
order
allowing
the
attorneys
to
withdraw
until
a
month
later,
after
the
siblings
had
entered
into
a
settlement
agreement
but
before
they
followed
through
on
the
settlement
by
asking
the
court
to
dismiss
the
litigation.
As
discussed
below,
O'Malley
would
go
on
to
retain
and
then
discharge
two
more
sets
of
attorneys
during
the
course
of
the
post-settlement
phase
of
the
litigation.
The
Settlement
¶11
The
siblings
entered
into
a
written
settlement
agreement
on
March
3,
2023.
As
we
understand
it,
a
significant
impetus
for
the
agreement
was
that
there
had
been
an
offer
to
purchase
the
residential
and
commercial
real
estate
and
some
or
all
of
the
siblings
wanted
to
accept
that
offer.
As
we
describe
in
greater
detail
below,
the
written
settlement
agreement
memorializes
an
agreement
to
sell
the
real
estate,
to
resolve
the
claims
between
the
siblings,
to
distribute
the
proceeds
of
the
real
estate
sale,
to
transfer
full
ownership
of
the
corporation
to
O'Malley,
and
to
dismiss
this
litigation.
The
siblings
and
the
corporation
were
party
to
the
agreement,
which
was
signed
on
March
3,
2023,
by
each
of
the
siblings
and
by
one
of
the
sisters,
Ann
Cady,
on
behalf
of
the
corporation
as
its
president.
We
sometimes
refer
to
the
siblings
and
the
corporation
collectively
as
the
“settling
parties.”
¶12
As
for
the
real
estate,
the
settlement
agreement
provided
that
both
parcels
would
be
sold
pursuant
to
the
terms
of
the
purchase
offer,
which
was
incorporated
into
the
agreement.
2
The
agreement
further
provided
that,
if
the
closing
did
not
occur
“due
to
factors
out
of
the
control
of
the
parties,”
the
settlement
agreement
would
be
“null
and
void
in
its
entirety.”
¶13
The
settlement
agreement
resolved
various
disputes
between
the
siblings
about
who
was
owed
money
and
who
would
be
responsible
for
certain
corporate
debts,
and
it
also
provided
that
O'Malley
would
assume
sole
ownership
of
the
corporation.
For
his
part,
O'Malley
agreed
that
upon
the
closing
of
the
real
estate
sale,
he
would
make
a
payment
to
Cady
to
pay
off
a
personal
loan,
he
would
resolve
a
specified
judgment
and
certain
debts
that
constituted
liens
on
the
real
estate,
and
he
would
be
responsible
for
specified
utility
bills
and
certain
credit
card
and
corporate
debts.
For
the
sisters’
part,
they
agreed
to
make
a
payment
to
O'Malley,
to
pay
certain
utility
and
legal
bills
owed
by
the
corporation,
and
to
surrender
their
roles,
shares,
and
interests
in
the
corporation
to
O'Malley,
“thus
giving
O'Malley
100%
...
ownership.”
3
*3
¶14
The
settlement
agreement
also
included
a
mutual
release.
Generally
speaking,
the
settling
parties
released
each
other
from
“any
and
all
liability,
claims,
counterclaims,
damages,
remedies,
and
causes
of
action,
of
any
kind
or
nature,
...
known
or
unknown,
that
existed
or
may
have
existed
on
or
before
the
date
of
this
Agreement
relating
to
the
Subject
Properties,
the
Corporation,
or
the
relationship
between
the
Parties.”
The
release
was
qualified
in
that
it
did
not
“bar
any
claim
of
the
Corporation
or
[the
sisters]
against
O'Malley
for
debts
incurred
on
behalf
of
the
Corporation
that
are
unknown
to
the
Corporation
or
[the
sisters],”
nor
did
it
“bar
any
claim
of
the
Corporation
or
O'Malley
against
[the
sisters]
for
debts
incurred
on
behalf
of
the
Corporation
that
are
unknown
to
the
Corporation
or
O'Malley.”
¶15
Each
of
the
settling
parties
expressly
acknowledged
that
the
written
settlement
agreement
constituted
the
“entire
agreement
and
understanding
between
the
Parties.”
They
further
acknowledged
that
no
other
party
had
“made
any
statement,
promise,
representation,
or
warranty
whatsoever
...
not
contained
within
this
Agreement
to
induce
[the
settling
party]
to
execute
this
Agreement,”
and
that
they
had
not
executed
the
agreement
“in
reliance
on
anything
not
contained”
in
the
agreement.
¶16
Finally,
the
parties
agreed
to
dismiss
the
lawsuit.
The
settlement
agreement
provided:
“Upon
the
complete
execution
of
this
Agreement,
which
contemplates
the
closing
of
the
Sale,
the
Parties
shall
then
file
a
stipulation
and
proposed
order
for
dismissal
of
the
Lawsuit
with
the
Court.”
¶17
In
mid-March
2023,
the
sisters’
attorney
filed
a
letter
to
inform
the
circuit
court
of
the
settlement.
Counsel
anticipated
that
a
stipulation
and
order
to
dismiss
would
be
filed
in
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
May.
However,
no
stipulation
was
forthcoming.
Meanwhile,
as
noted,
after
receiving
the
notice
of
settlement,
the
court
allowed
O'Malley’s
first
set
of
attorneys
to
withdraw.
The
Closing
¶18
The
closing
of
the
real
estate
transaction
occurred
on
June
15,
2023,
with
the
two
parcels
of
real
estate
selling
for
$1,000,000.
Prior
to
the
closing,
the
parties
worked
with
a
closing
agent
to
determine
how
the
sale
proceeds
would
be
divided.
Each
of
the
siblings
would
receive
an
equal
share
of
the
sale
proceeds,
which
would
then
be
adjusted
to
account
for
the
other
payments
and
liabilities
that
were
resolved
in
the
settlement
agreement.
For
his
part,
O'Malley’s
share
of
the
sale
proceeds
was
adjusted
upward
to
account
for
the
settlement
payment
from
the
sisters,
and
then
downward
to
account
for
the
loan
payoff
to
Cady
and
the
payments
of
other
debts
and
liabilities
that
O'Malley
assumed
in
the
settlement
agreement.
A
“closing
statement”
prepared
by
the
closing
agent
memorialized
the
dollar
value
of
the
distributions
to
each
of
the
siblings,
and
the
statement
was
signed
by
each
of
the
siblings
and
by
Cady
on
behalf
of
the
corporation.
¶19
The
closing
agent
also
prepared
tax
documents
(Form
1099-S)
for
the
siblings
and
the
corporation.
The
1099s
reflected
that
each
of
the
siblings
received
a
quarter
share
of
the
sale
proceeds
(that
is,
$250,000)
from
the
real
estate
transactions
and
that
the
corporation
received
$0.
Each
of
the
siblings
signed
his
or
her
1099,
and
Cady
signed
the
1099
for
the
corporation.
When
later
questioned
at
an
evidentiary
hearing,
the
closing
agent
testified
that
the
direction
on
how
to
distribute
the
proceeds
came
from
meetings
with
the
siblings,
and
the
siblings’
agreement
was
evinced
in
the
signed
closing
statement
and
the
1099s.
