Ebem v. Bondi, No. 1:24-CV-148-H-BU (Sept. 15, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Ezenwa Ebem v. Bondi et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Sept. 15, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
Magistrate (J.) (unanimous Court)
EUGENE EZENWA EBEM, Plaintiff, v. PAMELA BONDI, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2642207Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Abilene Division.EUGENE EZENWA EBEM, Plaintiff,v.PAMELA BONDI, et al., Defendants.No. 1:24-CV-148-H-BU|Filed 09/15/2025ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THEMAGISTRATE JUDGE AND OVERRULINGTHE PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONSJAMES WESLEY HENDRIX UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 Before the Court are the Findings, Conclusions, andRecommendations (FCR) of United States Magistrate JudgeJohn R. Parker (Dkt. No. 41) and Ebem's objections (Dkt.No. 42). Judge Parker recommends granting the defendants'motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 31), denying Ebem's motion tosupplement (Dkt. No. 18), and denying all pending motions asmoot. Dkt. No. 41. Ebem timely filed objections to the FCR.Dkt. No. 42.The Court overrules Ebem's objections and adopts the FCRin full. Ebem fails to demonstrate that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his Administrative Procedure Act(APA) and Mandamus Act claims. Further, Ebem fails toadequately plead a Fifth Amendment Due Process claimbecause he has not identified a cognizable liberty or propertyinterest to support his claim.1. Factual and Procedural BackgroundA. Factual BackgroundIn evaluating the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Courtaccepts as true the relevant facts alleged in Ebem's complaint,as it must at this procedural stage. See Richardson v. AxionLogistics, LLC, 780 F.3d 304, 306 (5th Cir. 2015). EugeneEzenwa Ebem is a citizen of Nigeria. Dkt. No. 1 at 12–13, 26.Ebem married Dymonique Renee Hootsell, a United Statescitizen, in Richardson, Texas in March 2016. Id. at 11–13.On February 3, 2021—five years later—Ebem filed an I-485application to adjust his immigration status with the UnitedStates Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Id. at6. Successful completion of this process allows the applicantto obtain lawful permanent resident status and obtain their“Green Card.” On the same day, Hootsell filed an I-130Petition for Alien Relative, which establishes the requisiterelationship for Green-Card eligibility. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 2.In February 2024, while his application was still pending,Ebem was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement(ICE) custody and detained at the Bluebonnet DetentionCenter in Anson, Texas. Id. at 4. While there, Ebem broughtthis suit. See Dkt. No. 1. ICE released him from custody aftereight months, but his removal proceedings remained pending—albeit stayed—before the Executive Office for ImmigrationReview (EOIR). See Dkt. Nos. 9; 33. USCIS issued a Noticeof Administrative Closure for Ebem's I-485 application inOctober 2024, explaining that because Ebem was “in aremoval proceeding” and “not an ‘arriving alien,’ only EOIRhas jurisdiction” over his I-485 application. Dkt. No. 18-6 at46.During an interview with USCIS in October 2024, Ebem'swife became frustrated, told the USCIS official “I am done,”and terminated the interview. Dkt. Nos. 18-1 at 4; 33-7at 1. USCIS understood this as a withdrawal of her I-130petition and subsequently terminated the petition. See id.Consequently, the following month, USCIS denied Ebem'sI-485 application based on the withdrawal of the I-130petition. Dkt. No. 33-7 at 1. Soon after, USCIS determinedthat it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the application dueto the pending removal proceedings. Id. Further adding toEbem's frustration, USCIS reopened his I-485 application thefollowing February, only to close it once again for lack ofjurisdiction. See id.B. Procedural Background*2 Ebem filed this action to compel the adjudication of hisI-485 application in September 2024, when his applicationhad been pending with USCIS for over 43 months. Dkt.No. 1-2 at 2. At the time, Ebem was in ICE custody atthe Bluebonnet Detention Center in Anson, Texas, wherehe was being held in connection with pending removalproceedings with the EOIR. Id. Ebem's original complaintraised two claims. His first claim arose under the APA andthe Mandamus Act, alleging that the defendants' failure toadjudicate his I-485 application constituted an “unreasonablefailure to act, in violation of the [APA].” Id. at 5. His
