Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)

Justice Rehnquist

delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue in these cases is the scope and meaning of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 486, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Act created substantive rights in favor of the mentally retarded, that those rights were judicially enforceable, and that conditions at the Pennhurst State School and Hospital (Pennhurst), a facility for the care and treatment of the mentally retarded, violated those rights. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings.

I

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania owns and operates Pennhurst. Pennhurst is a large institution, housing approximately 1,200 residents. Seventy-five percent of the residents are either “severely” or “profoundly” retarded — that is, with an IQ of less than 35 — and a number of the residents

are also physically handicapped. About half of its residents were committed there by court order and half by a parent or other guardian.

In 1974, respondent Terri Lee Halderman, a minor retarded resident of Pennhurst, filed suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of herself and all other Pennhurst residents against Pennhurst, its superintendent, and various officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania responsible for the operation of Pennhurst (hereafter petitioners). The additional respondents (hereinafter, with respondent Halderman, referred to as respondents) in these cases — other mentally retarded persons, the United States, and the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens (PARC) — subsequently intervened as plaintiffs. PARC added several surrounding counties as defendants, alleging that they were responsible for the commitment of persons to Pennhurst.

As amended in 1975, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that conditions at Pennhurst were unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous. Specifically, the complaint averred that these conditions denied the class members due process and equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, inflicted on them cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and denied them certain rights conferred by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 355, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 701 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Pur-don 1969). In addition to seeking injunctive and monetary relief, the complaint urged that Pennhurst be closed and that “community living arrangements”1 be established for its residents.

The District Court certified a class consisting of all persons who have been or may become residents of Pennhurst. After a 32-day trial, it issued an opinion, reported at 446 F. Supp. 1295 (1977), making findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the conditions at Pennhurst. Its findings of fact are undisputed: Conditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous, with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members, but also inadequate for the “habili-tation” of the retarded.2 Indeed, the court found that the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of some residents have deteriorated at Pennhurst. Id., at 1308-1310.

The District Court went on to hold that the mentally retarded have a federal constitutional right to be provided with “minimally adequate habilitation” in the “least restrictive environment,” regardless of whether they were voluntarily or involuntarily committed. Id., at 1314-1320. The court also held that there existed a constitutional right to “be free from harm” under the Eighth Amendment, and to be provided with “nondiscriminatory habilitation” under the Equal Protection Clause. Id., at 1320-1322. In addition, it found that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and § 201 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 50, § 4201 (Pur-don 1969), provided a right to minimally adequate habilitation in the least restrictive environment.

Each of these rights was found to have been violated by the conditions existing at Pennhurst. Indeed, the court held that a large institution such as Pennhurst could not provide adequate habilitation. ' 446 F. Supp., at 1318. It thus or

dered that Pennhurst eventually be closed, that suitable “community living arrangements” be provided for all Penn-hurst residents, that plans for the removal of residents from Pennhurst be submitted to the court, that individual treatment plans be developed for each resident with the participation of his or her family, and that conditions at Pennhurst be improved in the interim. The court appointed a Special Master to supervise the implementation of this order. Id., at 1326-1329.

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit substantially affirmed the District Court’s remedial order. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en banc). Unlike the District Court, however, the Court of Appeals sought to avoid the constitutional claims raised by respondents and instead rested its order on a construction of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seg. (1976 ed. and Supp. III).3 It found that §§ 111 (1) and (2) of the Act, 89 Stat. 502, 42 U. S. C. §§ 6010 (1) and (2), the “bill of rights” provision, grant to mentally retarded persons a right to “appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation” in “the setting that is least restrictive of . . . personal liberty.” The

court further held that under the test articulated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, 78 (1975), mentally retarded persons have an implied cause of action to enforce that right. 612 F. 2d, at 97. Because the court found that Congress enacted the statute pursuant to both § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment4 and the spending power,5 it declined to consider whether a statute enacted pursuant to the spending power alone “could ever provide the predicate for private substantive rights.” Id., at 98. As an alternative ground, the court affirmed the District Court’s holding that Pennhurst residents have a state statutory right to adequate “habilitation.”

The court concluded that the conditions at Pennhurst violated these federal and state statutory rights. As to relief, it affirmed the order of the District Court except insofar as it ordered Pennhurst to be closed. Although the court concluded that “deinstitutionalization is the favored approach to habilitation” in the least restrictive environment, it did not construe the Act to require the closing of large institutions like Pennhurst. Id., at 115. The court thus remanded the case to the District Court for “individual determinations by the court, or by the Special Master, as to the appropriateness of an improved Pennhurst for each such patient” and instructed the District Court or the Master to “engage in a presumption in favor of placing individuals in [community living arrangements].” Id., at 114-115.6

Three judges dissented. Although they assumed that the majority was correct in holding that Pennhurst residents have a right to treatment under the Act and an implied cause of action under the Act to enforce that right, they disagreed that the Act imposed a duty on the defendants to provide the “least restrictive treatment” possible. The dissent stated that “the language and structure of the Act, the relevant regulations, and the legislative history all indicate that the States may consider their own resources in providing less restrictive treatment.” Id., at 119. It did not believe that the general findings and declarations contained in a funding statute designed to encourage a course of conduct could be used by the federal courts to create absolute obligations on the States.7

We granted certiorari to consider petitioners’ several challenges to the decision below. 447 U. S. 904. Petitioners first contend that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 does not create in favor of the mentally retarded any substantive rights to “appropriate treatment” in the “least restrictive” environment. Assuming that Congress did intend to create such a right, petitioners question the authority of Congress to impose these affirmative obligations on the States under either its spending power or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Petitioners next assert that any rights created by the Act are enforceable in federal court only by the Federal Government, not by private parties.

Finally, petitioners argue that the court below read the scope of any rights created by the Act too broadly and far exceeded its remedial powers in requiring the Commonwealth to move its residents to less restrictive environments and create individual habilitation plans for the mentally retarded. Because we agree with petitioners’ first contention — that § 6010 simply does not create substantive rights — we find it unnecessary to address the remaining issues.