¶20
Following
the
closing
and
the
distribution
of
the
sale
proceeds,
the
sisters’
attorney
prepared
documents
that
would
transfer
the
sisters’
shares
of
the
corporation
to
O'Malley
and
a
stipulation
that
would
dismiss
the
lawsuit.
O'Malley
refused
to
accept
the
shares
unless
the
sisters
turned
over
corporate
documents
and
provided
an
“accounting”
of
the
corporation's
finances.
The
sisters
provided
documents,
but
O'Malley
refused
to
accept
them
and
refused
to
sign
the
stipulation
for
dismissal.
The
Motion
to
Enforce
the
Settlement
Agreement
*4
¶21
In
July
2024,
the
sisters
filed
a
motion
asking
the
circuit
court
to
enforce
the
settlement
agreement
and
dismiss
the
lawsuit.
Although
the
motion
was
styled
as
a
“motion
to
dismiss,”
it
was
not
a
motion
based
on
a
defense
set
forth
in
WIS
.
STAT
.
§
802.06(2)(a)
,
nor
was
it
a
motion
for
summary
judgment.
Instead,
it
was
effectively
a
motion
seeking
specific
performance
of
the
settlement
agreement,
which
would
result
in
the
dismissal
of
the
lawsuit.
¶22
In
the
motion,
the
sisters
represented
that
all
of
the
terms
of
the
settlement
agreement
“have
been
satisfied
or
resolved
except
that”
O'Malley
had
“failed
to
accept”
ownership
of
the
corporation.
The
sisters
represented
that
they
had
attempted
to
transfer
their
shares
to
O'Malley,
but
he
refused
to
accept
them.
The
sisters
also
represented
that
they
had
offered,
in
the
alternative,
to
dissolve
the
corporation.
However,
O'Malley
had
“not
agreed
to
any
proposed
solution
and
ha[d]
not
proposed
any
solution
to
dismiss
the
matter.”
¶23
O'Malley,
who
was
at
this
time
represented
by
a
second
set
of
attorneys,
filed
a
brief
opposing
dismissal.
In
that
brief,
O'Malley
argued
that
the
sisters
had
failed
to
establish
that
two
of
the
settlement
agreement's
“conditions
[of]
dismissal
...
ha[d]
been
met.”
More
specifically,
he
asserted,
“the
allocation
of
liabilities
for
capital
gains
taxes
on
the
sale
proceeds”
were
“at
variance
from
the
terms
of
the
closing,”
and
the
sisters
had
not
provided
“the
books,
accounts
and
records
of
[the
corporation]
in
up-to-date
and
merchantable
form.”
On
the
latter
point,
O'Malley
asserted,
he
was
uncertain
whether
the
documents
that
had
been
turned
over
were
complete,
and
he
objected
to
“being
asked
to
take
delivery
of
corporate
records
and
indicia
of
ownership
with
no
opportunity
to
verify
their
completeness
or
accuracy.”
¶24
Additionally
or
perhaps
in
the
alternative,
O'Malley
argued
that
the
terms
of
the
settlement
agreement
were
“so
contingent”
that
the
agreement
“is
of
questionable
enforceability,”
and
also
that
the
agreement
was
“not
sufficiently
definite
to
be
enforced.”
O'Malley
asserted
that
the
parties
should
have
included
additional
terms
in
their
agreement—“[t]he
real
estate
closing
and
its
subsequent
tax
reporting
should
have
been
defined
by
precise
terms”
in
the
settlement
agreement,
and
“[t]he
corporate
assets
should
have
been
inspected,
exceptions
to
their
suitability
noted,
and
the
problems
cured,”
presumably
prior
to
executing
the
settlement
agreement.
¶25
A
motion
hearing
was
scheduled
for
September
2024.
By
that
time,
O'Malley
had
discharged
his
second
set
of
attorneys
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
and
was
represented
by
a
third
set.
There
is
no
transcript
of
the
September
2024
hearing
in
the
record,
nor
is
there
any
written
order
memorializing
the
results
of
that
hearing.
Based
on
later
representations
by
the
circuit
court
and
the
siblings,
we
understand
that
O'Malley
raised
concerns
about
the
corporate
documents
he
had
received,
and
the
sisters
offered
to
provide
all
documents
in
their
possession.
Consistent
with
that
offer,
the
court
ordered
the
sisters
to
provide
the
documents
and
ordered
O'Malley
to
accept
them,
and
it
gave
O'Malley
60
days
to
review
the
documents
and
to
decide
whether
he
was
maintaining
his
objection
to
dismissal
of
the
lawsuit.
¶26
In
December
2024,
O'Malley’s
third
set
of
attorneys
wrote
to
inform
the
circuit
court
that
O'Malley
had
reviewed
the
documents
that
had
been
provided
and
continued
to
object
to
the
lawsuit
being
dismissed.
The
letter
stated
that,
“[a]mong
other
things,
the
documents
evidence
that
the
[sisters]
failed
to
comply
with
material
terms
of
the
settlement
agreement,
and
that
those
failures
may
constitute
grounds
for
invalidation
or
rescission
of
the
parties’
agreement.”
The
letter
did
not
identify
any
particular
term
that
the
sisters
failed
to
comply
with,
nor
did
it
identify
any
facts
that
would
support
invalidation
or
rescission
of
the
settlement
agreement.
The
letter
instead
asked
for
a
status
conference
to
establish
“an
appropriate
scheduling
order
addressing
additional
discovery
(to
the
extent
the
court
will
permit
it)
and
briefing.”
*5
¶27
At
the
same
time,
O'Malley’s
third
set
of
attorneys
moved
to
withdraw
from
the
case,
citing
“[f]undamental
disagreements”
that
had
“arisen
between
[O'Malley]
and
his
counsel
such
that
continued
representation
would
be
unreasonably
difficult
....”
Counsel's
motion
asserted
that
“[w]ithdrawal
may
be
accomplished
without
material
adverse
effect
to
the
defendant,
the
other
parties
to
this
matter,
or
the
[circuit]
court.”
The
court
did
not
at
that
time
enter
an
order
allowing
the
third
set
of
attorneys
to
withdraw.
¶28
Shortly
thereafter,
O'Malley
filed
a
pro
se
motion
and
a
pro
se
brief
opposing
the
pending
motion
to
enforce
the
settlement
agreement.
In
the
pro
se
motion,
O'Malley
cited
his
right
to
self-representation
and
asked
the
circuit
court
to
allow
him
to
proceed
pro
se.
In
so
doing,
he
“affirm[ed]
that
he
underst[ood]
the
responsibilities
and
obligations
associated
with
self-representation,
including
compliance
with
court
rules
and
procedures.”
O'Malley
also
asked
the
court
to
“[a]dmit
and
consider”
his
pro
se
brief
as
a
supplement
to
the
brief
that
had
been
previously
filed
by
his
second
set
of
attorneys.
¶29
O'Malley’s
supplemental
brief
was
lengthy
and
at
times
difficult
to
track,
but
we
summarize
its
arguments
as
we
best
understand
them.
4
According
to
O'Malley,
the
settlement
agreement
was
“invalid”
because
O'Malley
had
not
meaningfully
participated
in
the
negotiation;
because
the
sisters
and
their
attorney
unilaterally
imposed
certain
terms;
because
the
sisters’
attorney
had
previously
represented
the
corporation
which
created
a
“conflict
of
interest”;
and
because
O'Malley
signed
the
agreement
under
“undue
influence”
or
“duress.”
