poses. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 S.Ct. 473, 62 L.Ed. 968; United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 33 S.Ct. 253, 57 L.Ed. 481; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S.Ct. 421, 75 L.Ed. 926.
The defendants and their associates cannot complain of hardships heretofore imposed upon them. Not only have they paid no royalties for the use of the inventions, but they have defied the owners of the patents and are now contending that even if they are infringers, they cannot be required to pay damages since the plaintiff does not come into court with clean hands. In considering this aspect of the matter it is important to bear in mind that much of the defendants’ argument relates to the original licenses offered to the trade which were materially changed in 1948. We think that the case should be decided on the basis of the last offer, for even if the first offer was improper, the plaintiff was clearly within its rights in withdrawing and correcting it. Campbell v. Mueller, 6 Cir., 159 F.2d 803; Flexwood Co. v. Matt G. Faussner & Co., 7 Cir., 145 F.2d 528; Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., 4 Cir., 132 F.2d 947, 958.
The defendants, however, contend that even the present attitude of the plaintiff is unlawful, and hence it is deprived of the right to any relief. For this position they rely chiefly upon the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322, and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260. An examination of these cases clearly shows their irrelevancy to the present case. In the Hartford-Empire case a combination of corporations and of patents owned by them enabled the defendants to dominate the automatic manufacture of glass in this country; and the control of the patents was used to exclude other manufacturers from an opportunity to engage in the businesses and processes encompassed by new inventions. The defendants were able to allocate certain fields in glassware manufacture, to control the amount of production therein, and to maintain prices both as to the goods covered by the patents and as to other unpatented products.
The Supreme Court summarized the findings of fact of the trial court in this case in these words, 323 U.S. at page 400, 65 S.Ct. at page 381, 89 L.Ed. 322:. “The district court found that invention of glass making machinery had been discouraged, that competition in the manufacture and sale or licensing of such machinery had been suppressed, and that the system of restricted licensing had been employed to suppress competition in the manufacture of unpatented glassware and to maintain prices of the manufactured product. The findings are full and adequate and are supported by evidence, much of it contemporary writings of corporate defendants or their officers and agents.”
It was the unlawful character of these activities, which are in strong contrast with the free and independent competition existing in the hosiery industry, that led the Supreme Court to affirm the conclusion of the District Court that the leaders of the glass industry had violated the Sherman Act. The court said, 323 U.S. at pages 406-407, 65 S.Ct. at page 384:
“ ‘Rights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than other rights a universal license against positive prohibitions. The Sherman law is a limitation of rights,— rights which may be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained.’
“The difference between legitimate use and prohibited abuse of the restrictions incident to the ownership of patents by the pooling of them is discussed in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 S. Ct. 421, 75 L.Ed. 926. Application of the tests there announced sustains the District Court’s decision. It is clear that, by cooperative arrangements and binding agreements, the appellant corporations, over a period of years, regulated and suppressed competition in the use of glassmaking machinery and employed their joint patent position to allocate fields of manufacture and to maintain prices of unpatented glassware.”