Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 4074946 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Civil Division.Los Angeles CountyMiguel VILLASENOR,v.RALPHS GROCERY COMPANY.No. 23CMCV02044.October 28, 2025.Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.OrderMichael B. Wilson, Judge.*1 Honorable Michael B. WilsonCSR: NoneJudicial Assistant: R. AspirasERM: NoneCourtroom Assistant: D. McKinneyDeputy Sheriff: NoneAPPEARANCES:For Plaintiff(s): No AppearancesFor Defendant(s): No AppearancesNATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Ruling on Submitted MatterThe Court, having taken the matter under submission on 09/10/2025 for Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, now rulesas follows:I. BACKGROUND
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2This action concerns Defendant Ralphs Grocery Company (“Defendant” or “Ralphs”) termination of Plaintiff MiguelVillasenor's (“Plaintiff”) employment. Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Ralphs for approximately 29 years. On twooccasions, on March 26, 2023 and April 8, 2023, Plaintiff alleges that he was involved in confrontations with another Ralphsemployee involving a verbal argument and physical confrontation. Plaintiff alleges that, in the altercations, he only used physicalforce necessary to protect himself as is permitted under the right to self-defense. On or about May 9, 2023, Plaintiff allegesthat Ralphs terminated his employment wrongfully as a result of the altercations. Plaintiff also asserts that he has a mentaldisability, Ralphs knew about his disability, Ralphs did not make any accommodations for his disability, and Ralphs reasoningfor terminating him was pretextual and actually based on his disability.On December 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Defendant Ralphs and Does 1 through 100, inclusive,alleging causes of action for: (1) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (2) Disability Discrimination in Violationof California Government Code § 12940(a) (the “FEHA”); (3) Failure to Accommodate in Violation of California GovernmentCode § 12940(m); Failure to Engage in Interactive Process in Violation of California Government Code § 12940(n); (5)Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(h); (6) Assault; and (7) Battery.On January 24, 2024, Defendant filed its Answer to the Complaint.Pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation and the Court's Order, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) onNovember 21, 2024. The FAC alleges causes of action for: (1) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy; (2) DisabilityDiscrimination in Violation of California Government Code § 12940(a) (the “FEHA”); (3) Failure to Accommodate in Violationof California Government Code § 12940(m); (4) Failure to Engage in Interactive Process in Violation of Government Code §12940(n); (5) Retaliation in Violation of Government Code § 12940(h); (6) Assault; (7) Battery; (8) Negligent Supervision andRetention; and (9) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.*2 On January 7, 2025, pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation to extend the responsive pleading deadline, Defendant filed aMotion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's FAC. On February 26, 2025, the Court granted Defendant's motion and struck portionsof the FAC that argued Plaintiff's dismissal was in violation of public policy.On May 6, 2025, Defendant Ralphs filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgement or, in the alternative, SummaryAdjudication regarding all seven of the FAC's remaining causes of action.On July 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition.On July 18, 2025, Defendant filed its reply.II. ANALYSISA. Legal StandardThe purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cutthrough the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve theirdispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c),requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible fromthe evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material factand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th1110, 1119.)“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that thereare no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if theparty has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action ... cannot be established, or that there is a complete defenseto the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c (p)(2).) “Once the defendant ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to theplaintiff ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)A motion for summary judgment must be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) On the other hand, amotion for summary adjudication must be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense,a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Id. at § 437(f)(1).)“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (exceptevidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from thatevidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; seealso Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).)B. TimelinessThe Court acknowledges that Plaintiff's opposition was untimely as it was filed 6 days after the deadline mandated by statute.(Ramos Decl. 4.) However, Defendant replied and was able to respond to the opposition in its entirety. For that reason and forthe interests of justice, the Court exercises its discretion to consider Plaintiff's opposition.C.Evidentiary Objections*3 Plaintiff raises 58 objections to the evidence submitted by Defendant in support of its Motion. The Court notes that thevast majority of the statements objected to within the declaration Defendant provided derive from the declarants' observations,personal knowledge, or experience. As such, the Court rules as follows: Plaintiff's objection #10 to the Haddad Decl. isSUSTAINED. Plaintiff's objections #s 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 56 to the Luhring Decl. are SUSTAINED. The CourtOVERRULES the remainder of Plaintiff's evidentiary objections.Defendant submits 56 objections to the Plaintiff's declaration filed in support of his opposition. The Court SUSTAINS objections26, 36, 37, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, and 56. The Court OVERRULES objections 1-25, 37-35, 38-40, 43-44,45, 51,and 53.As some of these objections pertain to statements important or relevant to Plaintiff's case, the Court provides the followinganalysis:Objections 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, and 49 are sustained on hearsay grounds. These statements were made out of court and arebeing offered for their truth. The exception for vicarious admissions by an employee or agent of an employer does not applybecause these statements were not authorized by the Defendant. (Evid. Code § 1222; O'Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America,Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 563, 570-572.) California courts have held that statements by employees as highly ranking asdirectors do not fall under this exception when the admissions fall outside the scope of the employee's regular employment.(O'Neill v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1402-1403.) There is no evidence that the statementsobjected to here were made related to the declarants' job duties or responsibilities as an agent of Defendant. (Miller v. Anson-Smith Construction Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 161, 165-166; see also Bowser v. Ford Motor Co. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587,611-617.) In contrast, consider objections 3 through 8. These objections relate to a manager, Chelle Lujan's (“Lujan”), directions