Dismissal
pursuant
to
the
settlement
agreement
was
also
“premature”
because
the
agreement
contemplated
that
the
lawsuit
would
not
be
dismissed
until
“execution”
of
the
agreement
was
“complete,”
and
that
had
not
yet
occurred
because
corporate
ownership
had
not
been
transferred
to
O'Malley.
¶30
O'Malley’s
supplemental
brief
also
asserted
that
he
was
unwilling
to
accept
the
transfer
of
his
sisters’
shares
in
the
corporation
because
there
were
a
number
of
“unresolved
issues”
about
how
the
corporation
had
been
managed
that
predated
the
2023
settlement,
including
issues
with
corporate
recordkeeping
and
transparency.
According
to
O'Malley,
the
corporate
documents
that
had
been
provided
were
inadequate
and
left
lingering
questions.
Specifically,
O'Malley
could
not
verify
the
sisters’
representation
that
the
corporation
had
no
assets
after
the
real
estate
was
sold,
nor
could
he
verify
whether
it
had
additional
undisclosed
liabilities
that
could
offset
the
benefits
of
full
ownership,
rendering
the
settlement
agreement
“inequitable.”
Some
of
the
“unresolved
issues”
that
O'Malley
identified
in
his
supplement
were
also
the
subject
of
O'Malley’s
counterclaims,
and
he
argued
that
he
potentially
had
other
unpled
claims
such
as
breach
of
fiduciary
duty
that
he
might
wish
to
pursue
against
his
sisters.
*6
¶31
Additionally,
O'Malley’s
supplemental
brief
presented
his
concerns
about
decisions
that
the
sisters
had
purportedly
made
after
the
settlement
agreement
was
signed.
One
of
these
decisions
had
something
to
do
with
the
preparation
of
a
schedule
5K-1
tax
form
which,
O'Malley
asserted,
was
not
consistent
with
the
“property
allocation
values
agreed
to
and
executed
at
the
15
June
2023
closing.”
Another
decision
concerned
a
purported
quit
claim
of
corporate
real
estate
to
Sauk
County.
O'Malley
asserted,
among
other
things,
that
he
was
entitled
to
certain
disclosures,
including
a
detailed
list
of
all
contracts
that
the
sisters
entered
into
on
behalf
of
the
corporation
since
2020.
¶32
The
circuit
court
scheduled
a
telephone
motion
hearing
to
address
the
motion
to
withdraw
filed
by
O'Malley’s
third
set
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
5
of
attorneys.
On
January
7,
2025,
the
morning
of
the
hearing,
O'Malley
filed
a
pro
se
motion
that
appeared
to
reverse
course
on
his
request
to
represent
himself—O'Malley
instead
asked
the
court
to
“delay
any
subsequent
hearings”
to
give
time
for
“still
missing
corporate
records”
to
be
provided
and
“to
allow
[O'Malley]
time
to
secure
replacement
counsel
and
to
review
corporate
records
necessary
to
properly
respond
to
the
pending
matters.”
¶33
The
telephone
motion
hearing
took
place
as
scheduled
on
January
7,
2025.
The
circuit
court
acknowledged
O'Malley’s
request
for
additional
time
to
retain
replacement
counsel
and
review
corporate
records,
but
it
expressed
concern
about
the
length
of
time
that
the
case
had
been
pending
and
the
fact
that
the
sisters’
attorney
planned
to
leave
his
law
firm
after
the
end
of
the
month.
After
confirming
that
all
of
the
corporate
documents
that
had
been
provided
to
O'Malley’s
counsel
had
been
turned
over
to
O'Malley,
the
court
granted
counsel's
motion
to
withdraw.
The
court
agreed
to
postpone
the
evidentiary
hearing
on
the
sisters’
pending
motion
until
January
31,
but
no
later,
and
stated
that
if
O'Malley
wanted
to
be
represented
by
counsel
at
the
hearing,
O'Malley
would
have
to
retain
counsel
before
the
hearing
date.
The
Evidentiary
Hearing
¶34
The
evidentiary
hearing
proceeded
as
scheduled
on
January
31,
2025.
O'Malley
had
not
retained
replacement
counsel
and
represented
himself.
¶35
At
the
start
of
hearing,
the
circuit
court
reviewed
the
posture
of
the
litigation
between
the
siblings,
and
it
identified
what
had
been
addressed
and
what
remained
to
be
addressed
in
the
litigation
as
follows.
The
sisters’
complaint
and
O'Malley’s
counterclaim
had
each
sought
judicial
sale
of
the
real
estate,
but
that
relief
was
not
something
the
court
could
order
given
that
the
real
estate
no
longer
belonged
to
the
settling
parties.
And,
although
O'Malley
had
also
filed
a
counterclaim
for
unjust
enrichment,
the
counterclaim
had
been
resolved
through
the
settlement
agreement.
Specifically,
the
siblings
had
agreed
that
the
disbursements
from
the
real
estate
sale
would
“resolve”
their
competing
claims
“about
the
other
being
unjustly
enriched.”
Accordingly,
O'Malley’s
counterclaim
need
not
be
further
addressed,
assuming
that
the
settlement
agreement
was
enforceable.
Under
these
circumstances,
there
were
no
remaining
claims
or
counterclaims
in
the
lawsuit
left
to
adjudicate,
and
the
focus
of
the
evidentiary
hearing
would
be
on
whether
the
court
should
order
enforcement
of
the
settlement
agreement,
which
would
result
in
the
dismissal
of
the
lawsuit.
¶36
When
asked
whether
he
agreed
with
the
circuit
court's
summary
of
the
remaining
issues
in
the
litigation,
O'Malley
again
brought
up
concerns
about
missing
corporate
documents,
and
the
court
questioned
the
sisters’
attorney
about
whether
all
known
corporate
documents
had
been
provided
to
O'Malley.
Counsel
represented
that,
based
on
his
conversations
with
the
sisters,
all
known
corporate
records
in
their
possession
had
been
turned
over,
and
O'Malley
responded
that
he
had
not
received
documents
such
as
“corporate
minutes
from
many
major
decisions
that
were
made
after
the
settlement
agreement.”
Counsel
maintained
that
the
existing
records
had
been
turned
over,
and
suggested
that
O'Malley
was
raising
a
different
question
about
whether
“corporate
records
weren't
properly
kept.”
Based
on
this
discussion,
the
court
stated
that
“there
isn't
anything
more
for
the
court
to
order
at
this
time.”
*7
¶37
The
closing
agent
testified
at
the
hearing,
and
her
testimony
was
consistent
with
the
facts
set
forth
above:
all
four
siblings
had
agreed
to
the
division
of
sale
proceeds
that
was
represented
in
the
closing
statement;
the
proceeds
were
disbursed
consistent
with
that
statement;
and
the
1099
tax
forms
accurately
reflected
that
all
of
the
proceeds
were
distributed
to
the
siblings
and
none
to
the
corporation.
The
closing
agent
further
testified
that
the
siblings
all
agreed
that
Cady
should
sign
the
paperwork
on
the
corporation's
behalf.
¶38
O'Malley
also
testified
at
the
hearing.
