Hussain v. Mansoor Quraishi Docket No. TTD-CV25-5019431-S March 31, No. TTD-CV25-5019431-S (2026)

Case details
Full caption
AT ROCKVILLE. MOHAMED HUSSAIN v. MANSOOR QURAISHI DOCKET NO. TTD-CV25-5019431-S MARCH 31
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (CT)
Court
Connecticut Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 948918Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECKCOURT RULES BEFORE CITING.Superior Court of Connecticut,J.D. OF TOLLAND.AT ROCKVILLE.MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL.v.MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL.DOCKET NO. TTD-CV25-5019431-S|MARCH 31, 2026MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: DEFENDANT'SMOTION TO DISMISS (Entry No. 107.00)Graff, J.*1 On October 22, 2025, the defendant, Mansoor Quraishi,filed a special motion to dismiss, with an accompanyingmemorandum of law and exhibits. Docket Entry 107. OnNovember 26, 2025, the plaintiffs filed an objection to thespecial motion to dismiss. Docket Entry 114. On December3, 2025, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental objection to thespecial motion to dismiss. Docket Entry 116. Oral argumenton the special motion to dismiss was held on December 5,2025.On March 4, 2026, the court issued an order to show causerelating to the special motion to dismiss and scheduled ahearing for March 18, 2026. Docket Entry 123. The ordernotified defendant's counsel that he should be prepared toexplain how the brief was prepared, including by whatmeans legal research was conducted. Defendant's counselwas notified that he must be prepared to explain whethergenerative artificial intelligence (AI) was used in thepreparation of the brief filed at Docket Entry 107, and if so,which AI platform was used, and to what extent it was used inthe preparation of the brief. The order detailed eight (8) casecitations that were problematic, including instances where thecases did not exist; the quotes did not exist; and the citationswere wrong. All parties and counsel were required to attendthe hearing.At the hearing, Attorney Quraishi admitted that he usedAI to write the special motion to dismiss. Transcript, p.5:1-12. Attorney Quraishi indicated that he intended topursue the motion to dismiss, and to rest on the statutoryframework. Transcript, p. 12:2-24. The plaintiff did not objectto the defendant resting on the statutory framework. Thecourt is mindful that General Statutes § 52-196a conferson the defendant a “special statutory benefit” to file amotion to dismiss. Since the plaintiff did not object to thedefendant proceeding with his motion to dismiss, and sincethe defendant has statutory right to file the special motionto dismiss, the court will consider the defendant's motion todismiss without the AI generated portions of the brief. Seeorder at Docket Entry 123 for a list of the AI generated/hallucinated portions of the brief.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDGeneral Statutes § 52-196a (e)(2) provides: “When ruling ona special motion to dismiss, the court shall consider pleadingsand supporting and opposing affidavits of the parties attestingto the facts upon which liability or a defense, as the casemay be, is based.” The court finds the following facts basedon the complaint, dated August 26, 2025, and the affidavitssubmitted by both sides.Mohamed Hussain, is the sole member of VCare FamilyPractice LLC. Aiholaney Garcia is an employee of VCareFamily Practice LLC. From August 2016 to February 14,2018, the defendant provided computer/technological supportto VCare Family Practice LLC. The defendant was paid in fullfor all of the invoices that he submitted to the plaintiffs.From March 2016 through January 2018, the defendantinvested some money with VCare Family Practice LLC toopen a practice in Hartford. The Hartford practice did notperform well and had to be sold. The sale did not cover thelosses and there were no assets to distribute to the investors.Entry 114, Affidavit of Hussain; Entry 105, Affidavit ofQuraishi.*2 Between July 2, 2025, and July 11, 2025, the defendantmade ten (10) posts on his Facebook page about the plaintiffs.People were not able to comment on the posts. The posts areas follows:
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.29. July 2, 2025. “Mohamed Altaf Hussain...AiholaneyTorres...These two individuals conspired together toCOMMIT INDETITY FRAUD AND THEFT OF AMEDICAL DOCTOR...Mr. HUSSAIN IS A HIGH-LEVEL CRIMINAL...Mr. HUSSAIN also transportCONTROLLED SUBSTANCES to INDIA from theUSA and sold them there locally”10. July 3, 2025. “The MALE NURSEORGANIZED MEDICAL MAFIA COVEN/CULT OPERATED BY MOHAMED ALTAFHUSSAIN, APRN known as SHIFA CLINICin VERNON, CONNECTICUT...TARGETING AMEDICAL DOCTOR...TO IMPERSONATE USE ASHIS GHOST MEDICAL DIRECTOR”11. July 6, 2025. “TO: MOHAMED ALTAF HUSSAIN,APRN & CO ‘DEFRAUDING MEDICARE ANDMEDICAID since 2016’ ”.12. July 8, 2025. “TO: MOHAMED ALTAF HUSSAIN,APRN et al AIHOLANEY ‘LANEY’ TORRES YOUGUYS WOULD'VE BEEN BETTER OFF USING DRZHIVAGO AS YOUR GHOST MEDICAL DIRECTORFOR SHIFA CLINIC IN ELLINGTON CONNECTION(now in VERNON) INSTEAD OF DR KISHORETHAKUR, A TERMINALLY ILL CANCER PATIENTWITH A COLOSTOMY BAG, LIVING OUT OF HISCAR IN THE PARKING LOT OF THE MOHEGANSUN CASINO”13. July 8, 2025. “You have to explain to criminalslike MOHAMED ALTAF HUSSAIN APRN andAIHOLANEY ‘LANEY’ TORRES...YOU GUYSVIOLATED A CONNECTICUT LAW BY FAILINGTO REPORT AN IMPAIRED PRACTITIONER...YOUSCRWED ME OUT OF THOUSANDS OFDOLLARS...I HAVE THE GOOGLE DRIVE WITHALL THE FAKE DOCUMENTS YOU STAMPED DRKISHORE THAKUR'S NAME ON”14. July 8, 2025. “To: MOHAMED ALTAF HUSSAIN,APRN BE CLEAR, THIS IS NOT GOING TO STOPUNTIL YOU ARE IN PRISON FOR DEFRAUDINGTHE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS MEDICARE andMEDICAID PROGRAMS AS WELL AS VIOLATINGTHE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT OF1970...MARGARET NAVAROLI WANTS TO FILECHARGES ON THE DEATH OF HER SON, WHILEHE WAS UNDER YOUR CARE FOR SUBOXONE...Ibelieve both of you also stole my social securitynumber.”15. July 8, 2025. “ONE OF OUR PATIENTS NAMEDMICHELLE SAID YOU FONDLED HER BREASTSINAPPROPRIATELY WHILE EXAMINING HER ATSTAFFORD MEDICAL GROUP”16. July 8, 2025. “I'M WRITING TO THEJUDGES DIRECTLY ABOUT HOW YOU ANDAIHOLANEY TORRES STOLE DR KISHORETHAKUR'S IDENTITY...Also, I have the Google Drivewith your fraudulent Medicare documents in it...Also weshould let the judges know how you broke into StaffordMedical's Electronic Health Record system and STOLETHEIR PATIENTS, DIVERTING THEM TO SHIFACLINIC”17. July 11, 2025. “THEY ARE EXPERTS AT PURJURY(sic) AND HAVE BECOME SUPER COMFORTABLEMAKING FALSE STATEMENTS JUST ONE MORETHING THEY ARE PILING ON THEIR SOON TOBE PUBLIC RECORD OF SERIOUS CRIMINALOFFENSES AGAINST FEDERAL HEALTHCAREPROGRAMS”18. July 11, 2025. “COME TO SHARIA LAW CLINIC SOWE CAN ALL RIP OFF MEDICAID”Entry 100.32, Complaint, ¶¶ 9-18.As a result of the defendant's Facebook posts from early July2025, Hussain applied for a Civil Protection Order, DocketNumber TTD-CV25-5019232-S. Docket Entry 114, Affidavitof Hussain. On July 21, 2025, the court granted the applicationfor civil protection order for a period of one (1) year againstthe defendant.Garcia and the defendant were in a dating relationship forone month in 2015. As a result of the defendant's Facebookposts from early July 2025, Garcia applied for a RestrainingOrder, Docket Number TTD-FA25-5019231-S. Docket Entry114, Affidavit of Garcia. The ex parte restraining order wasgranted, and the order was served in hand on the defendanton July 8, 2025. Docket Entry 114, Affidavit of Garcia. OnJuly 16, 2025, the court issued a restraining order for a periodof one (1) year against the defendant. A warrant was issuedfor the defendant's violation of the restraining order due toFacebook posts made by the defendant. Entry 114, Affidavitof Garcia.