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4to Plaintiff regarding his on-the-job behavior and shift scheduling concerns. These are clearly within the scope of Lujan's dutiesand are impliedly authorized by Defendant given Lujan's role and responsibilities.In addition, objection 13 to Art Bedrossian's comments about Plaintiff being “special” is overruled because the commentpossibly shows discriminatory animus. (Ortiz v. Dameron Hospital Assn. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 568, 585.)The other group of objections that warrant a more detailed analysis are Defendant's objections numbered 36, 37, 54, 55, and 56.The Court sustains these objections pursuant to D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21. The Court findsthe statements in Plaintiff's declaration to directly contradict the statements he previously made under oath during deposition.Objections 36, 37, 54, 55, and 56 all relate to discrepancies between Plaintiff's deposition answers and the declaration provided inopposition to the instant motion. During deposition, after watching a video of the first altercation, Defense counsel inquired aboutwhether Plaintiff made physical contact first. Despite his previous assertion in the deposition that he did not, Plaintiff replies“I guess my recollection is wrong because I think that was my personal space, and I might have recalled it differently.” (SeeVillasenor Depo. 1 at pp. 91-92.) Then, Plaintiff is asked directly if after seeing the video, he agrees that he physically touchedthe other employee, Jackson, first. Plaintiff answers “yes.” (Ibid.) However, in Plaintiff's newly provided declaration he says,“Jackson touched me first by nudging my arm and restraining it with his forearm.” (Villasenor Decl. 107.) This is a directcontradiction with Plaintiff's statement in the deposition where he agrees that he touched Jackson first. (Turley v. FamilianCorp. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 969, 983.) Plaintiff attempts to justify this difference by saying “[a]lthough I answered ‘yes' thatI physically touched Jackson, as seen in the video, before he touched me, I was merely referring to the video where I amseen, apparently, touching Jackson first.” (Id. at 106.) The Court finds this explanation unconvincing as Plaintiff's statementof “I guess my recollection is wrong” indicates that he no longer thought he touched Jackson first and had been mistaken inhis memory. In addition, Plaintiff's direct answer of “yes” to counsel's question confirming that Plaintiff touched Jackson firstis unequivocal and not qualified by any suggestion that the video is untrustworthy or that Plaintiff still supports his originalrecollection. (Tiffany Builders, LLC v. Delrahim (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 536, 547.) Plaintiff had the opportunity to clarify thathe stood by his original recollection but instead chose to affirm that the video disproved his memory of the event.*4 As such, The Court SUSTAINS objections 26, 36, 37, 41, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, and 56. The Court OVERRULESobjections 1-25, 37-35, 38-40, 43-44,45, 51, and 53.In addition, Defendant objects to several statements in the Plaintiff's separate statement of facts. Objections with the separatestatements are procedurally improper. The Court will treat these objections as disputing the alleged material fact.D.Summary of Material FactsThe Court notes the following summary of material facts:Plaintiff began working for Defendant on or around February 24, 1994, in its Pacific Palisades store. (Def. UMF No. 1.) Until theevents which caused Plaintiff's termination, Plaintiff met or exceeded Defendant's performance expectations. (Def. UMF No. 7.)Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a mental disability dating back to his school days that he contends affects his intellect,ability to communicate and causes him to have poor math, reading and writing skills. (Def. UMF No. 8.) As of the date ofPlaintiff's deposition on August 27, 2024, a medical professional had never diagnosed him with a disability. (Id., No. 9.) Plaintiffnever provided Defendant with any documentation from a health care provider about his mental impairment. (Id., No. 12.)Plaintiff also never requested an accommodation from Defendant for his mental disability. (Id., No. 13.) Plaintiff did requesta few scheduling changes so that he could be available to pick up his relatives and so there would be fewer people to interactwith during his shift. (Id., Nos. 14, 15.)
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Defendant's Rules and Regulations identify one cause for immediate dismissal as “quarrelling or fighting on Companyproperty.” (Def. UMF No. 30.) Defendant posted these rules in every employee breakroom, including at the store Plaintiffworked. (Id., No. 31.) Plaintiff understood this rule and knew that vulgar language towards co-workers was inappropriate. (Id.,Nos. 32, 33.)On March 26, 2023, Plaintiff and another employee, Alfred Jackson (“Jackson”), were on the clock working in the receivingarea. (Id., No. 34.) Plaintiff and Jackson got into a dispute which is captured on camera. (Id., Nos. 37-39.) Plaintiff acknowledgesthat during and after this dispute he yelled profanities at Jackson. (Id., Nos. 40-41; Villasenor Decl. ¶¶ 51-54.) Plaintiff andDefendant disagree on whether Plaintiff or Jackson made the first physical contact and thus was the initial aggressor. (Def.UMF Nos. 40, 46.) Plaintiff argues that the physical contact displayed in the video was in self-defense and applied with minimalforce in an attempt to guard against Jackson. (Villasenor Decl. 53-56, 59.) Defendant claims that Plaintiff then tried to strikeJackson, but Plaintiff disputes that he intended to make physical contact. (Def. UMF No. 45; Villasenor Decl. 55-59.)On April 8, 2023, Plaintiff was again working in the receiving area and made contact with Jackson. (Def. UMF No. 48; VillasenorDecl. 76-80.) Plaintiff claims that Jackson began to use profanity and admits that he may have responded back in kind. (Def.UMF No. 50; Villasenor Decl. 53-54.) During this altercation, Jackson initiated the fight and punched Plaintiff. (Def. UMFNo. 53; Villasenor Decl. 79-80.) Plaintiff then swung at Jackson but alleges that he did not make physical contact and wasattempting to defend himself. (Def. UMF No. 54; Villasenor Decl. 80-81.) After this altercation, Plaintiff and Jackson wentto Store Manager, Nick Haddad's (“Haddad”) office. (Def. UMF No. 55.) The parties dispute in what order the parties arrivedto the office but agree that another dispute broke out. (Ibid.).