Although
the
circuit
court
gave
some
latitude
to
O'Malley
to
present
his
case,
the
court
also
sustained
objections
and
redirected
O'Malley’s
testimony
when
it
determined
that
O'Malley
was
veering
into
topics
that
were
irrelevant
to
the
enforceability
of
the
settlement
agreement,
which
was
the
only
remaining
issue
in
the
litigation.
We
describe
O'Malley’s
testimony
in
some
detail,
as
it
provides
helpful
context
to
his
arguments
on
appeal.
¶39
During
his
testimony,
O'Malley
made
a
number
of
admissions
about
the
circumstances
surrounding
the
negotiation
and
execution
of
the
settlement
agreement.
Among
other
things,
O'Malley
admitted
that
the
siblings
had
discussed
dissolving
the
corporation
as
part
of
the
settlement,
but
that
he
had
specifically
asked
that
the
ownership
of
the
corporation
be
transferred
to
him
instead.
He
also
admitted
that
he
signed
the
settlement
agreement,
the
closing
paperwork,
and
his
1099;
that
the
real
estate
had
been
sold
and
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
6
the
proceeds
had
been
disbursed;
and
that
the
disbursement
of
sale
proceeds
and
1099s
were
consistent
with
the
settlement
agreement.
In
O'Malley’s
view,
the
transfer
of
ownership
was
the
only
portion
of
the
settlement
agreement
that
had
not
been
completed.
¶40
O'Malley
further
testified
that
he
believed
that
he
was
the
sole
owner
of
the
corporation
pursuant
to
the
settlement
agreement.
However,
in
his
view,
ownership
“hasn't
been
properly
transferred”
because
his
sisters
had
not
provided
a
full
accounting
of
its
assets
and
liabilities.
When
asked
to
identify
a
provision
in
the
agreement
that
required
specific
documentation
to
be
provided,
O'Malley
pointed
to
the
provision
that
stated:
“[The
sisters]
agree
at
Closing
to
surrender
any
and
all
Johnson-O'Malley
roles,
shares
and
interests
over
to
O'Malley,
thus
giving
O'Malley
100%
...
ownership.”
As
we
best
understand
O'Malley’s
testimony,
the
point
he
was
attempting
to
convey
was
that
his
100%
ownership
included
ownership
of
all
corporate
records
and
that,
“according
to
Wisconsin
business
law,”
the
transfer
is
not
complete
until
records
are
provided.
¶41
During
his
testimony,
O'Malley
also
asserted
that
he
had
not
wanted
to
agree
to
the
terms
of
the
settlement
agreement
and
was
under
“undue
influence”
to
sign
it.
More
specifically,
he
testified
that
he
had
wanted
the
property
to
be
partitioned
rather
than
sold,
but
he
“was
told
that
if
[he]
didn't
sign
the
agreement”
the
corporation
might
lose
its
liquor
license,
“the
buyer
might
walk,”
the
lost
value
“would
come
out
of
...
[his]
ownership
proceeds,”
and
the
house
on
the
residential
property
would
likely
be
condemned.
When
asked
how
those
facts
amounted
to
undue
influence,
O'Malley
testified
that
the
situation
“created
a
sense
of
urgency
that
wouldn't
be
there
otherwise.”
¶42
O'Malley
also
testified
that,
in
his
view,
it
was
“highly
inappropriate”
for
the
corporation
to
be
included
as
a
party
to
the
settlement
agreement.
According
to
O'Malley,
the
corporation
had
not
been
included
until
the
sisters’
attorney
added
it
as
a
party
to
the
settlement
agreement
at
the
“last
minute.”
O'Malley
asserted
that
the
attorney
must
have
been
representing
the
corporation
as
well
as
his
sisters
during
the
settlement
negotiations,
and
that
the
attorney
continued
to
represent
the
corporation
after
the
closing
occurred.
*8
¶43
In
addition,
O'Malley’s
testimony
touched
on
his
concerns
about
poor
corporate
recordkeeping
practices
over
a
period
of
20
years,
and
he
asserted
that
the
corporation
might
have
liabilities
that
he
was
unaware
of
for
which
he
would
be
responsible.
¶44
Finally,
O'Malley
also
vaguely
alluded
to
events
that,
he
suggested,
had
occurred
after
the
closing.
Specifically,
he
testified,
“my
understanding
is
they
[the
sisters,
presumably]
made
a
huge
shift
for
their
tax
benefits
that
greatly
harmed
me,”
and
“my
understanding
is
they
flipped
it
and
suddenly
there
was
$700,000
put
on
the
corporation
that
wasn't
there.”
O'Malley
did
not
introduce
evidence
to
support
these
assertions.
¶45
The
circuit
court
determined
that
the
siblings
had
voluntarily
entered
into
the
settlement
agreement,
and
that
it
was
enforceable.
Therefore,
the
court
ordered
specific
performance
of
the
remaining
provisions
of
the
agreement
—namely,
that
all
shares
of
the
corporation
belonged
to
O'Malley
as
of
the
date
of
the
closing,
and
the
dismissal
of
the
lawsuit.
¶46
The
circuit
court
made
the
following
factual
and
legal
determinations
in
support
of
its
ruling.
The
settlement
agreement
was
signed
by
all
of
the
siblings
and
by
Cady
on
behalf
of
the
corporation.
The
agreement
contemplated
a
full
resolution
of
all
of
the
issues
in
the
lawsuit,
including
the
manner
in
which
the
sale
proceeds
would
be
divided
after
the
closing.
All
of
the
events
contemplated
by
the
agreement
had
occurred.
The
settling
parties
had
all
agreed
that
the
numbers
in
the
closing
statement
were
correct,
and
the
proceeds
were
disbursed
according
to
that
statement.
The
parties
also
signed
the
1099s
consistent
with
their
prior
agreement.
¶47
The
circuit
court
also
determined
that
the
facts
that
O'Malley
testified
to
regarding
a
“sense
of
urgency”
did
not
amount
to
undue
influence
or
duress.
As
the
court
explained,
“urgency
certainly
plays
a
part
in
all
kinds
of
business
dealings,”
especially
in
real
estate
transactions.
However,
it
“is
not
a
threat”
to
discuss
the
“potential
outcomes”
of
not
reaching
an
agreement—it
is
instead
a
natural
part
of
the
negotiation
process,
which
includes
“providing
information”
so
that
the
parties
can
make
“a
reasoned
decision
...
about
whether
to
go
forward
or
not.”
If
O'Malley
had
questions
about
corporate
recordkeeping
or
other
matters,
he
should
have
resolved
his
questions
before
signing
the
settlement
agreement.
¶48
The
circuit
court
entered
an
order
that
dismissed
all
claims
and
counterclaims
with
prejudice
and
ordered
that
all
“roles,
shares,
and
interests
[in
Johnson
O'Malley,
Inc.]
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
7
are
transferred
from
[the
sisters]
to
[O'Malley],
giving
[O'Malley]
100%
ownership
effective
June
15,
2023.”
O'Malley
appeals.
5
DISCUSSION
*9
¶49
There
is
no
dispute
that,
during
the
course
of
this
litigation,
O'Malley
signed
a
settlement
agreement
that
expressly
provided
that
it
was
intended
to
be
a
full
settlement
of
all
claims
that
were
or
could
have
been
brought
in
the
litigation.