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3*3 The plaintiffs filed the operative complaint on August26, 2025. In the complaint, the plaintiffs set forth claimsfor defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress,negligent infliction of emotional distress and invasion ofprivacy. On October 22, 2025, the defendant filed the presentspecial motion to dismiss. In the motion to dismiss, thedefendant argues that the statements at issue are on mattersof public concern and that the plaintiffs do not have probablecause that they will prevail on the merits of their claims. OnNovember 26, 2025, the plaintiffs filed an opposition to thespecial motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs argue that the specialmotion to dismiss should be denied as the statements at issuewere not made in a public forum and are not of public concern.The plaintiffs also argue that there is probable cause that theywill prevail on the merits of their claims.In their opposition, the plaintiffs claim that the special motionto dismiss was filed to delay the proceedings and that themotion is frivolous. The plaintiffs are seeking attorney's feesfor the costs associated with their opposition. The basisfor the plaintiffs’ argument is that on October 22, 2025,the same day that the special motion to dismiss was filed,the court was scheduled to proceed with a hearing on theplaintiffs’ application for prejudgment remedy. By way of theapplication for the prejudgment remedy, the plaintiffs soughtto attach the defendant's ownership interest in real estatelocated at 2 Davenport Road, West Hartford, Connecticut.The plaintiffs stated in their application for the prejudgmentremedy that “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood that Defendanthas sold, will, or will attempt to sell, remove, conveydissipate, or conceal assets with the intent to hinder, delay, ordefraud Plaintiffs which assets include, but are not limited to,said Defendant's ownership interest in real estate known at 2Davenport Road, West Hartford, Connecticut.” Docket Entry100.31.On December 3, 2025, the plaintiffs filed a supplementalopposition to the special motion to dismiss. In thesupplemental opposition to the special motion to dismiss,the plaintiffs state that the defendant fraudulently transferredthe property located at 2 Davenport Road, West Hartford,Connecticut to his father, Sultan A. Quraishi and a KatharinaA. Dienwebel. The plaintiffs argue that the quitclaim deedwas recorded on October 22, 2025, and is dated September 14,2021. The plaintiffs further argue that the quitclaim deed isevidence of the defendant's improper use of the special motionto dismiss to delay the proceedings so that the defendant couldtransfer the property out of his name before the applicationfor the prejudgment remedy could be ruled on.A hearing on the special motion to dismiss was held onDecember 5, 2025.1DISCUSSION*4 General Statutes § 52-196a “constitutes a specialstatutory benefit ... that provides a moving party withthe opportunity to have [a] lawsuit dismissed early in theproceeding and stays all discovery, pending the trial court'sresolution of the special motion to dismiss.” (Citationsomitted; internal quotation marks omitted). Priore v. Haig,344 Conn. 636, 659, 280 A.3d 402 (2022). “As this courthas observed, [a] special motion to dismiss filed pursuant to§ 52-196a ... is not a traditional motion to dismiss based ona jurisdictional ground. It is, instead, a truncated evidentiaryprocedure enacted by our legislature in order to achieve alegitimate policy objective, namely, to provide for a promptremedy.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Mulvihill v.Spinnato, 228 Conn. App. 781, 782–83, 326 A.3d 251, 254,cert. denied, 350 Conn. 926, 326 A.3d 248 (2024).Under § 52-196a, “a party may file a special motion to dismisswhen the opposing party's complaint is based on the movingparty's exercise of, among other things, the right of freespeech or the right to petition the government in connectionwith a matter of public concern.” Priore, 344 Conn. at 659.“Pursuant to § 52-196a (e) (3), the moving party bears theinitial burden to show by a preponderance of the evidencethat the complaint is based on the moving party's exercise ofits right of free speech, right to petition the government, orright of association under the Constitution of the United Statesor the Constitution of the state in connection with a matterof public concern ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted).Birch Hill Recovery Ctr., LLC v. High Watch Recovery Ctr.,Inc., 233 Conn. App. 182, 200, 339 A.3d 661 (2025). “If themoving party satisfies that burden, the burden shifts to thenonmoving party to establish that there is probable cause,considering all valid defenses, that the [nonmoving] partywill prevail on the merits of the complaint ....” Id. “For aspecial motion to dismiss to be granted, the court must resolveboth prongs in favor of the moving party.” (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Aguilar v. Eick, 234 Conn. App. 281, 287 n.6,344 A.3d 263 (2025).