*5 After this incident, both parties agree that Plaintiff and Jackson were asked to leave the store and Haddad contactedthe Defendant's Labor Management Department for additional guidance concerning discipline. (Def. UMF Nos. 56-57.) SeanLuhring (“Luhring”), an Associate Labor Relations Manager, began to investigate the altercation. (Id., Nos. 58, 63.) Luhring hadthe power, unlike store managers such as Haddad, to terminate employees for alleged misconduct. (Id., Nos. 59, 62.) Until thisincident, Luhring never had communicated with Plaintiff nor did Luhring have any knowledge of Plaintiff's alleged disability.(Id., Nos. 60-61.) Luhring requested and reviewed the security footage from both altercations between Plaintiff and Jacksonat least ten times. (Id., Nos. 64-65, 67.) After reviewing the video, Luhring determined that both Jackson and Plaintiff hadviolated Defendant's Rules and Regulations against “quarreling on Company property.” (Id., Nos. 68, 70.) Luhring found thatPlaintiff was the initial aggressor of the altercation on March 26, 2023, which Plaintiff disputes. (Id., No. 69; Villasenor Decl. 53-55.) Luhring then exercised his discretion to terminate Plaintiff's employment and instructed Haddad to notify Plaintiffvia email. (Def. UMF Nos. 71-72.) Both parties agree that during his four-year tenure, Luhring always exercised his discretionto terminate employees who engaged in physical altercations. (Id., No. 77.)Plaintiff later filed a grievance and a union representative, Kerry Guerrero, represented him in challenging the termination.(Def. UMF No. 84.) Plaintiff never disclosed to Guerrero that he believed he had a mental disability nor did she suspect thathe suffered from a disability. (Id., Nos. 90-91.) Plaintiff also did not mention his alleged disability in the eventual grievancemeeting. (Id., No. 97.) The termination was upheld after the grievance meeting. (Id., No. 99.)The parties dispute whether, based on these facts, Defendant had actual knowledge, or should have had knowledge of Plaintiff'sdisability and of Jackson's alleged propensity towards violence.E.DiscussionDefendant moves for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication regarding each cause of action in the FAC.Defendant's central contention as to the four causes of action related to disability discrimination is that Plaintiff never notifiedDefendant of the alleged disability and it was not apparent to Defendant that Plaintiff had a disability. Defendant alleges that
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6no retaliation occurred. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's termination was lawful due to his violation of Defendant's policyagainst workplace quarrelling. Defendant maintains that the remaining causes of action are subject to the worker's compensationexclusionary rule and thus cannot be litigated in this manner. Defendant contends that several of the causes of action rely onthe ratification by Defendant of Jackson's conduct and fail because Plaintiff cannot establish that the ratification occurred.The evidence provided for the Court to consider consists of emails, surveillance footage, discovery responses, declarations ofparties and witnesses, and deposition transcripts. The three primary documents the Court will rely on are the first deposition ofPlaintiff on June 5, 2024 (“Villasenor Depo. 1), the second deposition of Plaintiff on August 27, 2024 (“Villasenor Depo. 2),and Plaintiff's' declaration provided in opposition to this motion (“Villasenor Decl.”). For clarity purposes, the Court will referto the Bates stamped page numbers of the exhibits as they appear in Defendant's Revised Appendix of Evidence. Plaintiff doesnot dispute any of the documents' authenticity. In addition, the Court considers the separate statements filed for their undisputedmaterial facts (“Def. UMF” and “Plaintiff's UMF”).1. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public PolicyDefendant argues that this cause of action fails because Plaintiff was terminated for a lawful reason and no evidence ofdiscriminatory or retaliatory intent exists.To state a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, Plaintiff must be able to establish: (1) he wasactually or constructively discharged; (2) that the discharge was in violation of public policy; and (3) that he suffered damagesas a result. (Barbee v. Household Automotive Finance Corp. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 525, 533.) A termination is in violationof public policy when it is prohibited in either constitutional or statutory provisions, is public in the sense that it inures to thebenefit of the public, is well-established at the time of discharge, and is substantial and fundamental. (Ibid.)*6 Plaintiff pleads that the termination violated the following public policies: FEHA; Plaintiff's right to be accommodatedfor a mental disability, the right to not be retaliated against for engaging in protected activity, and the constitutional right toself-defense. (FAC 29.) The Court has already ruled, in its prior ruling on Defendant's demurrer, that the right to self-defenseis not a public policy for purposes of this cause of action. (See Minute Order, February 26, 2025.) There is much dispute inthis case regarding who, Jackson or Plaintiff, was the instigator of the altercation on March 26, 2023. The Court has reviewedthe video of the incident and acknowledges that as Plaintiff is blocking view of Jackson's arm, it is impossible to determinewhether Jackson made first physical contact. (Def's Revised App'x of Evidence, Exh. 5 at 2:38.) But the Court finds that thisdistinction is immaterial for purposes of this cause of action because it amounts to relitigating the issue already decided ondemurrer. Self-defense is not a public policy for purposes of this cause of action and therefore it does not matter if Plaintiffwas the initial aggressor. Plaintiff points to no other statutes that provide a public policy basis to prohibit termination due toa physical altercation.Given the above, the only public polices Plaintiff properly alleges were violated are the FEHA and other anti-discriminationlaws. However, as the Court details below, Plaintiff fails to establish that any disability discrimination under any statutoryauthority occurred. If there is no disability discrimination, there is no violation of public policy. As such, Defendant has metits burden to establish that there is no triable issue of material fact.Plaintiff offers no rebuttal in its opposition except to further argue disability discrimination occurred.Therefore, summary adjudication is GRANTED on this cause of action.2. FEHA Disability Discrimination