II

We turn first to a brief review of the general structure of the Act. It is a federal-state grant program whereby the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in creating programs to care for and treat the developmentally disabled. Like other federal-state cooperative programs, the Act is voluntary and the States are given the choice of complying with the conditions set forth in the Act or forgoing the benefits of federal funding. See generally King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has elected to participate in the program. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the agency responsible for administering the Act, has approved Pennsylvania’s state plan and in 1976 disbursed to Pennsylvania approximately $1.6 million. Pennhurst itself receives no federal funds from Pennsylvania’s allotment under the Act, though it does receive approximately $6 million per year in Medicaid funds.

The Act begins with an exhaustive statement of purposes. 42 U. S. C. § 6000 (b)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The “overall purpose” of the Act, as amended in 1978, is:

maximum potential through a system which coordinates, monitors, plans, and evaluates those services and which ensures the protection of the legal and human rights of persons with developmental disabilities.” (Emphasis supplied.)

As set forth in the margin, the “specific purposes” of the Act are to “assist” and financially “support” various activities necessary to the provision of comprehensive services to the developmentally disabled. § 6000 (b)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. III).8

The Act next lists a variety of conditions for the receipt of federal funds. Under § 6005, for example, the Secretary “as a condition of providing assistance” shall require that “each recipient of such assistance take affirmative action” to hire qualified handicapped individuals. Each State, in turn, shall “as a condition” of receiving assistance submit to the Secretary a plan to evaluate the services provided under the Act. § 6009. Each State shall also “as a condition” of receiving assistance “provide the Secretary satisfactory assur-

anees that each program . . . which receives funds from the State’s allotment . . . has in effect for each developmental^ disabled person who receives services from or under the program a habilitation plan.” § 6011 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. III). And § 6012 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) conditions aid on a State’s promise to “have in effect a system to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities.”

At issue here, of course, is § 6010, the “bill of rights” provision. It states in relevant part:

Noticeably absent from § 6010 is any language suggesting that § 6010 is a “condition” for the receipt of federal funding under the Act. Section 6010 thus stands in sharp contrast to §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, and 6012.

The enabling parts of the Act are the funding sections. 42 U. S. C. §§ 6061-6063 (1976 ed. and Supp. III).9 Those sections describe how funds are to be allotted to the States, re

quire that any State desiring financial assistance submit an overall plan satisfactory to the Secretary of HHS, and require that funds disbursed under the Act be used in accordance with the approved state plan. To be approved by the Secretary, the state plan must comply with several specific conditions set forth in § 6063. It, inter alia, must provide for the establishment of a State Planning Council, §6063 (b)(1), and set out specific objectives to be achieved under the plan, § 6063 (b)(2)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Services furnished under the plan must be consistent with standards prescribed by the Secretary, § 6063 (b)(5)(A)(i) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), and be provided in an individual manner consistent with § 6011, § 6063 (b)(5)(B) (1976 ed., Supp. III). The plan must also be supported by assurances that any program receiving assistance is protecting the human rights of the disabled consistent with § 6010, § 6063 (b)(5)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. III).10 Each State must also require its State Planning Council to serve as an advocate of persons with developmental disabilities. §6067 (1976 ed. and Supp. III).

The Act further provides procedures and sanctions to ensure state compliance with its requirements. The Secretary may, of course, disapprove a state plan, § 6063 (c). If a State fails to satisfy the requirements of § 6063, the Secretary may terminate or reduce the federal grant. § 6065 (1976 ed., Supp. III). Any State dissatisfied with the Secretary’s disapproval of the plan, or his decision to terminate funding, may appeal to the federal courts of appeals. § 6068. No other cause of action is recognized in the Act.

III

As support for its broad remedial order, the Court of Appeals found that 42 U. S. C. § 6010 created substantive rights in favor of the disabled and imposed an obligation on the States to provide, at their own expense, certain kinds of treatment. The initial question before us, then, is one of statutory construction: Did Congress intend in § 6010 to create enforceable rights and obligations?

A

In discerning congressional intent, we necessarily turn to the possible sources of Congress’ power to legislate, namely, Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and its power under the Spending Clause to place conditions on the grant of federal funds. Although the court below held that Congress acted under both powers, the respondents themselves disagree on this point. The Halderman respondents argue that § 6010 was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, they assert that § 6010 is mandatory on the States, regardless of their receipt of federal funds. The Solicitor General, in contrast, concedes that Congress acted pursuant to its spending power alone. Tr. of Oral Arg. 54. Thus, in his view, § 6010 only applies to those States which accept federal funds.11

Although this Court has previously addressed issues going to Congress’ power to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641, 651 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970); Fitzpatrick

v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1975),12 we have had little occasion to consider the appropriate test for determining when Congress intends to enforce those guarantees. Because such legislation imposes congressional policy on a State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional state authority, we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Our previous cases are wholly consistent with that view, since Congress in those cases expressly articulated its intent to legislate pursuant to § 5. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra (intent expressly stated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra (intent expressly stated in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra (intent expressly stated in both the House and Senate Reports of the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964); cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966) (intent to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment expressly stated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965). Those cases, moreover, involved statutes which simply prohibited certain kinds of state conduct. The case for inferring intent is at its weakest where, as here, the rights asserted impose affirmative obligations on the States to fund certain

services, since we may assume that Congress will not implicitly attempt to impose massive financial obligations on the States.

Turning to Congress’ power to legislate pursuant to the spending power, our cases have long recognized that Congress may fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States. See, e. g., Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U. S. 127 (1947); King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970). Unlike legislation enacted under § 5, however, legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the “contract.” See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 585-598 (1937); Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980). There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.13 Cf. Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U. S. 279, 285 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.

Indeed, in those instances where Congress has intended the States to fund certain entitlements as a condition of receiving

federal funds, it has proved capable of saying so explicitly. See, e. g., King v. Smith, supra, at 333 (Social Security Act creates a “federally imposed obligation [on the States] to furnish '’aid to families with dependent children . . . with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals,’ ” quoting the Act). We must carefully inquire, then, whether Congress in § 6010 imposed an obligation on the States to spend state money to fund certain rights as a condition of receiving federal moneys under the Act or whether it spoke merely in precatory terms.

B

Applying those principles to these cases, we find nothing in the Act or its legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to require the States to assume the high cost of providing “appropriate treatment” in the “least restrictive environment” to their mentally retarded citizens.

