Coleman v. RPF-Somers Investors, LLC, No. 25-CV-1277-JPS-JPS (Nov. 4, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Alaya Coleman v. RPF-Somers Investors, LLC, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Nov. 4, 2025
Disposition
Remanded
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3079236Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff,v.RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC, ANNENBERGINESTMENTS LTD., LV PROPERTYMANAGEMENT, MOYER PROPERTIES,LLC, DAVIAON JOHNSON, MELVIN PITT,NICOLETTE WASHINGTON, MAURICEPASQUIER, and KAYLA RIVERA, Defendants.Case No. 25-CV-1277-JPS-JPS|Filed 11/04/2025Attorneys and Law FirmsAlaya Coleman, Racine, WI, Pro Se.Eric J. Van Schyndle, Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee,WI, for Defendants RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS,LLC, ANNENBERG INESTMENTS LTD., MOYERPROPERTIES, LLC.Evan Thomsen, Matthew N. Kees, Amundsen DavisLLC, Milwaukee, WI, for Defendant LV PROPERTYMANAGEMENT.Terry W. Rose, Rose & Rose, Kenosha, WI, for DefendantMAURICE PASQUIER.ORDERJ. P. Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge1. INTRODUCTION*1 In July 2025, Plaintiff Alaya Coleman (“Coleman”),proceeding pro se, sued Defendants RPF-Somers Investors,LLC (“RPF-Somers”), Annenberg Investments Ltd.(“Annenberg”), Moyer Properties, LLC (“Moyer”) (together,“the Removing Defendants”), LV Property Management(“LV”), Daviaon Johnson (“Johnson”), Melvin Pitt, NicoletteWashington, Maurice Pasquier, and Kayla Rivera (alltogether, “Defendants”)1 for, inter alia, sexual assault,negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress,invasion of privacy, trespass, and for a civil violation ofthe Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. ECF No. 1-2. In August2025, the Removing Defendants removed this action to theEastern District of Wisconsin, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.ECF No. 1.There are multiple pending motions in this case, which wasrecently assigned to this branch of the Court for furtherdisposition. See Oct. 10, 2025 docket entry. The RemovingDefendants moved to dismiss Coleman's complaint. ECF No.2. LV separately moved to dismiss Coleman's complaint. ECFNo. 4. Coleman has not responded to either motion, but shehas filed several additional motions. Specifically, Colemanhas filed a motion to remand this case to state court, ECF No.6, which is fully briefed by the parties who have appeared thusfar (Removing Defendants and LV), ECF Nos. 13, 21, 23; fordefault judgment as to Johnson, ECF No. 28; and for leave tofile an amended complaint, ECF No. 31. For the reasons statedherein, the Court will deny all the pending motions in thiscase and order Coleman to amend her complaint to complywith Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 or face dismissal ofthis case.2. MOTION TO REMANDIt is a “well-known rule that removal is proper over any actionthat could have been filed originally in federal court.” Tylka v.Gerber Prods. Co., 211 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing28 U.S.C. § 1441 and Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp.,405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972)). District courts must construe theremoval statute narrowly, however, and resolve any doubtsregarding subject matter jurisdiction in favor of remand. Ests.of Briney ex rel. Clay v. Mr. Heater Corp., 602 F. Supp. 2d997, 1001 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (citing Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc.,985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993) and Illinois v. Kerr-McGeeChem. Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 576 (7th Cir. 1982)).Coleman moves to remand this case back to the Circuit Courtof Kenosha County, Wisconsin where it was originally filed.2ECF No. 6. In support, Coleman argues that the removal was“both jurisdictionally defective and procedurally improper.”Id. at 1. The Court will address each argument in turn.2.1 Jurisdictional Requirements for Removal*2 Coleman argues that the Court lacks subject matterjurisdiction because “[n]o federal question appears on the faceof the [c]omplaint, and complete diversity of citizenship isabsent.” Id. at 2. The Removing Defendants removed thiscase pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that removal