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Defendant alleges that Plaintiff fails to establish that he had a disability, that Defendant had knowledge of the disability, andthe termination was based on his disability.To prevail on summary judgment, Defendant is required to show either that (1) plaintiff could not establish one of the elementsof the FEHA claim, or (2) there was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision to terminate plaintiff's employment.(Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355.)A prima facie case of disability discrimination requires a showing that:(1) plaintiff suffered from a disability or was regarded assuffering from a disability; (2) plaintiff could perform the essential duties of the job with or without reasonable accommodations;and (3) plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability. (Sandellv.Taylor-Listug, Inc.(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th297, 310.) FEHA defines a mental disability as “any mental or psychological disorderor condition, such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or specific learning disabilities,that limits a major life activity.” (Gov. Code § 12926 (j)(1).)Plaintiff's Alleged DisabilityPlaintiff admits that he has never been formally diagnosed with a mental disability and never provided Defendant or its agentsdocumentation of his disability. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 16; Def. UMF No. 142.) Plaintiff does allege that he met with apsychiatrist after he was suspended from employment but admits that the provider did not communicate that Plaintiff sufferedfrom any mental impairment or disability. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 19.)Defendant's Knowledge of Plaintiff's DisabilityDefendant alleges that it was not informed of Plaintiff's disability and that the disability was not obvious or apparent. Defendantand Plaintiff both provide deposition transcripts and declarations as to this issue. To determine whether Defendant has met itsburden by establishing there is no triable issue of material fact as it relates to its knowledge of Plaintiff's disability, the Courtmust consider the evidence presented purporting to prove Plaintiff's disability and Defendant's knowledge of it.Plaintiff does not allege that he ever directly told Defendant or his agents that he had a disability, but instead that some ofhis behavior and statements to Defendant's agents put them on notice of his (undiagnosed) disability. Thus, Plaintiff arguesthat Defendant had constructive knowledge of his disability because “Defendant knew Plaintiff had restrictive behaviors, rigidroutines, and communicative and social challenges, among other limitations that affected his ability to communicate with co-workers and perform some tasks.” (FAC 20.) Plaintiff asserts that he has known that he had a disability “since [his] schooldays,” and believes he suffers from “not being able to communicate well and [his] intellect [sic].” (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 14.)Specifically, Plaintiff notes that he was in special education throughout school because of his poor math, reading and writingskills. (Id. at p. 15.) During his employment for Defendant,*7 Plaintiff claims his disability manifested through struggles with routines being broken, communication issues, andfrustration. (Id. at p. 18.) Plaintiff points to five individuals that also worked for Defendant whom he alleges had knowledge ofhis mental disability. First, Plaintiff identifies Lujan, the Store Leader at Ralphs Malibu from 2015-2019. Plaintiff claims thathad several arguments about particular schedule changes, time-off requests, and disorganization issues with Lujan. (VillasenorDecl. ¶¶ 11-13.) Ralph's Malibu conducted a “secret shopper” program in which employees were evaluated by a consultantwho pretended to shop at Ralphs. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff alleges that Lujan noted his challenges with this program and withcommunication with others in general. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also mentions that Lujan told him “look for opportunities to say hello” topeople when critiquing his performance in the secret shopper program. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff also asserts that when discussinghis work responsibilities, Lujan said “we're not going there.” (Id. at 15.) Lastly,
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Plaintiff claims that he refused promotional discussions with Lujan and told her it was because he wanted to work with as fewpeople as possible as it was difficult for him to communicate with other employees. (Id. at 37.) However, this is contradictedby his deposition testimony in which he said that he did not tell Lujan that he wanted to avoid other people, but that “asking forthe schedule shift was enough to solve the problem.” (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 53.) Plaintiff states that another manager, RosieRamos (“Ramos”), informed him that he failed or needed to improve on about 20 of the “secret shops” he also discussed withLujan. (Villasenor Decl. 25.) Plaintiff claims that Ramos also called him a “creature of habit” and said he “start[ed] everydaywith a certain routine.” (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 21.) Plaintiff additionally says that Ramos saw him eating lunch alone mostdays and not talking to anyone during work hours. (Villasenor Decl. 26.)Plaintiff additionally highlights Art Bedrossian (“Bedrossian”), another Store Director, with whom Plaintiff alleges he hadseveral arguments with about Plaintiff's overtime. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 24.) During one argument, Plaintiff specificallyasserts that Art Bedrossian said to another manager “that guy is kind of different, he's kind of special” in reference to hisbehavior. (Ibid.) Plaintiff notes that he is not sure those were the exact words, but it was something to that effect. (VillasenorDecl. 21.) Plaintiff says he perceived this comment to mean that Bedrossian thought he had “special needs.” (Id. at 22.)Bedrossian allegedly commented on Plaintiff's secret shop performance as well, asking why plaintiff did not like making eyecontact. (Id. at 23.)Although not mentioned in the opposition or FAC, during his deposition and in his declaration, Plaintiff also claimed that aprevious produce manager, Eddie Kuong (“Kuong), was aware of his disability. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 28; Villasenor Decl.¶¶ 30-34.) In particular, Plaintiff says they had constant arguments and this should have alerted Kuong to his disability aboutPlaintiff's work speed. (Ibid.) However, Plaintiff admits he never communicated to Kuong anything regarding a disability andanswered “I don't know” when asked if there was any other reason Kuong should have known about Plaintiff's alleged mentaldisability. (Ibid.) Plaintiff asserts that he also expressed to Kuong that he liked set schedules thus alerting him to his symptomof rigidity. (Id. at p. 45.)Finally, Plaintiff recalls another interaction with a manager he refers to only as “Jose.” (Villasenor Decl. ¶¶ 27.) Plaintiff allegesthat in a fit of anger due to disorganization of the receiving area, he kicked a pallet. (Id. at 28.) Jose saw this incident on thesurveillance camera and issued written discipline for kicking the pallet. (Id. at 29.)Importantly, however, Plaintiff does not claim that Haddad, his supervisor, or Luhring, the ultimate termination decision maker,had any independent or constructive knowledge of his disability prior to his termination. Plaintiff says he has no knowledge ofwhether Art Bedrossian communicated to any other managers, including Haddad that Plaintiff was “special” or had a disability.(Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 38.)*8 In the opposition, Plaintiff provides a few citations to cases to argue that the law supports a finding of disability even when ithas not been formally diagnosed if the employer learns about the disability from a third party or observes the disability itself. Thefirst case Plaintiff cites is Bilo v. Dept. of Defense (D. Haw. 2010) 720 F. Supp. 2d 1267. As pointed out by Defendant in its reply,this case does not exist. The Court recognizes, however, another case Plaintiff cites does state that a disability can be establishedby proving the employer observed behavior consistent with the disability or had a third-party alert them to the possibility of adisability, (Faust v. California Portland Cement Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 864, 887 (“Faust”) citing Schmidt v. Safeway Inc.(D.Or. 1994) 864 F.Supp. 991, 997.) Faust does state this standard, but the facts of Faust are distinguishable because the plaintiffin Faust provided a request for a leave of absence by a medical provider though there was no formal diagnosis. (Ibid.) Here,Plaintiff did not provide any medical documentation to Defendant. Thus, Faust stands for the general proposition that disabilitycan be observed but does not support that Plaintiff's specific facts establish that Defendant constructively observed his disability.On the other hand, Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist. (3d Cir. 1999) 184 F.3d 296 (“Taylor”) does exist but the Court agreeswith Defendant that it is distinguishable from the present case. In Taylor, the constructive notice occurred after Taylor wasactively psychotic at work, hospitalized with the employer's knowledge, and after she provided notes to her employer thatstated she was being treated by medical professionals and needed to monitor lithium levels in her blood. (Taylor v. Phoenixville
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9School Dist. (3d Cir. 1999) 184 F.3d 296, 313-314.) Here, Plaintiff was never hospitalized during his employment because ofhis mental disability and never provided any medical notes related to the alleged disability. The only potential similarity is thatPlaintiff contends Defendant or its agents observed his behavior. But the Court finds there is significant distinction between theobservance of an actively psychotic episode's delusions and paranoia in comparison to Plaintiff's reliance on rigid routines andcomplaints about working conditions. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has provided no authority that supportsthe specific manifestations of his alleged disability were sufficient to put Defendant on notice of his disability.In addition, the Court notes that “while knowledge of the disability can be inferred from the circumstances, knowledge will onlybe imputed to the employer when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts.” (Featherstonev. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1167 citing Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57Cal.App.4th 228, 237.) “Vague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employeron notice of its obligations under the [FEHA].” (Ibid. adopting the standard in Morisky v. Broward County (11th Cir. 1996) 80F.3d 445, 447.) Plaintiff provides no authority that considers facts similar to this case. However, Defendant does provide a fewexamples of what conditions and behavior have led to a finding of constructive notice of a disability, including having seizuresand being in a wheelchair. (Rogers v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (M.D. Ala. 1998) 18 F.Supp.2d 1328.) California courts have held thatdefendant employers who knew that their employee had an alcohol problem or that knew that their employee needed to get acancerous tumor removed, had constructive notice of a disability even if the plaintiff did not use the word disability to describetheir state. (Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles, Inc. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 570, 593; Faust, supra 150 Cal.App.4th at 887.)The Court finds that comments about Plaintiff's routines or character as a “creature of habit” cannot establish Defendant'sknowledge of the alleged disability. There are many other reasonable interpretations of these comments outside ofacknowledging a disability. Not every person who likes routine or has habits is a person with a disability. Plaintiff's commentsabout his own routines and preferences for limited social contact were vague as they did not specify what incapacity Plaintiff had.Plaintiff admits to never having discussed these struggles Haddad. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at p. 30.) Plaintiff also does not allegethat any of these employees who commented on his behavior reported his behavior to upper management. (Id. at pp, 36, 38.)*9 The only comment that falls out of the general, vague references to routines is the comment by Bedrossian calling Plaintiff“special.” This could be interpreted as referencing a disability. However, “isolated or stray remarks ... are immaterial in provinga discriminatory motive.” (Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Med. Ctr. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 138, 154, fn. 15; Horn v. Cushman &Wakefield Western (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 798, 809.) This singular comment by Bedrossian is not alleged to have been reportedto any management that had the authority to take adverse employment action against Plaintiff. Thus, this one comment is a strayremark and cannot be the sole basis for imputing knowledge of Plaintiff's disability to Defendant.Thus, Defendant has met its burden to prove that there is no triable issue of material fact related to this cause of action.Adverse Employment ActionEven if the comments by Plaintiff's coworkers amounted to knowledge of a disability, Defendant also argues that the adverseemployment action in this case, Plaintiff's termination, was not causally connected to any disability discrimination.There is no dispute that a termination is an adverse employment action. However, Plaintiff must also establish that his terminationwas “because of the disability or perceived disability.” (Sandellv. Taylor-Listug, Inc.(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th297, 310.) It isundisputed that the stated reason for Plaintiff's termination was his altercations with Jackson. (Def. UMF Nos. 227-228; DefsRevised App'x of Evid., Exh. 101.) It also undisputed that during these altercations, Plaintiff engaged physically with Jacksonand yelled profanities at him. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at pp. 91-96; Villasenor Depo. 2 at p. 118.) Plaintiff admits that he has noknowledge of whether Luhring, the termination decisionmaker, had knowledge of his alleged disability. (Villasenor Depo. 2 at p.148.) Plaintiff also does not recall that he mentioned his alleged disability during the grievance meeting. (Villasenor Depo. 2 atpp. 142-143, 147.) Plaintiff does not dispute that the there was a policy against “quarrelling” on company property. (VillasenorDepo. 2 atp. 138; Def. UMF Nos. 116, 132.)
