Hill v. State, No. CIV-25-522-SLP (July 3, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Sharita Hill v. State of Oklahoma
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
July 3, 2025
Disposition
Remanded
Majority
Scott L. Palk (J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THEOKLAHOMA MEDICAL MARIJUANA AUTHORITY, Defendant.United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma. | July 3, 2025 | Slip Copy | 2025 WL 1840659Document Detailsstandard Citation:SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THEOKLAHOMA MEDICAL MARIJUANA AUTHORITY, Defendant.,No. CIV-25-522-SLP, 2025 WL 1840659 (W.D. Okla. July 3, 2025)All Citations:Slip Copy, 2025 WL 1840659Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:OklahomaDelivery DetailsDate:July 5, 2025 at 6:04 AMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineORDER (p.1)All Citations (p.5)
SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 1840659Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff,v.STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel.,THE OKLAHOMA MEDICALMARIJUANA AUTHORITY, Defendant.Case No. CIV-25-522-SLP|Filed 07/03/2025ORDERSCOTT L. PALK UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismissand Brief in Support [Doc. No. 6]. The matter is fullybriefed and ready for decision. See Pl's. Resp. [Doc.No. 7] and Def.'s Reply [Doc. No. 8]. For the reasonsset forth, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED andPlaintiff's federal claims are DISMISSED. Plaintiff'sstate-law claim is remanded to the District Court ofOklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.I. IntroductionPlaintiff originally filed this action in the DistrictCourt of Oklahoma County, State of Oklahoma.Defendant them removed the action to federal courtbased on federal question subject matter jurisdiction.See Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1]. Plaintiff is aformer employee of the Oklahoma Medical MarijuanaAuthority (OMMA), a state agency within the Stateof Oklahoma. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1-2] at ¶¶2, 6.1Plaintiff is over the age of 50 years. Id., 6.Plaintiff alleges that she was fired in retaliation for“protected whistleblowing activity” and based onher age after reporting a conflict of interest anda violation of OMMA policy. Compl., 32. Shebrings the following claims for relief: (1) a state-lawBurk tort claim2 for wrongful termination in violationof Oklahoma public policy; (2) a Title VII claimfor retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);and (3) an age discrimination claim under the AgeDiscrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623.As relief, she seeks monetary damages.Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Title VII claimfor failure to state a claim upon which relief maybe granted under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rulesof Civil Procedure. Defendant further seeks dismissalof Plaintiffs ADEA claim under Rule 12(b)(1) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on grounds ofEleventh Amendment immunity.II. Governing StandardsMotions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “generallytake one of two forms. The moving party may (1)facially attack the complaint's allegations as to theexistence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) gobeyond allegations contained in the complaint bypresenting evidence to challenge the factual basis uponwhich subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Merrill LynchBus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citationomitted). Here, Defendant makes a facial attack as tothe existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Where amotion to dismiss is based on a facial attack, courts“apply the same standards under Rule 12(b)(1) that areapplicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss forfailure to state a cause of action.” Muscogee (Creek)Nation v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 611 F.3d 1222, 1227 n.1(10th Cir. 2010).“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Robbins v. Oklahoma.,519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). “A claim hasfacial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factualcontent that allows the court to draw the reasonableinference that the defendant is liable for the misconductalleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Pleadings that do notallow for at least a reasonable inference of the legallyrelevant facts are insufficient.” Burnett v. Mortg. Elec.Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir.2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).And a complaint must contain more than “[t]hreadbare
SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supportedby mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at678.III. DiscussionA. Title VII Retaliation*2 To establish a prima facie case of retaliationunder Title VII, a plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) that [she]engaged in protected opposition to discrimination,(2) that a reasonable employee would have foundthe challenged action materially adverse, and (3) thata causal connection existed between the protectedactivity and the materially adverse action.’ ” Alabiv. Vilsack, 860 F. App'x 576, 581 (10th Cir. 2021)(quoting Hansen v. SkyWest Airlines, 844 F.3d 914, 925(10th Cir. 2016)). With respect to the first element,an employee has engaged in protected activity if heor she opposes employment discrimination based onrace, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Deanv. Computer Scis., Corp., 384 F. App'x 831, 838 (10thCir. 2010); see also Iweha v. State of Kansas, 121F.4th 1208, 1233 (10th Cir. 2024) (“The ‘protectedactivity’ refers to the plaintiff's ‘protected opposition todiscrimination’ made illegal under Title VII.” (quotingLounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1233 (10th Cir.2015)); McDonald-Cuba v. Santa Fe Protective Servs.,Inc., 644 F.3d 1096, 1102 (10th Cir. 2011) (Under TitleVII, “protected activity consists of activity opposingor complaining about discrimination by the employerbased on race, color, religion, gender, or nationalorigin.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2)).Plaintiff identifies her “protected activity” as“reporting ethical violations, conflicts of interest, andfinancial misconduct.” Compl., 64. Such conductis not protected activity for the purposes of aTitle VII retaliation claim. And in her Response,Plaintiff simply argues that her claims “implicatediscriminatory treatment, which qualifies as protectedopposition under Title VII.” Resp. at 5. Her conclusoryargument does not suffice. The failure to allege anyfacts showing protected activity is fatal to Plaintiff'sTitle VII claim. See, e.g., Collins v. Kansas City Mo.Pub. Sch. Dist., 92 F.4th 770, 774 (8th Cir. 2024)(Title VII retaliation claim failed to establish plaintiffwas engaged in protected activity where plaintiff “wascomplaining of the school district's alleged retaliationagainst him as a whistleblower, not as someone whohad participated in protected activity that concernsTitle VII”); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., No. 09-2615-JWL, 2010 WL 11627419 at *3 (D. Kan. June 9,2010) (plaintiff's “whistleblower activity” of “utilizingthe corporate fraud hotline to report that the humanresources manager had manipulated employees' time-keeping records” was not activity protected by TitleVII and, therefore, claim was subject to dismissal);New v. Bd of Cnty. Comm'rs for Tulsa Cnty., 434 F.Supp.3d 1219, 1226 (N.D. Okla. 2020) (dismissingTitle VII retaliation claim based on plaintiff's reportingof “a consensual sexual relationship between co-workers” because such conduct is not protectiveactivity); Manatu v. Bowery Residents Comm., No. 99–CV–722 (FB), 2000 WL 1159330, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.Aug. 11, 2000) (finding that the plaintiff failed toshow that she engaged in protected activity whenshe “allege[d] that she was retaliated against [for][ ] report[ing] mismanagement ... to state auditors”because “Title VII does not protect whistleblowerswho complain about mismanagement”). Accordingly,the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Title VII claim.B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity BarsPlaintiff's ADEA ClaimDefendant moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's ADEAclaim asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity.Plaintiff responds and argues Defendant has waivedEleventh Amendment immunity by removing thisaction to federal court.When a plaintiff sues a State in federal court, the Statecan invoke two immunities: (1) Eleventh Amendmentimmunity from suit – a jurisdictional bar that preventsa federal court from hearing the case; and (2) sovereignimmunity from liability, which is a substantivedefense. See Trant v. Oklahoma, 754 F.3d 1158, 1172(10th Cir. 2014). The latter immunity is not affectedby the removal of a case to federal court. See id. at1172 (recognizing that a state may invoke immunityfrom liability even after agreeing to removal); see alsoBarrow v. Kansas State Univ., No. 22-3266, 2023 WL10101935 at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 25, 2023) (fact thatthe State of Kansas “effectively waived its EleventhAmendment immunity by consenting to removal tofederal court” was “not relevant or determinative” toissue of its entitlement to the “traditional sovereignimmunity from liability”); Bright v. Univ. of Okla. Bd.of Regents, 705 F. App'x 768, 769 n. 2 (10th Cir. 2017)
SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3(“A state that removes a case to federal court waivesits Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federalcourt but not its sovereign immunity from liability.”).*3 Here, Defendant invokes Eleventh Amendmentsovereign immunity from liability and seeks dismissalof Plaintiff's ADEA claim on jurisdictional grounds.See Pettigrew v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Pub. Safety,722 F.3d 1209, 1212 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[I]mplicitin enactment of the Eleventh Amendment is thatstate sovereign immunity ordinarily bars federal-courtjurisdiction over private suits against a state by citizensof the state.”).3 Plaintiff has not alleged that anyexception to sovereign immunity would allow her tosue Defendant for damages under the ADEA. SeeLevy v. Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 789F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining thatstate agencies are generally protected from suit bysovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendmentunless: (1) the state consents to suit; (2) Congress hasappropriately abrogated a state's sovereign immunity;or (3) Plaintiff's complaint alleges an ongoing violationof federal law and Plaintiff is seeking prospectiverelief).Plaintiff, relying solely on her waiver-by-removalargument, fails to address Defendant's invocation ofsovereign immunity from liability. The Court agreeswith Defendant that Oklahoma has not consented tosuit or liability under the ADEA and has waivedits Eleventh Amendment rights. See Okla. Stat.tit. 51, § 152.1. And “the Supreme Court hasrejected Congress's attempt to abrogate state sovereignimmunity in the ADEA.” Barrow, 2023 WL 10101935at *3 (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000). Moreover, Plaintiff seekssolely monetary damages against Defendant and doesnot allege any ongoing violation of federal law.Accordingly, sovereign immunity from liability barsPlaintiff's ADEA claim.C. Leave to Amend is DeniedPlaintiff has requested that she be granted leave toamend her pleading should the Court deem dismissalof her claims proper. Plaintiff's request is whollyconclusory. She fails to identify any relevant additionalfactual allegations or governing law that would deemleave to amend proper. She simply cites the familiarstandard under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure that the court should “freely give leavewhen justice so requires.”Plaintiff has not filed a formal motion requesting leaveto amend. See Calderon v. Kan. Dep't of Social andRehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1186–87 (10th Cir.1999) (Generally, “a court need not grant leave toamend when a party fails to file a formal motion.”).Nor has Plaintiff complied with this Court's local rulegoverning amendment pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). SeeLCvR 15(a)(2). Under these circumstances, Plaintiffhas failed to provide sufficient notice of the basis forany further amendment. See Calderon, 181 F.3d at1186–87 (explaining “a request for leave to amendmust give adequate notice to the district court andto the opposing party of the basis of the proposedamendment before the court is required to recognizethat a motion for leave to amend is before it” andnoting the Circuit has held an informal request toamend made in a response to a motion to dismisswas insufficient); see also Albers v. Bd. of Cnty.Comm'rs of Jefferson Cnty., Colo., 771 F.3d 697,706 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[A] bare request to amendin response to a motion to dismiss is insufficient toplace the court and opposing parties on notice of theplaintiff's request to amend and the particular groundsupon which such a request would be based.”); Barrettv. Univ. of N.M., 562 F. App'x 692, 694–95 (10thCir. 2014) (mere suggestion in opposition to motionto dismiss that plaintiff should be allowed leave toamend was insufficient; a “formal motion to amend,accompanied by a purported amended complaint, givesthe [trial] judge an opportunity to consider whetherthe new complaint can pass muster” and “[a] lessdisciplined approach wastes time and effort”). TheCourt, therefore, denies Plaintiff's request for leave toamend.D. The Court Declines to Exercise SupplementalJurisdiction Over Plaintiff's State Law Claim*4 The only remaining claim in this lawsuit isPlaintiff's state-law Burk claim. The Court declines toexercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-lawclaim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (allowing court to“decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” overa state-law claim when it “has dismissed all claimsover which it has original jurisdiction ....”).4 The
SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Tenth Circuit has stated that “[n]otions of comityand federalism demand that a state court try its ownlawsuits absent compelling reasons to the contrary.”Thatcher Enter. v. Cache Cnty. Corp., 902 F.2d 1472,1478 (10th Cir. 1990). Moreover, the Tenth Circuithas instructed that “[w]hen all federal claims havebeen dismissed, the court may, and usually should,decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remainingstate claims.” See Koch v. City of Del City, 660F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Brooksv. Gaenzle, 614 F.3d 1213, 1229 (10th Cir. 2010)(affirming district court's grant of summary judgmenton federal claims for excessive force and conspiracyand malicious prosecution but reversing district court'sgrant of summary judgment on remaining state lawclaims of assault and battery as “best left for astate court's determination” and declining to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction) abrogated on other groundsby Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021).In