EUGENE EZENWA EBEM, Plaintiff, v. PAMELA BONDI, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2second claim alleged a Fifth Amendment Due Processviolation, due to the “[d]efendants' refusal to adjudicate theapplication ... before a final administrative decision” in hisremoval proceedings. Id.Judge Parker liberally construed Ebem's Motion in Supportof Existing Mandamus Application (Dkt. No. 18) as a motionto supplement his original complaint and bring a new claimrelating to USCIS's adjudication of his wife's I-130 petition.Dkt. No. 41 at 4, 11–13. In addition to this motion, Ebem hasfiled—among other things—a motion for a protective order(Dkt. No. 14), a motion for a preliminary injunction (Dkt. No.15), a motion to expedite proceedings (Dkt. No. 16), a motionfor sanctions (Dkt. No. 17), a motion to expedite (Dkt. No.26), and a motion for entry of default (Dkt. No. 27).The defendants moved to dismiss. Dkt. No. 31. Ebemresponded the next day (Dkt. No. 33), and the defendantsreplied (Dkt. No. 35). Judge Parker entered an FCRrecommending that the Court grant the defendants' motionto dismiss because: (1) the Court lacks subject-matterjurisdiction over Ebem's APA and Mandamus Act claims; and(2) Ebem failed to plead a valid due-process claim against thedefendants. Dkt. No. 41 at 13. The FCR also recommendeddenying as futile Ebem's motion to supplement his claimsand denying as moot all other pending motions. Id. Ebemtimely filed nine objections to the FCR (Dkt. No. 42), and thedefendants responded (Dkt. No. 43). Ebem then filed a motionto join his wife as a coplaintiff to this action (Dkt. No. 44) anda reply1 (Dkt. No. 45).2. Legal StandardsA. Review of the Magistrate Judge'sRecommendationsA party who seeks to object to any part of a magistratejudge's FCR must file specific written objections within 14days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). When a party timely objects,a magistrate judge's FCR regarding a dispositive matter isreviewed de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The districtcourt may then accept, reject, or modify the recommendationsor findings in whole or in part. See id. Objections to theFCR must be “specific,” such that they “put the districtcourt on notice of the urged error.” Williams v. K&B Equip.Co., 724 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 1984). “[A]n objectionmust identify the specific finding or recommendation towhich objection is made, state the basis for the objection,and specify the place in the magistrate judge's report andrecommendation where the disputed determination is found.”Thompson v. Bumpas, No. 4:22-CV-640, 2022 WL 17585271,at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2022) (citing United States v.Mathis, 458 F. Supp. 3d 559, 564 (E.D. Tex.), rep. & rec.adopted, 458 F. Supp. 3d 559 (E.D. Tex. 2020)). The districtcourt need not consider “frivolous, conclusive or generalobjections.” Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). Likewise, a mere disagreementwith a recommendation or summary of previously presentedarguments cannot trigger de novo review and is thus reviewedfor plain error. Leslie G. v. Kijakazi, No. 5:21-CV-202,2023 WL 2536111, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2023) (citingHernandez v. United States, No. PE:11-CR-442-RAJ(I), 2016WL 6998387, at *16 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2016)).B. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1)*3 A party may challenge a court's subject-matterjurisdiction with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. Fed.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). When considering such a motion, “thecourt may find a plausible set of facts by considering anyof the following: ‘(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaintsupplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in therecord; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputedfacts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.’ ” Lanev. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotingBarrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5thCir. 1996)). The plaintiff, as the party asserting jurisdiction,“constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction doesin fact exist.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161(5th Cir. 2001). Thus, at the pleading stage, the plaintiffmust “allege a plausible set of facts establishing jurisdiction.”Physician Hosps. of Am. v. Sebelius, 691 F.3d 649, 652 (5thCir. 2012).C. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)“To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaintmust contain sufficient factual matter which, when taken astrue, states ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ”Innova Hosp. San Antonio, Ltd. P'ship v. Blue Cross & BlueShield of Ga., Inc., 892 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotingBell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In otherwords, the plaintiff must plead facts “that allow[ ] the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable forthe misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678(2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probabilityrequirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibilitythat a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly,550 U.S. at 556). If a complaint pleads facts that are “