The
agreement,
which
was
not
contingent
on
any
future
event
except
the
closing
of
the
real
estate
sale,
was
made
in
writing
and
subscribed
by
each
party;
therefore,
the
statutory
requirements
for
a
binding
and
enforceable
settlement
agreement
are
satisfied.
See
WIS
.
STAT
.
§
807.05
;
see
also
Affordable
Erecting,
Inc.
v.
Neosho
Trompler,
Inc.
,
2006
WI
67,
¶¶22-24,
28,
291
Wis.
2d
259,
715
N.W.2d
620
(interpreting
§
807.05)
.
6
¶50
On
appeal,
O'Malley
makes
a
number
of
arguments
about
why
the
circuit
court
should
not
have
enforced
the
settlement
agreement,
which
called
for
the
dismissal
of
the
lawsuit.
His
arguments
are
at
times
difficult
to
parse,
only
some
of
them
were
raised
during
the
circuit
court
proceedings,
and
many
are
not
supported
by
citations
to
the
record
or
legal
authority.
We
now
consider
O'Malley’s
arguments
as
best
as
we
understand
them.
¶51
We
begin
with
O'Malley’s
arguments
about
purportedly
unfilled
“conditions
precedent”
to
the
dismissal
of
the
lawsuit.
Whether
the
conditions
precedent
to
the
enforcement
of
a
settlement
agreement
have
been
fulfilled
involves
both
questions
of
law
(what
the
agreement
requires)
and
questions
of
fact
(whether
those
things
occurred
as
the
agreement
requires).
Schlosser
v.
Allis-Chalmers
Corp.
,
86
Wis.
2d
226,
244,
271
N.W.2d
879
(1978)
(the
meaning
of
an
unambiguous
contract
is
a
question
of
law);
Smith
Realty
Co.
v.
Zimmerman
,
75
Wis.
2d
11,
17,
248
N.W.2d
472
(1977)
(whether
a
party's
activities
constitute
performance
of
its
obligations
under
a
contract
may
present
a
question
of
fact).
¶52
O'Malley
argues
that
the
circuit
court
erred
by
dismissing
the
lawsuit
pursuant
to
the
settlement
agreement
without
regard
to
whether
the
conditions
precedent
to
dismissal
had
been
satisfied.
Specifically,
O'Malley
contends,
those
conditions
were
“the
proper
transfer
of
corporate
ownership”
and
“an
honest
allocation
of
the
sale
proceeds,”
which,
O'Malley
asserts,
“did
not
occur.”
“[A]t
minimum,”
O'Malley
argues,
the
court
should
have
“held
an
evidentiary
hearing
on
whether
the
settlement
conditions
were
met”
but
the
court
“instead
...
enforced
the
[settlement]
agreement
without
inquiry.”
¶53
This
argument
is
ahistorical—as
noted,
the
circuit
court
did
hold
an
evidentiary
hearing,
and
during
the
hearing
it
gave
explicit
consideration
to
whether
everything
that
the
agreement
contemplated
happening
prior
to
dismissal
had
occurred.
The
court
found
that
everything
the
agreement
contemplated
had
indeed
occurred,
and
O'Malley
does
not
persuade
us
that
the
court
erred
with
respect
to
any
determination
on
these
points.
¶54
To
illustrate,
regarding
the
first
alleged
condition
precedent—the
transfer
of
corporate
ownership—the
circuit
court
found
that
the
sisters
had
attempted
to
transfer
their
shares
to
O'Malley.
The
court
also
implicitly
found
that
O'Malley
did
not
have
any
valid
reason
to
refuse
to
accept
their
shares.
Therefore,
the
court
ordered
that
the
corporation
belonged
to
O'Malley
as
of
the
date
of
the
closing,
thus
fulfilling
that
aspect
of
the
settlement
agreement.
*10
¶55
Although
O'Malley
continues
to
argue
that
no
proper
transfer
of
corporate
ownership
occurred,
his
argument
is
unsupportable.
The
argument
appears
to
be
based
on
his
assertion
that
the
sisters
have
not
given
him
certain
corporate
documents
that
may
or
may
not
exist.
However,
O'Malley
does
not
point
to
any
provision
of
the
settlement
agreement
that
contemplated
an
exchange
of
documents.
That
omission
is
telling—although
the
court
ordered
the
sisters
to
produce
the
records
in
their
possession
after
they
offered
to
do
so,
there
was
nothing
in
the
settlement
agreement
that
required
any
particular
records
or
documents
to
be
provided.
Therefore,
there
was
no
unfulfilled
condition
precedent
regarding
the
transfer
of
corporate
ownership.
7
¶56
Regarding
the
second
alleged
condition
precedent,
the
allocation
of
sale
proceeds,
the
circuit
court
found
that
the
proceeds
were
disbursed
in
accordance
with
the
settlement
agreement
and
the
closing
statement,
which
had
been
approved
by
O'Malley.
O'Malley
does
not
argue
that
this
finding
is
clearly
erroneous,
nor
does
he
dispute
that
he
actually
received
his
share
of
the
proceeds,
as
reflected
in
the
closing
statement.
Therefore,
to
the
extent
that
the
proper
disbursement
of
sale
proceeds
was
a
condition
precedent
of
dismissal,
that
aspect
of
the
settlement
agreement
was
also
fulfilled.
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
8
¶57
O'Malley
makes
arguments
about
the
sale
proceeds
on
appeal,
but
his
concern
does
not
appear
to
be
about
how
the
net
proceeds
were
disbursed
(that
is,
all
to
the
siblings
and
none
to
the
corporation).
Instead,
as
best
as
we
understand
it,
his
concern
appears
to
be
that,
following
the
closing,
a
portion
of
the
lump
sum
payment
for
the
real
estate
may
have
been
attributed
to
the
commercial
parcel
that
had
been
owned
by
the
corporation.
O'Malley
contends
that
this
attribution
of
value
has
tax
consequences
and
his
concern
may
or
may
not
be
valid
as
an
accounting
and
tax
matter,
but
it
is
wholly
irrelevant
to
the
issue
here.
The
issue
is
whether
there
were
any
remaining
conditions
that
had
to
be
fulfilled
before
the
litigation
was
dismissed
pursuant
to
the
settlement
agreement,
and
there
were
no
terms
in
that
agreement
that
addressed
the
tax
consequences
of
the
real
estate
transaction.
Nor
were
there
any
terms
that
addressed
how
the
payment
should
be
allocated
between
the
two
parcels
that
were
included
in
the
real
estate
sale.
Therefore,
O'Malley
has
not
identified
an
unfulfilled
condition
precedent
to
dismissal
pursuant
to
the
settlement
agreement.
*11
¶58
We
now
turn
to
O'Malley’s
numerous
arguments
about
the
sisters’
pre-settlement
actions
with
respect
to
managing
the
corporation.
In
continuing
to
advance
these
arguments,
O'Malley
does
not
come
to
grips
with
the
fact
that
he
signed
a
settlement
agreement
that
resolved
all
of
the
claims
he
had
raised
in
the
litigation
and
that
also
included
a
mutual
release.
Accordingly,
the
sisters’
presettlement
actions
are
no
longer
relevant
for
purposes
of
this
litigation
unless
there
is
some
reason
that
the
settlement
agreement
is
unenforceable.