There is virtually no support for the lower court’s conclusion that Congress created rights and obligations pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act nowhere states that that is its purpose. Quite the contrary, the Act’s language and structure demonstrate that it is a mere federal-state funding statute. The explicit purposes of the Act are simply “to assist” the States through the use of federal grants to improve the care and treatment of the mentally retarded. § 6000 (b) (1976 ed.-, Supp. III). Nothing in either the “overall” or “specific” purposes of the Act reveals an intent to require the States to fund new, substantive rights. Surely Congress would not have established such elaborate funding incentives had it simply intended to impose absolute obligations on the States.

Respondents nonetheless insist that the fact that § 6010 speaks in terms of “rights” supports their view. Their reliance is misplaced. “ ‘In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’” Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U. S. 707, 713 (1975),

quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdoré, 8 How. 113, 122 (1849). See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418, 420 (1973). Contrary to respondents’ assertion, the specific language and the legislative history of § 6010 are ambiguous. We are persuaded that § 6010, when read in the context of other more specific provisions of the Act, does no more than express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment. It is simply a general statement of “findings” and, as such, is too thin a reed to support the rights and obligations read into it by the court below. The closest one can come in giving § 6010 meaning is that it justifies and supports Congress’ appropriation of money under the Act and guides the Secretary in his review of state applications for federal funds. See United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152 (1938).14 As this Court recognized in Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 413, “Congress sometimes legislates by innuendo, making declarations of policy and indicating a preference while requiring measures that, though falling short of legislating its goal, serve as a nudge in the preferred directions.” This is such a case.

The legislative history buttresses our conclusion that Congress intended to encourage, rather than mandate, the provision of better services to the developmentally disabled. The House Committee believed the purpose of the Act was simply to continue an existing federal grant program, designed to promote “effective planning by the states of their programs, initiation of new, needed programs, and filling of gaps among existing efforts.” H. R. Rep. No. 94-58, pp. 6, 8-9 (1975). Indeed, as passed by the House, the Act contained no “bill of rights” provision whatsoever. The Committee instead merely “applauded” the efforts of others to secure rights for the developmentally disabled. Id., at 7.

Respondents, however, argue vigorously that the legislative history of the bill as passed by the Senate evinces Congress’ intent to impose absolute obligations on the States to fund certain levels of treatment. Respondents rely most heavily on Title II of the Senate bill which adopted a “Bill of Rights” for the mentally retarded and contained over 400 pages of detailed standards “designed to assist in the protection of the human rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” S. Rep. No. 94-160, p. 34 (1975). The Report also noted that the “Federal Government has a responsibility to provide equal protection under the law to all citizens.” Id., at 32. And Senator Stafford stated on the Senate floor that “Title II was added to the bill to assist in the protection of the rights guaranteed under our Constitution for those individuals that will require institutionalization.” 121 Cong. Rec. 16516 (1975).

Respondents read too much into these scattered bits of legislative history. In the first place, it is by no means clear that even the Senate bill created new substantive rights in favor of the disabled.15 Despite the general discussion of

equal protection guarantees in the Senate Report, the Committee’s view of the Act was quite modest. It explained that the purpose of Title II was simply “to stimulate the States to develop alternative programs of care for mentally retarded.” S. Rep. No. 94-160, supra, at 1. It viewed Title II as satisfying the “need for a clear exposition of the purposes for which support should be provided under the authorities of the Act.” Id., at 3. Nor are the remarks of various Senators to the contrary. Senator Stafford spoke merely in terms of “assisting” the States. Senator Randolph, in introducing the bill on the floor of the Senate, confirmed the Senate’s limited purpose. He said:

Even Senator Javits, the principal proponent of Title II, did not read the Act as establishing new substantive rights to enforce those guaranteed by the Constitution. He explained that Title II “represents a reaffirmation of the basic human and civil rights of all citizens. It offers the direction to provide a valid and realistic framework for improving the overall situation of this country’s mentally retarded and other developmentally disabled individuals.” Id., at 16519 (emphasis supplied).

In any event, whatever the Senate’s view of its bill, Congress declined to adopt it. The Conference Committee rejected the explicit standards of Title II and instead com

promised on the more general statement of “findings” in what later became § 6010. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-473, pp. 41, 43 (1975). As Senator Javits noted with respect to the compromise, “Title II of the Conference agreement establishes a clear Federal policy that the mentally retarded have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation.” 121 Cong. Rec. 29820 (1975) (emphasis supplied).

In sum, nothing suggests that Congress intended the Act to be something other than a typical funding statute.16 Far from requiring the States to fund newly declared individual rights, the Act has ’ a systematic focus, seeking to improve care to individuals by encouraging better state planning, coordination, and demonstration projects. Much like the Medicaid statute considered in Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980), the Act at issue here “was designed as a cooperative program of shared responsibilities], not as a device for the Federal Government to compel a State to provide services that Congress itself is unwilling to fund.” Id., at 309.

There remains the contention of the Solicitor General that Congress, acting pursuant to its spending power, conditioned the grant of federal money on the State’s agreeing to underwrite the obligations the Court of Appeals read into § 6010. We find that contention wholly without merit. As amply demonstrated above, the “findings” in § 6010, when viewed

in the context of the more specific provisions of the Act, represent general statements of federal policy, not newly created legal duties.

The “plain language” of § 6010 also refutes the Solicitor General’s contention. When Congress intended to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds, as in §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, 6012, 6063, and 6067, it proved capable of doing so in clear terms. Section 6010, in marked contrast, in no way suggests that the grant of federal funds is “conditioned” on a State’s funding the rights described therein. The existence of explicit conditions throughout the Act, and the absence of conditional language in § 6010, manifest the limited meaning of § 6010.

Equally telling is the fact that the Secretary has specifically rejected the position of the Solicitor General. The purpose of the Act, according to the Secretary, is merely “to improve and coordinate the provision of services to persons with developmental disabilities.” 45 CFR § 1385.1 (1979). The Secretary acknowledges that “[n]o authority was included in [the 1975] Act to allow the Department to withhold funds from States on the basis of failure to meet the findings [of §6010].” 45 Fed. Reg. 31006 (1980). If funds cannot be terminated for a State’s failure to comply with § 6010, § 6010 can hardly be considered a “condition” of the grant of federal funds.17 The Secretary’s interpretation of § 6010, moreover, is well supported by the legislative history. In reaching

the compromise on § 6010, the Conference Committee rejected the Senate’s proposal to terminate federal funding of States which failed to comply with the standards enumerated in Title II of the Senate’s bill, see n. 15, supra. By eliminating that sanction, Congress made clear that the provisions of § 6010 were intended to be hortatory, not mandatory.18

The fact that Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million in 1976, a sum woefully inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing “appropriate” treatment in the “least restrictive” setting, confirms that Congress must have had a limited purpose in enacting § 6010. When Congress does impose affirmative obligations on the States, it usually makes a far more substantial contribution to defray costs. Harris v. McRae, supra. It defies common sense, in short, to suppose that Congress implicitly imposed this massive obligation on participating States.