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4A. Public ForumThe defendant's statements were made in the publicforum. See Primrose Companies, Inc. v. McGee, SuperiorCourt, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. UWY-CV-21-6062747-S (August 26, 2022, Pierson, J.); Jackson v.Mayweather, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1240, 1252, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d234, 245 (2017), as modified (Apr. 19, 2017) (Facebook postspublic forum).The plaintiffs argue that the posts were not made in the publicforum because the defendant turned off the public comments.“California courts have held that ‘[w]eb sites accessible tothe public .... are public forums for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Nygard,Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1039, 72Cal. Rptr. 3d 210 (2008). California courts have analogizedinternet websites to an electronic public bulletin board ‘opento literally billions of people all over the world.’ Choker v.Mateo, 209 Cal. App. 4th 1138, 1146, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 496(2012); see also Wilbanks v. Wolk, 121 Cal. App. 4th 883, 897,17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497 (2004) (public bulletin board ‘is publicbecause it posts statements that can be read by anyone who isinterested, and because others who choose to do so, can posta message through the same medium that interested personscan read’).” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Holly EstatesDevelopment, LLC v. Provenzano, Superior Court, judicialdistrict of Danbury, Docket No. DBD-CV-24-5021337-S(November 3, 2025, Brazzel-Massaro, J.T.R.). The fact thatthe defendant turned off the public comments function is notdispositive on the issue of whether the posts were made in thepublic forum. The defendant's posts were made on Facebookfor anyone in the public to see.B. Matter of Public Concern*5 The defendant argues that the statements in the postsaddressed health and safety and therefore the posts were madeon a matter of public concern.A matter of public concern is defined as “an issue relatedto (A) health or safety, (B) environmental, economic orcommunity well-being, (C) the government, zoning and otherregulatory matters, (D) a public official or public figure,or (E) an audiovisual work ....” General Statutes § 52–196a (a) (1). “Courts have found that mixed questions ofprivate and public concerns may be protected under thefirst amendment and that the fact that a statement evolvesfrom a personal dispute does not preclude some aspect ofit from touching [on] matters of public concern.” (Internalquotation marks omitted.) Robinson v. V. D., 346 Conn.1002, 1009, 293 A.3d 345 (2023). Generally, speech arisingfrom a personal dispute implicates a matter of publicconcern when the content of the speech concerns not onlythe individual but could conceivably be of concern to thegeneral public. See id., 1010 (finding public concern wherespeech extended beyond parties to systemic issues withingovernmental entity and broader community interests); seealso Balasubramanian v. Patel, Superior Court, judicialdistrict of Hartford, Docket No. HHD CV 25-6202901S(January 5, 2026, Shaikh, J.). “As the United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit recently stated: [S]peech onmatters of public concern is at the heart of [f]irst [a]mendmentprotection.... Whether speech addresses a matter of publicconcern is to be determined by the content, form, and contextof [the relevant] statement, as revealed by the whole record....Speech that relates to any matter of political, social, or otherconcern to the community ... which may include conductimplicat[ing] public safety and welfare ... for example,generally falls within the heart of the [f]irst [a]mendment'sprotection.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marksomitted.) Robinson v. V. D., 229 Conn. App. 316, 338–39, 328A.3d 198 (2024).“Because Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute was so recentlyenacted, Connecticut courts routinely refer to other states’case law, including California and Nevada, to interpret theConnecticut statute.” Sicignano v. Pearce, 228 Conn. App.664, 678, 325 A.3d 1127 (2024). “[C]ourts in Californiaand Nevada ... have utilized the following principles fordistinguishing between a public and private interest: ‘First,public interest does not equate with mere curiosity.... Second,a matter of public interest should be something of concern toa substantial number of people.... Thus, a matter of concernto the speaker and a relatively small, specific audience isnot a matter of public interest.... Third, there should besome degree of closeness between the challenged statementsand the asserted public interest ... the assertion of a broadand amorphous public interest is not sufficient .... Fourth,the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the publicinterest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition foranother round of [private] controversy....” Robinson v. V.D.,229 Conn. App. at 339 (citing Weinberg v. Feisel, 110 Cal.App. 4th 1122, 1132, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385 (2003); Smith v.Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 68, 481 P.3d 1222 (2021); 61A Am.Jur. 2d 448, Pleading § 380 (2021)).*6 In the present case, some of the allegations of thecomplaint are about a private dispute between former co-