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10Plaintiff tries to claim this reason for termination was pretextual because Jackson was the initial aggressor and Defendantdeviated from its policies when it did not discipline Jackson after the March 25, 2023, altercation. However, no employee thathad the ability to fire or discipline Jackson knew about the incident on March 26th until April 8th. (Def's UMF Nos. 57-63.)After the April 8th incident, termination quickly followed. (Def's Revised App'x of Evid., Exh. 101; Def. UMF Nos. 68, 70.)While the termination email does mention Plaintiff being the initial aggressor, the violated policy does not require a finding thatthe employee was the initial aggressor nor does Luhring claim that Plaintiff only violated the policy because he made physicalcontact first. (Ibid.) In other words, Luhring relied on the general policy against “quarreling” which does not require a findingof being the initial aggressor. (Ibid.) In addition, Plaintiff cannot point to any evidence that his alleged disability was discussedby Luhring or other managers with the authority to terminate him. Thus, the Court cannot find the stated reason for Plaintiff'stermination, the altercations with Jackson, was pretextual.Therefore, the adverse employment action, Plaintiff's termination, was not “because of” his alleged disability and there is notriable issue of material fact related to disability discrimination. Defendant has met its burden. While Plaintiff could rebut byshowing the lawful reason for termination was pretextual, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not meet his burden to establishpretext.*10 The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary adjudication on the First Cause of Action for FEHA DisabilityDiscrimination.3. FEHA Failure to AccommodateDefendant argues that Plaintiff does not present a triable issue of material fact as it relates to the second cause of action forfailure to accommodate because: (1) Defendant had no knowledge of the alleged disability; and (2) Plaintiff did not requestan accommodation.A prima facie case of failure to accommodate requires: (1) that the plaintiff has a disability or was regarded as suffering froma disability; (2) that the plaintiff could perform the essential duties of a sought reassigned job with or without reasonableaccommodations; and (3) that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate. (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169Cal.App.4th 1185, 1193.) “Under the FEHA, ‘reasonable accommodation’ means ‘a modification or adjustment to the workplacethat enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired.”’ (Cuiellette v. City of Los Angeles (2011)194 Cal.App.4th 757, 766.) “Reasonable accommodations include ‘[j]ob restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,reassignment to a vacant position, ... and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”’ (Swanson v. MorongoUnified School Dist. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 954, 969.)Employers must have knowledge of a plaintiff's disability to establish a claim under a failure to accommodate theory. (Pensingerv. Bowsmith, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 722, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, disapproved on other grounds byColmenares v. BraemarCountry Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6.) As stated in the previous section, the Court finds that Defendant didnot have notice, actual or constructive, of Plaintiff's alleged disability. As such, Plaintiff cannot prove that Defendant failed toaccommodate his disability. Thus, Defendant has met its burden of establishing there is no triable issue of material fact relatedto the Third Cause of Action. Plaintiff presents no evidence on opposition to the contrary.Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary adjudication on the Third Cause of Action for Failure toAccommodate.4. FEHA Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to show a triable issue of material fact related to the Fourth Cause of Action because it hadno knowledge of the alleged disability and Plaintiff did not request an accommodation.“Two principles underlie a cause of action for failure to [engage in the good-faith interactive process]. First, the employee mustrequest an accommodation. Second, the parties must engage in an interactive process regarding the requested accommodationand, if the process fails, responsibility for the failure rests with the party who failed to participate in good faith.” (Gelfo v.Lockheed Martin Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 34, 54 [internal citations omitted].) “The point of the interactive process isto find reasonable accommodation for a disabled employee, or an employee regarded as disabled by the employer, in order toavoid the employee's termination. Therefore, a pretextual termination of a perceived-as-disabled employee's employment inlieu of providing reasonable accommodation or engaging in the interactive process does not provide an employer a reprievefrom claims for failure to accommodate and failure to engage in the interactive process.” (Moore v. Regents of University ofCalifornia (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 216, 243-44 (italics in original).)*11 To prove that an employer failed to engage in the interactive process, the plaintiff must establish that the employer knew,actually or constructively, about the plaintiff's disability. (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169.) The Court again points to its initial analysis for the First Cause of Action. Defendant wasnot actually or constructively on notice of Plaintiff's alleged disability. Therefore, Defendant meets its burden of establishingthere is no triable issue of material fact related to this cause of action.Even if the Court were to consider this cause of action beyond the knowledge requirement, Plaintiff admits to never havingasked for an accommodation while specifically referencing his alleged disability. (Villasenor Depo. 1 at pp. 53, 57.) Plaintiffdoes say he asked for changes to his work schedule but admits that he did not specify it was because of any disability. (Id.at p. 53.) In addition, Plaintiff admits that one of the schedule changes was requested so that he could pick up his brother'schildren from school. (Id. at p. 52.) This is not a accommodation request based on disability. The Court highlights that bothof these scheduling requests were granted and thus Plaintiff cannot rely on them for this cause of action. (Id. at pp. 59-60.)The last possible allegation of a request for accommodation occurred when Plaintiff contends that after the March 26, 2023incident, he requested to not work with Jackson. However, Plaintiff acknowledges that the stated reason for his request was thathe feared Jackson, not that his disability prevented him from working with Jackson. (Villasenor Decl. 68.) As such, Plaintiffnever requested an accommodation sufficient to require Defendant to engage in the interactive process.Plaintiff responds by highlighting the same conversations with Defendant's employees regarding his routines and rigidity. TheCourt finds that these conversations do not establish that Defendant had knowledge of Plaintiff's alleged disability. Therefore,the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to meet its burden of establishing that there is a triable issue of material fact related to thiscause of action.The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary adjudication as to the Fourth Cause of Action in the FAC.5. FEHA RetaliationRalph's argues that Plaintiff's FEHA Retaliation claim fails because it did not have knowledge of Plaintiff's disability andPlaintiff's' termination was not based on a discriminatory or retaliatory reason.“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a ‘protectedactivity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between theprotected activity and the employer's action.” (Meeks v. Autozone, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 855, 878-879.) “An ‘adverseemployment action,’ which is a critical component of a retaliation claim, requires a substantial adverse change in the terms andconditions of the plaintiffs employment.” (Holmes v. Petrovich Development Co., LLC (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1063.)Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for theadverse employment action. If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action, the presumption