¶59
O'Malley
makes
several
arguments
about
why
the
settlement
agreement
is
unenforceable
which
we
now
consider
and
reject.
¶60
To
the
extent
that
O'Malley
renews
an
argument
about
undue
influence
or
duress,
the
circuit
court
determined
that
the
facts
O'Malley
testified
to
did
not
amount
to
either.
O'Malley
does
not
develop
an
argument
as
to
why
that
determination
is
erroneous.
He
does
make
some
assertions
about
being
under
“pressure
from
multiple
directions,”
about
the
quality
of
representation
he
received
from
his
attorney
during
settlement
negotiations,
and
about
the
sisters’
attorney's
“last-minute”
insistence
that
the
corporation
be
included
in
the
settlement
agreement
and
its
mutual
release,
but
he
does
not
attempt
to
pair
those
arguments
with
the
elements
of
either
legal
doctrine.
8
¶61
Instead,
O'Malley
makes
new
arguments
about
alleged
fraudulent
inducement
or
alleged
material
breaches
of
the
settlement
agreement.
Although
O'Malley
discussed
the
sisters’
pre-
and
post-closing
conduct
in
detail
in
his
circuit
court
filings,
he
did
not
develop
any
theory
based
on
fraudulent
inducement
or
material
breach
in
the
arguments
he
made
in
the
circuit
court.
We
could
disregard
O'Malley’s
argument
on
that
basis,
9
but
we
choose
to
further
address
those
arguments
for
completeness.
¶62
Beginning
with
fraudulent
inducement,
for
O'Malley’s
argument
to
have
any
merit,
there
would
have
to
be
facts
showing
that
the
sisters
engaged
in
fraudulent
conduct
before
the
settlement
agreement
was
executed.
Kaloti
Enterprises,
Inc.
v.
Kellogg
Sales
Co.
,
2005
WI
111,
¶42,
283
Wis.
2d
555,
699
N.W.2d
205
(“[t]o
invoke
this
narrow
fraud
in
the
inducement
exception,”
the
misrepresentation
must
occur
“before
the
contract
was
formed”).
Here,
there
were
no
facts
identified
in
O'Malley’s
circuit
court
filings
or
that
were
adduced
at
the
hearing
that
would
support
an
argument
that
fraudulent
conduct
occurred
before
the
settlement
agreement
was
executed.
To
be
sure,
O'Malley’s
pro
se
supplemental
brief
in
opposition
to
dismissal
asserted
that
there
were
“serious
concerns
of
potential
fraud”
with
respect
to
post-
closing
documentation
that
allocated
the
purchase
price
between
the
two
parcels
of
real
estate,
but
O'Malley
fails
to
explain
how
post-closing
conduct
that
occurred
after
the
settlement
agreement
was
signed
could
have
induced
him
to
sign
the
agreement.
*12
¶63
As
for
O'Malley’s
argument
that
the
sisters
materially
breached
terms
in
the
settlement
agreement,
there
are
several
significant
problems.
Most
notably,
O'Malley
has
not
identified
any
conduct
by
the
sisters
that
would
constitute
a
material
breach
of
any
term
in
the
settlement
agreement.
As
mentioned,
the
agreement
did
not
require
the
sisters
to
provide
any
particular
documents,
and
did
not
address
how
the
purchase
price
would
be
allocated
between
the
parcels
of
real
estate.
To
the
extent
that
O'Malley
or
the
corporation
could
potentially
have
a
legal
claim
against
someone
or
something
with
respect
to
any
pre-
or
post-closing
actions,
including
how
the
settlement
proceeds
were
reported
for
tax
purposes,
he
does
not
identify
any
legal
theory
under
which
that
potential
claim
would
prevent
the
settlement
agreement
from
being
enforced.
10
¶64
Separately,
O'Malley
also
makes
some
arguments
about
the
propriety
of
the
role
that
the
attorney
who
represented
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
9
his
sisters
played
in
the
litigation.
Specifically,
O'Malley
asserts
that
the
attorney
was
engaged
in
“dual
representation”
because
he
was
“speaking
for
the
corporation”
as
well
as
his
sisters
during
the
settlement
negotiations,
and
that
the
attorney
continued
to
represent
the
corporation
in
the
litigation
that
occurred
after
the
settlement
agreement
was
signed.
O'Malley
argues
that
the
attorney
“claimed
to
represent
a
company
they
no
longer
owned—against
the
interests
of
its
sole
shareholder,”
and
he
suggests
that
the
circuit
court
erred
by
not
requiring
“proof
of
[the
attorney's]
authority
to
represent
the
corporation
post-closing.”
¶65
These
arguments
fail
because,
among
other
things,
they
are
not
supported
by
the
record.
Most
notably,
O'Malley
does
not
identify
any
occasion
during
this
litigation
in
which
the
attorney
who
represented
the
sisters
purported
to
represent
or
speak
for
the
corporation.
O'Malley
asks
us
to
infer
that
the
attorney
must
have
been
representing
the
corporation's
interests,
rather
than
the
sisters’
interests,
because
the
attorney
insisted
that
the
corporation
be
included
as
a
party
to
the
settlement
agreement
and
because
the
attorney
argued
against
some
of
the
requests
that
O'Malley
made
in
the
circuit
court,
but
that
inference
does
not
hold
up.
The
sisters,
who
had
been
corporate
shareholders
and
had
participated
in
its
management,
would
have
had
good
reasons
to
want
the
corporation
to
be
included
in
the
settlement
agreement
so
that
O'Malley,
who
would
control
the
corporation
after
the
closing,
would
be
precluded
from
bringing
claims
against
them
on
the
corporation's
behalf.
And
the
sisters
would
also
have
had
a
personal
stake
in
wanting
the
litigation
to
be
dismissed.
The
fact
that
the
sisters’
attorney
pushed
for
these
positions
in
and
out
of
court
is
not
proof
that
the
attorney
was
representing
the
corporation
rather
than
or
in
addition
to
the
sisters
in
this
litigation.
11
*13
¶66
Finally,
O'Malley
makes
a
series
of
due
process
arguments
about
how
his
right
to
be
heard
was
violated
by
the
“truncated”
proceedings
held
by
the
circuit
court.
Specifically,
O'Malley
takes
issue
with
the
fact
that
the
court
limited
the
time
devoted
to
the
evidentiary
hearing,
sustained
a
number
of
objections
to
the
relevance
of
evidence
he
wanted
to
offer,
and
dismissed
the
case
even
though,
O'Malley
asserts,
a
number
of
O'Malley’s
motions
remained
“unresolved.”
None
of
these
arguments
have
merit.
¶67
O'Malley’s
assertion
that
he
had
pending
motions
that
were
not
resolved
prior
to
dismissal
is
not
borne
out
in
the
record.
12
O'Malley
may
mean
to
argue
that
the
circuit
court
dismissed
the
litigation
without
addressing
every
argument
that
O'Malley
wanted
the
court
to
address,
but
he
has
not
identified
any
reason
that
the
court
was
required
to
address
these
arguments,
given
the
court's
determination
that
there
was
an
enforceable
settlement
agreement
that
called
for
dismissal
of
the
litigation.
It
was
also
within
the
court's
discretion
to
exclude
irrelevant
evidence
that
went
beyond
the
scope
of
the
hearing,
and
we
agree
with
the
court's
view
on
the
proper
scope
of
the
hearing.