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5workers that escalated into a course of frequent socialmedia posting about the plaintiffs’ personal and businessrelationships. See Balasubramanian, supra; Robinson v. V.D., supra, 346 Conn. 1010. The content of the social mediaposts in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, and 16 of the complaintdemonstrate the personal dispute between the parties. Thedefendant wrote several of the social media posts directlyaddressed to the plaintiffs, starting the social media postswith the greeting “To:” followed by the plaintiff's names.See above list, posts at paragraphs 11, 12, 14. In addition,the defendant frequently used the word “you” in the poststo speak directly to the plaintiffs. For example, he wrote:“You guys violated a Connecticut law by failing to report animpaired practitioner.” He also wrote: “You scrwed [sic] meout of thousands of dollars.” See above list, post at paragraph13. The defendant also addressed the plaintiffs, telling themthat he planned to write to the judges about the plaintiffs’participation in identity fraud and Medicare fraud. See abovelist, post at paragraph 16. The defendant wrote this post onthe same day that he was served in hand with the ex parterestraining order. The fact that the defendant addressed theposts to the plaintiffs and spoke directly to the plaintiffs inthe posts undermines his argument that he was using theposts “to inform the public about critical healthcare issues.”Docket Entry 107, p. 15. See Holly Estates Development,LLC, supra (postings to Google and Better Business websiteswere personal in nature by using “our experience... ourinteractions...” and “our opinion of the work done on ourproperty and our dissatisfaction with how the entire situationwas handled by the plaintiffs...” (Emphasis in original)).In addition, by looking at the context of the posts, thetiming of the defendant's posts cast doubt on the defendant'sargument that he is now trying to warn the public aboutthe plaintiffs’ activities that occurred several years ago. Thedefendant wrote at least two if not more of the posts afterbeing served with the ex parte restraining order. Complaint,¶¶ 17-18. The business and personal relationships betweenthe parties ended seven (7) years ago. Any concern thatthe defendant had about the plaintiffs’ alleged fraudulentactivities could have been addressed years ago. The defendantprovides no credible explanation for this lapse in time.2The posts in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 of the complaintdo not bring to the forefront a matter of public concern butare without a doubt a personal dispute between the parties.The court finds that defendant has failed to make an initialshowing that the posts in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 areon matters of public concern.Turning to the posts in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18,the defendant has met his burden of showing that theyinvolve matters of public concern. Importantly, the defendantis not speaking directly to the plaintiffs in these specificposts. Although the defendant uses the word “you” in thepost in paragraph 15, it is not clear who “you” is. Theposts in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18 refer to Medicaidfraud, impersonation of a doctor, identity fraud, transportationof controlled substances from a foreign country, andinappropriate touching during a medical examination. Theseposts address matters of health and safety that concern thepublic.C. Probable Cause to Prevail on the Merits1. DefamationThe court must now determine if the plaintiffs have probablecause to prevail on the merits of their claims relating to theposts in paragraphs 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18 of the complaint.“The legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide beliefin the existence of the facts essential under the law forthe action and such as would warrant a man of ordinarycaution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances,in entertaining it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Elderv. Kauffman, 204 Conn. App. 818, 825, 254 A.3d 1001(2021). “Proof of probable cause is not as demanding asproof by preponderance of the evidence ... and is substantiallyless than that required for conviction under the reasonabledoubt standard.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marksomitted.) Mulvihill, 228 Conn. App. at 790. “Probable causeis a flexible common sense standard ... [that] does not demandthat a belief be correct or more likely true than false.” (Internalquotation marks omitted.) 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC v.Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, 695, 915 A.2d 916, cert.denied, 282 Conn. 905, 920 A.2d 311 (2007).*7 “In assessing whether the plaintiff established probablecause that it would prevail under the second prong of §52-196a (e) (3), the court must construe the pleadings,affidavits, and other proof submitted in the light mostfavorable to the [plaintiff] ... and determine whether theplaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made aprima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorablejudgment.” Birch Hill Recovery Ctr., LLC, 233 Conn. App. at200–01.
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6In counts one, five and nine, the plaintiffs set forth claims ofdefamation. The plaintiffs allege and argue that the statementsare defamatory because the defendant made statements offact and because they are defamation per se. “A defamatorystatement is defined as a communication that tends to harmthe reputation of another as to lower him in the estimationof the community or to deter third persons from associatingor dealing with him ....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)NetScout Systems, Inc. v. Gartner, Inc., 334 Conn. 396, 410,223 A.3d 37 (2020). “Defamation is comprised of the tortsof libel and slander. Defamation is that which tends to injurereputation in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem,respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held,or to excite adverse, derogatory, or unpleasant feelings oropinions against him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)DeVito v. Schwartz, 66 Conn. App. 228, 234, 784 A.2d 376(2001). “Slander is oral defamation.... Libel ... is writtendefamation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v.Cosley, 110 Conn. App. 283, 297, 955 A.2d 550 (2008).