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2was proper because Coleman “alleged that [Defendants] haveviolated” 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and therefore the Court has federalquestion jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ECF No.1 at 2. They further asserted that the Court has supplementaljurisdiction over the remaining state law claims pursuant to28 U.S.C. § 1367 because they “form part of the same case orcontroversy [as Coleman's federal claim] under Article III ofthe United States Constitution.” Id. at 2–3.Coleman first argues that federal question jurisdiction islacking because the “gravamen of this action is local andgrounded in Wisconsin law: premises-liability standards,landlord duties to tenants, and nuisance enforcement ata Kenosha property.” ECF No. 6 at 20. The RemovingDefendants do not address this argument in their brief, insteadstating only that Coleman's pleading of a federal cause ofaction—namely, her civil RICO claim—“is [alone] sufficientto [establish] original jurisdiction [to the] Court,” makingremoval proper. ECF No. 13 at 3–4 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1441(c)). They assert that “[b]ecause a federal question isplainly presented on the face of [Coleman's] complaint,[Coleman does] not show that federal-question jurisdiction islacking or that removal was unauthorized.” Id. at 4 (quotingPatterson v. Evers, No. 25-CV-41-WMC, 2025 WL 2105652,at *3 (W.D. Wis. July 28, 2025)).Coleman is correct that a plaintiff is “master of the[c]omplaint,” ECF No. 6 at 21, which is a phrase that refers tothe “well-pleaded complaint rule” that “provides that federaljurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presentedon the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint” andallows a plaintiff to “avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusivereliance on state law.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.386, 392 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S.109, 112–13 (1936)) (footnote omitted). But here, Plaintiffdid not exclusively rely on state law but rather includeda federal claim in her operative complaint (the amendedcomplaint from Kenosha County Circuit Court which wasremoved). She provides no support for the notion that removalis improper merely because most of the claims are based instate law. In her reply, Coleman asserts that the “inclusion of[the RICO claim] in the amended complaint does not convertthe action into a federal case.” ECF No. 21 at 2. In support sherelies on a Supreme Court case that is inapposite—MerrellDow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). Id.at 2–3 (stating that the Supreme Court held that “the merepresence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does notautomatically confer federal-question jurisdiction” (quoting478 U.S. at 813). In Merrell Dow, however, the Courtexpressly noted that the parties agreed that the complaint did“not allege that federal law create[d] any of the causes ofaction [it] asserted.” 478 U.S. at 811 (footnote omitted). Incontrast, Coleman's complaint does state a cause of actionexpressly created by federal law—namely, her civil RICOclaim. The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff's argument on thispoint.Coleman next argues that the Court exercising supplementaljurisdiction over state-law claims is not appropriate in thiscase because state issues “ ‘substantially predominate’ overany federal count in terms of proof, scope, and remedy.” ECFNo. 6 at 20 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)). Defendantsassert that supplemental jurisdiction is proper here becausethe “state-law and federal-law claims are based on thesame nucleus of facts” and that the claims are “inextricablyrelated.” ECF No. 13 at 5–6 (citing Oney v. Assured RecoveryLLC, No. 19-C-680, 2019 WL 3346754, at *3 (E.D. Wis. July25, 2019); and Fowler v. Evansville Convention & VisitorsBur., No. 3:10-CV-104-RGY-WGH, 2010 WL 4291298, at*4 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2010); and quoting Angelopoulos v.Keystone Orthopedic Specs., S.C., No. 12-CV-05836, 2014WL 292578, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2014)).*3 The Court agrees with Defendants here, because thestate law claims and the civil RICO claim “involve thesame witnesses, physical locations, [and] incidents.” Id. at7. Indeed, Plaintiff brings the civil RICO claim against allDefendants and the claim incorporates all the prior paragraphsof the complaint, which include the various allegationssurrounding purported violations of Wisconsin law. ECF No.1-2 at 195. The Court therefore rejects Coleman's argumentthat its exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state lawclaims would be improper in this case.Coleman lastly asserts that, even if the Court has federaljurisdiction over the civil RICO claim, “the negligenceand premises-liability claims are ‘separate and independent’under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(2) and must be severed andremanded.” ECF No. 6 at 20. Defendants argue that severanceis improper here because “[c]ourts in this District exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims where theyclosely relate to RICO claims,” which is the case here. ECFNo. 13 at 5 (citing Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'lBank of Sheboygan, 803 F. Supp. 1486, 1509 (E.D. Wis.1992)).The Court has already held that the state law claimsinvolve the same core facts as the civil RICO claim.