EUGENE EZENWA EBEM, Plaintiff, v. PAMELA BONDI, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops shortof the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlementto relief.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 557).In resolving a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept allwell-pleaded facts as true and view those facts in the lightmost favorable to the plaintiff.” Richardson, 780 F.3d at 304–05 (quoting Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.,614 F.3d 145, 146 (5th Cir. 2010)). But a court should not“accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factualinferences, or legal conclusions.” Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc.,407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). “Threadbare recitals of theelements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusorystatements, do not suffice” for purposes of stating a plausibleclaim to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “When there arewell-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume theirveracity and then determine whether they plausibly give riseto an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.3. AnalysisThe Court has examined the record and reviewed theunobjected-to portions of the FCR for plain error. Serrano v.Customs & Border Patrol, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 975F.3d 488, 502 (5th Cir. 2020). Finding no plain error, the Courtaccepts and adopts these portions of the FCR.Ebem timely filed nine objections to the FCR. See Dkt. No. 42at 2, 12–31. He first objects to Judge Parker's purported failureto address a non-existent “Clerk's Entry of Default.” Id. at12–14. Second, Ebem objects to the FCR's “[d]isregard of theImmigration Judge's” allegedly “[b]inding APA [f]indings”and takes issue with Judge Parker's characterization of thestatus of the I-130 petition. Id. at 14–16. Ebem's thirdobjection complains of “[f]actual [e]rrors in the FCR” andrestates his grievances with USCIS regarding the I-130petition. Id. at 16–18. Objection four reasserts Ebem'sAPA arguments previously considered by Judge Parker andattempts to add a new “Separation-of-Powers Violation”claim. Id. at 18–21. In his fifth objection, Ebem reassertshis APA and Due Process claims and attempts to add a FirstAmendment retaliation claim. Id. at 21–23. Ebem's sixthobjection realleges previous arguments concerning his wife'sI-130 petition and attempts to add a new equal-protectionclaim. Id. at 23–25. Finally, the remaining objections reassertEbem's previously considered APA arguments and disputeJudge Parker's analysis of the record. Id. at 25–32.A. The Court overrules Ebem's nine objections to theFCR.*4 The Court overrules Ebem's nine objections and adoptsthe FCR in full. Insofar as these objections recite newclaims (e.g., First Amendment retaliation, equal protection,separation of powers violations), they will not be consideredbecause “issues raised for the first time in objections tothe report of a magistrate judge are not properly before thedistrict judge.” Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 219 n.3 (5thCir. 2001) (citing United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626,630 (5th Cir. 1992)). Ebem's objections one through eightare substantially similar to the allegations in his complaint(Dkt. No. 1), motion in support of his existing mandamusapplication (Dkt. No. 18), and response in opposition to thedefendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 33), all of which themagistrate judge considered. Thus, the Court reviews the FCRfor plain error as to these objections.i. The Court overrules Ebem's objection to JudgeParker's disregard of a nonexistent “entry of default.”Objection one states that the FCR failed to account for thefact that “the Clerk entered default” on March 18, 2025—thesame day Ebem moved for entry of default. Dkt. No. 42 at 12.A pro se plaintiff could be forgiven for misunderstanding theprocess for entry of default judgment set out in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure. But misrepresentations of basicfacts are another matter. Contrary to the Ebem's contentions,the Clerk never entered default judgment pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 55. Rather, Ebem simply refiledhis motion for default judgment (Dkt. No. 27), which wasrelabeled as “Clerks Entry of Default” (Dkt. Nos. 28-4; 29-1).Ebem then repeatedly referenced his refiled and relabeledmotion as if it were an entry of default judgment.2Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(2) gives aUnited States officer or employee 60 days to answer acomplaint if they are sued in their official capacity. But Ebemdid not properly serve the United States Attorney's Office—as required—until January 21, 2025. Dkt. No. 31 at 10n.3. The defendants' motion to dismiss filed on March 24,2025 was therefore timely. See Dkt. No. 31. And even if thedefendants had not timely responded, Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 55(d) requires a satisfactory evidentiary showingbefore default judgment is “entered against the United States,its officers, or its agencies.” Ebem has not met this burden.The Court thus overrules this objection.