the exercise of its discretion, the Court finds thestate court is in a better position to evaluate Plaintiff'sremaining state-law claim. There are no compellingreasons why this Court should address the state-lawclaim. Accordingly, the Court will remand the state-law claim to state court.E. Admonishment to Plaintiff's CounselConcerning Citations in the Response BriefAs a final matter, the Court takes the opportunity toaddress an issue raised by Defendant in its Reply aboutthe case citations in Plaintiff's Response that Defendantdescribes as “wholly inaccurate.” See Reply at 1, n. 1.The Court has reviewed these case citations and agreeswith Defendant that they are inaccurate, nonexistentand include direct quotes that cannot be located.5Further, these inaccuracies signal that Plaintiff'scounsel may have used AI to assist in the drafting ofPlaintiff's Response (or otherwise counsel producedexceptionally sloppy work). In this regard, this Court'sChambers Rules include “Disclosure and CertificationRequirements” for use of “Generative ArtificialIntelligence” and expressly provide that an attorney orparty must disclose in any document to be filed withthe Court “that AI was used and the specific AI toolthat was used” and to “certify in the document thatthe person has checked the accuracy of any portionof the document drafted by generative AI, includingall citations and legal authority.” See id.6 No suchdisclosure and certification has been made in this case.The Court's Rules further provide that an attorneywill be responsible for the contents of any documentsprepared with generative AI, in accordance with Rule11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that thefailure to make the disclosure and certification “mayresult in the imposition of sanctions.” Id.Certainly, courts have increasingly found theimposition of sanctions proper in response to anattorney's conduct in citing “fake cases” that are“hallucinations” generated by an artificial intelligenceplatform. See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Walmart, 348F.R.D. 489, 495-496 (D. Wyo. 2025) (citing fakecases in a signed motion violated Rule 11(b)(2)and subjected attorneys to imposition of monetarysanctions); Bunce v. Visual Technology Innovations,Inc., No. 23-cv-1740, 2025 WL 662398 at *1 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 27, 2025) (imposing sanctions where theattorney filed two separate motions that cited twocases that could not be located “on any legal researchtool ....”); Ramirez v. Humala, No. 24-CV-242 (RPK)(JAM), 2025 WL 1384161 at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. May 13,2025) (collecting cases finding “the submission ofnonexistent case citations in filings to the court toconstitute sanctionable conduct” under Fed. R. Civ. P.11(b)(2)).*5 This Order serves as a strong admonishmentto Plaintiff's counsel. On remand, Plaintiff's counselis forewarned of possible sanctions that the statecourt may choose to impose should counsel continueto submit filings with such inaccuracies as thosecontained in its Response.IV. ConclusionIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows:1) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support[Doc. No. 6] is GRANTED and Plaintiff's federalclaims are DISMISSED.2) The Court declines to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim and thatclaim is remanded to the District Court of OklahomaCounty, State of Oklahoma for further proceedings.
SHARITA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel., THE..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5A separate judgment of dismissal shall be enteredcontemporaneously with this Order on Plaintiff'sfederal claims. The Clerk of Court is directed to take allactions necessary to effect a remand of the remainingstate-law claim to the District Court of OklahomaCounty, State of Oklahoma.IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 1840659Footnotes1Under Oklahoma law, an action is commenced with the filing of a Petition. Because this case has beenremoved, the Court refers to the Petition as the Complaint, consistent with the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure and federal nomenclature.2See Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla. 1989).3Defendant, as an agency of the State, is treated as an “arm of the state” for sovereign immunity purposes.See Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 2017).4This case was removed solely on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal [Doc. No.1]. The record is void of any evidence that the parties are of diverse citizenship. To the contrary, the recordssupports that the parties are all citizens of the State of Oklahoma.5Defendant points out these inaccuracies and states that they “make it impossible for Defendant to providea complete response to Ms. Hill's Opposition.” See Reply at 1, n. 1. Defendant does not, however, requestany affirmative relief.6Available at www.okwd.uscourts.gov/chambers-rules.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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