“Whether words are actionable per se is a question of lawfor the court.... All of the circumstances connected withthe publication of defamatory charges should be consideredin ascertaining whether a publication [i]s actionable perse.” (Citations omitted.) Miles v. Perry, 11 Conn. App.584, 586-87 and 602-604, 529 A.2d 199 (1987) (affirmingtrial court's finding, even though plaintiff only claimedhumiliation and mental anguish, that defendants’ remarksabout plaintiff were actionable per se as libel and slanderwherein they falsely claimed she misappropriated fundsduring church meeting). “Libel or slander is ... actionable perse if it charges a crime involving moral turpitude or to whichan infamous penalty is attached”; (citations omitted) id., 602;but a statement is “not slanderous per se if [it] charge[s] nomore than specific acts, unless those acts are so charged as toamount to an allegation of general incompetence or lack ofintegrity.” Proto v. Bridgeport Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557,567, 72 A.2d 820 (1950). “When the defamatory words areactionable per se, the law conclusively presumes the existenceof injury to the plaintiff's reputation. [The plaintiff] is requiredneither to plead nor to prove it.” (Internal quotation marksomitted.) Lowe v. Shelton, 83 Conn. App. 750, 766, 851 A.2d1183, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 915, 859 A.2d 568 (2004). “Toprevail on a common-law defamation claim, a plaintiff mustprove that the defendant published false statements about herthat caused pecuniary harm.” Daley v. Aetna Life & CasualtyCo., 249 Conn. 766, 795, 734 A.2d 112 (1999).In order to support a cause of action for defamation, “thestatement in question must convey an objective fact, asgenerally, a defendant cannot be held liable for expressing amere opinion.” Id. “Although it is clear that expressions ofopinion are constitutionally protected, the determination ofwhether a specific statement is one of opinion or one of factis difficult ... [and] must be made from the perspective of anordinary reader of the statement. Some of the factors used tomake this determination are: (1) its truth or falsity; (2) thelanguage used; and (3) its context.” (Internal quotation marksomitted.) Scandura v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp., SuperiorCourt, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford,Docket No. CV-93-0529109-S (July 5, 1994, Hennessey, J.).“A statement can be defined as factual if it relates to anevent or state of affairs that existed in the past or presentand is capable of being known.... In a libel action, suchstatements of fact usually concern a person's conduct orcharacter.... An opinion, on the other hand, is a personalcomment about another's conduct, qualifications or characterthat has some basis in fact.” (Citations omitted; emphasisomitted.) Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc.,188 Conn. 107, 111, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982). Although “thisdistinction [between fact and opinion] may be somewhatnebulous ... [t]he important point is whether ordinary personshearing or reading the matter complained of would be likelyto understand it as an expression of the speaker's or writer'sopinion, or as a statement of existing fact.” (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Id., 111-12. “[I]f the alleged defamatorywords could not reasonably be considered defamatory inany sense, the matter becomes an issue of law for thecourt.... When such a determination is made, the words thatare claimed to be defamatory are given their natural andordinary meaning and are taken as reasonable persons wouldunderstand them.... Moreover, the words must be viewed inthe context of the entire editorial.” (Citations omitted; internalquotation marks omitted.) Dow v. New Haven Independent,Inc., 41 Conn. Supp. 31, 36, 549 A.2d 683 (1987).*8 “At common law, [t]o establish a prima facie caseof defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1)the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) thedefamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person;(3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person;and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result ofthe statement.” (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marksomitted.) Stevens v. Khalily, 220 Conn. App. 634, 642, 298A.3d 1254, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 915, 303 A.3d 260 (2023).
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7The defendant admits in his affidavit that he made thestatements to inform the public. Docket Entry 107, ExhibitA. He also swears that he made the statements based onfactual information that he observed or confirmed throughreliable sources. Furthermore, the plain language of the postsindicates that they are meant to convey statements of fact.The defendant does not use language that suggests that heis giving an opinion about the plaintiffs, rather he usesdefinitive language as if he is providing factual statements.The defendant's statements could be objectively verified.The defendant's statements contained in the Facebook postsin paragraphs 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18 of the complaint arestatements of fact.The defendant's statements were published to a third person.The defendant published his statements on his publicFacebook page. The defendant admits in his affidavit thathe made the statements to inform the public. It is clear thatthe defendant published his statements on Facebook for thepublic to see.3The plaintiff argues that statements contained in the Facebookposts are defamation per se. To fall under the category ofdefamation per se, the plaintiff must demonstrate that thedefamatory speech is either: “(1) statements that accuse aparty of a crime involving moral turpitude or to which aninfamous penalty is attached, [or] (2) statements that accusea party of improper conduct or lack of skill or integrityin his or her profession or business and the statement iscalculated to cause injury to that party in such profession orbusiness.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 646-47.Connecticut courts have clarified: “[M]oral turpitude ...[remains] a vague and imprecise term to which no hardand fast definition can be given.... A general definition ...is that moral turpitude involves an act of inherent baseness,vileness or depravity in the private and social duties whichman does to his fellowman or to society in general, contraryto the accepted rule of right and duty between man andlaw.