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Nevertheless, even where supplemental jurisdiction is proper,a court may decline to exercise it if “(1) the claim raisesa novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claimsubstantially predominates over the claim or claims overwhich the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) thedistrict court has dismissed all claims over which it hasoriginal jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances,there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Coleman appears to raise only thesecond ground in her motion to remand, and grounds one,three, and four do not apply here in any instance. The Court isnot persuaded that Coleman's state law claims “substantiallypredominate[ ]” over her civil RICO claim because it seemslikely that “presentation of the original and supplementalclaims will [likely] overlap substantially at trial,” whichsuggests that supplemental jurisdiction will “realize economyand efficiency” in this case. Oney, 2019 WL 3346754, at*3 (quoting 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHURR. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §3567.3 (3d ed. 2008); Bartoli v. Applebee's Rest., No. 00 C5954, 2001 WL 40798, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17 2001); andWagner v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 12-744-GPM, 2012 WL6586347, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2012)). Because Colemanwill need to rely on her state law claims to establish elementsof her civil RICO claim, the Court finds that substantialoverlap exists and therefore that severing the state law claimswould be improper in this instance.2.2 Procedural Requirements for RemovalWhen removing a case from state court under § 1441(a),as the Removing Defendants have done here, 28 U.S.C. §1446(b)(2)(A) requires that “all defendants who have beenproperly joined and served must join in or consent to theremoval of the action.” “A ‘defect in the removal procedure’normally requires remanding a case that has been removedunder section 1446(a).” Walton v. Bayer Corp., 643 F.3d 994,998 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and quoting Inre Continental Cas. Co., 29 F.3d 292, 293–94 (7th Cir. 1994)).Coleman argues that the removal of this case was improperbecause the notice of removal “suffers from untimely andinvalid consents, violation of the ‘rule of unanimity,’ andother statutory errors.” ECF No. 6 at 2. She goes on to explainthat the Removing Defendants “did not secure unanimouswritten consent from all properly served parties, relied onsecond-hand or attorney assurances rather than docketedconsents, attempted to include the consent of an unserveddefendant, and misstated the identity and citizenship of aforum defendant.” Id. at 4. Because Johnson was served butdid not provide consent to the removal and because LV wasserved but did not file a formal notice of consent to theremoval on the record, Coleman argues the notice of removalis defective and the case must be remanded. Id. at 5–7; 10–13.*4 First, with respect to LV having been served but notfiling a formal notice of consent to removal on the state courtdocket, the Removing Defendants respond that Colemanrelies on inapplicable caselaw to support her position,specifying that she cites dicta that is not supported by theconclusion, hallucinates nonexistent quotes from cases, andfails to account for more recent changes to the removal statutethat undermine her point. ECF No. 13 at 8–9. The Courtagrees. This case is similar to Jenson v. Lowe's Home Centers,LLC, where the plaintiff objected to removal because notall properly served defendants had filed a written consent toremoval. No. 1:22-cv-01100-JRS-MPB, 2022 WL 4462425(S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2022). Instead, the removing party statedthat it had conferred with the other served parties and had“been advised that they consent[ed] to the removal of th[e]action.” Id. at *1. The Southern District of Indiana found thatremoval was proper there because the 2011 amendment tothe removal statute allowed for removal when all properlyjoined defendants either joined in or consented to removalof the action. Id. at *1–2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A)).The court also noted that the party who had not filed noticeof consent to removal “made a general appearance [in thefederal case] and filed an answer,” which showed “consentto th[e] [c]ourt's jurisdiction.” Id. at *2. That same party alsofiled a verified consent to removal on the record after theplaintiff moved to remand. Id. at *1. These facts, accordingto the Southern District of Indiana court, dispelled “[a]nylingering doubts” about the parties’ consent to removal. Id.at *2. This case is nearly identical to Jenson—in its notice ofremoval, the Removing Defendants asserted that LV's counselhad consented to removing the case, ECF No. 1 at 3 andECF No. 1-6 at 2, LV appeared before this Court and fileda responsive pleading, ECF No. 4, and LV's counsel filed adeclaration confirming that LV had consented to the removalof this case “at the time it was removed.” ECF No. 14 at 2.The Court finds that these facts, taken together, demonstratethat the notice of removal complied with the requirements of28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).Coleman also argues that Johnson's consent to removal wasrequired because he was properly served. ECF No. 6 at 5–7,10–11. Coleman alleges that Johnson was personally served.Id. at 10. The Removing Defendants respond that Johnson