EUGENE EZENWA EBEM, Plaintiff, v. PAMELA BONDI, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4ii. The Court overrules Ebem's objection to JudgeParker's failure to recognize a nonexistent “finaland binding” finding by an Immigration Judge.*5 Objection two complains that the FCR ignores the“Immigration Judge's [r]uling” that “USCIS's years ofinaction violated the Administrative Procedure Act.” Dkt.No. 42 at 14. Ebem's exhibit supporting this contention is atranscript of a hearing in which an Immigration Judge toldEbem that he “can't do much other than wait ... becauseunfortunately ... the way the regulations are written, theyhave deprived the courts of review authority over I-130petitions.” Dkt. No. 33-5 at 5. This objection likewise lacksany evidentiary support and is thus overruled.iii. The Court overrules Ebem's objections toJudge Parker's analysis concerning Ebem'sI-485 application and his wife's I-130 petition.Objections three through eight, insofar as they do not statenew claims, merely restate previously considered argumentsconcerning the processing of Ebem's I-485 application andhis wife's I-130 petition. Dkt. No. 42 at 16, 18, 21, 23, 25,27. But 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) bars judicial review ofadjustment-of-status applications, even when made outsidethe removal context. See Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328,340 (2022); Momin v. Jaddou, 113 F.4th 552, 558 (5th Cir.2024). Thus, Ebem's APA and Mandamus Act claims mustbe dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matterjurisdiction.Further, the Fifth Circuit has held that an alien's interest inadjustment-of-status proceedings—and any interests relatedto such proceedings—are not protected liberty interests thatcan support a Due Process claim. See, e.g., Mendias-Mendozav. Sessions, 877 F.3d 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2017); see also Ahmedv. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining thatthe Fifth Circuit “has repeatedly held that discretionary relieffrom removal, including an application for an adjustment ofstatus, is not a liberty or property right that requires dueprocess protection”). Ebem's Due Process claim thereforemust be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.Objections three through eight are thus overruled for thereasons stated in the FCR.iv. The Court overrules Ebem's objection to aperceived insinuation in Judge Parker's FCR.Objection nine takes issue with the FCR's characterizationof the facts, claiming that it “wrongly state[s] that Plaintiffwaited ‘five years after marriage’ to file and treated thiscase as though it were the only immigration filing. That isdemonstrably false.” Dkt. No. 42 at 29 (emphasis in original).But Ebem alleges in his complaint that he and his wife “havebeen married since March 26, 2016” and that they filed theirrespective application and petition “[o]n February 3, 2021.”Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3. The FCR acknowledges this by statingthat “[f]ive years after their wedding, Ebem filed an I-485Adjustment of Status application.” Dkt. 41 at 1–2. Ebem thusappears to object only to perceived insinuations in the FCR.See Dkt. No. 42 at 30 (“The FCR implied that Plaintiff rushedto court or acted prematurely.”). Because a district court neednot consider “frivolous, conclusive or general objections,”this objection is overruled. Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8.B. The plaintiff's motion to supplement is futile.In his FCR, Judge Parker construed Ebem's motion in supportof his mandamus application (Dkt. No. 18) as a motion tosupplement his original complaint and bring a new claimconcerning USCIS's adjudication of his wife's I-130 petition.Dkt. No. 41 at 4, 11–13. Judge Parker concluded that the“claims [Ebem] attempts to add are ... futile and wouldbe dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at13. Judge Parker thus recommended that the Court denyEbem's motion to supplement. Id. No party objects to thisrecommendation. See Dkt. Nos. 42; 43. Thus, for the reasonsstated in Judge Parker's FCR, the Court finds that Ebem hasfailed to demonstrate that his supplemented claims would notbe futile, and his motion to supplement is therefore denied.C. The plaintiff's motion for joinder is denied.