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Silano v. Cooney,189 Conn. App. 235, 244 n.8, 207 A.3d 84 (2019). Somelibelous statements are actionable per se so long as the libel isone which charges a crime which involves moral turpitude orto which an infamous penalty is attached. Proto v. BridgeportHerald Corp., supra, 136 Conn. 566.*9 The defendant accuses the plaintiffs of committingcrimes to the statements contained in the Facebook postsin paragraphs 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18 of the complaint. Thedefendant accuses the plaintiffs of committing the fraud,theft, Medicaid and Medicare fraud, perjury, identity theft;sexual assault; impersonation; fraud; and drug trafficking.The crimes hold severe penalties. The defendant also accusesthe plaintiffs of not having the proper conduct or skillor integrity in their professions. Based on the facts andcircumstances of the relationship between the parties, it isreasonable to believe that the statements were made to causeinjury to the plaintiffs’ business.“When the defamatory words are actionable per se, thelaw conclusively presumes the existence of injury to theplaintiff's reputation”. (internal quotation marks omitted)Stevens, supra, 220 Conn. App. at 646. Thus, the plaintiffsare not required to plead or prove any special damages orreputational harm. The plaintiffs have met their burden ofdemonstrating probable cause that they will prevail on themerits on their claims of defamation.2. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional DistressIn counts two, three, six and seven, the plaintiffs setforth claims of intentional infliction of emotional distressand negligent infliction of emotional distress. A claim forintentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof:“(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress orthat he knew or should have known that emotional distresswas the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conductwas extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conductwas the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that theemotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.”Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757A.2d 1059 (2000). “Liability for intentional infliction ofemotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all boundsusually tolerated by decent society.... Liability has been foundonly where the conduct has been so outrageous in character,and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible boundsof decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterlyintolerable in a civilized community.... Conduct on the partof the defendant that is merely insulting or displays badmanners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to formthe basis for an action based upon intentional infliction ofemotional distress.” (Citations omitted; internal quotationmarks omitted.) Id., 210-11. Whether conduct is extreme andoutrageous for purposes of a claim for intentional inflictionof emotional distress is “initially a question for the court todetermine.” Id., 210.
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8To prove a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress,the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the defendant's conductcreated an unreasonable risk of causing the plaintiff emotionaldistress; (2) the plaintiff's distress was foreseeable; (3) theemotional distress was severe enough that it might result inillness or bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's conduct wasthe cause of the plaintiff's distress.” Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co.,262 Conn. 433, 444, 815 A.2d 119 (2003).The conduct of the defendant in writing the statements in theFacebook posts establishes probable cause for intentional andnegligent infliction of emotional distress. Garcia avers that thedefendant harassed her through the Facebook posts so muchso that she filed a restraining order against the defendant.Docket Entry 114, Garcia Affidavit, ¶¶ 8-12. Garcia alsoavers that the content of the statements about criminal activityare false. Id. Similarly, Hussain avers that the defendant'sstatements on Facebook were harassing and threatening,causing Hussain to file for a civil protective order. DocketEntry 114, Hussain Affidavit, ¶¶ 5-10. Hussain also avers thatthe content of the statements about criminal activity are false.Id. There is also evidence that the defendant continued topost statements after the civil protective order and restrainingorder were put in place, which reasonably can establish bothintentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Thedocuments submitted together with the allegations in thecomplaint tend to establish conduct that was intended orknown to be likely to cause severe emotional distress, thatdid cause severe emotional distress and was “extreme oroutrageous” conduct, all necessary elements of intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. See Gleason, 319 Conn. at406 n. 14.*10 The documents submitted together with the allegationsin the complaint establish that there is probable cause tobelieve that the plaintiffs will prevail on their claims fornegligent infliction of emotional distress. The statementson Facebook were negligently posted. There is probablecause that the statements would foreseeably cause emotionaldistress severe enough that it might result in illness orbodily harm or that the defendant's conduct would cause theplaintiffs’ distress.The plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstratingprobable cause that they will prevail on the merits on theirclaims of intentional infliction of emotional distress andnegligent infliction of emotional distress.3. Invasion of PrivacyIn counts four and eight, the plaintiffs set forth claims forinvasion of privacy. “To establish a false light invasion ofprivacy claim, the claimant must show that ‘the false lightin which [she] was placed would be highly offensive to areasonable person, and ... the actor had knowledge of oracted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicizedmatter and the false light in which [she] would be placed....The essence of a false light privacy claim is that the matterpublished concerning the [claimant] (1) is not true ... and (2)is such a major misrepresentation of [her] character, history,activities or beliefs that serious offense may reasonablybe expected to be taken by a reasonable [person] in [her]position.’ ” Borg v. Cloutier, 200 Conn. App. 82, 109 (2020)(citations omitted).Superior Courts have followed the Restatement commentaryin determining whether the “publicity” element of a falselight invasion of privacy claim is satisfied. Karlen v. Saleeb,Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. FSTCV 21-5025649 S (February 1, 2024, Krumeich, J.T.R.):“3 Restatement (Second) Torts, Invasion of Privacy § 652E,comment a, pp. 394-95 (1977), incorporates the discussionon the difference between publication and publicity foundin § 652D. ‘Publication’... includes any communicationby the defendant to a third person. ‘Publicity’... meansthat the matter is made public, by communicating it tothe public at large, or to so many persons that the mattermust be regarded as substantially certain to become one ofpublic knowledge. The difference is not one of the meansof communication ... It is one of a communication thatreaches, or is sure to reach, the public ... The distinction ...is one between private and public communications.’ 3Restatement (Second) Torts, Invasion of Privacy § 652D,comment a, p. 384 (1977).’ ”Accord, Pearce v. Miele, 2016 WL 785557*8 (Conn. Super.2016) (Noble, J.) (and cases collected therein).The court has already concluded that the defendant postedhis statements on Facebook in the public forum, andthe defendant does not contest this fact. Therefore, thedefendant's statements were public communications. As tothe remainder of the elements of the false light claim,the plaintiffs have submitted evidence that the statementsare not true. Likewise, as discussed above, the defendant'sstatements relate to the plaintiffs committing crimes and to
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9their professional behaviors. The plaintiffs have submittedevidence that these statements are major misrepresentationsof their characters and that a reasonable person in theirposition would be offended if they were the subject ofthese statements. The plaintiffs have met their burden ofdemonstrating probable cause that they will prevail on themerits on their claims for invasion of privacy.D. Attorney's Fees*11 The plaintiffs seek an award of attorney's fees under §52-196a (f) (2). Section 52-196a (f) (2) allows this court toaward attorney's fees if it concludes that the special motion todismiss was “frivolous and solely intended to cause delay”.The defendant addressed this issue in his reply at docket entry118.Even though this court has denied the motion to dismiss, onthis record, this court cannot find that the arguments werefrivolous and solely intended to cause delay.The motion to dismiss is denied.All CitationsNot Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2026 WL 948918Footnotes1The plaintiffs filed a request for leave to file an amended complaint and an amended complaint on November26, 2025, almost a month after the motion to dismiss was filed. See Docket Entry 110. In the amendedcomplaint, the plaintiffs sought to add address the defendant's arguments raised in the motion to dismiss byadding additional allegations. The Appellate Court has not addressed whether a complaint can be amendedwhile a special motion to dismiss is pending. See Pryor v. Brignole, 231 Conn. App. 659, 666, n.7, 333 A.3d1112 (2025). However, in Pryor, the court referred to the decision in Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC v.High Watch Recovery Center, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-23-6034689-S (February 23, 2024, Lynch, J.) for the proposition that a complaint cannot be amended while a specialmotion to dismiss is pending. While Birch Hill Recovery Center, LLC was affirmed on other grounds a monthafter Pryor was decided, this court adopts the sound reasoning set forth in the Birch Hill Recovery Center,LLC superior court's decision relative to the amended complaint. This decision only addresses the originalcomplaint filed at docket entry 100.32.2In support of his motion to dismiss, the defendant submitted copies of United States Postal Service trackingcards to the Department of Public Health, dated October 15, 2025, and October 21, 2025. The record beforethe court does not indicate what was sent to the Department of Public Health but whatever was sent wasdone during the pendency of this action and well after the defendant and the plaintiffs parted ways. Based onthe record before it, the court is not presented with a situation where the defendant petitioned the governmentfor suspected criminal activity or improper activity. See Reid v. Harriman, Superior Court, judicial district ofFairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. CV196083510S (October 28, 2019, Welch, J.).3The defendant claims that the statements contained in the Facebook posts are true, and claims truth as aspecial defense. The plaintiffs have denied all of the conduct, particularly the criminal conduct alleged by thedefendant's statements. The plaintiffs have provided sworn statements that there was no identity theft. DocketEntry 114, Affidavit of Hussain, ¶¶ 22, 23. They refute that they used a “ghost doctor” to sign documents.Docket Entry 114, Affidavit of Hussain, 19; Affidavit of Shaikh, ¶¶ 20-21. The plaintiffs provided swornstatements that they have not defrauded any federal reimbursement programs, and that any money owed tothe defendant was paid. Docket Entry 114, Affidavit of Garcia, ¶¶ 15-16; Affidavit of Hussain, ¶¶ 25, 30. Thecourt finds that there is probable cause to find that the plaintiffs would defeat the defendant's special defense.
MOHAMED HUSSAIN ET AL. v. MANSOOR QURAISHI ET AL., Not Reported in Atl.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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