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12of retaliation “drops out of the picture,” and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation. (Yanowitzv. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042 [internal citations omitted].)*12 As the Court has already established, Plaintiff was terminated for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. plaintiff cannotestablish a nexus between his protected activity and his termination. There is no evidence that Defendant or its agents consideredan alleged disability when terminating Plaintiff. For example, Plaintiff provides no proof that Defendant referred to his requestsfor schedule changes or his history of disagreements and communication issues with other co-workers while terminating him.Thus, Defendant did not mention any accommodation requests in its reasons for termination. Because of this, Defendant cannotbe said to have relied on Plaintiff's behavior derived from his disability to justify his termination. Even if Plaintiff argued withJackson because of his disability, the “quarreling” still violated Defendant's policies. As such, no retaliation occurred.Defendant has shown that there is no triable issue of material fact related to the Fifth Cause of Action. As already discussed,Plaintiff fails to prove that the reason for termination was pretextual. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of establishingthere is a triable issue of material fact.The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary adjudication on the Fifth Cause of Action for FEHA Retaliation.6. AssaultRalph's moves for summary adjudication on Plaintiff's assault cause of action on the grounds that: (1) the cause of action issubject to the worker's compensation exclusionary rule; (2) Defendant did not ratify the conduct of Jackson as he was terminated;and (3) Defendant cannot be held liable for the tortious conduct of another employee based on the respondeat superior theory. AsDefendant makes no challenge as to the failure to prove any of the elements of this cause of action, the Court will not considerthe sufficiency of Plaintiff's factual representations.Plaintiff does not respond to these arguments in the opposition.Worker's Compensation Exclusionary RuleIt is true that generally intentional torts of employees are subject to the workers' compensation exclusionary rule, prohibitingemployees from filing a civil suit for these claims. (Worker's Compensation Code § 3601 (b).) Defendant correctly notes thatthe respondeat superior theory cannot impute an employee's conduct onto the employer for purposes of this rule. (Fretland v.County of Humboldt (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1497.) However, conducts by another employee can be imputed onto theemployer if the employer engaged in “positive conduct” or “ratified” the conduct of the other employee. (Iverson v. Atlas PacificEngineering (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 219, 228.) Thus, Ralph's must prove that it did not ratify the Jackson's conduct.Ralph's claims that no ratification exists because it terminated Jackson as a result of his conduct. But it is undisputed thatJackson was terminated after the second altercation on April 8, 2023. (Def. UMF No. 244.) This means that Defendant couldhave ratified the conduct of Jackson in the first altercation on March 26, 2023 by not disciplining him for his violations of theDefendant's policy on workplace quarreling. “Ratification is the voluntary election by a person to adopt in some manner as hisown an act which was purportedly done on his behalf by another person, the effect of which ... is to treat the act as if originallyauthorized by him.” (Rakestraw v. Rodriguez (1972) 8 Cal.3d 67, 73.) Ratification may occur expressly or impliedly “based onconduct of the purported principal from which an intention to consent to or adopt the act may be fairly inferred.” (Ibid.)It is undisputed that Store Manager Haddad de-escalated the altercation on March 26, 2023. (Villasenor Decl. ¶¶ 57-63.). Inaddition, it is undisputed that, on that same day, Haddad reviewed the surveillance footage and found that there had been aphysical altercation before he arrived to de-escalate. (Plaintiff's UMF No. 11.) Haddad admits that despite knowing it wasDefendant's policy to report a violation of Defendant's rules to the Labor Relations Department, he did not report this incident
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.13because he believed that his verbal coaching resolved the dispute (Id., No. 12). Plaintiff does not argue that Luhring, thetermination decision maker, knew about the first altercation prior to April 8, 2023. (Def. UMF Nos. 57-63.) The first time anyindividual with the authority to terminate or discipline found out about the physical altercation was on April 8, 2023 after thesecond altercation occurred. (Ibid.) Thus, if Defendant can provide authority that Haddad as Store Manager was not an agentacting on behalf of Defendant, then Defendant establishes that no ratification occurred.*13 However, Defendant provides no authority that holds, for the purposes of the worker's compensation exclusionary rule, thatratification can only be completed through an agent that has disciplinary authority.The Court recognizes that other statutes dodistinguish between lower-level supervisory employees and “managing agents” who have authority to discipline and terminate.(See e.g., Civ. Code § 3294 (b).) But, the worker's compensation statute does not have this distinction. (Civ. Code § 3601.)Defendant admits that Haddad failed to report the first altercation to the Labor Relations Department. (Plaintiff's UMF No. 12).He failed to do so, even though he was required to under Defendant's policy. (Ibid.; Haddad Depo. at pp. 172, 176.) As such, itcould be argued that Defendant ratified the behavior of Jackson because its agent, Haddad, failed to report the first altercationand thus no discipline or termination occurred. For these reasons, the Court finds that there is a triable issue of material fact as towhether Haddad in his capacity as an agent for Defendant ratified the conduct of Jackson. Defendant has thus failed to meet itsburden that there is no triable issue of material fact. A triable issue of fact exists as to whether Ralph's ratified Jackson's behavior.Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary adjudication on the Sixth Cause of Action for Assault is DENIED.7.BatteryDefendant asserts the same arguments against the battery cause of action as it did for the assault cause of action. The sameprinciples apply to a battery cause of action under the worker's compensation rule.However, the Court finds that the battery cause of action in this case is distinguishable. An essential element of battery is thatthe defendant “touched” the plaintiff. (Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 669.) The Court previouslyruled in the evidentiary objections portion of this ruling, that Plaintiff admitted during his deposition that Jackson did not touchhim during the first altercation on March 26, 2023. (See Villasenor Depo. 1 at pp. 91, 95.) On the other hand, it is not disputedthat Jackson touched Plaintiff during the second altercation on April 8, 2023. (Def. UMF No. 53.) The parties dispute how manytimes Jackson punched Plaintiff, but they agree that Jackson punched Plaintiff at least once. (Ibid.) As such, the only batteryin this case occurred on April 8, 2023. It is undisputed that Jackson was immediately suspended after the April 8 altercationand later terminated. (Id., Nos. 56, 68.) The incident was reported and investigated starting on April 10, 2023. (Id. at No. 57.)Because of this, Defendant establishes that it did not ratify the actions of Jackson after the battery on April 8, 2023.The Court finds that the worker's compensation exclusionary rule applies, and the Defendant has thus successfully presentedan affirmative defense to this cause of action.The Court GRANTS summary adjudication on the Seventh Cause of Action for Battery.8. Negligent Supervision and RetentionDefendant next contends that the Eighth Cause of Action fails because it is subject to the worker's compensation exclusionaryrule and Defendant did not know that Jackson was violent. The FAC alleges that Defendant was negligent in retainingJackson because of his purported history of violence and in retaining other unidentified managers because of their disabilitydiscrimination towards Plaintiff. (FAC 110-111.) As discussed above, the Court finds Defendant did not have knowledgeof Plaintiff's disability, did not make termination decisions based on the alleged disability and did not fail to accommodatePlaintiff. Thus, any claim of negligent retention or supervision based on disability discrimination fails. However, the Court