Our conclusion is also buttressed by the rule of statutory construction established above, that Congress must express clearly its intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so that the States can knowingly decide whether or not to accept those funds. That canon applies with greatest force where, as here, a State’s potential obligations under the Act are largely indeterminate. It is difficult to know what

is meant by providing “appropriate treatment” in the “least restrictive” setting, and it is unlikely that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound to provide such treatment. The crucial inquiry, however, is not whether a State would knowingly undertake that obligation, but whether Congress spoke so clearly that we can fairly say that the State could make an informed choice. In this case, Congress fell well short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with § 6010. Not only does § 6010 lack conditional language, but it strains credulity to argue that participating States should have known of their “obligations” under § 6010 when the Secretary of HHS, the governmental agency responsible for the administration of the Act and the agency with which the participating States have the most contact, has never understood § 6010 to impose conditions on participating States. Though Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it does not include surprising participating States with postacceptance or “retroactive” conditions.

Finally, a brief comparison of the general language of § 6010 with the conditions Congress explicitly imposed on the States demonstrates that Congress did not intend to place either absolute or conditional obligations on the States. The Court of Appeals, for example, read § 6010 to impose an obligation to provide habilitation plans for all developmentally disabled persons. But Congress required habilitation plans under § 6011 “only when the Federal assistance under the Act contributes a portion of the cost of the habilitation services to the developmentally disabled person.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 43 (1975). If the Court of Appeals were correct, of course, there would be no purpose for Congress to have required habilitation plans at all, or to have limited the requirement to certain programs, since such plans automatically would have been mandated in all programs by the more inclusive requirements of § 6010.

Second, the specific condition imposed in § 6063 (b)(5)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) requires each state plan to

Once again, these limitations — both as to programs assisted under the Act and as to affording protection in a manner that is “consistent with § 6010” — would be unnecessary if, as the court below ruled, all state programs were required to fund the rights described in § 6010.

And third, the court below held that § 6010 mandated de-institutionalization for most, if not all, mentally retarded persons. As originally enacted in 1975, however, the Act required only that each State use not less than 30 percent of its allotment “for the purpose of assisting it in developing and implementing plans designed to eliminate inappropriate placement in institutions of persons with developmental disabilities.” § 6062 (a) (4).19 Three years later, Congress relieved the States of even that modest duty. Instead of requiring the States to use a certain portion, of their allotment to support deinstitutionalization, Congress required the States to concentrate their efforts in at least one of four areas, only one of which was “community living arrangements.” § 6063 (b) (4) (A) (ii) (1976 ed., Supp. III). Had § 6010 created a right to deinstitutionalization, the policy choices con

templated by both the 1975 and 1978 provisions would be meaningless.

In sum, the court below failed to recognize the well-settled distinction between congressional "encouragement” of state programs and the imposition of binding obligations on the States. Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297 (1980). Relying on that distinction, this Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397 (1979), rejected a claim that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bars discrimination against handicapped persons in federally funded programs, obligates schools to take affirmative steps to eliminate problems raised by an applicant's hearing disability. Finding that “state agencies such as Southeastern are only ‘encourage [d] ... to adopt and implement such policies and procedures,’ ” id., at 410 (quoting the Act), we stressed that “Congress understood [that] accommodation of the needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and knew how to provide for it in those instances where it wished to do so.” Id., at 411. Likewise in this case, Congress was aware of the need of developmentally disabled persons and plainly understood the difference, financial and otherwise, between encouraging a specified type of treatment and mandating it.

IV

Respondents also suggest that they may bring suit to compel compliance with those conditions which are contained in the Act. Of particular relevance to these cases are § 6011 (a) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) and §6063 (b)(5)(C) (1976 ed'., Supp. Ill), which are quoted supra, at 12-13, 26.20

That claim raises several issues. First, it must be determined whether respondents have a private cause of action

to compel state compliance with those conditions.21 In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the State. See §6065 (1976 ed., Supp. III). Just last Term, however, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980), we held that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for state deprivations of “rights secured” by “the laws” of the United States. See 448 U. S., at 4. Whether Thiboutot controls these cases depends on two factors. First, respondents here, unlike the plaintiffs in Thiboutot, who alleged that state law prevented them from receiving federal funds to which they were entitled, can only claim that the state plan has not provided adequate “assurances” to the Secretary. It is at least an open question whether an individual’s interest in having a State provide those “assurances” is a “right secured” by the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 1983. Second, Justice Powell in dissent in Thiboutot suggested that § 1983 would not he available where the “governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.” Id., at 22, n. 11. It is unclear whether the express remedy contained in this Act is exclusive.

Second, it is not at all clear that the Pennhurst petitioners have violated §6011 and § 6063 (b) (5) (C) (1976 ed. and Supp. III). Those sections, by their terms, only refer to “programs assisted” under the Act. Because Pennhurst does not receive federal funds under the Act, it is arguably not a “program assisted.” Thus, there may be no obligation on the State under § 6011 to assure the Secretary that each resident of Pennhurst have a habilitation plan, or assure the Secretary

under § 6063 (b) (5) (C) that Pennhurst residents are being provided services consistent with § 6010.22

Third, there is the question of remedy. Respondents’ relief may well be limited to enjoining the Federal Government from providing funds to the Commonwealth. As we stated in Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S., at 420, welfare claimants were “entitled to declaratory relief and an appropriate injunction by the District Court against the payment of federal monies . . . should the State not develop a conforming plan within a reasonable period of time.” (Emphasis in original.) There, we rejected the suggestion that the courts could require the State to pay the additional sums demanded by compliance with federal standards. Relying on King v. Smith, 392 U. S. 309 (1968), we explained that “the State had alternative choices of assuming the additional cost” of complying with the federal standard “or not using federal funds.” 397 U. S., at 420-421. Accordingly, we remanded the case so that the State could exercise that choice.