The
additional
evidence
that
O'Malley
wanted
to
offer
may
have
been
relevant
to
a
number
of
potential
claims
that
O'Malley
would
have
liked
to
bring
against
his
sisters,
but
it
was
not
relevant
to
the
narrow
issue
before
the
court,
which
was
whether
the
settlement
agreement
should
be
enforced.
Finally,
regarding
the
two-hour
time
slot
that
the
court
devoted
to
the
evidentiary
hearing,
it
is
within
a
circuit
court's
discretion
to
schedule
proceedings
in
a
manner
that
balances
the
need
of
any
one
case
against
the
needs
of
others.
See
Hefty
v.
Strickhouser
,
2008
WI
96,
¶31,
312
Wis.
2d
530,
752
N.W.2d
820
(“circuit
courts
have
discretion
to
control
their
dockets”).
Here,
we
are
not
persuaded
that
the
court
erred
by
allotting
two
hours
for
the
hearing,
especially
given
the
narrow
issue
that
was
before
the
court.
13
*14
¶68
For
all
of
the
above
reasons,
we
conclude
that
the
circuit
court
did
not
err
in
enforcing
the
settlement
agreement
and
dismissing
this
litigation
with
prejudice
pursuant
to
that
agreement.
By
the
Court.—
Order
affirmed.
This
opinion
will
not
be
published.
See
WIS
.
STAT
.
RULE
809.23(1)(b)5.
All
Citations
Slip
Copy,
2026
WL
184862
Footnotes
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
10
1
All
references
to
the
Wisconsin
Statutes
are
to
the
2023-24
version.
2
The
offer
to
purchase
and
its
addendum
were
not
included
in
the
documents
filed
in
the
record.
There
is
no
argument
that
the
details
of
those
documents
are
material
to
this
appeal.
3
The
settlement
agreement
also
included
provisions
about
how
some
personal
property
would
be
distributed,
but
those
provisions
are
not
at
issue
here.
4
By
attempting
to
summarize
the
arguments
O'Malley
made
in
his
pro
se
motion
and
supplemental
brief
in
opposition,
we
do
not
mean
to
suggest
that
the
circuit
court
was
required
to
consider
them,
given
that
O'Malley
was
represented
by
counsel
when
the
motion
and
brief
were
filed.
See
Johnson
v.
Johnson
,
2016
WI
App
60,
¶26,
371
Wis.
2d
388,
885
N.W.2d
603
(declining
to
consider
a
pro
se
motion
filed
by
a
litigant
when
the
litigant
was
represented
by
counsel
at
the
time
of
the
pro
se
filing);
State
v.
Debra
A.E.
,
188
Wis.
2d
111,
138,
523
N.W.2d
727
(1994)
(addressing
the
concept
of
“hybrid”
representation,
and
providing
that
an
appellate
court
may
but
need
not
consider
pro
se
briefs
filed
by
a
represented
appellant).
5
The
briefs
and
appendices
filed
in
this
appeal
violate
various
provisions
of
the
rules
of
appellate
procedure
found
in
WIS
.
STAT
.
ch.
809.
First,
the
brief
and
appendix
that
the
sisters
filed
and
the
reply
brief
and
appendices
that
O'Malley
filed
do
not
comply
with
WIS
.
STAT
.
RULE
809.19(8)(bm)
,
which
addresses
the
pagination
of
appellate
briefs
and
appendices.
See
RULE
809.19(8)(bm)
(providing
that,
when
paginating
briefs,
parties
should
use
“Arabic
numerals
with
sequential
numbering
starting
at
‘1’
on
the
cover”).
This
rule
was
amended
to
its
current
form
in
2021,
see
S.
CT
.
ORDER
20-07,
2021
WI
37,
397
Wis.
2d
xiii,
and
the
reason
for
the
amendment
is
that
briefs
are
now
electronically
filed
in
PDF
format,
and
are
electronically
stamped
with
page
numbers
when
they
are
accepted
for
efiling.
The
pagination
requirements
ensure
that
the
numbers
on
each
page
of
a
brief
“will
match
...
the
page
header
applied
by
the
eFiling
system,
avoiding
the
confusion
of
having
two
different
page
numbers”
on
every
page
of
a
brief.
Supreme
Court
Note,
2021,
RULE
809.19
.
Second,
O'Malley’s
appendices
also
include
some
documents
that
were
not
filed
during
the
circuit
court
proceedings
and
are
not
included
in
the
record
on
appeal.
We
disregard
these
documents
because
our
appellate
review
is
limited
to
the
record
on
appeal,
which
contains
only
those
documents
that
were
presented
during
the
circuit
court
proceedings.
See
State
ex
rel.
Wolf
v.
Town
of
Lisbon
,
75
Wis.
2d
152,
155-56,
248
N.W.2d
450
(1977)
.
Third,
although
WIS
.
STAT
.
RULE
809.19(1)(d)
and
(e)
require
appellate
briefs
to
contain
appropriate
references
to
the
record
and
citation
of
supporting
legal
authorities,
O'Malley’s
briefing
contains
a
number
of
factual
assertions
that
are
not
paired
with
any
reference
or
citation
to
any
portion
of
the
record
and
a
number
of
assertions
about
the
law
that
are
not
paired
with
citations
to
legal
authority.
It
is
within
our
discretion
to
disregard
such
factual
and
legal
assertions
as
unsupported.
See
State
v.
Pettit
,
171
Wis.
2d
627,
646-47,
492
N.W.2d
633
(Ct.
App.
1992)
(a
court
need
not
consider
arguments
that
are
unsupported
by
legal
citations
or
are
otherwise
undeveloped).
Finally,
and
most
troublingly,
O'Malley’s
briefs
also
include
false
legal
citations.
Specifically,
some
of
the
citations
in
his
briefs
are
to
legal
authorities
that
do
not
exist,
and
other
citations
are
to
legal
authorities
that
exist
but
are
wholly
unrelated
to
the
proposition
for
which
they
are
cited.
The
inclusion
of
false
legal
citations
in
O'Malley’s
briefing
violates
WIS
.
STAT
.
RULE
809.19(1)(e)
and
(4)(b)
.
The
sisters
pointed
out
these
false
citations
in
their
respondents’
brief,
but
O'Malley
did
not
acknowledge
the
error
in
his
reply
brief
and
instead
continued
to
use
the
same
false
citations.
This
is
a
significant
violation
of
court
rules;
accordingly,
we
considered
whether,
on
our
own
motion,
to
order
O'Malley
to
show
cause
why
he
should
not
be
sanctioned
for
the
false
citations
pursuant
to
RULE
809.19(2)
,
which
provides
broad
authority
to
issue
sanctions
for
a
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
11
failure
to
comply
with
this
court's
rules.
In
the
end,
we
decline
to
issue
such
an
order
in
favor
of
a
prompt
resolution
of
this
appeal.
But
we
caution
O'Malley
not
to
repeat
this
violation
in
any
future
filings
in
this
or
any
court.
We
offer
an
additional
note
of
caution—if
the
root
of
the
problem
is
that
O'Malley
used
generative
AI
for
legal
research
and
trusted
it
to
provide
accurate
results,
he
should
be
aware
that
there
are
many
reported
instances
in
which
generative
AI
has
hallucinated
nonexistent
cases
and
misreported
the
holdings
of
existing
cases.