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4was not properly served, so his consent was not required. ECFNo. 13 at 13–14.Wisconsin requires a plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligenceat personal service in the first instance. WIS. STAT. §801.11(1)(a). Only if that is not successful may a plaintiffattempt to serve a defendant by leaving the summons atthe defendant's usual place of abode with a competent adultor member of the defendant's family who is informed ofthe summons’ contents. Id. § 801.11(1)(b). Only when aplaintiff's reasonable diligence under both methods fails mayit then serve a defendant via publication and mailing. WIS.STAT. § 801.11(1)(c). While “[r]easonable diligence does notrequire ‘all possible diligence which may be conceived,’ ... itdoes require a plaintiff to ‘exhaust ... any leads or informationreasonably calculated to make personal service possible.’ ”Wis. Laborers Health Fund v. Sup. Sewer & Water, Inc., No.21-CV-193-JDP, 2021 WL 6333911, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 7,2021) (first quoting Haselow v. Gauthier, 569 N.W.2d 97, 101(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) then quoting Cunningham v. Montes,No. 16-cv-761-jdp, 2018 WL 2390118, at *2 (W.D. Wis. May25, 2018) and then citing West v. West, 262 N.W.2d 87, 89(Wis. 1978)).As the Removing Defendants point out, service on Johnson isplainly deficient here because nothing suggests that Plaintiffexercised reasonable diligence by first attempting personalservice on Johnson. ECF No. 13 at 13 (citing The Goat LLC v.Adv. Wholesale, LLC, 349 F.R.D. 318, 329 (E.D. Wis. 2025)).Even if the process server's affidavit of service on Johnson'smother, ECF No. 6-1 at 17, could constitute an attempt topersonally serve Johnson,3 one single attempt at personalservice is inadequate to establish reasonable diligence underWisconsin law. See The Goat LLC, 349 F.R.D. at 329. Further,the record suggests that the service of Johnson's mother wasdeficient even as a method of substitute service because itdid not occur at Johnson's “usual place of abode” as requiredby Wisconsin Statutes § 801.11(1)(b). Compare ECF No. 6-1(demonstrating that Johnson's mother was served at 38436 N.Spitz Dr., Beach Park, Illinois 60099) with ECF No. 1-2 at 9(alleging that Johnson's last known address is 2382 Spitz Dr.,Beach Park, Illinois 60099). Accordingly, because Plaintiffhas failed to properly serve Johnson, his consent to removalwas not required. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).*5 Coleman also argues that RFP-Sommers’ citizenshipof Wisconsin bars removal. ECF No. 6 at 8–10 (citing 28U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1)). In doing so she mistakenly assumes thatthe case was removed based on diversity citizenship, but itwas removed instead based on federal question jurisdiction,see supra Section 2.1, so the citizenship of the parties isirrelevant. See Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 747 F.Supp. 1281, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (noting that, if federalquestion jurisdiction applies, “diversity of citizenship iswholly irrelevant”).Coleman also argues that the notice of removal is procedurallydefective because it fails to attach an exhibit packet andwitness list. ECF No. 6 at 15–16. Coleman does not provideany authority to suggest that failure to include these types ofadditional submissions in the notice of removal forms a defectin the removal procedure such that remand is required under28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). See generally id. The Court does not seehow she could, as “a totally inconsequential defect in removalpapers [does not] deprive the district court of jurisdiction overa case removed to it.” Walton, 643 F.3d at 999 (citing Riehlv. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 1967);Cook v. Randolph County, 573 F.3d 1143, 1149–50 (11th Cir.2009); and 14C CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3733, pp. 635–41 (4thed. 2009)). In Walton, the Seventh Circuit held that failureto include in the removal papers “the summonses that theplaintiff had served on them in the state court” was such a“totally inconsequential defect.” Id. at 998–99. The Courtviews the absence of an exhibit packet and witness list assimilarly “inconsequential.”Coleman lastly argues that removal was procedurallydefective in this case because she was not properly servedwith the removal paperwork and no certificate of service wastimely filed on the record in this forum. ECF No. 6 at 16–19.Coleman misreads the removal statute, however, which doesnot require that a removing defendant serve an adverse partywith notice of removal, but merely that it “give written noticethereof to [the] adverse part[y] and ... file a copy of the noticewith the clerk of [the] State court” where the case was filed. 28U.S.C. § 1446(d) (emphasis added). Coleman acknowledgesthat she received written notice of removal on August 28,2025 and August 29, 2025.4 See ECF No. 6 at 16–17. TheRemoving Defendants also properly filed a notice of removalin the state court. Alaya Coleman v. Dablessin Wilson, etal., No. 2025CV000739 (Kenosha Cnty. Cir. Ct. 2025),available at https://wcca.wicourts.gov/caseDetail.html?caseNo=2025CV000739&county No=30 (last visited Nov.4, 2025), Aug. 25, 2025 docket entry. Defendants have,accordingly, complied with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1446(d).