In other instances, however, we have implicitly departed from that rule and have affirmed lower court decisions enjoining a State from enforcing any provisions which conflict with federal law in violation of the Supremacy Clause, e. g., Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598 (1972). In still other cases, we have struck down state laws without addressing the form of relief, e. g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). In no case, however, have we required a State to provide money to plaintiffs, much less required a State to take on such open-ended and potentially burdensome obligations as providing “appropriate” treatment in the “least restrictive” environment. And because this is a suit in federal court, anything

but prospective relief would pose serious questions under the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974).23

These are all difficult questions. Because the Court of Appeals has not addressed these issues, however, we remand the issues for consideration in light of our decision here.

V

After finding that federal law imposed an obligation on the States to provide treatment, the court below examined state law and found that it too imposed such a requirement. 612 F. 2d, at 100-103. The court looked to § 4201 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, which provides in pertinent part:

Respondents contend that, even if we conclude that relief is unavailable under federal law, state law adequately supports the relief ordered by the Court of Appeals. There are,

however, two difficulties with that argument. First, the lower court’s finding that state law provides a right to treatment may well have been colored by its holding with respect to | 6010. Second, the court held only that there is a right to “treatment,” not that there is a state-right to treatment in the “least restrictive” environment. As such, it is unclear whether state law provides an independent and adequate ground which can support the court’s remedial order. Accordingly, we remand the state-law issue for reconsideration in light of our decision here.24

For similar reasons, we also remand to the Court of Appeals those issues it did not address, namely, respondents’ federal constitutional claims and their claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

VI

Congress in recent years has enacted several laws designed to improve the way in which this Nation treats the mentally retarded.25 The Developmental^ Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act is one such law. It establishes a national policy to provide better care and treatment to the retarded and creates funding incentives to induce the States to do so. But the Act does no more than that. We would be attribut

ing far too much to Congress if we held that it required the States, at their own expense, to provide certain kinds of treatment. Accordingly, we reverse the principal holding of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice Blackmun,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

Although I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed, and although I am in accord with much of what the Court says about the meaning of this confused and confusing legislation, see ante, at 11-27, I do not join the Court's advisory discussion in Part IY of its opinion., In that Part, the Court properly and correctly notes, ante, at 30, that it leaves open for consideration on remand whether, and in what form, §§ 6011 and 6063 create rights that are enforceable by private parties like those that make up these plaintiff classes. The Court, however, seems to me strongly to intimate that it will not view kindly any future positive holding in that direction. I agree that this specific question was not presented and is not today decided, but I decline to join what appears to be a negative attitude on the part of the Court to what is a possible construction of the Act.

It seems plain to me that Congress, in enacting § 6010, intended to do more than merely set out politically self-serving but essentially meaningless language about what the developmentally disabled deserve at the hands of state and federal authorities. A perfectly reasonable judicial interpretation of § 6010, which would avoid the odd and perhaps dangerous precedent of ascribing no meaning to a congressional enactment, would observe and give effect to the linkage between § 6010 and § 6063. As the Court points out, ante, at 12, a State that accepts funds under the Act becomes legally obligated to submit a state plan containing “assur-

anees satisfactory to the Secretary that the human rights of all persons with developmental disabilities . . . who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected consistent with section 6010_” 42 U. S. C. § 6063 (b)(5)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. III).

That private parties, the intended beneficiaries of the Act, should have the power to enforce the modest legal content of § 6063 would not be an unusual application of our precedents, even for a legislative scheme that involves federal regulatory supervision of state operations See, e, g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 (1979); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970). See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1 (1980).

Finally, I have difficulty with the Court’s suggestion, ante, at 28-29, that Pennhurst should be free of the Act’s requirements because it does not directly receive funds under the Act. The Commonwealth’s program for the institutionalized developmentally disabled is unified in one administration. To restrict the definition of "program assisted” in § 6063 to specific institutions within a unified program would allow a State to insulate substandard institutions from federal requirements merely by allocating federal funds to acceptable premises and state funds to substandard ones.

Justice White,

with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting in part.

Pennhurst is a residential institution for the retarded operated by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and serving a five-county area. Roughly half of its 1,200 residents were admitted upon application of their parents or guardians while the remainder were committed pursuant to court order. After extensive discovery and a lengthy trial, the District Court held that the conditions of confinement at Pennhurst violated the rights of its residents under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, state

law,1 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and entered a detailed remedial order requiring the eventual closing of Pennhurst in favor of community living arrangements for Pennhurst’s displaced residents. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (ED Pa. 1978). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the result reached by the District Court was proper under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6000 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill) (Act), although relief under that statute had not initially been raised in that court. 612 F. 2d 84 (1979) (en banc). The Court of Appeals determined that the Act created judicially cognizable rights to treatment and to receipt of care in the least restrictive environment, and that the right to treatment was also supported by state law. The court essentially affirmed the remedial order entered by the District Court with one significant exception.2 Finding that the legislative history did not require the abandonment of large institutional facilities, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in ordering Pennhurst to be. closed. Rather, the Court of Appeals required that each resident of Pennhurst be afforded an individual hearing before a Special Master to determine the appropriate level of institutionalization with a presumption established that community-based living arrangements were proper.

In essence, the Court concludes that the so-called “Bill of Rights” section of the Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010, merely serves to establish guidelines which States should endeavor to fulfill, but which have no real effect except to the extent that the Secretary of Health and Human Services chooses to use the criteria established by § 6010 in determining funding under the Act. In my view, this reading misconceives the impor

tant purposes Congress intended § 6010 to serve. That section, as confirmed by its legislative history, was intended by Congress to establish requirements which participating States had to meet in providing care to the developmentally disabled. The fact that Congress spoke in generalized terms rather than the language of regulatory minutia cannot make nugatory actions so carefully undertaken.

I

As an initial matter, I agree that § 6010 was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power, and not pursuant to its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, I agree that the Act was not intended to place duties on States independent of their participation in the program established by the Act. The Court of Appeals, in the section of its opinion concerning the exercise of a private cause of action, determined that § 6010 was passed pursuant to § 5, reasoning that since the Fourteenth Amendment included a right “ ‘to be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security,’ ” 612 F. 2d, at 98, quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673 (1977), congressional passage of § 6010 indicated its desire to enforce this interest.3 Congressional action under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, has very significant consequences, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), and given these ramifications, it should not be lightly assumed that Congress acted pursuant to its power under § 5 in passing the Act.