6
WISCONSIN
STAT
.
§
807.05
provides:
“No
agreement,
stipulation,
or
consent
between
the
parties
or
their
attorneys,
in
respect
to
the
proceedings
in
an
action
or
special
proceeding
shall
be
binding
unless
made
in
court
...
and
entered
in
the
minutes
or
recorded
by
the
reporter,
or
made
in
writing
and
subscribed
by
the
party
to
be
bound
thereby
....”
Whether
a
settlement
agreement
is
enforceable
under
this
statute
is
a
question
of
law
that
we
review
de
novo.
Waite
v.
Easton-White
Creek
Lions,
Inc.
,
2006
WI
App
19,
¶5,
289
Wis.
2d
100,
709
N.W.2d
88
(2005)
.
7
Indeed,
rather
than
arguing
on
appeal
that
the
settlement
agreement
required
the
transfer
of
any
specific
documentation,
O'Malley
points
to
the
statutory
provisions
in
WIS
.
STAT
.
§§
180.1602
-1604
that
govern
a
shareholder's
right
to
inspect
corporate
records
and
a
corporation's
statutory
responsibilities
with
respect
to
a
shareholder's
written
notice
for
an
inspection
of
corporate
records.
There
are
several
independent
problems
with
any
argument
O'Malley
might
be
making
about
these
statutes.
First,
O'Malley
did
not
make
any
argument
based
on
§§
180.1602-1604
during
the
circuit
court
proceedings.
Second,
he
does
not
specifically
identify
any
notice
that
he
sent
to
the
corporation's
registered
agent,
as
required
by
§
180.1602(2)(c)
and
WIS
.
STAT
.
§
180.1150(1)(c)
.
Third,
§
180.1604
addresses
a
shareholder's
recourse
against
a
corporation
that
refuses
to
allow
inspection;
therefore,
any
claim
under
that
statute
would
be
against
the
corporation,
not
against
his
sisters.
As
O'Malley
acknowledges
elsewhere
in
his
brief,
the
corporation
is
not
a
party
to
this
litigation.
Finally,
even
if
O'Malley
had
shown
a
violation
of
§§
180.1602-1604,
he
does
not
point
to
anything
in
the
settlement
agreement
establishing
that
compliance
with
these
statutes
was
a
prerequisite
to
transferring
ownership
of
the
corporation.
8
Undue
influence
is
a
legal
theory
that
is
typically
used
as
a
basis
for
objecting
to
a
will,
and
has
no
apparent
relevance
here.
See
Kehrbert
v.
Pribnow
,
46
Wis.
2d
205,
208-09,
174
N.W.2d
256
(1970)
(discussing
the
elements
of
undue
influence,
which
are
susceptibility,
opportunity,
disposition,
and
the
achievement
of
a
coveted
result).
Economic
duress
can
be
a
defense
to
the
enforcement
of
a
contract,
but
a
party
alleging
economic
duress
must
prove
that
the
party
was
the
victim
of
a
wrongful
or
unlawful
act;
the
act
or
threat
deprived
the
party
of
the
party's
unfettered
will;
and
as
a
result,
the
party
was
compelled
to
make
a
disproportionate
exchange
of
values
or
give
something
up
for
nothing.
Wurtz
v.
Fleischman
,
97
Wis.
2d
100,
109,
293
N.W.2d
155
(1980)
.
O'Malley
has
not
shown
that
any
of
these
elements
were
satisfied
here.
9
See
Green
v.
Hahn
,
2004
WI
App
214,
¶21,
277
Wis.
2d
473,
689
N.W.2d
657
(“Except
in
rare
circumstances
that
are
not
present
here,
we
will
not
address
an
issue
that
an
appellant
raises
for
the
first
time
on
appeal,
because
doing
so
undermines
judicial
economy
and
creates
an
incentive
for
parties
to
build
in
error
in
order
to
have
an
adverse
outcome
in
the
trial
court
overturned
on
appeal.”).
10
In
his
appellate
briefing,
O'Malley
makes
a
more
general
argument
about
“post-signing
misconduct”
which,
he
asserts,
could
prevent
the
settlement
agreement
from
being
enforced.
However,
as
legal
authority
for
this
proposition,
he
includes
a
citation
to
a
purported
Wisconsin
Court
of
Appeals
case
that
does
not
exist.
This
is
consistent
with
other
false
case
citations
that
are
scattered
throughout
his
briefs,
which
we
disregard.
11
Conversely,
O'Malley
argues
that
if
the
attorney
did
not
represent
the
corporation
during
the
settlement
negotiations,
that
could
create
a
different
problem,
in
that
the
corporation
would
be
bound
to
an
agreement
Ann
K.
Cady,
Beth
L.
Corning,
and
Caron
G.
Roesler,...,
Slip
Copy
(2026)
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
12
it
entered
without
its
own
counsel.
O'Malley
does
not
cite
any
legal
authority
to
support
his
assertion
that
this
creates
a
problem,
and
we
see
no
problem
under
these
facts.
As
noted,
all
of
the
shareholders
of
the
corporation
were
parties
to
the
settlement
agreement,
and
O'Malley
fails
to
explain
why
the
shareholders
could
not
collectively
reach
an
agreement
to
which
the
corporation
would
also
be
bound.
12
The
record
reflects
that
O'Malley
filed
three
motions,
the
first
two
on
December
16,
2024,
and
the
third
on
the
morning
of
January
7,
2025.
The
December
2024
motions
asked
the
circuit
court
to
allow
him
to
proceed
pro
se,
to
consider
his
pro
se
brief,
and
to
seal
certain
documents
that
he
had
filed,
and
the
court
did
that.
O'Malley’s
January
2025
motion
asked
the
court
to
“delay
any
subsequent
hearings
...
for
60
days
following
receipt
of
still
missing
corporate
records
to
allow
[O'Malley]
time
to
secure
replacement
counsel
and
to
review
corporate
records,”
and
the
court
gave
its
reasons
for
denying
that
motion
during
the
hearing
that
took
place
that
same
day.
O'Malley’s
appellate
briefing
makes
references
to
“motions
to
compel”
that
O'Malley
says
he
filed
during
the
circuit
court
proceedings,
but
there
is
nothing
in
the
record
that
supports
O'Malley’s
assertion
that
he
filed
a
motion
to
compel.
O'Malley
may
be
referring
to
the
pro
se
motions
he
filed
in
December
2024
and
in
January
2025
that
we
addressed
in
the
preceding
paragraph;
if
so,
none
of
these
documents
contained
any
motion
to
compel.
Likewise,
although
O'Malley
asserts
that
his
January
2025
motion
“condition[ed]
withdrawal”
of
his
third
set
of
attorneys
on
his
sisters’
“production
of
missing
corporate
records
and
time
for
review,”
the
motion
did
no
such
thing.
13
To
the
extent
that
O'Malley
makes
any
additional
arguments
in
his
appellate
briefs
that
we
have
not
explicitly
addressed
here,
we
reject
those
arguments
as
undeveloped,
unsupported,
or
unpersuasive.
Pettit
,
171
Wis.
2d
627,
646-47
.
End
of
Document
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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