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5For all these reasons, Coleman's motion to remand, ECF No.6, will be denied in full.3. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENTOn October 9, 2025, Coleman requested entry of default asto Johnson, asserting that he was “properly served” on orabout July 22, 2025. ECF No. 27. The Clerk of Court has notentered default, but Coleman nevertheless moved the sameday for default judgment as to Johnson. ECF No. 28 (citingFED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2)). The Court will deny Coleman'smotion because Johnson was never properly served, see supraSection 2.2, therefore he cannot be faulted for his failure toappear. Silva v. City of Madison, 69 F.3d 1368, 1376 (7thCir. 1995) (“[A] responsive pleading is required only afterservice has been effected and the party has been made subjectto the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” (citing FED. R. CIV.P. 12(a)(1)(A); Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff &Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987); and Mid-Continent WoodProds., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1991)));United States v. Kramer, 225 F.3d 847, 857 (7th Cir. 2000)(noting that a default judgment is void if a party has notbeen properly served and the court therefore has no personaljurisdiction over that party); Cardenas v. City of Chicago,646 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The plaintiff bears theburden to demonstrate that the district court has jurisdictionover each defendant through effective service.” (citing Homerv. Jones-Bey, 415 F.3d 748, 754 (7th Cir. 2005))).4. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDEDCOMPLAINT*6 Coleman moves the Court for leave to file an amendedcomplaint, attaching her anticipated amended complaint tothe motion.5 ECF Nos. 31 and 31-1. The Court will denyColeman's motion because her anticipated second amendedcomplaint, ECF No. 31-1, fails to comply with Federal Ruleof Civil Procedure 8. Further, because the operative complaintin this case, ECF No. 1-2, also fails to comply with Rule 8, theCourt will order Plaintiff to amend her complaint to resolvethis deficiency.To state a claim, a complaint must provide “a short and plainstatement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled torelief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(d)(1) requires that“each allegation ... be simple, concise, and direct.” This rule“requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, sothat judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a goldcoin from a bucket of mud.” United States ex rel. Garst v.Lockheed-Martin Corp., 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).Neither Coleman's operative complaint nor her proposedamended complaint comply with Rule 8’s requirement thatcomplaint provide a “short and plain statement of theclaim[s]” nor that the allegations be “simple, concise, anddirect.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) and (d)(1). The operativecomplaint in this matter is 243 pages long. See ECF No. 1-2.Coleman's proposed second amended complaint is 411 pages,excluding attachments. See ECF No. 31-1. Both complaintsare far too long for Rule 8’s requirement. Garst, 328 F.3dat 378 (“Length may make a complaint unintelligible, byscattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies thefew allegations that matter.”); see id. at 378–79 (affirmingdismissal of a 155-page complaint with 99 attachments forfailure to comply with Rule 8); Belk v. Watson, No. 21-cv-142-DWD, 2022 WL 22919763, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2022)(“Plaintiff's 255-page complaint is anything but short andplain.”); Benson v. Tucker, No. 1:25-CV-300-TLS-JEM, 2025WL 2773377, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding thatthe plaintiff's 132-page complaint did not comply with Rule8). The Court will accordingly order that Coleman file asecond amended complaint that is no more than twenty-five(25) pages long. Coleman must file this amended complainton or before December 4, 2025. Failure to timely file asecond amended complaint that complies with this lengthrequirement will result in the Court dismissing her casewithout further notice.5. MOTIONS TO DISMISSThe Removing Defendants and LV separately move todismiss the operative complaint for failure to state a claim.ECF Nos. 2 and 4. Because the Court is permitting Colemanto amend her complaint to comply with Rule 8, it willdeny the pending motions to dismiss without prejudice. TheCourt further notes that it is contemporaneously filing itsComprehensive Protocols and Procedures Order with thisOrder, which contains specific rules that parties must followto file a compliant Rule 12 motion before this branch of theCourt. Accordingly, should any defendant elect to file anotherRule 12 motion in the future, it should take care to complywith the requirements of that order.6. CONCLUSION*7 For the reasons discussed herein, the Court will denyColeman's motion to remand this case. ECF No. 6. It willfurther deny Coleman's motion for default judgment as toJohnson, ECF No. 28, and her motion for leave to file anamended complaint, ECF No. 31. The Court will deny as
