¶¶ 26-28. Daisley interviewed with Riggs executives, including Lex, and Hoffman, and the bank’s then-Chief Executive Officer, in April 1999. Id. ¶ 81. After this visit, and the signing of the formal legal agreement between Treasury and Riggs for the development and management of CA$HLINK II in early May 1999, id. ¶ 35, Riggs presented Daisley with an offer letter “setting forth some, but not all, of the components of the verbal offers and commitments” Daisley had previously received from Lex and Hoffman. Id. ¶ 36. Daisley signed the offer letter, but “with the understanding that his term of employment was for a minimum of six years” and that he would receive the ‘enhanced compensation package’ he had previously discussed with Lex and Hoffman, id. ¶37. He began work at Riggs on May 24, 1999, as Senior Vice President and President of Riggs Enterprise Solutions. Id. ¶ 39. Lex resigned from Riggs that same day, replaced as Chief Operating Officer by Robert Roane. Id. ¶ 40.
Daisley’s new position placed him in regular contact with Treasury employees, including Jack McGuire of the FMS division, as Riggs began implementing CA$HLINK II. Id. ¶ 41, 200. In the third quarter of 1999, Treasury issued its first change request. Id. ¶41. Daisley expressed concern that the change would force Riggs to bear higher costs than originally called for in its agreement with Treasury. Id. ¶ 44. He therefore negotiated on behalf of Riggs for Treasury to absorb an additional $9,834,420 for the change request. Id. During and after these discussions, the relationship between Riggs and Treasury became strained, “primarily because Defendant Treasury did not want to pay more money to Defendant Riggs for CA$HLINK II Change Requests, even though these changes had been initiated by Defendant Treasury.” Id. ¶ 46.
Treasury issued no fewer than twelve additional change requests for CA$HLINK II during the rest of Daisley’s tenure with Riggs. Id. ¶¶ 69, 81-82, 89-90, 103. Upon each of these change requests, the relationship between Treasury and Riggs became increasingly antagonistic because of Treasury’s resistance to paying for the related cost overruns. Id. ¶¶ 75, 93, 106. McGuire, for instance, told Daisley that “other banks worked for Treasury for free” and that he “did not understand why Riggs Bank would not do the same.” Id. ¶ 113.
Daisley, however, successfully negotiated for Treasury to pay additional money for ten of the change requests. Id. ¶¶ 69, 81-82, 89-90. As a “direct result of [Dais-ley’s] negotiations,” Treasury’s total costs for CA$HLINK II increased nearly $14,000,000 over its original commitment to Riggs. Id. ¶ 109. Daisley thus became the “proverbial ‘thorn in the side’ of Defendant Treasury” because he “resisted numerous efforts” by his Treasury counterparts to have Riggs bear costs for which Treasury had failed to budget. Id. ¶ 134.
Roane, on the other hand, took a more “conciliatory” approach towards Treasury. Id. ¶ 109. Because he had difficulty understanding the technical aspects of CA$HLINK II, Treasury staff easily “outmaneuvered” him, id. ¶¶ 52, 71, 110, and he acceded to Treasury’s requests, even when the department refused to pay for its own change orders. Id. ¶¶ 103, 106, 108. Roane’s approach established a “precedent” that Treasury personnel should try to “work around” Daisley in order to “achieve Defendant Treasury’s aims.” Id. ¶ 71.
Roane also came to resent both Dais-ley’s technical expertise, id. ¶ 145-46, and his financial compensation from Riggs. Id. ¶ 71. As a result, Roane began to undermine Daisley’s position with Trea