Here, there is no conclusive basis for determining that Congress acted pursuant to § 5. Nothing in the statutory language refers to the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 6010 was but one part of a bill whose underlying purpose was to extend and modify an existing federal-state grant program. The initial program was unquestionably passed pursuant to Congress’ spending power. Moreover, § 6010 (3) is by its express terms a limitation on federal and state spending. The rights articulated in § 6010 are also cross-referenced in §6063 (1976 ed. and Supp. Ill), which details the operation of the grant program.4 Thus, all objective considerations connected with § 6010 and its operation suggest that Congress enacted it pursuant to its Spending Clause powers.

Of course, resolution of the § 5 issue does not determine the issue whether § 6010 was intended by Congress to have substantive consequences as part of a statute enacted under Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and in my view, the majority makes far too much of the fact that § 6010 was not passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. While this conclusion has significant ramifications for the appropriate remedy for violations of the Act, it does not follow that § 6010 was to have no impact or effect besides the mere “encouragement” of state action and created no obligations on participating States and no rights in those being served by programs maintained by a State in cooperation with the Federal Government.

II

The language and scheme of the Act make it plain enough to me that Congress intended § 6010, although couched in

terms of rights, to serve as requirements that the participating States must observe in receiving federal funds under the provisions of the Act. That Congress was deadly serious in stating that the developmentally disabled had entitlements which a State must respect if it were to participate in a program can hardly be doubted.

Federal involvement in state provision of health care to those persons with developmental disabilities began in 1963 with the passage of the Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, Pub. L. 88-164, 77 Stat. 282. That statute provided funds for the construction of health care facilities and specifically encouraged the development of community-based programs.5 The Developmentally Disabled Act, technically an amendment to the Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, was passed in light of Congress’ continued concern about the quality of health care being provided to the developmentally disabled and that federal support for improved care should be increased. A central expression of this concern was § 6010, which declares by way of four congressional “findings” that:

1. Persons with developmental disabilities have a “right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation.”

2. Treatment should be designed to maximize an individual’s potential and should be provided “in the setting that is least restrictive of the person’s personal liberty.”

3. The State and Federal Governments have an obligation to assure that public funds are not provided to institutions or programs that do not provide “appropriate treatment,

services and habilitation” or do not meet minimum standards of care in six specific respects such as diet, dental care, and the use of force or chemical restraints.

4. Rehabilitative programs should meet standards designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for patients, and these standards should be appropriate to the needs of those being served, depending on the type of institution involved.6

As clearly as words can, § 6010 (1) declares that the developmentally disabled have the right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation. The ensuing parts of § 6010 implement this basic declaration. Section 6010 (3), for example, obligates the Federal and State Governments not to spend the public funds on programs that do not carry out the basic requirement of § 6010 (1) and, more specifically, do not meet minimum standards with respect to certain aspects of treatment and custody. Sections 6010 (2) and (4) are phrased in less mandatory terms, but the former unmistakably states a preference for treatment in the least restrictive environment and the latter for establishing standards for assuring the appropriate care of the developmentally disabled in relation to the type of institution involved. Both sections, by delineating in some respects the meaning of “appropriate”

treatment, services, and habilitation, implement the basic rights that the developmentally disabled must be afforded for the purpose of the programs envisioned by the Act. Hence, neither section could be ignored by the Secretary in carrying out his duties under the statute.

Standing on its own bottom, therefore, § 6010 cannot be treated as only wishful thinking on the part of Congress or as playing some fanciful role in the implementation of the Act. The section clearly states rights which the developmentally disabled are to be provided as against a participating State. But § 6010 does not stand in isolation. Other provisions of the Act confirm the view that participating States must take account of § 6010 and that the section is an integral part of an Act cast in the pattern of extending aid conditioned on state compliance with specified conditions. Section 6063 (a) requires that for a State to take advantage of the Act, it must have a “plan submitted to and approved by the Secretary. . . .” Section 6063 (b) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill), which is entitled “Conditions for Approval,” states that “[i]n order to be approved by the Secretary under this section, a State plan for the provision of services and facilities for persons with developmental disabilities must” be filed; and in its original form, § 6063 required the plan to satisfy the conditions stated in some 30 numbered paragraphs. The 24th specification was that the plan must “contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the Secretary that the human rights of all persons with developmental disabilities ... who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected.” Any doubts that the human rights referred to in § 6063 (b) (24) corresponded to those specified in § 6010 were removed in 1978 when § 6063 (b) was amended to restate the conditions which a plan must satisfy. Section 6063 (b)(5)(C) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) now provides:

all persons with developmental disabilities (especially those persons without familial protection) who are receiving treatment, services, or habilitation under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected consistent with section 6010 of this title (relating to the rights of the developmentally disabled).”

Pennsylvania has submitted a plan under § 6063, that is, a plan providing services for the developmentally disabled in Pennsylvania. The Court states that the plan has been approved and that funds have been allocated to the State. These funds will necessarily be supporting Pennsylvania’s “programs” for providing treatment, services, or habilitation within the meaning of § 6063 (b)(5)(C); and under the express terms of that section, Pennsylvania is required to respect the § 6010 rights of the developmentally disabled in its state institutions, including Pennhurst, and to give the Secretary adequate assurances in this respect. This is true whether or not Pennhurst itself directly receives any share of the State’s allocation. It should also be noted that § 6063 (b)(3)(A) (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) provides that “the funds paid to the state under § 6062 of this title will be used to 'make a significant contribution toward strengthening services for persons with developmental disabilities through agencies in the various political subdivisions of the State.” Thus, funds received under the Act were intended to result in the improvement of care at institutions like Pennhurst.7

The legislative history of § 6010 confirms the view that Congress intended § 6010 to have substantive significance. Both the initial House of Representatives and Senate versions of the Act contained provisions indicating congressional concern with the character and quality of care for the developmentally disabled’. The House bill, H. R. 4005, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), did not have a bill of rights section akin to § 6010. It did, however, have a provision that required States to spend at least 10% of their respective allotments “for the purpose of assisting ... in developing and implementing plans designed to eliminate inappropriate placement in institutions of persons with developmental disabilities.” § 5 (b)(4). Debate in the House of Representatives indicated that the spending restriction was designed to promote community-based facilities to counteract the unfortunate practice of widespread institutionalization of developmentally disabled persons.8