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6moot Coleman's motion to add Marteze Little as a Defendant,ECF No. 30, and it will deny without prejudice the RemovingDefendants’ and LV's motions to dismiss, ECF Nos. 2 and 4.The Court will further order Coleman to file a secondamended complaint that is no more than twenty-five (25)pages long. The Court is enclosing a copy of its amendedcomplaint form and instructions. Coleman must file thissecond amended complaint on or before December 4,2025. Her second amended complaint must bear the docketnumber assigned to this case and must be labeled “SecondAmended Complaint.” Plaintiff's second amended complaintshould accurately state what occurred and when, and it mustprovide the Court and Defendant(s) with notice of what anydefendants allegedly did or did not do to violate Coleman'srights. Any such amended complaint must be complete inand of itself without reference to any prior version of thecomplaint. Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch.Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1057 (7th Cir. 1998) (citingWellness Cmty.-Nat'l v. Wellness House, 70 F.3d 46, 49 (7thCir. 1995)). In the case of amendment, the “prior pleading is ineffect withdrawn as to all matters not restated in the amendedpleading.” Id. (quoting Fuhrer v. Fuhrer, 292 F.2d 140, 144(7th Cir. 1961)). Failure to timely file a second amendedcomplaint that complies with the Court's twenty-five (25)-page length requirement will result in the Court dismissingColeman's case without further notice.Accordingly,IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Alaya Coleman's motion toremand, ECF No. 6, be and the same is hereby DENIED;IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff AlayaColeman's motion for default judgment as to DaviaonJohnson, ECF No. 28, be and the same is hereby DENIED;IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff AlayaColeman's motion for leave to file an amended complaint,ECF No. 31, be and the same is hereby DENIED insofar asit seeks to file the anticipated amended complaint attached asECF No. 31-1;IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff AlayaColeman's motion to add Marteze Little as a Defendant, ECFNo. 30, be and the same is hereby DENIED as moot;IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants AnnenbergInvestments, Ltd., Moyer Properties, LLC, and RPF-SomersInvestors, LLC's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 2, be and thesame is hereby DENIED without prejudice;IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant LV PropertyManagement's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 4, be and the sameis hereby DENIED without prejudice;IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Alaya Coleman,on or before December 4, 2025, shall FILE a secondamended complaint in accordance with the instructionsprovided herein. Failure to timely do so will result in dismissalof this case; andIT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk's Office mailPlaintiff Alaya Coleman a blank non-prisoner amendedcomplaint form and a copy of the guide entitled “Answers toPro Se Litigants’ Common Questions,” along with this Order.Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 4th day of November,2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3079236Footnotes1Coleman also originally named Dablessin Wilson as a defendant in this case, see ECF No. 1-2, but hassince voluntarily dismissed that party without prejudice, see ECF No. 34. Dablessin Wilson has thus beenterminated from the docket, see Oct. 20, 2025 docket entry, and is omitted from the case caption.2Coleman also seeks to recover her out-of-pocket costs and expenses in objecting to removal. ECF No. 6 at26–27 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). While it is true that “[a]n order remanding the case may require paymentof just costs and actual expenses,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447, it would be improper to award Coleman her expenses
ALAYA COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. RPF-SOMERS INVESTORS, LLC,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7in objecting to what the Court has determined was a proper notice of removal, see infra Sections 2.1 and 2.2.The Court will accordingly deny Coleman's motion request for costs.3The Court is not convinced of this, as the affidavit itself notes that the manner of service was “SubstituteService” rather than “Personal Service.” See ECF No. 6-1 at 17. Moreover, the language of WisconsinStatutes § 801.11(1)(a)–(b) demonstrates that substitute service is appropriate only after reasonablediligence at personal service has been completed.4The Removing Defendants properly effectuated service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(C), whichpermits serving a notice to a party by “mailing it to the person's last known address.” The Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure apply to a civil action after it is removed from state court. FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(1).5Coleman also moves the Court for leave to add an additional defendant, Marteze Little, to her complaint. ECFNo. 30. This motion is now moot, however, because Coleman has since filed notice of voluntary dismissal forMarteze Little. See ECF No. 34. The Court will accordingly deny as moot Coleman's motion to add MartezeLittle as a Defendant.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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