*6 Finally, on September 5, 2025, Ebem moved to amend hiscomplaint to add his wife as a coplaintiff, noting that the FCR“placed substantial weight” on the fact that she is not a party tothis case. Dkt. No. 44 at 1. Ebem argues that good cause existsto permit this amendment because the purportedly “retaliatorywithdrawal” of his wife's I-130 petition “occurred only afterthis federal case was filed.” Id.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires that leaveto amend be freely granted “when justice so requires.” But“motions to amend may properly be denied when there has
EUGENE EZENWA EBEM, Plaintiff, v. PAMELA BONDI, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5been undue delay in moving for leave to amend.” In re BeefIndustry Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1162 (5th Cir. 1979)(citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Rule 15(a)has no time limit for permissive amendments, but, “at somepoint, time delay on the part of a plaintiff can be procedurallyfatal.” Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004)(cleaned up). The withdrawal of Ebem's wife's I-130 petitionoccurred approximately one month after this case was filed—nearly eleven months before Ebem's motion for joinder. Buthis motion to add his wife as a plaintiff did not arrive untilafter the litigation before the magistrate judge concluded, theFCR issued, and his deadline to object to the FCR had expired.Ebem offers no satisfactory explanation for this delay in hismotion, despite having received notice of this exact defectmany months prior (Dkt. No. 35 at 6). The Fifth Circuit hasaffirmed denials of similar amendments because “a ‘busydistrict court need not allow itself to be imposed upon bythe presentation of theories seriatim.’ ” Rosenzweig v. AzurixCorp., 332 F.3d 854, 865 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Freemanv. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 469 (1967)). Ebem'smotion for joinder is therefore denied as untimely.4. ConclusionThe Court overrules Ebem's objections (Dkt. No. 42) andadopts the FCR (Dkt. No. 41) as the findings of this Court.Thus, the defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 31) isgranted, and Ebem's motion to supplement (Dkt. No. 18) isdenied as futile. Likewise, the motion to amend (Dkt. No. 44)is denied. All other pending motions are denied as moot.So ordered on September 15, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2642207Footnotes1Ebem identified this filing as a response, but it is properly construed as his reply to the defendants' response(Dkt. No. 43).2The Court notes that Ebem's motions and objections were likely generated via artificial intelligence (AI).See, e.g., Dkt. No. 33 (making liberal use of bolding, italicizing, and emoji bullet points, consistent with AIoutput formatting). Thus, the Court construes Ebem's misrepresentations of the record as the product of AImisapplication, rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court. But “the use of artificial intelligencemust be accompanied by the application of actual intelligence in its execution.” Willis v. U.S. Bank Nat'lAss'n as Tr., Igloo Series Tr., No. 3:25-CV-516, 2025 WL 1408897, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2025) (internalquotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court warns Ebem that false statements in his pleadings mayresult in sanctions against him, including dismissal with or without prejudice, and that false statements inan affidavit or unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury may result in prosecution for perjury. Theconsiderable latitude afforded to pro se parties is not an exemption from Rule 11's obligations to verify thelegal and factual support behind one's arguments. Id. at *3; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access