The Senate version of the Act, S. 462, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), contained a separate Title II, called the “Bill of Rights for Mentally Retarded and Other Persons with Developmental Disabilities,” setting forth in extensive detail specific standards which state programs and facilities were required to meet. The impetus behind the Senate’s “Bill of Rights” was the recognition by several Senators of the tragic conditions of confinement faced by many residents of large institutions.9 An often repeated purpose of the Bill of Rights was to foster the development of community-based facilities as well as to encourage overall better care and treatment for the mentally disabled.10 At the same time, there was the realiza

tion that institutions still had a significant role to play in the treatment of the mentally disabled.11

The Senate’s version of Title II provided two methods for the States to comply with the requirements of the Act. First, a State wishing to participate could opt to follow guidelines to be established by the Secretary under Part B of Title II. §210 (a). Alternatively, a State could decide to meet the extensive standards specified in Parts C and D relating to residential and community facilities respectively. Under the Senate bill, it was clear that the standards encompassed by the alternative procedures were not merely hortatory. That bill provided that within one year after the enactment, a State desiring funding must provide assurances to the Secretary that “each such facility or agency has established a plan for achieving compliance no later than 5 years after the date of enactment . . . .” §203 (a). After the 5-

year period, “no residential facility or program of Community care for individuals with developmental disabilities shall be eligible to receive payments either directly or indirectly under any Federal law, unless such residential facility meets the standards promulgated under parts C or D of this title or has demonstrated to the Secretary for a reasonable period of time that it has actively implemented the requirements of part B.” §206 (a).

Following Senate and House passage, the different bills came to a Conference Committee. The resulting compromise kept the House 10% spending restriction which the Conference Report noted was “designed to eliminate inappropriate placement in institutions of persons with developmental disabilities . . . .” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 33 (1975). The Senate’s detailed Bill of Rights was replaced by § 6010, a. comparatively brief statement of the developmentally disabled’s rights expressed in general terms. The specific mechanism of alternative compliance standards was omitted. The Conference Report set forth the following as the statement of purpose of the Conference version of the Senate’s Title II.

and that programs for the developmentally disabled should meet appropriate standards including standards adjusted for the size of the institutions ....

Following the Conference Report, the Act was passed with minimal debate.12

The Senate’s version of the Bill of Rights was hundreds of pages long and constituted an attempt to define the standards and conditions of state participation with precision and in great detail. The Conference Report makes clear that the detailed version was rejected, not to substitute a merely advisory section for an extended statement of conditions, but

rather to substitute a generalized statement of entitlements that a participating State must respect and that would adequately meet congressional concerns without encountering the inflexibility of legislatively prescribed conditions of treatment and care. There is no basis for considering the shortened statement as intended to play a qualitatively lesser role in the scheme of the Act. Rather, the compromise is best understood as a rejection of either the need or the ability of Congress to specify the required standards in a manner resembling administrative regulations.13

IV

As previously stated, § 6010 should be understood to require a State receiving funds under the Act to observe the rights established by the provision. None of the concerns expressed by the Court present sufficient reason to avoid or overcome the statutory mandate.

It is true that the terms “treatment, services and habilitation” to which § 6010 declares an entitlement are not self-defining. But it does not follow that the participating States are free to ignore them. Under §6010 (3) (A), as already indicated, the State has an “obligation” not to spend public funds on any institutional or other residential facility that “does not provide treatment, services and habilitation which is appropriate to the needs of such persons.” If federal

funds are to be used to support a program, the program must (1) provide for the § 6010 rights to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation; (2) observe the direction in § 6010 (2) that treatment, services, and habilitation be furnished in the least restrictive setting; (3) satisfy the minimum standards referred to in § 6010 (3) (B); and (4) follow the provisions of § 6010 (4), which offers further guidance for the participating State in furnishing the treatment, services, and habilitation to which the developmentally disabled are entitled.

Furthermore, before approving a state plan, the Secretary must assure himself that the rights identified under § 6010 will be adequately protected by the participating State. Why the language of an express “condition,” which § 6010 lacks, should be the only touchstone for identifying a State’s obligation is difficult to fathom.14 Indeed, identifying “rights” and requiring the participating State to observe them seems a far stronger indicia of congressional intent than a mere statement of “conditions.”

To argue that Congress could not have intended to obligate the States under § 6010 because those obligations would

be large and for the most part unknown is also unpersuasive. Section 6010 calls for appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation; and, as already detailed, the remaining sections spell out, some in more detail than others, the scope of that requirement. Beyond this, however, the content and reach of the federal requirements will, as a practical matter, emerge from the process of preparing a state plan and securing its approval by the Secretary. The state plan must undertake to provide services and facilities pursuant to “standards” prescribed by the Secretary; and, as will become evident, the State’s option to terminate its statutory duties must be respected by the courts. In any event, there is no indication in the record before us that the cost of compliance with § 6010 would be “massive.” The District Court found that non-institutional facilities located in the communities would be significantly less expensive to operate than facilities like Penn-hurst. 446 F. Supp., at 1312. At best, the cost of compliance with § 6010 is indeterminate.

It is apparently suggested that § 6010 is reduced to a mere statement of hope by the absence of an express provision requiring the Secretary to cut off funds in the event he determines that a State is not observing the rights set out in § 6010. But it is clear that the Secretary may not approve a plan in the first place without being assured that those rights will be protected, and it is difficult to believe that the Secretary must continue to fund a proglam that is failing to live up to the assurances that the State has given the Secretary.

It is also a matter of substantial moment that § 6012 (1976 ed., Supp. Ill) expressly conditions the approval of a plan on the State’s providing “a system to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities,” and that the system must “have the authority to pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies to insfire the protection of rights of such persons.” § 6012 (a) (2) (A). Section 6012 goes on to provide federal aid in establishing such sys-

terns, and it seems rather plain that the Act contemplates not only ongoing oversight by the Secretary but also enforcement of the rights of persons receiving treatment through judicial action or otherwise.

