The Florida Supreme Court denied Biddulph mandamus relief on the same federal claim he raises here. The existence of this state court ruling calls our subject matter jurisdiction into question under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 480-82, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1314-15, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Although no party has raised this issue, we cannot proceed without subject matter jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, based on statutory jurisdictional limitations, teaches us that federal district courts have no authority to review final judgments of state courts. The rule applies "not only to claims actually raised in the state court, but also to claims that were not raised in the state court but are ‘inextricably intertwined' with the state court’s judgment.” Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 466 (11th Cir.1996). This circuit recognizes an exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, when the plaintiff has no "reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings.” Id. at 467 (citing Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984)). That exception applies here. In Florida, mandamus is not awarded as a matter of right but at the court's discretion, Somlyo v. Schott, 45 So.2d 502, 504 (Fla.1950), and only upon a showing of a clear legal right to performance of an indisputable legal duty, State ex rel. Eichenbaum v. Cochran, 114 So.2d 797, 800 (Fla.1959). Because the Florida Supreme Court has strictly limited authority to grant a writ of mandamus to those cases where there is a clear right to performance of an indisputable legal duty, the state mandamus proceeding did not afford Bid-dulph the kind of "reasonable opportunity” to raise his federal claim that would preclude our independent review of that claim. The Florida Supreme Court's refusal to grant a writ of mandamus means only that the state court failed to find it clear and indisputable either that the state initiative system violated the First Amendment or that the state initiative process had to be altered in the manner Biddulph requested in order to comply with the First Amendment. In fact, Florida courts could probably never grant mandamus relief for such a novel (and therefore disputable) federal constitutional claim. See, e.g., Kane Homes, Inc. v. City of North Lauderdale, 418 So.2d 451, 453 n. 3 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1982) (mandamus will apply "when the law prescribes and defines [a duty] with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment”) (quoting State ex rel. Zuckerman-Vernon Corp. v. City of Miramar, 306 So.2d 173, 175 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1974), cert. denied, 320 So.2d 389 (Fla.1975)).

Biddulph argues that the state must "narrowly tailor any restrictions it imposes upon” the initiative process and "avoid unnecessary impediments.” Appellant’s Brief at 36. Biddulph further contends that Florida "may not abridge First Amendment rights without establishing compelling necessity.” Id. at 43.

Biddulph claims that in collecting the 400,000 signatures required he expended thousands of hours of effort and hundreds of thousands of dollars and that he paid the supervisors of elections more than $25,000 to verify the signatures.

See Emily Calhoun, "Initiative Petition Reforms and the First Amendment,” 66 U.Colo. L.Rev. 129 (1995) (arguing that Madison’s version of the petition right preserved direct access to government but gave representatives ultimate power to reject petitions on the theory that representatives have to exercise judgment on behalf of the common good, not factions, even if those factions constitute a majority); see also Norman B. Smith, " ‘Shall Make No Law Abridging ...': An Analysis of the Neglected, But Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition,” 54 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1153, 1154 (1986) (noting that interests served by petition right are keeping government informed of peoples’ needs and of peoples' reaction to government actions); Stephen A. Higginson, Note, "A Short Histoiy of the Right to Petition the Government For the Redress of Grievances,” 96 Yale L.J. 142, 156 (1986) (explaining that in drafting Bill of Rights, Congress defeated amendment giving people the right to instruct their representatives but in doing so expressly affirmed Congress’ duty to consider citizen communications, like petitions).

In Delgado v. Smith, 861 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918, 109 S.Ct. 3242, 106 L.Ed.2d 589 (1989), a panel of this circuit in dicta appears to have approved of a district court's statement that initiative "petitions represent the exercise of individuals of their fundamental rights to express themselves freely and to petition the government for redress of grievances....” Id. at 1498-99. This statement, quoted in passing and not necessary or even relevant to the panel's decision in the case (as discussed infra), does not constitute a holding of this court. Biddulph acknowledges that the right to propose legislation by citizen initiative is not guaranteed by the United States Constitution but is a state-created right. Thus, the sort of petitioning occurring in the citizen initiative is not guaranteed by the Petition Clause in the first place. This alone should indicate that the guarantee found in the Petition Clause is not implicated by the regulation of a citizen initiative.

Colorado argued that because the power to present amendments through voter initiative is a state-created right and not a federal right, the state could freely impose limitations on the exercise of that right. Id. at 423, 108 S.Ct. at 1893. The Court rejected this argument, however, reasoning that the power to ban initiatives entirely (and therefore, by analogy, to regulate them) does not include “the power to limit discussion of political issues raised in initiative petitions." Id.

. The Meyer Court noted that the Colorado measure at issue there burdened political speech partly by making "it less likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discussion." Id. at 422, 108 S.Ct. at 1892. Although this language out of context might suggest that strict scrutiny be applied to statutes burdening a sponsor's ability to place a measure on the ballot, Meyer, read as a whole, does not lead to that conclusion; the Court established an explicit distinction between a state's power to regulate the initiative process in general and the power to regulate the exchange of ideas about political changes sought through the process. The Court only addressed the constitutionality of the latter. See discussion supra at n. 6.

Delgado also cited Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), and Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), for the proposition that the rights of free speech and association are implicated where state statutes impose restrictions on private political activity. Neither of these cases would mandate application of strict scrutiny in this case, however. In Williams the Supreme Court struck down as violative of equal protection an Ohio statute which required any new political party seeking a position on the ballot in a presidential election to obtain petitions signed by 15% of the qualified electors who voted in the last gubernatorial election. The statute at issue in that case was flawed because it infringed both First Amendment and equal protection rights. The Court characterized the Ohio statute as a severe restriction that favored the two established political parties over new parties struggling for existence. 393 U.S. at 31, 89 S.Ct. at 10. Accordingly, the Court held that the state failed to show any compelling interest for placing such an unequal burden on minority groups where important First Amend-merit rights were at stake. Id. at 31, 89 S.Ct. at 11. In contrast, Biddulph does not allege that Florida's initiative process discriminated against or even disparately impacted a minority party or political view. In Tashjian, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that required voters to be registered members of a party in order to vote in that party's primary. The Connecticut Republican Party had declared its primary open to independent voters. The Supreme Court held that the statute burdened the Connecticut Republican Party’s right to associate with others for political ends and applied strict scrutiny. 479 U.S. at 217-29, 107 S.Ct. at 550-56. The statute at issue in Tashjian directly burdened the First Amendment rights of individuals to associate for political purposes. The regulations at issue here, in contrast, have no such direct effect on political association. The types of association and equal protection rights infringed by the statutes at issue in Williams and Tashjian are not raised by Bid-dulph's claim. Were these rights directly burdened, strict scrutiny indeed might apply.

The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to at least two other state statutes that impermis-sibly burdened speech about changes at issue in referendum elections. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,-U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (holding Ohio statute that prohibits the distribution of anonymous campaign literature unconstitutional); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (holding statute prohibiting corporations from making contributions or expenditures for the purpose of affecting referendum elections unconstitutional).

Biddulph has not requested that we weigh state interests against the voters’ burden' — the case-by-case balancing test called for by the Supreme Court in the ballot access cases. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983). That test is not appropriate here. Unlike the petitioners in Celebrezze and Takushi, Biddulph has not raised a right-to-vote or freedom-of-association claim. Additionally, this case involves an initiative’s access to the ballot, not a *1501candidate’s. This difference is material because, as noted earlier, the right to place an initiative on the ballot is a right created by the- state.

Appellant's request for oral argument is denied. Appellee's "Suggestion of Mootness,” construed as a motion to dismiss this case as moot, is denied.