that horizontally in the relation of wholesalers to retailers in other types of business enterprises there is neither severely restricted (10-day) credit as in the case of sales of liquor nor absolute prohibition of credit as in the case of sales of beer or wine to retail vendors. Vertically, the charge complains of the different treatment as between sales of liquor (10-days) and sales of beer and wine (prohibition) on credit. These charges are in effect made on behalf of all retail vendors since there is no contention of preference or discrimination as between any one or more distributors and particular retailers.
In the
Poresky quest we start from the historical fact that the liquor business has been the subject of severe legislative restraints. Courts have long recognized that the State has broad power to control the liquor business and restrict the scope of its operation,
11 Hornsby v. Allen, 5 Cir., 1964, 326 F.2d 605, 609, so long as the restriction is not arbitrary. See Mayhue v. City of Plantation, 5 Cir. 1967, 375 F.2d 447; Parks v. Allen, 5 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 210.
Regulations of the kind under scrutiny are common and have been upheld. See, e. g., Tom & Jerry, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Com., 1968, 183 Neb. 410, 160 N.W.2d 232; Fowler v. Harris, 1930, 174 Md. 398, 200 A. 825. And the Supreme Court of Florida has expressly done so in Pickerill v. Schott, 1951, 55 So.2d 716, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815, 73 S.Ct. 9, 97 L.Ed. 634 as has the Florida Court of Appeals, Over-street v. Lee, 1953, 152 So.2d 201.
The Florida Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of the “Tied tiouse Evil Act” was to prevent monopoly or control by manufacturers or distributors of the retail outlets of intoxicating liquors. The basic aim, so the Court declared, of the legislation is to prevent the manufacturers and distributors from having any financial interest, whether direct or otherwise, in the establishment or business of any retail liquor vendor. The Court reasoned that the Florida legislature must have felt that regulating the credit which a manufacturer, wholesaler or distributor could extend to a retail liquor dealer would effectively prohibit the manufacturers, wholesalers or distributors from exercising control over the retail operation through the device of credit. As the Court saw it, by the use of credit manufacturers and distributors could exert as much pressure as if they were actually lending money to retailers. The Court summed it up in emphatic terms, “the legislature has determined that this regulation is in the public interest and is a proper exercise of the police power. There is nothing unreasonable or arbitrary about this regulation, and there was no abuse of legislative discrimination”. 55 So.2d at 719.
This basic purpose, to divorce manufacturing-distributing activities of the liquor business from that of retailers, in the light of years of experience in many of the evils and problems of this traffic afforded a valid basis for legislative judgment. The size and economic resources of manufacturers-distributors in contrast to that of retailers entitled the legislature impliedly to conclude that the real, actual independence of retailers would be jeopardized by the granting of credit on improvident terms in amount or duration. Like considerations and legislative awareness of the volume of consumption of beer and wine and the circumstances under which they are sold to countless thousands of consumers justified a difference in treatment between sales of liquor to retailers on limited (10-day) credit and the absolute denial for beer and wine. And, of course, the legislature clearly has wide authority to treat similar and related problems dif
11
The extent is illustrated by the relinquishment by Congress of its power to regulate this part of interstate commerce. Brown, Free Will in the Frontiers of Federalism, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 999, 1011 n. 40 (1960).