It is thus not of determinative significance that the Secretary was once of the view that noncompliance with § 6010 did not provide sufficient reason to cut off funds under the Act. As the Court recognizes, the 1978 amendments have convinced him that § 6010 rights must be respected;15 but if the Secretary’s original view was correct, and I do not think it was, this would not foreclose judicial remedies sought by or on behalf of developmentally disabled persons injured by the State’s failure to observe § 6010 rights. Moreover, the Solicitor General, who is the legal representative of the United States, is of the view that the Act does create enforceable rights. In any event, this Court, as it is permitted to do, has disagreed on occasion with the administrative determination of the Secretary. See, e. g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421

U. S. 707, 715, and n. 11 (1975); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U. S. 598, 602 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U. S. 282, 286, and n. 3 (1971). See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 140-146 (1976).

V

Given my view that Congress intended § 6010 to do more than suggest that the States act in a particular manner, I find it necessary to reach the question whether these rights can be enforced in federal courts in a suit brought by the developmentally disabled. This action was brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, and directly under the Developmentally Disabled Act. The Court of Appeals determined that under the factors enunciated in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), an implied private cause of action existed under the Act. Subsequently, however, we held that “the § 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4 (1980). It is acknowledged by all parties that it is appropriate to consider the cause-of-action question in light of the intervening decision in Thiboutot.

We have often found federal-court jurisdiction to enforce statutory safeguards in grant programs in suits brought by injured recipients. See, e. g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U. S. 397 (1970); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U. S. 251 (1974); Carle-son v. Remillard, supra. In essence, Thiboutot creates a presumption that a federal statute creating federal rights may be enforced in a § 1983 action. To be sure, Congress may explicitly direct otherwise, such as if the “governing statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of its terms.” Thiboutot, supra, at 22, n. 11 (Powell, J., dissenting). See generally Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 672 (1979) (§ 1983 protections apply to all rights secured by federal statutes “unless there is clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that for various other reasons a § 1983 action is

inconsistent with congressional intention”) (White, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475 (1973), we. held that § 1983 did not provide a basis for relief since federal habeas corpus proceedings constituted the sole remedy for challenging the fact or duration of confinement. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U. S. 144, 150, n. 5 (1970). Attempting to fit within the exception, the Pennhurst petitioners suggest that Congress intended the sole remedy for violations of the terms of the Act to be the power of the Secretary to disapprove a State’s plan. See 42 U. S. C. § 6063 (c). According to these petitioners, imposition of a private remedy would be incompatible with the overall scheme ■of the Act, especially given the amorphous quality of the asserted rights.

As a general matter, it is clear that the fact that a federal administrative agency has the power to oversee a cooperative state-federal venture does not mean that Congress intended such oversight to be the exclusive remedy for enforcing statutory rights. This Court is “most reluctant to assume Congress has closed the avenue of effective judicial review to those individuals most directly affected by the administration of its program [s]” even if the agency has the statutory power to cut off federal funds for noncompliance. Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 420. In part, this reluctance is founded on the perception that a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences to the supposed beneficiaries of the Act. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 708, n. 42 (1979). In this litigation, there is no indication that Congress intended the funds cutoff, which, as the Court notes, the Secretary believed was not within the power of the agency, to be the sole remedy for correcting violations of § 6010. Indeed, § 6012 and the legislative history of the Act reveal that Congress intended judicial enforcement of § 6010. See supra, at 46; H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 42 (1975) (the statutory rights established by. § 6010 “should be protected and assured by the Congress and the courts”). Ac

cordingly, I would hold that jurisdiction under § 1983 was properly invoked in these cases under Thiboutot.

VI

I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings. This litigation does not involve the exercise of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as the Court of Appeals held, but is an exercise of the spending power. What an appropriate remedy might be where state officials fail to observe the limits of their power under the United States Constitution or fail to perform an ongoing statutory duty imposed by a federal statute enacted under the commerce power or the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily the measure of a federal court’s authority where it is found that a State has failed to perform its obligations undertaken pursuant to a statute enacted under the spending power. The State’s duties in the latter situation do not arise until and unless the State chooses to receive federal funds. Furthermore, the State may terminate such statutory obligations, except those already accrued, by withdrawing from the program and terminating its receipt of federal funds. It is settled that administrative oversight and termination of federal funding in the event of a State’s failure to perform its statutory duties is not the sole remedy in Spending Clause cases. “It is . . . peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field than in other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States are being expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has attached to their use.” Rosado v. Wyman, supra, at 422-423. It is equally clear, however, that the courts in such cases must take account of the State’s privilege to withdraw and terminate its duties under the federal law. Although the court may enjoin the enforcement of a discrete state statutory provision or regulation or may order state officials prospectively to perform their duties incident to the

receipt of federal funds, the prospective force of such injunctions cannot survive the State’s decision to terminate its participation in the program. Furthermore, there are cases in which there is no identifiable statutory provision whose enforcement can be prohibited. Rosado v. Wyman was such a case, and there, after finding that the State was not complying with the provisions of the Social Security Act, we remanded the case to the District Court to “afford [the State] an opportunity to revise its program in accordance with [federal requirements]” as we had construed them to be, but to retain jurisdiction “to review . . . any revised program adopted by the State, or, should [the State] choose not to submit a revamped program by the determined date, issue its order restraining the further use of federal monies . . . .” 397 U. S., at 421-422. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974).

It is my view that the Court of Appeals should have adopted the Rosado approach in these cases. It found the State to be in noncompliance with the federal statute in major respects and proceeded to impose a far-reaching remedy, approving the appointment of a Special Master to decide which of the Pennhurst inmates should remain and which should be moved to community-based facilities. More properly, the court should have announced what it thought was necessary to comply with the Act and then permitted an appropriate period for the State to decide whether it preferred to give up federal funds and go its own route. If it did not, it should propose a plan for achieving compliance, in which event, if it satisfied the court, a decree incorporating the plan could be entered and if the plan was unsatisfactory, the further use of federal funds could be enjoined. In any event, however, the court should not have assumed the task of managing Pennhurst or deciding in the first instance which patients should remain and which should be removed. As we recently recognized in Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979): “The mode and procedure of medical diagnostic procedures is not the business of judges. What is best for a

child is an individual medical decision that must be left to the judgment of physicians in each case. We do no more than emphasize that the decision should represent an independent judgment of what the child requires and that all sources of information that are traditionally relied on by physicians and behavioral specialists should be consulted.” Id., at 607-608. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 429 (1979) (commitment depends “on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists”). In enacting § 6010, Congress eschewed creating any specific guidelines on the proper level of institutionalization, leaving the question to the States to determine in the first instance. A court-appointed Special Master is inconsistent with this approach.

Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases for further proceedings.