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14must still address whether Defendant can establish that there is no triable material fact as it relates to negligent retention andsupervision of Jackson.There is no dispute that Jackson and Plaintiff engaged in a verbal and physical altercation on March 26, 2023. (Villasenor Depo.1 at pp. 91-96; Villasenor Depo. 2 at p. 118) There is also no dispute that this altercation was a violation of Defendant's policiesregulating workplace conduct. (Haddad Decl. 8-10; Def. UMF Nos. 31-33.) Yet, Defendant admits no disciplinary actionwas taken against Jackson for his role in the March 26th altercation until after the second altercation occurred on April 8th.(Haddad Decl. 8-10; Plaintiff's UMF No. 11.) As such, it is arguable that Defendant negligently retained and supervisedJackson during the time period between the altercations. If discipline had occurred, it is possible that the April 8th altercationwould have been prevented. As mentioned in the Court's analysis on the assault cause of action, the worker's compensationexclusionary rule does not state that liability is only imputed on employers if they or their “managing agents” are the allegedtortfeasors. Haddad was arguably acting as an agent of the Defendant when he did not pursue reporting the first altercation tothe Labor Relations Department. Therefore, the failure to discipline was arguably ratified by an agent of the Defendant. Assuch, Defendant fails to prove that the worker's compensation exclusionary rule applies to this cause of action.*14 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff fails to prove that Defendant knew Jackson was violent. To support this argument,Defendant cites Z.V. v. County of Riverside (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 889, 902, which held “[t]o establish negligent supervision,a plaintiff must show that a person in a supervisorial position over the actor had prior knowledge of the actor's propensity todo the bad act.” Defendant claims that there is no admissible evidence that it had knowledge of Jackon's potential violence.However, the authority Defendant cites actually undermines its position. It is undisputed that Haddad had knowledge of theMarch 26, 2023, incident. (Plaintiff's Decl. 53-57, 61, Plaintiff's UMF No. 11) During that incident, Haddad acknowledgesthat he witnessed Jackson engaging in a verbal and physical altercation with Plaintiff. (Ibid.) Therefore, Haddad was aware onand after March 26, 2023, that Jackson violated Defendant's policy against “quarrelling” on company property. (Haddad Decl. 8-Minute 10.) Because Haddad had knowledge that this violation occurred, he had knowledge that Jackson had a propensityfor this type of behavior and may have acted in accordance again. As the authority presented does not distinguish betweensupervisors with and without disciplinary authority, the Court finds Haddad's knowledge can be imputed to Defendant. Thus,Defendant had knowledge of Jackson's prior assaultive behavior.Defendant thus fails to establish that there is no triable issue of material fact related to this cause of action. The Court DENIESDefendant's motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Eighth Cause of Action for Negligent Retention and Supervision.9. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)Defendant offers two bases for finding there is no triable material fact as to the ninth cause of action: (1) the affirmative defenseof the application of the worker's compensation exclusionary rule; and (2) that Plaintiff fails to prove that Defendant's allegedconduct was “outrageous.”IIED claims are generally subject to the worker's compensation exclusionary rule if the employer's conduct does not violatepublic policy nor exceeds the risks inherent in the employment relationship. (Livitsanos v. Continental Culture Specialists, Inc.(1992) 2 Cal.4th 744, 754.) Physical disputes between coworkers have been found to be a risk inherent in employment if thedisputes are related to workplace issues. (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 160; Jones v. Departmentof Corrections & Rehabilitation (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1383-1384.) But the ratification exception still applies. Aspreviously stated, Defendant arguably ratified Jackson's conduct on March 26, 2023, when its agent, Haddad failed to report theincident to management and thus no discipline was given. As such, the worker's compensation exclusivity rule does not apply.Defendant next argues that Plaintiff fails to establish that the conduct at issue was “outrageous.” Conduct must be outrageousfor it to establish an IIED claim. (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129
Villasenor v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2025 WL 4074946 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.15Cal.App.4th 1228, 1259.) Conduct is outrageous if it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilizedcommunity.” (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009.)As Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant or its agents physically assaulted him, the behavior in question is the failure todiscipline Jackson after the March 26, 2023 incident.In Light v. Department of Parks Recreation, the Court held that a defendant's conduct was not outrageous as a matter oflaw even though it contributed to a violation of the FEHA and Courtroom Assistant: D. McKinney Deputy Sheriff: Noneconstituted retaliation. (Light v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 102.) Because the defendant'sactions, while improper, were regular supervisory actions such as refusing to investigate complaints, the Court held that anIIED claim could not be established. (Ibid.) Specifically the court noted that the defendant's “responsibility as a supervisoralone is insufficient” to form the basis of an IIED claim. (Ibid.) The same conclusion was reached by another court that heldthat actions like termination, demotions, transfers, and refusals to raise salaries were simply “personnel management activity”and thus insufficient to establish a claim of IIED. (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 79-80.) Inthis case, similarly, Defendant's actions at most consisted of a failure to discipline or terminate Jackson. These are actions thatfall within the scope of the regular duties of personnel management. As such, Plaintiff cannot establish Defendant's behaviorwas “outrageous” and thus fails to prove an element required of an IIED claim. For this reason, Defendant meets its burden ofestablishing that no triable issue of material fact exists as to the Ninth Cause of Action.*15 Plaintiff does plead that the alleged disability discrimination also gave him emotional distress. However, as the Court hasalready found that no discrimination occurred, this cannot form the basis of an IIED claim.Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's motion for summary adjudication of the Ninth Cause of Action for IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress.III. CONCLUSIONThe Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Adjudication as to the Plaintiff's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,Seventh, and Ninth Causes of Action in the First Amended Complaint. The Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for SummaryAdjudication as to the Sixth and Eighth Cause of Action for Assault and Negligent Supervision and Retention alleged in theFirst Amended Complaint.Clerk hereby gives notice.Certificate of Service is attached.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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